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The W.E. Upjohn Institute is pleased to publish a comprehensive review of 
training and remediation strategies for unemployed and underemployed persons. 
Although employability development programs that emphasize relatively long- 
term investments in training have been subordinate to programs that provide jobs, 
this orientation was largely due to the short-term goals inherent in both the policy 
orientation and management of the Comprehensive Employment and Training 
Act.
The author clearly notes the need to reorient the ends and means of CETA. 
Taggart advocates that improvements be made in CETA through gradual realign 
ment and the development of new training activities and guidelines. In his view, 
training should receive top priority in order that today's unemployed and 
underemployed can be equipped to meet the future needs of business and industry 
as the U.S. enters a potential labor shortage situation within the next decade or so. 
This study is published with the expectation that the author's views on the role 
and importance of training will contribute to a more informed discussion of 
future employment policies and programs.
Facts and observations presented in this publication are the sole responsibility 
of the author. His viewpoints do not necessarily represent positions of the W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
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It is human nature to neglect and squander resources which are 
plentiful. It is also human nature to react with alarm and surprise when 
these same resources later become scarce and valuable. For decades, our 
nation has had a surfeit of unskilled and entry workers, the result, first, 
of rising agricultural productivity and rural migration, and, subsequently, 
of increased female labor force participation and the coming of age of the 
post-war babies. Because these human resources were plentiful, they have 
been wasted and disdained. As a nation, we have concentrated our in 
vestments on higher education and advanced levels of preparation for those 
best able to compete in and contribute to the labor market. Persons of 
limited employability have been provided income maintenance, makework, and 
remedial band-aids in order to assure minimum well-being and to buy social 
peace.
Within a decade, barring world economic collapse or major changes in 
our nation's immigration policies, we will face a shortage rather than a 
surfeit of entry workers. Today's leftovers will become a scarce and 
valuable resource. There will be much handwringing and breastbeating, 
then, about why we have done so little to prepare persons of limited 
employability to meet the critical needs of industry, and why we have 
wasted so much money investing in advanced degrees that have a less than 
expected payoff for society and the degree-holders.
The time to begin addressing the issue is now. Sagging productivity 
during the 1970s and the decline of our relative economic growth taught us 
the dangers of short-term perspectives, inadequate and erratic investments 
in capital and equipment, and wasteful use of scarce natural resources. 
The lessons are equally applicable to human resources. The future of the 
economy and the social fabric depends in great measure on our willingness 
to initiate and sustain policies which will develop the potential of those 
who have traditionally been discarded and ignored, but who will be needed 
more in the coming decades. At least on this one issue, the prescriptions 
to achieve equity and efficiency are coincident. Those who preach the 
supply-side Gospel, as well as those concerned with mitigating the 
inequalities which have proved resistant to short-duration interventions, 
should be able to find common ground in support of profitable human 
resource investments.
And there is little doubt that training and remediation activities for 
persons of limited employability are profitable. According to the best 
available evidence, short-duration local classroom training raises earnings 
by a tenth in the year after termination, while training on-the-job yields 
increments almost twice as large. Comprehensive residential training for 
the most disadvantaged youths pays off in earnings gains of a tenth as well 
as large reductions in crime and dependency. Moreover, the impacts of 
local classroom and residential training increase rather than decay, while 
longer-duration training pays off more than proportionately. Every dollar 
spent on residential training yields at least $1.45 in social benefits, 
according to conservative estimates of the current values of benefits and
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costs and after accounting for alternative real returns on the same 
resources. Local classroom training returns an estimated $1.38 for each 
dollar invested, while the payoff of on-the-job training is substantially 
greater. The investment in remediation and training is, thus, at least as 
profitable as the investment in higher education, and it is profitable 
despite labor market conditions which currently militate against training 
and despite correctable shortcomings in programs and policies.
Most training and remediation for persons of limited employability is 
provided under the aegis of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. 
CETA allocates federal funds to state and local governments for classroom 
and on-the-job training, as well as for job creation and other activities. 
Job Corps is a nationally-operated residential training program for young 
adults also authorized by CETA. Expenditures for Job Corps, local 
classroom and on-the-job training totaled $2 billion in 1980.
Yet the primary emphasis of CETA has been to provide jobs rather than 
training, and a helping hand rather than substantive remediation or career 
ladders. Three-fourths of all local CETA allocations in 1980 were used for 
subsidized employment rather than training or transition services. Local 
training was primarily of limited duration and in a classroom rather than 
job setting. Just a third of classroom trainees received more than half a 
year of instruction, and less than one in fifty terminees from local 
programs were graduates of more than a year's training. While Job Corps 
invested more intensively, opportunities were available for only one in 
twenty CETA youth participants. Less than one in ten local nonsummer CETA 
participants was trained on the job in the private sector. In total, 
training was available for just a small proportion of the universe of need. 
Average enrollments in CETA training components in 1980 represented one- 
twentieth of the unemployed, less than a tenth of the low-income persons in 
the work force full-year and predominantly full-time but with earnings 
below the poverty level, and only half a percent of the labor force. 
Retrenchment since then has substantially reduced training as well as work 
experience opportunities.
CETA's planning, budgeting, record-keeping, decisionmaking and 
management approaches for local programs evolved to accomplish short-term, 
palliative missions; they discourage training investments and undermine 
training quality. Resources are allocated according to local area need. 
Localities with few jobs and many unemployed get disproportionate funds 
despite limited opportunities for training and intense pressures for job 
creation. The budgets for CETA categorical programs fluctuate erratically 
from year to year, and the allocation of these resources to local areas 
based on relative unemployment rates magnifies the variability and 
uncertainty in local efforts, undermining systematic decisionmaking and 
institution-building. The standardized management information system for 
CETA does not record the intensity of services and is focused on short-term 
outcomes, so that pressures for placement or cost-saving result in limited 
services and quick fixes. There are no national standards for curricula or 
for participant performance, no criteria for completion, and no CETA 
credentials which document skill acquisition. The federal regulations 
stack the cards against on-the-job training, while local decisionmaking 
based on short-term results discourages long-duration classroom training.
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As the dramatic decline in labor force entrants in the next two 
decades creates shortages of entry workers and increases the importance and 
potential of training, the ends and means of the CETA system or its 
successor must be reoriented. Training rather than job creation should 
receive priority. Where jobs are provided, they should be combined with 
and lead into training. The less employable who are willing and able to 
make a "quantum leap" should be provided the opportunity. Placement must 
be emphasized, particularly where substantial training investments are 
involved. Mechanisms are needed to facilitate mobility from high unem 
ployment and poverty areas.
To achieve these aims, some long-accepted tenets of employment and 
training policy must be exorcised:
--Income maintenance should be deemphasized. Allowances and wages in 
training and subsidized jobs are in some cases more than is justified by 
need or productivity; they attract and hold some participants who have 
limited interest in improving employability. Reduced allowances and wages 
would encourage transition into unsubsidized employment and would leave 
room for incentives to reward participant performance.
-Uniform, federally-mandated competency assessment systems should be 
adopted to measure academic and vocational skill acquisition, to organize 
individualized, self-paced instruction, to judge the efffectiveness of 
training institutions, and to certify competencies attained.
-More intensive investments are needed. A second tier should be 
built on the short-duration training and remediation efforts which now pre 
dominate so that individuals with initial deficits but substantial po 
tential are provided opportunities for upward mobility.
--Sorting the performers from nonperformers among participants should 
be an objective rather than a taboo, as long as remediation and training is 
focused on those who need it most. The "winners" among the disadvantaged 
can be rewarded without punishing the "losers," if those who cannot advance 
to second tier activities continue to receive the type of help now 
provided.
--Training for the disadvantaged should utilize mainstream insti 
tutions wherever possible, providing participants greater choice and 
applying stricter standards of individual performance.
It is unnecessary and unwise to ravage the current CETA system, which 
is providing useful short-term training as effectively as possible con 
sidering the obstacles and the absence of clear guidance. Improvements can 
be achieved through gradual realignment, the development of new components 
and changes in the groundrules:
--Remedial education and training should be required supplements to 
any CETA work experience, and the hours of subsidized work provided for any 
individual should be further restricted.
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--The training required as part of work experience should be un- 
stipended, reducing the hourly compensation and thereby encouraging tran 
sition into unsubsidized employment. Allowances should cover the poverty 
deficit, with supplemental rewards for performance, rather than being based 
on hours of participation.
--On-the-job training regulations should be modified to provide for a 
short "try-out" period during which the disadvantaged participants will be 
stipended by the public sector while working in the private sector.
-Long-term training at the local level should be encouraged by 
set-asides and incentive grants; the CETA Management Information System 
must certainly be altered so that intensive investments are no longer 
confused with inefficient investments.
--States should arrange to serve residents of those local areas unable 
to provide long-term training by contracting with other areas, by es 
tablishing statewide programs, and by providing for mobility and resi 
dential support.
--Residential- "corporate career" training and internship programs 
operated by private sector corporations and associations in their own 
training facilities should be developed at the national level, with 
opportunities available equally to all in need who prove their commitment 
and capacity.
--Youth developmental activities should be separated from career 
oriented efforts for adults. In the career system, placement should be 
emphasized. No intensive training program should be recontracted or slots 
refilled until a predetermined proportion of completers have secured 
training-related jobs. "Try-out" OJT positions should not be refilled 
unless one of every two participants who get a try-out is hired per 
manently.
--Increased reliance must be placed on the voucher approach for 
service delivery. Like the GI-bill, assistance might be provided as a 
right for those who earn it, with individual choices about how and where to 
best use these benefits.
It is not enough to reorient and restructure the remediation and 
training system, focusing solely on the supply side of the equation. As 
the surplus of entry workers turns to a shortage, there will be need and 
potential to increase the incentives for private sector training. Payroll 
taxes now used for unemployment insurance might be better applied for 
training, with tax offsets where employers mount their own efforts or work 
closely with public programs. Training requirements for career entry jobs 
in our economy need to be formalized through an expanded and more flexible 
apprenticeship system. Once job requirements are specified, we must assure 
that the past victims of discrimination are helped to achieve the knowledge 
and the skills required for career entry, but that once they attain these 
competencies they are no longer victimized by prejudice.
It does not require hundreds of pages of exposition to make these 
points. Even the most detailed analysis will not yield unequivocal proof 
of what has worked and why. It is impossible to project with any certainty 
what will occur in the future. Evidence alone cannot dictate what are in 
herently political and normative judgments about what should be done. The 
massive detail serves a different purpose. We have complicated social 
policy almost beyond understanding. Since employment and training 
activities have been a major growth area, they have attracted legions of 
social scientists using their most refined methods to measure every aspect 
of manpower programs and their impacts. Their labors have been supported 
on the supposition that the knowledge generated would help to rationalize 
policymaking, program design, and management. But research, evaluation and 
demonstration activities have pushed far beyond the point of diminishing 
returns. There is so much information that it overwhelms policymakers and 
managers, as well as undermining public understanding and support. Every 
finding is equivocated or contradicted by an array of competing facts and 
figures. Expertise has become so narrowly focused that it is difficult to 
integrate the information so that it makes sense as a whole. Positive or 
negative findings, although only pieces of a total puzzle, have at times 
exerted disproportionate impact on policy and practice when they have 
supported prevailing or emerging political consensus.
I have tried to wrestle this welter of information into submission, 
not to discover new truths or to grind any axes, but rather to make sense 
out of the confusion and to return to the zone of diminishing rather than 
negative returns. It is a heroic undertaking to try to interpret and 
integrate the vast array of information generated by two decades of 
manpower program experience and hundreds of millions of dollars invested in 
research, evaluation and demonstration activities. The interpretations and 
the integrations are not sacrosanct. Much evidence has undoubtedly been 
overlooked, many of the nuances ignored, and some of the arguments 
truncated.
Yet few are likely to condemn the sins of omission. The hundreds of 
pages of details and dissections provide a challenge to any reader. This 
exegesis is intended for the knowledgeable policymaker, analyst, manager, 
or observer who already understands the basics of labor market problems and 
remedial interventions, who is struggling to make sense of the mountains of 
information, and who is willing to invest time and energy recognizing that 
the payoff of increased understanding is modest. "Ivory tower" scholars 
will not want to be sullied by the nuts and bolts of management information 
systems and performance standards; practitioners may have little interest 
in--and some disdain for--the intricacies of benefit-cost analysis or 
documented employability distributions; legislators and policymakers may 
consider both analytical and operational insights to be inconsequential for 
the political agenda. This volume is only worth the effort for those who 
believe that theory, practice, and policy are interdependent, that under 
standing the details of operations and evaluations is necessary to increase 
knowledge, and that greater knowledge can and should guide policy and 
practice. Naysayers who deny that labor market problems are real and 
serious, that social interventions can make a difference, or that the 
effectiveness of public programs can be improved, will find little to 
support their preconceptions. By the same token, there is little ammuni-
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tion for defenders of the status quo or the status quo ante. The short 
comings of past efforts are undeniable, and the need for and directions of 
change are documented. The arguments are directed to those who believe we 
can and must do better.
This study was made possible by grants from the Charles Stewart Mott 
and Edna McConnell Clark Foundations, but the content is my responsibility. 
Thanks to Sar, Seymour, Cathy, Nancy, Babs, Flabs, and the few who keep the 
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TEACH THEM TO FISH

"Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day. 
Teach him to fish and you feed him for life. "
SECTION 1. 
A MENU FOR 
THE LABOR MARKET'S LEFTOVERS
In good times and bad, there are millions of individuals who fail in 
or are failed by the labor market. As a result of low earnings, in 
voluntarily part-time employment, and periods of nonemployment, 15.0 of the 
82.5 million persons in the work force fifty weeks or more during 1979 had 
annual earnings less than what would have been provided by minimum wage 
employment during the hours they were willing and able to work (Table 1.1). 
Some among this group were secondary earners or had other sources of 
income, so that the welfare consequences of their labor market problems 
were not overwhelming. But 4.6 million had earnings so low that, even when 
combined with the wages and salaries of other family members, their 
earnings were below the poverty level. Another million full-year work 
force participants resided in large families whose total earnings were 
below poverty even though their own earnings were above the minimum wage 
equivalent. Though transfer payments frequently supplemented wages, 3.0 
million full-year work force participants were counted among the poor, 
along with their dependents.
Standards of need and concern may vary, but the seriousness of these 
labor market problems and the severity of the resulting hardship cannot be 
easily dismissed. These are not individuals with a marginal attachment to 
work. Among the 15 million full-year labor force participants failing to 
achieve minimum wage earnings during their hours of availability, 4.6 
million were employed full-time for at least 49 weeks. Even when their 
full-time, full-year earnings were augmented by the wages of other family 
members, 1.4 million had below-poverty family earnings, and .9 million 
remained in poverty after receipt of cash transfers.
The numbers counted as having labor market problems and the numbers 
suffering hardship as a result are even larger if al 1 work force par 
ticipants are considered, including those who entered or left the labor 
force during the year. A staggering total of 28.9 million work force 
participants in 1980, or one-fourth of the total, fell short of the minimum 
full-employment standard--i.e., their earnings did not equal the equivalent 
of the minimum wage for all hours and weeks each was willing and able to 
work. There were 6.9 million work force participants counted among the 
poor, and their combined earnings deficit relative to the minimum full- 
employment standard equalled half of the total poverty deficit.
Table 1.1 
The Leftovers 1n the Labor Market 1n 1979--Persons With Employment and Earnings Problems and Resulting Hardship
In Work Force In Work Force In Work Force at
50 Weeks or More 26 Weeks or More Least One Week
During 1979 During 1979 During 1979
(OOOs) (OOOs) (OOOs)
Persons wanting to work, working or seeking
work who earned less than the minimum wage
multiplied by their hours of availability for work 15,013 19,984 28,893
Employed full-time during period in work force 4,577 5,260 6,948
Intermittently employed during period 1n work force 4,796 6,497 7,855
Employed part-time during entire period in work force 5,301 7,805 12,175
Could not find job during period in work force 339 422 1,915
Persons wanting to work, working or seeking work
whose annual earnings, combined with those of
other family members, were less than poverty
level for their households 5,546 7,818 12,914
Employed full-time during period 1n work force 1,386 1,705 2,857
Intermittently employed during period 1n work force 1,815 2,528 3,151
Employed part-time during entire period in work force 2,161 3,351 6,005
Could not find job during period in work force 183 235 902
Persons wanting to work, working or seeking work
whose annual earnings, combined with those of
other family members and supplemented by other
income sources, remained less than the poverty level
for their households 3,026 4,172 6,853
Employed full-time during period in work force 897 1,082 1,704
Intermittently employed during period in work force 1,051 1,487 1,913
Employed part-time entire period in work force 952 1,440 2,630
Could not find job during period in work force 126 164 606
Source: Bureau of Census, unpublished tabulations from March 1981 Current Population Survey based on Sar A. Levitan and 
Robert Taggart, Hardship: A System for Measurement and Analysis of the Welfare Consequences of Employment and 
Earnings Problems (Washington, D.C.:Center for'Social Policy Studies, January 1981).
Economic growth and tight labor markets modestly alleviate but hardly 
eliminate such problems. In March 1968, during a period of what now is 
remembered fondly as "full-employment," one in eight active or discouraged 
labor force participants was officially unemployed, out of the labor force 
due to discouragement over limited job prospects, working part-time in 
voluntarily, or employed full-time but earning less than a poverty income 
over the previous year. This incidence rate was only slightly below the 
one-in-seven ratio which prevailed among work force participants in March 
1980. I/ If the unemployment and discouragement rates in 1980 had been 
reduced to the extremely low rates a decade previously, there would still 
have been over four million persons in the labor force full-time, full-year 
in 1980 with earnings below the poverty level because of unemployment or 
low wages, and with family incomes no more than 50 percent above pov 
erty. 2J In other words, the problems of the labor market's "leftovers"-- 
those with limited skills, experience, and credentials, the victims of 
stunted opportunities, discrimination, and bad luck, the residents of 
poverty areas and declining labor markets, and those whose individual, 
family, or cultural problems undermine successful performance in the 
workplace will not be solved by an improved economy alone.
A basic dilemma of every society is how to deal with this excess and 
least productive segment of its work force. There are six basic alter 
natives. The first is to do nothing, in the belief that any step will be 
ineffective or even counterproductive, that those who fail in a competitive
labor market have only themselves to blame, and that hardship is a great 
motivator. This "let them eat cake" approach has proved more durable in 
rhetoric than in application. Political expediency has usually favored 
"bread and circuses" providing income or in-kind support for minimal needs 
and diversion from the grim reality of poverty and inequality. However,
neither bread nor circuses come cheap, and an alternative has always been 
job creation whether the waging of wars or the building of Pyramids to 
put the idle to work and make them pay for their support. With the rise of 
industrial societies and the increased complexity of the labor market, the 
options have expanded. Existing jobs can be accessed by reducing the costs 
of labor or certain types of labor, or by "jawboning" employers into hiring 
more or different persons than dictated by market forces or market mores. 
Reduced labor costs can stimulate employment growth, or at least a 
redistribution of employment opportunities. Wage subsidies to encourage 
the hiring of the less employable have been around since the introduction 
of the Speenhamland system in England in 1795. Labor market inter 
mediation, i.e., public support of exchanges to match up workers with jobs, 
began in most industrial nations at the turn of the century in the belief 
that some or all of joblessness resulted from either ignorance of available 
opportunities or malingering which could be addressed by conditioning 
income transfers on the use of labor market exchanges.
The final approach for dealing with the excess and least productive 
segment of the work force is to increase their productivity through 
education and training. On-the-job training as a public policy is nothing 
new. Our nation was built on the labor of indentured servants most of 
whom were debtors, the children of the poor or "undesirables" not absorbed 
in the European labor market and, therefore, shipped over to the new 
country to work and learn a trade. Institutional training and education 
were viewed as the primary mechanisms for absorbing and "Americanizing" 
immigrant populations in the early 1900s. In the last two decades, 
however, human resource development has emerged as a basic tool of manpower 
policies addressed to the problems of the "leftovers" in the economy. 
Unlike the income maintenance, job creation, employer subsidy, or labor 
market intermediation approaches, the goal of education and training 
efforts is not just to mitigate the symptoms of the problems, but to get at 
their causes, to alter not just the present but the future as well. As an 
old proverb moralizes: "Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. 
Teach him to fish and you feed him for life."
While almost all developed countries have experienced a secular 
increase in active efforts targeted to the labor market's leftovers, most 
have also experienced cycles of activism then neglect. Nations vary over 
time, as well as relatively, in their emphasis on providing fish, creating 
jobs to work off the costs, guiding and coercing those in need to the best 
fishing spots, stocking the lakes, teaching fishing skills, or simply 
trying to ignore the reality that people are hungry. These fluctuations 
follow some predictable patterns. Income maintenance tends to move forward 
in ratchets. Social unrest or the discovery of previously "hidden" 
distress generates support for broad changes which frequently overshoot 
available resources and lead to inclusion of some who are considered 
"malingerers" and "cheaters." Exposure of these problems then offers an 
excuse to stabilize or even reverse the progress, until a new salient of 
distress is "discovered," or a new crisis generates consensus for another
action period. Job creation is tied to the business cycle. When economic 
conditions deterioriate, pressure mounts for a policy response, and job 
creation is usually the most expedient and visible remedy. When conditions 
improve or stabilize, or the fisc runs dry, public opinion shifts and the 
created jobs previously considered "vital" and "productive" become per 
ceived as idle leaf-raking. Retrenchment usually follows. Job access 
strategies fluctuate in a counter cycle. When tight labor markets absorb 
the more employable workers, employers are ready to support subsidy schemes 
which will help them cope with the costs of reaching further down the labor 
queue. When conditions normalize, the entreaties and incentives have few 
takers. Labor market intermediation, because of its low cost, tends to 
continue in good times and bad, but it becomes more fashionable when the 
"let them eat cake" approach is in ascendancy or when business conditions 
are good. Evidence of unfilled jobs is then used to support the argument 
that low cost placement and job search assistance activities can get 
everyone employed, and that the high costs of job creation, hiring sub 
sidies, and income maintenance can, therefore, be reduced. This approach 
works until it is tried on more than a limited scale and the truth becomes 
evident that frictional problems are small in relation to structural 
problems that there really are not enough jobs for those who lack skills. 
Business conditions also affect the emphasis on training, education, and 
employability development. Investments in the future rest on the assump 
tion and evidence that they will pay off that once taught to fish, an in 
dividual will, indeed, be fed for a lifetime. When resources are scarce or 
joblessness is prevalent, the investment costs become more burdensome and 
the payoffs more questionable since already skilled resources are idle.
The cycles of activism and neglect, and the shifts in emphasis from 
one approach to another, are demarcated by periods of friction and debate. 
In democratic societies, such changes in public policy usually require 
broad consensus and compelling arguments in order to overcome the vested 
interests benefitting from the status quo. To build this consensus and 
rationale, it is almost always necessary to inflate expectations and ignore 
shortcomings, or, conversely, to minimize needs and to exaggerate flaws. 
While the policies may represent reasonable responses to changing con 
ditions, policymaking itself is rarely a rational process. Each change in 
pace or emphasis is heralded as a new and permanent departure rather than a 
needed correction. The mechanics of gear-shifting, accelerating and 
braking are all consuming, leaving little time to focus on ultimate des 
tinations.
Social policy in this country reflects these same patterns. The New 
Deal and the War on Poverty were active periods, followed by retrenchment 
and stabilization under the Eisenhower and Nixon/Ford administrations. We 
are now, apparently, at a turning point in another cycle. During the late 
1970s, there was a dramatic expansion of public efforts on behalf of the 
excess and least employable segments of the work force. The Carter 
administration's economic stimulus package including public service 
employment, youth jobs, and public works, represented the largest con 
centrated job creation effort in our nation's history, even though few 
commentators have recognized its scale. This was accompanied by a massive 
expansion in residential skill training for disadvantaged youth and the 
initiation of special national programs for institutional and on-the-job 
training. As the stimulus took hold and employment growth accelerated,
emphasis shifted to tax credit mechanisms to encourage private employers to 
reach down to the disadvantaged. These incentives were complemented by 
private sector initiatives providing employment and training resources 
through business-dominated local organizations in order to better adapt 
public interventions to employers' needs.
These recent job creation and training efforts were mounted under the 
authorization of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) and 
the oversight of the Department of Labor's Employment and Training Adminis 
tration. Real expenditures under CETA more than doubled between 1976 and 
1980, rising to a peak of over $10 billion. Problems were inherent in such 
pell-mell expansion. They became visible just as overall employment growth 
was undermining the consensus and need for such activities, while inflation 
was eroding the nation's ability to pay. Not unexpectedly, criticism of 
CETA reached a fever pitch, particularly concerning its countercyclical job 
creation components. President Reagan campaigned on the promise of 
governmental retrenchment, and even though the Carter administration's 
budget had already drastically reduced CETA work components, the new 
administration followed through on its campaign promise by proposing and 
achieving the immediate elimination of both countercyclical and structural 
public service employment, as well as trimming youth job programs.
Throughout this turbulent period, the "T" in CETA was generally 
obscured by the "E" and the "A". During the economic stimulus in the late 
1970s, job creation received priority and the delivery system at the 
federal, state, and local levels strained to reach hiring targets. Most of 
the action revolved around public service employment, so that CETA became 
synonymous with PSE, as it was called. When doubts mounted about the need 
for and efficacy of job creation, this identification became costly. The 
public's disdain for perceived "makework" was translated into a disdain for 
all CETA activities and for the delivery system as well. In retrospect, 
the administrative problems resulting from the massive CETA growth must 
certainly be judged as minor by any reasonable standards, but "fraud and 
abuse"--however isolated relative to total activities are the lightning 
rods for changing public values. The administrative arrangements for the 
delivery of employment and training services, thus, became the subject of 
detailed legislative tinkering in 1978 to solve alleged shortcomings. In 
many ways, these changes simply made things worse certainly more com 
plicated. As the 1980s opened, there was widespread agreement that more 
substantial changes were required perhaps even the elimination of CETA at 
the end of its authorization in 1982.
Little of the criticism was focused on CETA's training components. 
While the public may have limited enthusiasm for "makework," there is much 
stronger support for training and education that increases the self- 
sufficiency of the disadvantaged and meets the skill needs of the economy. 
Nevertheless, there is a good possibility that in the fervor of budget 
cutting, public training investments for persons of limited employability 
will also be judged expendable. It is to be hoped that such decisions 
would consider the impacts and effectiveness of CETA training, the pros 
pects for improved performance, and the future role of training in our 
economy. The detailed analysis which follows seeks to provide the in 
formation needed for this consideration. It focuses on the neglected 
dimension of CETA--training for the disadvantaged.
There is, of course, no exact dichotomy between training, job crea 
tion, labor market intermediation, job access and income maintenance. 
Subsidized public sector jobs may serve as training sites. Tax credits and 
other subsidy mechanisms may be a good way to "buy" jobs for those who are 
trained. Placement and labor market intermediation are important adjuncts 
to training, although they more often occur without it. Income maintenance 
is a fundamental component where the disadvantaged lack the resources to 
invest their time and energy in training. Yet if these elements are 
interrelated, training is certainly different!'able in that its fundamental 
aim is to improve the skills and competencies of individuals in order to 
increase future employability, rather than to maintain well-being or 
provide immediate employment.
The analysis concentrates on the training which occurs under the 
auspices of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act simply because 
CETA accounts for the bulk of training activities for persons of limited 
employability and limited prospects. The substance of the training 
activities, their impacts and impact patterns, are the primary concern. 
CETA administrative or decisionmaking arrangements are considered only to 
the extent they affect training outcomes. In fact, CETA consists of 
several different administrative, decisionmaking, and delivery approaches 
for training, which can be and are contrasted to suggest ways in which 
training goals might best be acheived under whatever legislation replaces 
or modifies the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act.
Although CETA is the primary mechanism for dealing with the labor 
market's "leftovers," CETA training represents only a minor element of our 
nation's overall human resource development system. More than most other 
industrial countries, we rely on the education system to initially prepare 
our work force, with limited formalized training beyond the career entry 
point and with skills acquired, instead, through job mobility and cumula 
tive work experiences. For those who do not make it in the educational 
system or onto a job ladder in the labor market, the options are limited. 
CETA training for the disadvantaged amounted to less than 2 percent of 
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CETA expenditures for training 2.0
The private sector does not provide many alternatives. Expenditures 
for private vocational and technical school training in 1980 were an esti 
mated $1.8 billion, with some of this subsidized by public funds, par 
ticularly under the veterans' training programs, and much of it beyond the 
means of persons with limited earnings and income. The estimates of formal
training and education financed by industry are not very dependable, but a 
best guess is that between $5 billion and $8.5 billion were spent in 1980,
excluding the wage and salary costs for training during work hours. 4/ 
Finally, private expenditures for elementary and secondary education were 
$11.9 billion and those for higher education were $19.0 billion. CETA 
training, thus, represented less than 1 percent of combined public and 
private human resource development expenditures. _5/
From any reasonable perspective, then, it is striking how little this 
nation commits to improving the employability of those at the end of the 
labor queue. Under CETA in 1980, there were 700,000 new participants in 
institutional or on-the-job training, representing just 4 percent of all 
those who experienced unemployment during the year, a miniscule .6 percent 
of all persons in the labor force, and less than a tenth of all persons in 
the labor force at least half the year whose earnings, when combined with 
those of other family members, fell below the poverty level. The average 
number in training at any point in time was less than half this level. In 
other words, CETA--even before the Reagan administration retrenchments was 
anything but "comprehensive" in addressing the human resource development 
needs of persons with limited employability.
The evidence of unfilled needs is not, in itself, a proof that more 
training for the disadvantaged is worthwhile, and this analysis is intended 
as an objective assessment not as advocacy. It seeks to cut through the 
confusion that surrounds CETA, and sort through the massive information 
which has been gathered but largely unutilized, in order to determine the 
amount and types of training which are being provided, the numbers and 
characteristics of recipients, the aggregate impacts, the success deter 
minants, the success rates for different trainee groups, the benefits and 
costs of training, the theoretical models which best explain these 
patterns, the institutional factors producing the aggregate outcomes, and 
the best means to improve performance. Training as a tool for improving 
limited employability is the concern, not CETA itself. There were other 
funding, decisionmaking, and administrative mechanisms for training before 
CETA, there are several variants under CETA, and new approaches may be 
needed in the future. But evidence and analysis concerning the current 
system's effectiveness should be the driving force of any reform, rather 
than anecdote and ideology which have been the primary focus in discussions 
of CETA to date.
SECTION 2. 
A PREVIEW OF COMING ATTRACTIONS
The description and analysis which follow are extremely detailed and 
range from abstract theory and recondite benefit-cost calculations to "nuts 
and bolts" assessments of management information systems, performance 
monitoring approaches and regulations. The second chapter describes CETA 
and its training components, providing a roadmap for the complicated 
legislative and programmatic structure, as well as an overview of activity 
levels and trends, the allocation of training opportunities, and the sa 
lient features of the various training approaches. The third chapter 
provides the view from the "ivory tower," synthesizing the findings from a 
wide range of evaluations concerning the effectiveness of training ac 
tivities, the causal factors and the patterns of impact in order to 
determine why, how, and for whom, not just whether, training works. The 
fourth chapter focuses on delivery and decisionmaking. It seeks to 
determine how policy decisions, management approaches and systems, and 
institutional factors produce the results which have been analyzed in the 
preceding chapters, and to determine how improvements can best be achieved. 
The final chapter summarizes the findings on training and its impacts as 
well as those concerning decisionmaking and delivery. It interprets both 
sets of findings, discusses some of the controversial underlying issues and 
long-term options, and provides detailed recommendations for immediate 
action.
The analysis is not simple. The evidence is drawn from a diverse 
array of sources. In almost all cases, data had to be manipulated and 
adjusted to focus on specific issues or to achieve comparability across 
sources. Particularly in the impact and benefit-cost sections, there was 
reliance on studies and methodologies supported by a separate analytical 
literature. The footnotes reference the sources of information, discuss 
the major interpretative issues, explain data manipulations, and provide 
detail to back up summary information in the text. While every effort is 
made to simplify the presentation, the volume of information is more than 
most readers would care to know, and the last chapter provides a compre 
hensive summary of the findings so that it can be read alone.
Yet if the evidence is voluminous and the analysis complex, the con 
clusions are quite simple. They may also be somewhat controversial, both 
for supporters and critics of employment and training programs. The most 
important finding is that training programs and the training system work 
despite substantial room for improvement and despite labor market con 
ditions that are far from propitious. The evidence overwhelmingly indi 
cates that CETA training for the leftovers in the labor market increases 
their post-program employment and earnings. Moreover, the dollars-and- 
cents benefits from training outweigh the costs, so that the investment 
pays off for society. The potential for and directions of improvement are 
fairly clear. While there are shortcomings in the current system, there 
are no villains. The system emerged to meet and did meet the needs of the 
last two decades, when job creation was the most critical issue. Its 
problems were mostly the result of unclear and changing signals, and the 
lack of a coherent design. The drastic decline in the number of work force 
entrants in the coming years will alter needs and potentials, but there is
every reason to believe that the existing delivery system s if properly 
directed and realigned, can adjust to these changes and that it provides a 
reasonable foundation for meeting the needs of the next two decades.
It is the basic precepts of employment and training policy rather 
than the system itself which are challenged by the evidence:
First, a fundamental postulate of manpower policy over the last two 
decades is that work experience increases employability. The evidence 
suggests, on the contrary, that work per se does not improve post-program 
labor market success, except when it is targeted to those entering or 
reentering the labor force and needing a stepping-stone, when it is 
designed as a training activity or is combined with classroom training, and 
when it serves as a transition and on-the-job training mechanism into 
unsubsidized employment in the public and nonprofit sectors. Job creation 
may be justified because it alleviates structural and countercyclical 
problems and is a preferable alternative to income maintenance, but not 
because of its effects on employability. There is potential and need to 
increase the training elements in work experence.
Second, CETA has been focused on short interventions intended to yield 
immediate improvements in employment and earnings. Yet training pays off 
most when it is long enough so that participants can achieve measurable and 
certifiable competencies that are required in the labor market. For a 
disadvantaged individual to attain a high school equivalency or post- 
secondary training degree, or to learn almost any occupational skill, takes 
substantially more time than the average duration of CETA training. Only a 
small minority of participants are assigned to training that is long enough 
to provide credentials and competencies that will help to feed them for a 
lifetime. Perhaps only a few in a hundred participants have the endurance 
or capacity for the one-, two- or even four-year training, but it is 
critical to begin providing opportunities for this minority to achieve 
"quantum leaps" in employability.
Third, CETA is now essentially a "one-shot" intervention rather than 
an employability development system. The participant enters the door, is 
assessed, assigned to a limited duration component, and then (sometimes) 
placed in a job on completion. What is needed is an opportunity ladder 
which individuals will mount and scale at the level and pace dictated by 
their ability and motivation. This, in turn, requires a system for 
measuring competencies and competency acquisition. It requires standards 
of completion as well as qualitative standards for inputs. Most of all, it 
requires that these standards be maintained. Some of those who now linger 
in CETA's training activities without performing or progressing should be 
terminated. The better classroom training opportunities, and the limited 
number of on-the-job training slots should go to those who have progressed 
through the system rather than to those who are most qualified when they 
enter and have the least need of help. Activities should be building 
blocks, with increased use of combinations such as work experience leading 
to classroom training followed by training on-the-job.
Fourth, more sorting must be done among those in need. The labor 
market's leftovers include individuals of widely-ranging potential, and too 
little is now done for those who have greater ability and motivation. If a
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second tier of advanced opportunities were added to what now exists in 
CETA, no one who exerted an effort would get less than under the current 
system, but those who exerted more effort and had more potential could 
advance substantially. Alternatively, the second tier might be financed by 
savings which could be achieved under current programs if they were focused 
solely on training rather than functioning as stopgaps for persons with no 
other options. Allowances in classroom training and wages in on-the-job 
training should be used as a means to reward performance, to cover the 
extra costs of participation, and to meet only the poverty deficits which 
would hinder participation, rather than providing an incentive to par 
ticipate even when there is no desire to be trained. There is room for 
some savings in this regard, probably enough to finance longer training for 
a reasonable proportion of current trainees. But a tradeoff is inherent: 
Fewer individuals can be served when longer training is provided with any 
given level of resources. While the net result of adding a second tier of 
opportunities will be greater average and aggregate impacts for those in 
need, the benefits will be less broadly shared. This is only equitable if 
the opportunity structure is established so that all participants have an 
equal shot at the longer and more promising training opportunities.
Some changes are needed in law, regulations, program design, and 
management in light of these findings, but the bigger challenge is to alter 
thought processes which have guided manpower programs and policies for 
years. We must begin thinking about long-term impacts and "quantum leaps" 
not just immediate outcomes and marginal gains. A stable training system 
is needed rather than an ever changing array of separate training programs. 
There must be long-term strategies, both locally and nationally, for 
building a range of new opportunity tracks for disadvantaged individuals 
with potential. Quality, not just quantity, needs to be emphasized in 
curricula, in staff, and in outcomes. The employment and training system 
must, in every way possible, utilize existing institutions rather than 
maintaining segregated and frequently second-class delivery approaches for 
the disadvantaged.
Even with such changes, the potential of training efforts for persons 
of limited employability will be circumscribed unless the institutional 
setting is altered. As long as there are disincentives for training by the 
private sector, as long as the competencies and training needed to fill 
available jobs in the economy are uncertain, and as long as help is offered 
to persons of limited employability as an act of "noblesse oblige," public 
programs will continue to have difficulty determining and meeting private 
sector needs, private employers will stay at arm's length, discounting the 
quality of training, and public resources will remain inequitably dis 
tributed and overly concentrated on advanced education even though entry- 
level investments would yield more payoff in the expected labor market of 
the next two decades. Some of the long-term options which need to be 
considered are, first, a GI-Bill approach to career training and education, 
where all individuals would be guaranteed two years of post-secondary 
training or retraining to be purchased from public and private institutions 
by voucher; second, employer and employee taxes to cover part of the costs 
of this career training, with credits where the private sector provides the 
training itself, in order to encourage more entry training; and third, 
expansion of the apprenticeship system to formalize the career entry tracks 
and to identify the competencies and training necessary to perform career 
entry jobs in our economy.
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While these changes in the precepts of employment and training 
programs and in the setting in which they operate may be considered 
revolutionary, they can and must be achieved through a steady evolutionary 
process. The current array of CETA training programs and institutions can 
serve as a foundation for building a more effective, equitable, and
comprehensive system. The changes which are necessary in the short term 
are justified on their own merits, and do not require, nor do they commit 
the nation to, a specific long-term path. Yet they certainly make sense in 
terms of what can be expected in the labor market in the years ahead. 
There is no question that we are entering a decade when the number of 
excess and less desirable workers will decline as demographic trends play 
out. There will, at the same time, be increasing demand for minimal com 
petencies in even the lowest-level jobs. In contrast to the situation in 
the 1970s, there will be abundant opportunities for successfully training 
those at the end of the labor queue for career entry rather than just 
short-term jobs. Training which is longer term and more ambitious in its 
aims should become more feasible.
While the weight of the evidence is convincing in suggesting the 
redirections for employment and training policy in the 1980s, it does not 
rest on proof of the failure of policies in the 1970s or on promises of 
massive improvements in the next decade. Training cannot help much in 
areas or in periods where there are massive job deficits. It can help only 
those who are willing and able to work to get ahead. Only a minority will 
be "fed for a lifetime" by the skills and credentials they can reasonably 
be expected to acquire. Yet with a changing economic scenario and 
realizable improvements in design and management, training can be an even 
more profitable public investment than it has proved in the past. The 
evidence which follows suggests that priority in the policy mix for the 
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Employment and training programs have been a major growth area of 
social welfare policy over the last two decades--not only in resource and 
activity levels, but in programmatic diversity as well as legislative and 
regulatory complexity. The earliest initiatives were targeted to the 
structural problems of lagging industries and areas which had been 
exacerbated by a decade of slow economic growth. The Area Redevelopment 
Act in 1959 and the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 initiated 
institutional and on-the-job training efforts targeted for displaced 
workers in depressed areas. Under the war on poverty, emphasis shifted to 
the economically disadvantaged. Several new manpower programs were added 
by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the most ambitious of which was 
Job Corps. It aimed to interrupt the "vicious cycle of poverty" by 
providing a structured residential environment for learning and development 
where poor youths age 14 to 21 could escape from deprivation and realize 
their full potential. Job Corps was and remains the most comprehensive and 
intensive human resource investment program for the disadvantaged. The 
Economic Opportunity Act also initiated job creation programs for the 
hard-to-employ who were left behind despite accelerating economic growth in 
the mid-1960s. The Neighborhood Youth Corps provided in-school, summer and 
out-of-school work experience for teenagers to promote the development of 
needed employability skills while keeping the streets quiet. The anti- 
poverty act also created jobs programs for older workers and welfare 
recipients on the assumption that work was preferable to dependency. In 
1965 the New Careers program was introduced which sought to restructure 
professional jobs in the public and nonprofit sectors, to train the disad 
vantaged to perform as paraprofessionals and to subsidize their on-the-job 
learning. New Careers evolved in the late 1960s into the Public Service 
Careers (PSC) program, retaining the emphasis on providing career ladders 
into unsubsidized public and nonprofit sector jobs.
As employment growth accelerated in the second half of the 1960s, 
attention turned to the private sector. A Work Incentive (WIN) program was 
adopted in 1967 as a substitute for the antipoverty workfare program. By 
providing institutional and on-the-job training, plus financial incentives 
for work by relief recipients, it aimed to facilitate private sector rather 
than public sector employment. Later, the training components were reduced 
so that WIN became essentially a placement and job search assistance 
mechanism. The Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (or JOBS) program 
was launched with much fanfare in 1968 to increase private sector in 
volvement in manpower programs through contract and voluntary on-the-job 
training of the disadvantaged. The Concentrated Employment Program 
provided extra resources to poverty areas to be used primarily for pre- 
employment services such as counseling, motivation activities, job 
development, and placement assistance.
By the time these private sector-oriented programs were geared up, 
unemployment began to rise rapidly and the pendulum shifted in the opposite 
direction. After some heated debate, the Emergency Employment Act was
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passed in 1971, initiating the first countercyclical job creation program 
since the New Deal the Public Employment Program. This filled out the 
tool kit of manpower programs. The components (although not the labels or 
funding mechanisms) have remained essentially unchanged ever since. The 
tool kit included basically preventative measures, primarily summer and 
in-school jobs to help disadvantaged youth get off on the right foot, 
remedial activities such as Job Corps and institutional training under 
MDTA,ameliorative interventions including temporary jobs for older 
workers, welfare recipients, and dropout youth, job access efforts such as 
job restructuring under PSC, placement and job development under CEP and 
WIN, plus on-the-job training under MDTA and JOBS, and countercyclical 
measures, as typified by the Public Employment Program.
To better organize the tool kit, Congress passed the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act in 1973 with the aim of consolidating federal 
employment and training resources into block grants to local units of 
government representing populations of more than 100,000, and to states 
representing the remaining smaller areas. Although the initial intent was 
to let these state and local "prime sponsors" decide how to spend their 
block grants after a mandated planning process and subject to local 
advisory council review, and to leave them free to administer local 
programs, the law as well as the regulations and administrative procedures 
which subsequently interpreted and applied it, fell far short of the 
decentralization and decategorization originally promised. The summer 
employment program the progeny of the summer Neighborhood Youth Corps and 
a public service employment component a combination of PSC and PEP were 
retained by the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act as separate 
categorical activities with their own eligibility rules and allocation 
formulae. Job Corps was continued as a distinct, nationally-directed 
program, although its authorization was included under the CETA umbrella 
and its management shifted from the Office of Economic Opportunity to the 
Department of Labor. A smorgasborg of small, nationally-run programs for 
special needs groups such as older workers, migrants, Indians, offenders, 
and displaced homemakers were added incrementally. The WIN program was not 
included under the CETA umbrella. Even in the "block grant" titles of 
CETA, there were a variety of federal set-asides and specifications 
dictating the use of resources.
The CETA system was hardly operational before there were major changes 
and then dramatic expansion. The 1976 amendments separated public service 
employment into countercyclical and structural components, the first 
directed to the victims of recession and funded by a "trigger formula" 
which would automatically expand resources when unemployment rose, and the 
second aimed at providing career entry opportunities, training, and 
short-term work for persons of limited employability. Under the economic 
stimulus package of the Carter administration in 1977, these two public 
service employment components were increased from the 300,000 to 750,000 
combined enrollment level in response to high and rising unemployment. A 
national Skills Training Improvement Program (STIP) was initiated providing 
grants to competitively-selected prime sponsors to provide long-term 
training linked to the private sector. The HIRE program was also launched 
with an aim of fostering on-the-job training, particularly for Vietnam 
veterans. Funds under this program were administered both by prime spon 
sors and from the federal level. The Youth Employment and Demonstration
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Projects Act in 1977 created two new categorical programs targeted 
specifically to youth which were to be operated by all prime sponsors, a 
large-scale experimental program testing a job guarantee, saturation 
approach in selected prime sponsor areas, and a conservation program 
operated jointly by the Departments of Labor, Agriculture and Interior on 
public lands. To round out the economic stimulus measures, the long 
standing summer program was expanded by a fourth, while the Job Corps 
program was doubled in size.
The changes continued without pause. A Private Sector Initiative 
Program was authorized in the 1978 CETA amendments. PSIP established 
Private Industry Councils or PICs in each prime sponsor area to plan and 
administer CETA-authorized activities linked to the private sector and 
funded by a separate CETA title. The 1978 amendments increased the 
targeting as well as the training emphasis under the structural public 
service employment program. The "comprehensive" block grant was modified 
by additional set-asides for upgrading and retraining, as well as for 
education-linked activities.
Just as the new youth programs were implemented and the public service 
employment expansion digested, the gears were shifted into neutral and then 
slammed into reverse. The Carter administration announced the con 
solidation of the separate CETA youth programs, but its proposed Youth Act 
of 1980 fell short of enactment. However, the conservation and experi 
mental job guarantee programs just enacted in 1977 were ended. The public 
service employment components of CETA were also substantially retrenched. 
The incoming Reagan administration went further, completely eliminating 
funding for public service employment activities and drastically cutting 
local nonsummer youth programs.
As a result of all these changes, the CETA system today is unques 
tionably more complicated than the "categorical nightmare" it was designed 
to replace. With reauthorization pending in 1982, with uncertainty about 
budget levels for 1983 and beyond, and with drastic retrenchment already 
underway, the situation is even more confusing. The latest dependable data 
cover fiscal year 1980, which ended in October 1980. Yet several programs 
authorized by the existing legislation and fully operational in 1980 were 
phased out in fiscal 1981. The nomenclature, titles, funding levels, and 
priorities may undergo some dramatic changes in anticipation or as a result 
of the 1982 legislation. Nevertheless, the program mix existing in fiscal 
1980 and authorized by the 1978 CETA amendments provides the only available 
baseline for understanding of the system.
Legislative Framework
In the CETA system of fiscal 1980, nine-tenths of the service years of 
employment and training activity were provided under the seven major titles 
and subparts of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act which allo 
cate funds based on relative unemployment and poverty to the nearly five 
hundred state and local "prime sponsors" which serve as managing and 
decisionmaking agents. For each of the separate categorical allocations, 
the prime sponsors must submit annual plans outlining activities for the 
coming year, projecting enrollment and spending levels and participant
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characteristics, as well as detailing procedures and guarantees to satisfy 
the differing requirements of each title as interpreted in federal 
regulations. The plans must be approved by the Department of Labor, and 
prime sponsors must subsequently submit quarterly reports indicating 
performance relative to plan. They are subject to a once-a-year assessment 
by the Department of Labor, as well as periodic monitoring visits to assure 
compliance with the law and regulations in their exercise of delegated 
decisionmaking, management, and operational responsibilities. The seven 
categorical programs are as follows:
  Title IIBC, Comprehensive Employment and Training Services, pro 
vides for a full range of activities for the unemployed and economically 
disadvantaged (i.e., persons living in welfare recipient families or those 
with a family income in the last six months which is below the higher of 
the poverty level 'or 70 percent of the Bureau of Labor Statistics 1 lower 
living standard). The prime sponsor decides on the mix of services to be 
offered and the subgroups to be served among the eligible population. Up 
to 6.5 percent of funds may be used for upgrading and retraining of 
laid-off or currently underemployed workers who are not necessarily 
economically disadvantaged.
t Title IIP, Transitional Employment Opportunities for the Economi 
cally Disadvantaged, or structural public service employment, fully sub 
sidizes the employment of economically disadvantaged, long-term (15 weeks 
or more) unemployed individuals in regular jobs in the public and nonprofit 
sectors as well as in specially created projects providing needed public 
services. In order to assure employability development and not just 
employment, the law requires that 15 percent of funds in 1980, 20 percent 
of funds in 1981, and 22 percent of funds in 1982 be used for training of 
participants. Prime sponsors are, in concept, free to use all of Title I ID 
allocations for training or any other allowable CETA service. In 1982, 
there is no funding for Title I ID.
  Title IV, Youth Employment and Training Programs (YETP), is the 
comprehensive local program for youths. The prime sponsor may provide any 
of the services allowable under Title I IB, but only for persons age 14 to 
21. The income eligibility restrictions are somewhat more lenient than 
under Title I IB. Up to 10 percent of funds may be used for nondisad- 
vantaged youth and the income standard for eligibility is 85 percent rather 
than 70 percent of the BLS lower living standard. Since nearly half of 
participants in Title I IB are under the age of 22, there is substantial 
overlap between YETP and Title IIB activities.
  Title IV, Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects 
(YCCIP), supports year-round neighborhood-based work projects of tangible 
benefit to the community. These jobs are targeted for unemployed 16-19 
year-olds. Eligibility is not restricted by family income. Supportive 
services may be offered but training and remediation are discouraged 
because YCCIP was intended to emphasize structured, supervised work rather 
than human resource development.
t Title IV, Summer Youth Employment Program, provides summer jobs 
for 14 to 21 year-old economically disadvantaged youth. The funds may also 
be used for all other services authorized under Title IIB as well as for
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Job Corps. Funds for all the other titles of CETA may also be, and fre 
quently are, used by prime sponsors to create summer jobs.
t Title VI, Countercyclical Public Service Employment,, is targeted 
for the victims of recession who have been unemployed during 10 of the 
prior 12 weeks and have a family income in the last 3 months less than 100 
percent of the BLS lower living standard. The funds under this title may 
be used for any of the activities allowable under other titles. The CETA 
legislation contains a "trigger formula" for funding so that Title VI is to 
expand automatically to absorb 20 percent of the unemployed in excess of 4 
percent or 25 percent if unemployment rises above 7 percent. In practice, 
appropriations have not reflected this groundrule. Countercyclical public 
service employment was phased out in fiscal 1981 despite an unemployment 
rate in excess of 7 percent.
t Title VII, Private Sector Initiative Program, authorizes local 
Private Industry Councils with predominant business membership to decide on 
the use of funds provided under this title. The eligibility provision and 
allowable activities are the same as for IIBC, but there is an emphasis on 
the involvement of and placement in the private sector.
There are further complications. Six percent of Title IIBC funds are 
set-aside for vocational education activities and distributed to the states 
by a needs formula. The states then suballocate to prime sponsors for the 
support of training activities. Another 4 percent of funds under Title IV 
YETP and under Title IIBC are distributed to Governors for special 
statewide activities, plus an additional 1 percent of Title IIBC funds for 
educational linkage activities. In many cases these are distributed on an 
application basis to the sub-state prime sponsors.
In addition to these state- and locally-operated programs supported by 
legislatively-specified allocations based on the relative unemployment and 
poverty rates of states and localities, there are a range of activities 
funded under the Secretary's discretionary authority, out of set-asides 
under each of the CETA titles. These resources are used for innovative 
demonstration programs, to meet special needs of areas and population 
groups, to reward performance by prime sponsors, and to mount special 
purpose initiatives. The Secretary decides on the use and distribution of 
these funds consistent with the requirements of each title.
There are also several national programs. Title III of CETA au 
thorizes and funds national programs targeted to displaced homemakers, 
seasonal farmworkers, veterans, older workers, offenders, youth and persons 
of limited English speaking ability. Job Corps is authorized as a subpart 
of CETA Title IV, with legislative language largely unchanged since the 
Economic Opportunity Act. The residential Job Corps centers located 
throughout the country are operated by private for-profit and nonprofit 
contractors, and by the Departments of Agriculture and Interior on federal 
lands. A Young Adult Conservation Corps is authorized under CETA Title 
VIII, and an experimental Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects under 
Title IV which guarantees jobs for all poor 16- to 19-year-old students in 
selected areas. Both of these programs were phased out during fiscal 1981.
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State and local prime sponsors are sometimes used as delivery agents 
for these various national programs. For instance, two prime sponsors are 
the contractors for the operation of residential Job Corps centers and 
several others use funds provided to them by formula under Title IIBC or IV 
to purchase training slots in Job Corps. The Entitlement projects were 
managed by 17 prime sponsors. The HIRE program was operated under Title 
III authority and was funded in part through prime sponsors while the STIP 
program was carried out under the Secretary's discretionary authority and 
provided resources on a competitive basis to 45 percent of prime sponsors. 
States administer portions of the funds for Title III older worker 
programs. They also received a set-aside under the Young Adult Con 
servation Corps while it existed.
The Building Blocks
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act specifies the activities 
that are allowable under these various funding categories, with further 
specification provided by the federal regulations and the management 
information system. There are three major classifications of training 
under state and local programs:
t Classroom occupational skills training is normally conducted in 
an institutional setting and i"s designed to provide individuals with 
technical skills and information required to perform a specific job or 
group of jobs. The training must be in occupations where there is a 
reasonable chance of employment. It is not allowed for high turnover, low 
wage jobs. Training may last up to two and a half years. Trainees are 
entitled to an hourly allowance equal to the minimum wage plus supplements 
for dependents and for extraordinary participation costs, although 
allowances are reduced for public assistance and unemployment compensation 
recipients. Stipends may be received for only two years of training. 
Classroom training provided to workers already employed but in low level 
jobs is labeled upgrading. If it is provided to displaced workers, it is 
labeled retraining.
t Other classroom training is also usually conducted in an in 
stitutional setting and provides basic skills needed to perform generally 
in the labor market, rather than in a specific job. It includes remedial 
education, preparation for a high school equivalency degree, training in 
English as a second language, and, in some cases, school-to-work transition 
activities.
t On-the-job training is a combination of work, orientation, and 
skill training conducted primarily in a private sector workplace after the 
participant has been hired by the employer. It aims to provide the skills 
specifically needed to adequately perform in this job. In matching 
participants and jobs, the aim is to assure that the trainee lacks the 
education, training, or work experience normally required by the employer. 
The employer is, then, reimbursed for the extra supervision needed by, and 
lower productivity of, disadvantaged participants, as well as for any 
outside training costs. The reimbursement ordinarily equals 50 percent of 
the participant's wage during the period of training, at the end of which 
time successful trainees continue in unsubsidized jobs with the employer.
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CETA also authorizes a range of pre-employment activities for par 
ticipants with little or no labor market experience, primarily youth. 
These activities, which are usually more limited in intensity than 
classroom and on-the-job training, are included in a separate category 
labeled employment and training services, but are very closely related to 
training, as well as being difficult to distinguish from each other:
  Vocational exploration activities expose participants to jobs 
available in the private sector through observation of workplaces, class 
room instruction, and, if appropriate, limited practical work experience as 
long as it does not contribute to additional sales or profits of private 
for-profit employers.
0 Transition services provide labor market information, job search 
assistance, needs assessment, counseling and placement for in-school youth.
  Job search assistance seeks to teach participants what is ex 
pected by employers at the hiring door, as well as where and how to find 
jobs. Job search activities are a component of vocational exploration and 
school-to-work transition efforts, but they may also be offered separately 
as a short-duration intervention.
Last, but hardly least, there are two employment-oriented components:
t Work experience is a subsidized short-term or part-time work 
assignment with a public or nonprofit employer which is designed to enhance 
employability through the development of good work habits and basic work 
skills. Whether offered as a summer or part-time in-school activity for 
youth, an aging vat for dropouts, or a labor market reentry vehicle, the 
primary aim of work experience is to provide a stepping-stone for persons 
who have never worked or who have not been working for an extended time. 
The progress of the participant in work experience positions is to be 
reviewed every two months in order to assess the appropriateness of a 
transfer to another activity. The amount of work experience for an in 
dividual is limited to 1,000 hours during any one-year period and 2,000 
hours during a five-year period, although the limitations do not apply to 
in-school youth.
  Public service employment is fully-subsidized work in regular 
governmentancinonprofit sectorjobs in such fields as environmental 
quality, child care, health care, education, crime prevention and treat 
ment, recreation, transportation, park and public facility maintenance, 
conservation, housing, and neighborhood improvement. PSE is an option for 
workers with previous experience and skills who are suffering from tem 
porary setbacks, in which case it is distinguished from work experience by 
the types of individuals served as well as the levels of supervision and 
performance required on the job assignments. PSE jobs may in many cases be 
quite similar to work experience assignments, but work experience is more 
restrictive than PSE.
Each of the titles and subtitles of CETA specifies which of these 
activities is allowable and for whom. Under formula-funded programs, the 
prime sponsor chooses among these allowable activities, specifying the 
service mix in the annual plan submitted and approved by the Department of
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Labor. Occupational skills training, other classroom training, and 
on-the-job training are allowable activities under all the separate 
subparts of CETA. It is possible for prime sponsors to allocate all funds 
received by formula (except the limited amount under YCCIP) for these 
training activities. History and convention would militate against such a 
decision in the case of PSE (IID and VI) and in summer programs, but there 
is no doubt that a decision to expend all of IIBC, YETP and PSIP resources 
on training of one sort or another would be acceptable. Public service 
employment is permissible only under Titles IID and VI, and is, therefore, 
essentially proscribed for fiscal 1982 as a result of the elimination of 
funding for these titles. Employment and training services and work 
experience are allowable under all titles.
These broad primary activity classifications encompass treatments 
which may vary significantly in intensity, duration, and focus. For 
instance, classroom training in occupational skills may last anywhere from 
a few weeks of part-time training up to two and a half years of full-time 
instruction. OJT may be a way of placing a student in a part-time 
school-year job or an arrangement for a year or more training in a worksite 
combined with supplemental classroom instruction. Work experience may be 
five hours weekly employment for an in-school youth or full-time work for 
an adult. Job search assistance may be as short as a few days, while 
school-to-work transition may be a set of activities stretching over a 
junior and senior year and the intervening summer, or placement assistance 
and occupational exploration activities concentrated in the last semester 
before school-learning.
There is also substantial overlap between these categories. A par 
ticipant is identified with a particular primary activity according to the 
predominant focus of treatment during the period of participation. If 
occupational skills training accounts for 51 percent of time and remedial 
education 49 percent, the individual is counted as a skills training 
participant. An on-the-job trainee may also be receiving outside classroom 
instruction. A participant in work experience may be receiving three hours 
of classroom training daily along with five hours of work. Most par 
ticipants in CETA receive either employment and training services or 
supportive services as part of another primary activity. Under YETP, for 
instance, all in-school work experience must be combined with counseling, 
occupationalinformation and efforts to overcome sex stereotyping a 
combination labeled "career employment experience." Some CETA participants 
may move from one primary activity to another; for instance, from work 
experience to classroom training or from classroom training to on-the-job 
training. There is no special classification for persons who receive these 
sequential combinations; instead, they are assigned according to the major 
treatment during their period of participation.
Job Corps is a fourth category of training provided under CETA. Its 
legislatively-specified treatment combines occupational training, remedial 
education, work experience, OJT in some cases, as well as employment and 
training services in order "to assist young persons who need and can 
benefit from an unusually intensive program, operated in a group setting, 
to become more responsible, employable and productive citizens ...." The 
services which must be provided to each corpsmember at either residential 
or nonresidential centers include "an intensive, well-organized, and fully
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supervised program of education, vocational training, work experience, 
planned vocational and recreational activities, physical rehabilitation and 
development, and counseling." Job Corps is also required to provide 
subsistence, transportation, clothing and equipment, recreational services, 
assistance in career planning, as well as monthly allowances during 
participation and readjustment allowances upon termination. Prime sponsors 
may use the resources allocated to them by formula under each of the seven 
CETA subparts to purchase training opportunities in Job Corps. For 
example, when Job Corps was doubled in size in the 1978-1980 period, 
several states offset the costs of establishing Job Corps centers in order 
to have a continuing residential treatment option located within the state. 
Participants in local programs may also be referred to Job Corps and are 
eligible for available opportunities equally with other applicants.
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SECTION 2. 
A PROFILE OF CETA TRAINING
Dollars and Bodies
Given the multiple titles and subparts under CETA, each with its own 
allocation formula, target group, administrative rules, and activity com 
binations, it is difficult to precisely identify or simply describe CETA 
training. There are several alternate measures of activity levels which 
all must be considered in order to provide a full picture. Annual par 
ticipants in a program or activity include those entering in the previous 
year and still receiving treatment, plus the new entrants; in other words, 
this measure includes some who received most of their services in the prior 
year and some who will receive them in the following year. The number of 
new participants, which includes only those entering during the year, is a 
better indicator of annual activity if the program has remained relatively 
stable in scale; however, the number of new participants exaggerates 
service levels during the phase-up of a program when participants are being 
brought on board throughout the year, and understates activities during a 
phase-down when few new participants are enrolled. Service years are 
calculated by averaging the end-of-quarter enrollments during the year. 
This figure roughly indicates the on-board strength maintained during the 
year, except when applied to summer and in-school programs which operate 
for only part of the year. A short-duration activity will have more total 
and new participants per service year than a long-duration treatment.
There were over 2 million enrol lees in CETA programs in fiscal 
1980. I/ Over two-thirds of these new participants were assigned to work 
components as a primary activity, or nearly half if the summer program 
enrollments are excluded.
New Participants Distribution 
 (OOOs) by Component
CETA Local Programs 2,006.4 94.8%
Classroom training 349.3 16.5
OJT 93.9 4.4
Youth transition services 83.9 4.0
Summer youth work experience 696.4 32.9
Nonsummer youth work experience 287.0 13.6
Adult work experience 62.5 3.0
Public service employment 378.2 17.9
Direct referral 29.4 1.4
Assignment unknown 25.8 1.2
Job Corps 70.4 3.3
National Programs 39.4 1.9
Total 2,116.2 100.0
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Service years were only half of new enrollments, basically reflecting 
an average length of stay in CETA of around half a year. Work components 
accounted for two-thirds of the one million service years of employment and 
training activities estimated for fiscal 1980. 2/
Service Years Distribution 
(OOOs)
CETA Local Programs 1,041.8 95.0%
Classroom training 219.9 20.0
OJT 54.3 4.9
Youth transition services 41.3 3.7
Summer youth work experience 126.2 11.6 
Nonsummer work experience
for adults and youth 252.3 23.0
Public service employment 347.8 31.7
Job Corps 35.7 3.2
National Programs 20.0 1.8
Total 1,097.5 100.0
Costs may also be measured in several ways. The costs by program 
component, such a classroom training, OJT, or work experience, include all 
expenditures incurred in providing services to participants who are pri 
marily in these components; for instance, the classroom training program 
component includes allowances, supportive services and employment and 
training services along with the costs of purchasing or providing 
vocational or remedial training. Expenditures by functional activity 
disaggregate expenditures into categories such as administration, 
allowances, wages and fringes, worksite supervision, training, and 
services. The "training" functional activity category includes the costs 
of purchasing or providing vocational or remedial training for participants 
in classroom training as a primary activity and the employer reimbursement 
costs for on-the-job trainees, but also includes the training expenditures 
for participants in work experience and other primary activities, while 
excluding the costs of allowances or supportive services received by 
classroom trainees. Costs can be calculated on a per participant, per new 
participant, or per service year basis.
In fiscal 1980, the expenditures for training as a functional 
activity for materials, training staff, and training facilities totalled 
$757 million under CETA programs other than Job Corps and an estimated $59 
million under Job Corps (if only the educational and vocational supplies 
and teachers in Job Corps are counted) (Table 2.1). The expenditures on 
classroom training as a primary activity (i.e., including allowances and 
services received by participants) amounted to over a billion dollars; 
those for OJT totalled one-fifth this amount and the total pricetag for Job 
Corps was a little less than one-half a billion dollars. Supplemental
Table 2.1 
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*0oes not include prime sponsor administrative costs or Department of Labor administrative costs in case of Job Corps. 
"Participants counted in prime sponsor tallies.
Source: Fisca1 198  "<
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training transition services and vocational exploration as primary 
activities, and PSE training as an adjunct to subsidized work added nearly 
three hundred million dollars to the training pricetag, raising it to 
almost two billion dollars.
The lion's share of CETA training was supported under Title IIBC 
(Table 2.2). Job Corps training represented a small share of person years 
of training, but a significant share of training program expenditures 
because of its intensity and duration. Conversely, PSE and transition 
services accounted for a substantial portion of participants receiving some 
training but a lesser share of person years and expenditures because of the 
limited duration and intensity of these supplemental training activities. 
Nevertheless, the phase-out of the public service employment titles in 1981 
will substantially reduce the training levels under CETA, since PSE funded 
over a fifth of expenditures for actual training activities in 1980.
Program component costs vary markedly, reflecting differences in 
intensity and duration, as well as wages and allowances to participants. 
The total service year and per participant costs for classroom and on- 
the-job training under Title IIBC, including estimated administrative 
expenditures and supplemental vocational education grants, were over $8,000 
annually in fiscal 1980, compared to a full cost of over $13,000 for Job 
Corps but under $1,000 for transition services. 3/
Fiscal 1980 Program Component Cost Levels
Classroom training
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The Substance of Training
Job Corps is the most intensive and comprehensive of the training 
interventions. Enrollees are normally allowed to stay two years or longer 
under exceptional circumstances such as participation in advanced train 
ing and average tenure for Corpsmembers completing a vocational program in 
1980 was 1.1 years. The 6.0 month average duration of stay for par 
ticipants was due to the large proportion of early leavers. Two-fifths of 
participants remained less than 90 days, while another three in ten left 
before completing their full vocational program. 4/
Table 2.2 
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100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source. Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor, calculations from Management Information System Fiscal 1980 Summary 
Reports and Job Corps Financial Reports, Fiscal 1980, unpublished.
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During the period of participation, Job Corps training, work and 
education activities are provided 40 hours weekly, usually split evenly 
between education and vocational training (plus work) during the first six 
months, with a greater concentration on vocational training beyond this 
point. Remedial education programs in Job Corps provide individualized, 
self-paced instruction which spans the pre-reading through high school 
equivalency level. There are provisions for advanced students to attend 
college and post-secondary institutions with Job Corps support. Vocational 
training in Job Corps centers is primarily in the clerical and service 
occupations for females, and construction or automotive repair for 
males. 5/
Occupations of Training 
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Corpsmembers at most residential centers play a major role in 
maintenance, food service, health care, and clerical work, as well as 
undertaking capital improvements on and construction of facilities as part 
of vocational skill training. Work experience is provided in conservation 
activities in those centers located on federal lands. There are also 
provisions for on-the-job training in the private sector as a transition 
mechanism for some terminating Corpsmembers.
All participants must complete an initial world-of-work program, 
which, in part, is used to determine the appropriate vocational training 
assignment. Counseling, guidance, and orientation are available on an 
as-needed basis. Allowances are $40 monthly at entry, rising to as high as 
$100 per month for participants remaining over six months. There is a 
readjustment allowance paid upon termination and based upon duration of 
stay. Job Corps also provides room and board, clothing, recreation and en 
tertainment. All participants who stay more than 30 days receive com 
prehensive health care; those staying over 90 days receive full dental 
treatment.




Residential living and food 
Education and vocational materials 
and staff (including union
programs (12.6)
Maintenance and utilities (9.6
Work project expenses (8.8
Administrative and other staff (25.7)
Pay and allowances 8.8
Travel 1.3
Recruitment and placement 3.2
Capital 14.8
Other 7.0
According to Job Corps records, two-thirds of terminees are "placed" 
in employment, and more than nine of ten are positive terminations. 7/ 
However, follow-up surveys indicate a much lower employment rate. For 
instance, 1977 Corpsmembers were employed two-fifths of the weeks in the 
first post-termination year. Just half were employed 18 months after 
termination and only a fourth were employed full-time. Less than a fifth 
claimed that placement assistance had been provided which helped in getting 
at least one post-program job. 8/ Because less than a third of entrants 
completed training, while only a proportion of these found employment and a 
smaller proportion found training-related jobs, a best estimate is that 
just one in seven entrants completed a full vocational program and was 
subsequently employed in a training-related job. 9/
Classroom training under CETA is shorter duration, with an average 
stay in fiscal 1980 of 5.1 months. Among 1977 classroom trainees who 
considered themselves to be "completers," a third stayed less than three 
months and just one in twenty received more than a year of training. 10/
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Time Enrolled in CETA All Trainees Completers









Local classroom training averaged between 22 and 26 hours per week in 
fiscal 1976. ll/ A typical completer with a little over 22 weeks of par 
ticipation thus received between 500 and 600 hours of treatment, or roughly
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one-fourth the treatment hours (excluding recreation 
activities) of the average Job Corps completer.
and center life
Among 1977 trainees, a fifth reported that they were in education 
activities, a little less than a fifth were in a combination of vocational 
and educational activities, and the remaining three-fifths were in skills 
training alone. 12/ For classroom training across all CETA titles in 1980, 
66 percent of classroom training participants were involved primarily in 
occupational skills training and 34 percent primarily in "other" training. 
Excluding classroom training funded under Title IV youth programs, the 
rates were 72 percent and 28 percent, respectively. 13/






















































Consistent with the regulations, local classroom trainees usually 
receive the minimum wage for hours of participation unless they are welfare 
recipients, in which case they receive a training stipend. Between a fifth 
and fourth of 1976 participants either received no allowance or less than a 
minimum wage equivalent. 15/
Hourly Allowance Reported by Fiscal 1976 Participants 











Among fiscal 1976 classroom trainees, half received manpower services 
and one in five received other supportive services according to prime 
sponsor records (which probably understate the extent of services re 
ceived): 16/















The full costs of fiscal 1978 classroom training under the compre 
hensive CETA Title IIBC were distributed as follows, according to the best 





A review by the General Accounting Office of fiscal 1977 Title IIBC 
(then Title I) occupational training activities in a stratified sample of 
prime sponsors found that half of trainees were placed in unsubsidized 
employment at termination; 36 percent were placed in training-related jobs; 
and 32 percent were placed in training-related jobs which they retained 
half a year or more. 18/ For a larger and more representative sample of 
fiscal 1977 enrollees in both occupational and "other" classroom training, 
44 percent entered unsubsidized employment; 40 percent were in some other 
status; and 16 percent were not tracked. Thus, half those with status 
recorded were placed. 197 There is no exact record of training completion 
because there are no graduation standards. Half of 1977 classroom trainees 
did not know whether they had completed or not, but among those who had a 
view, three-fourths considered themselves to be completers. 20/
On-the-job training is usually short-term. Although there is sig 
nificant variability in the scheduled length, the average duration of stay 
in 1980 was 4.3 months. Among 1977 completers, over a third were in OJT 
less than 90 days, while a fifth participated half a year or more. 21/
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The primary occupations of assignment are in the clerical, service, 
nontransportation operative and craft occupations. 22/
Percent of Percent of 




Job/Training Assignment Total Males Females
Professional and
managerial 8% 11% 8% 
Clerical 19 11 48 
Crafts 29 3 
Construction crafts 6 
Welding 3 
Other crafts 16 
Assemblers/laborers
farm workers/
garage workers 10 14 4 
Nontransportati on
operatives 21 25 22 
Transportation
operatives 6 4 
Service workers 12 8 15 
Private household workers -- -- 2
OJT participants receive the usual entry wage of the jobs to which 
they are assigned. For fiscal 1976 participants, the average wage was 
$3.21, or more than half again the $2.10 minimum at the start of the year 
and two-fifths above the $2.30 rate in effect at the end of the year. 23/
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Percent of Fiscal 1976 





A little over two-fifths of OJT participants receive manpower services 
in addition to training on the job, and less than a fifth receive sup 
portive services. 24/
















The OJT reimbursement to employers is intended to cover the costs of 
extra supervision, diminished productivity, and onsite training. There are 
rarely any additional reimbursements for services because these are usually 
provided directly by the prime sponsor. The full costs of fiscal 1978 
on-the-job training under the comprehensive Title IIBC were distributed as 





A study of on-the-job training as operated by a stratified sample of 
prime sponsors in fiscal 1977 found a placement rate of 58 percent at 
termination, with 38 percent retained in training-related jobs six months 
later. 26/ The findings from a larger sample of prime sponsors in 1977 
found that among OJT participants, 69 percent entered employment upon 
termination, 24 percent had another termination status and 8 percent had no 
termination status recorded. The employment rate among those with a status 
noted was, thus, 74 percent. Among the 45 percent of participants cogni-
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zant of completion or noncompletion of training, over three-fourths 
considered themselves to have been completers. 27/
Who Gets Trained
All CETA programs are targeted to individuals of limited employ- 
ability. Yet within the eligible population (which varies with the 
differing eligibility standards from title to title), there is enormous 
diversity in background and potential, and presumably a wide variance in 
the need for and ability to benefit from different employment and training 
activities. A major task of local decisionmakers is to decide on the mix 
of activities to be supported under each allocation and all allocations 
taken together. A second task is to decide how to divide up the different 
service opportunities among enrollees.
During fiscal 1980, classroom training opportunities were available 
for less than a fifth of the two million new participants in local CETA 
programs, or for three in ten of the entrants into nonsummer programs. OJT 
opportunities were available for less than one in twenty enrollees, or 8 
percent excluding the summer participants. Job Corps opportunities 
represented only 5 percent of the youth enrollments in CETA local programs.
The chances of assignment to classroom training were substantially 
higher for those 1980 enrollees who were female, Hispanic, Indian and 
Asian, persons with limited English speaking ability and single parents 
(Figure 2.1). Using as a benchmark the white male high school graduate's 
probability of assignment to classroom training (29 percent), the relative 
probabilities were as follows:
Percent Subgroup Assigned to Classroom
Training Divided by Percent for 















The "plums" are the on-the-job training opportunities which provide 
immediate earnings as well as a high probability of future employment. 
These are allocated to the most employable CETA entrants. The relative 
chances of OJT assignment are almost the inverse of those for classroom 
training. Only one in seven white male high school graduates entering CETA
Fiqure 2.1
Probability of Initial Training Assignment Under CETA Local Programs 
For All Fiscal 1980 Participants (Excluding Summer Enrollees)
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in 1980 was assigned to OJT, but this rate was more than double that for 
other CETA enrol lees.
Percent Subgroup Assigned to On-The-Job
Training Divided by Percent 















As a result of these varying assignment probabilities, males accounted 
for 63 percent of the new participants in OJT in fiscal 1980 but only 43 
percent of classroom trainees and 45 percent of adult work experience 
enrollees. Three-fifths of OJT participants were whites, compared to less 
than two-fifths of youth program participants. School dropouts accounted 
for nearly two-fifths of classroom trainees but only a third of total 
enrollees (Table 2.3).
The relative employability of participants assigned to different 
components can be estimated by weighting entry characteristics according to 
their marginal relationship to post-program earnings (as derived from 
regression equations of the two-year post-program earnings of 1975 par 
ticipants, controlling for component and duration of stay). The projected 
earnings of 1977 classroom trainees were 89 percent those of all non-summer 
CETA participants, while the projected earnings of on-the-job trainees 122 
percent of the average. 28/ In other words, the "employability" of the OJT 
participants was nearly two-fifths above that of the classroom trainees as 
measured by likely earnings in the absence of participation by this method. 
Another estimate of relative earnings potential is provided by the 1977 and 
1978 earnings of control groups selected from the 1976 Current Population 
Survey sample and matched to fiscal 1976 CETA entrants on the basis of a 
number of variables. 29/ This approach suggests a one-fourth differential 
in earnings potential between participants assigned to OJT and those 
assigned to classroom training.
1977 1977-1978
Social Security Social Security
Covered Earnings Covered Earnings
1977 as Percent 1977-1978 as Percent
Social Security Average for All Social Security Average for All
Covered Earnings CETA Controls Covered Earnings CETA Controls
Classroom training
control group $3513 99* $7413 98X
OJT control group 4430 125 9394 124
PSE control group 4589 129 9771 129
Work experience control group 3061 86 6739 89
All nonsummer CETA control group 3548 100 7577 100
Table 2.3 



















































































































































































(Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, 1981).
37
Assignment patterns must respond to the interests of individual 
participants as well as to their relative employability. Most CETA 
entrants want a job not training. Three-fourths of fiscal 1977 npnsummer 
local participants entered CETA primarily because they wanted a job or a 
better job, while only 21 percent claimed that they wanted job training and 
3 percent wanted to improve basic skills (Table 2.4). Of those seeking 
training or basic skills improvements, 56 percent were assigned to class 
room training, and 8 percent to OJT. Among this group who wanted and were 
assigned to training, 87 percent entered CETA with a specific type of 
training in mind and two-thirds of these received it. Looking at the 
half-empty cup, half of participants who wanted job training either did not 
get assigned to training or did not get the type of training they sought 
(unless provided through work experience or public service employment). 
White male entrants were least likely to want job training or basic skills, 
which was fortuitous since white and black males were much less likely than 
females to get training if they wanted it. On the other hand, among those 
who wanted jobs rather than training, females were more likely than males 
to receive training instead. Most summer youth program enrol lees simply 
wanted a job, but among the minority seeking training, many did not get it. 
The percentage of participants who wanted and got training was 64 percent 
excluding the summer program but only 53 percent including it.
Job Corps is a major source of training for disadvantaged and dropout 
youth. The 70.4 thousand new Job Corps enrol lees during fiscal 1980 
equaled nearly half the total youth enrollments in classroom training under 
local CETA programs. The five in six Corpsmembers who were dropouts repre 
sented one-third the number of dropout youth enrolled in all local CETA 
programs and half again the number of dropout youth who participated in 
local classroom or on-the-job training. 30/ Job Corps entrants have been 
characterized as the "hardest of the hard-core." The typical Corpsmember 
faces almost overwhelming barriers to employment. Only half of 1977 Job 
Corps participants came from two-parent families compared to four-fifths of 
all youth; the average size of their families was 6.4 persons, compared to 
3.4 for the total youth population (Table 2.5). Income per family member 
was less than a third that for the total population. The average reading 
and math performance at entry was below the sixth grade level. In 
addition, a fourth of Job Corps enrollees had applied for but been rejected 
by the military. Over a third had never held a job of 20 hours or more per 
week which lasted a month. Two-fifths had previous arrests and three in 
ten previous convictions. 31/ The annual earnings of youth comparable to 
those who entered Job Corps in 1977 averaged only $2700 over the next two 
years, or less than three-fourths of the 1977 Social Security covered 
earnings of controls for 1976 CETA classroom trainees, three-fifths of the 
earnings of OJT controls, and three-fourths of the earnings of controls for 
all nonsummer participants. 32/
Trends in Training
Employment and training activities experienced phenomenal growth in 
the 1960s and 1970s. In constant 1980' dollars, total expenditures rose 
from next to nothing in 1961 to the billion dollar level in 1965, doubled 
again in 1966, and then, after leveling off between 1967 and 1970, doubled 
once more to a level of over $6 billion by 1972. After another plateau,
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Table 2.4 
Primary Motivation for Entering CETA and Assignment Within CETA for Fiscal 1977 Local Enrol lees
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Percent who wanted job 
or basic skills 
training 24.4
Percent who wanted 
job or basic skills 
training who were 
assigned to class 
room training 56.0
Percent who wanted job 
or basic skills 
training who were 
assigned to classroom 
or on-the-job 
training 63.9
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Source: Continuous Longitudinal Mapower Survey, Fiscal 1977 New Enrol lees, Westat, Inc., unpublished tabulations.
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Table 2.5
Family Background at Age 15: 
1977 Job Corps Participants and U.S. Population
Percentage living with two parents 
Percentage living with one parent 
Percentage living with other
relatives
Percentage living alone 
Percentage institutionalized 
Family size
Percentage living outside U.S. 
Percentage in non-English-speaking
households
Education of father or other male 
head (highest grade completed) 
Percentage of fathers completed high
school 
Education of mother or other female
head (highest grade completed) 




Percentage of families below
poverty level
Percentage of families below 
poverty level or 
receive welfare assistance 
Percentage of families receiving
public transfers 
Percentage of families receiving
cash welfare 
Percentage of families receiving
food stamps 
Percentage of families living
in public housing 














































Source: Stuart Kerachsky, et al., "An Examination of Job Corps Partici 
pation," in Assessments of Job Corps Performance and Impacts, 
Volume I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
May 1980), pp. 363-364.
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real expenditures increased to over $7 billion in 1976 and a peak of more 
than $12 billion in fiscal 1978 before declining by a third to less than $9 
billion in 1980. 33/ Real expenditures will decline by half in fiscal 1981 
and to a third the 1980 level in fiscal 1982.
Training components increased in real and absolute terms, but at a 
much more modest pace (Figure 2.2). Outlays for classroom and on-the-job 
training and Job Corps rose to $650 million (1980 dollars) in 1968, then 
leveled off and were still less than $700 million in 1974. They, then, 
began rising steadily to the $1.9 billion level in 1980. Where training 
expenditures predominated in the policy mix for the first decade of 
manpower programs, representing 63 percent of constant dollar outlays in 
1969, they fell to only 15 percent in 1978 before rebounding to 21 percent 
in 1980 as a result of cutbacks in the CETA jobs components.
The pace of expansion, and the relative emphasis on work versus 
training, has fluctuated significantly from year to year. While the annual 
increments in real expenditures display a cyclical pattern, large increases 
in job creation have absorbed the extra resources that might otherwise have 
gone for training during the growth cycles (Figure 2.3).
The relative emphasis on the different training approaches has also 
shifted over time. On-the-job training represented less than a tenth of 
training expenditures from 1963 through 1968. It increased to 22 percent 
from 1969 through 1973, but declined to an average of 16 percent of train 
ing expenditures over the remainder of the decade. The intensive remedia 
tion approach of Job Corps accounted for nearly half of training expendi 
tures in the program's heyday from 1966 through 1968, then declined to less 
than a fourth over the next ten years until an expansion was initiated 
which doubled real expenditures and nearly doubled enrollment. Finally, 
locally-delivered classroom training increased from half of outlays during 
the 1960s to 55 percent in the first half of the 1970s and 63 percent in 
the second half.
As a result of these increased training investments, the number of 
annual new participants in Job Corps, classroom and on-the-job training 
rose to 336,000 in fiscal 1967, increased more slowly to 481,000 by 1972, 
then declined until 1977, before accelerating to 701,000 new participants 
in 1979 (Figure 2.4). Classroom enrollments accounted for almost all of 
this growth. In fact, there were only half as many new OJT participants in 
1980 as in 1972. Annual enrollments in OJT in the five years before the 
implementation of CETA averaged half again the level attained between 1975 
and 1980.
The growth of CETA training enrollments is much less impressive when 
measured relative to the expanding labor force. Despite a two-fifths 
increase in annual enrollments over the 1970s, the number of annual new 
training participants rose only from .56 percent to .66 percent of the 
labor force and will decline to the earlier level in fiscal 1981.
The same trends are evident when training is measured in service years 
(Figure 2.5). The service years of OJT during the 1975-1980 period of 
"decentralization and decategorization" under CETA were less than two- 
thirds the levels achieved from 1969 through 1974 under federally-directed 
categorical programs. Job Corps represented three-tenths of service years
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Figure 2.2
CETA and Antecedent Program Outlays 






63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
$2B .
$1B .
Ceta and Antecedent Program Outlays 
For Training (Constant 1980 $ Billions)
Total
^^ Local Classroom Training 
Corps ..........       "'
r- . . . .. . . 
63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 880
Training Component Expenditures 
as Percent of Total Expenditures 






•••••"' n IT •••—•••... •—..... ***- —— - — «* --— •"*"
63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
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by Employment and Training Administration, Office of Administration 
and Management and Office of Job Corps and \oung Adult Conservation 
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Year-to-Year Changes in Employment and Training Components
(Constant 1980 Dollars)
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Figure 2.4
HtH tHKOLLCES IN TRAINING ACTIVITIES 
(thousands)
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in 1968 but fell to a tenth in 1976 and remained only a ninth in fiscal 
1980 despite the doubling of the program. Local classroom training 
expanded in both absolute and relative terms. Again, the growth is less 
impressive when measured relative to the universe of need. Rapid expansion 
during the tight labor markets of the 1960s raised average on-board 
strength to 5.3 percent of average unemployment in fiscal 1969. Training 
enrollments then fell to 1.4 percent of average unemployment in fiscal 1975 
before rising to 4.8 percent at the end of the decade. Thus, there was no 
increase over the 1970s in training relative to need as measured by the 
unemployment rate. On-the-job trainees equaled 2.1 percent of the unem 
ployed in 1969, but only .7 percent in 1980.
Since most CETA training is provided under Title IIBC (formerly Title 
I), which also leaves the most flexibility for local decisionmakers and 
represents both the initial intent of CETA and the likely model of any 
future consolidated block grant, changes over time in the mix and content 
of "comprehensive" activities funded under this title are significant. 
Whether as a result of local preference for classroom training or as a 
reflection of the rapidly increasing resources for job creation available 
under other titles of CETA, classroom training outlays rose from a third of 
Title I expenditures in fiscal 1975 to nearly three-fifths of Title IIBC 
expenditures in fiscal 1980 (Table 2.6). On the other hand, OJT efforts 
received limited emphasis throughout the CETA regime. There was a sub 
stantial rise in the cost of classroom training in 1979 and 1980 due to 
legislated minimum wage rises which increased allowance components, and due 
to greater administrative costs resulting from the 1978 CETA amendments. 
In real terms, the cost of OJT slots has been relatively stable. The 
duration of classroom training increased from 4.3 months in 1976 to 5.1 
months in 1980. This occurred despite increasing emphasis on shorter 
duration "other" classroom training which accounted for three in ten 
classroom trainees in fiscal 1980. The duration of stay for occupational 
skills components was estimated to be 5.9 months in fiscal 1980 compared to 
3.5 months in "other" training components. 34/
There have been some changes over time in the enrollee mix under local 
CETA training programs. From 1976 to 1979, the female share of new 
participants in classroom training rose from 50 percent to 60 percent 
(Table 2.7). Under the MDTA institutional program which, was the primary 
classroom training vehicle before CETA, women represented only two-fifths 
of enrollees. 35/ The tightening of eligibility requirements in the 1978 
CETA amendments was reflected in an increased percentage of economically 
disadvantaged trainees. The veteran's share among training participants 
declined substantially over the post-Vietnam period, so that veterans 
represented just 9 percent of classroom trainees in 1980 compared to 25 
percent of the MDTA institutional training enrollment. There has been 
little shift under CETA in the racial composition of participants, but a 
major shift from pre-CETA. Whites accounted for three-fifths of classroom 
training enrollments under MDTA compared to less than half under CETA. 36/ 
There has been a much smaller increase in the female share under OJT, 
although it should be noted that women accounted for 37 percent of trainees 
under CETA in 1980 compared to 22 percent under MDTA-OJT through 1974. 
There was also a declining enrollment of veterans and an increasing 
enrollment of low-income participants. 37/
Table 2.6 
Training Activities Under CETA Title IIBC (formerly Title I)



















Cost Per Service Year:
Classroom training 
OJT







































































































































Source: Richard Wagner, "Historical CETA Data for Titles II-ABC (formerly Title I), II-D (formerly 
Title II), and Title VI Fiscal Years 1975 Through 1979," Mimeo. Employment and Training 
Administration, Office of Community Employment Programs, March 1980; and unpublished tabu 
lations for fiscal 1980 from same source.
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Table 2.7 
Trends in Participant Mix Under CETA Local Programs :
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Age it entry 
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*Includes primary training components under all formula-allocated CETA 
programs.
Source: CETA Supplemental MIS Tables by Initial Program Assignment. New
Enrol lees During October 1979-September 1980. Employment and Train 
ing Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, un 
published; Westat, Inc. Characteristics of Enrol lees Who Entered 
Adult-Oriented CETA Programs During Fiscal Year 1979 (October 1979 
Through September 1979)7(Washington, D.C.:Employment and Training 
Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, February 
1981).
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Mirroring the increased number of female trainees, there have been 
some shifts in training occupations. 38/ The clerical and service occupa 
tions have increased in importance since MDTA, while traditionally male 
construction and craft jobs have declined:
1977
1972 CETA 1972 1977 
MDTA- Classroom MDTA- CETA- 
Institutional Training OJT OJT
Professional
and managerial 13.0 7.1 5.1 8.3 
Clerical 22.2 36.1 10.1 18.9 
Service 12.2 15.8 8.0 10.9 
Construction
crafts 8.7 4.8 16.7 6.1 
Welding 8.3 10.5 5.8 2.6 
Other crafts 23.3 19.0 28.3 16.0 
Other occupations 12.4 6.7 25.8 37.2
Although the basic Job Corps service mix and targeting have remained 
relatively constant over the years, some changes have occurred. During the 
1970s, there was a slight increase in female representation and a slight 
upward trend in the age of entrants, although educational status and family 
background did not change noticeably. 39/
Characteristics of Job Corps Enrol lees 1969 1979
Sex
Male 11% 71% 
Female 23 29
Age
16 and under 30 25
17 26 25 
18-21 42 50
Less than high school completed 83 83 
Average reading score at entry
(norm-referenced SAT-tests) 5.5 5.6
grades grades
Public assistance recipient 30 30 
Broken home 50 48
The average duration of stay rose from 5.5 months in 1968 to 6.0 
months in 1980. 40/ This resulted both from a decline in the 90 day 
dropout rate and an increased average duration of stay for those remaining 
more than 90 days. One factor was the implementation of longer-duration 
training components including an advanced career training program in 
post-secondary institutions and colleges (4 percent of 1980 enrollment), an 
industry work experience program to ease the transition into the labor 
market after training (1 percent of enrollment), advanced programs operated
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in centers by unions and employer associations (12 percent of training 
enrollment), and several special needs groups programs (1 percent of en 
rollment).
The real cost of Job Corps declined from $20,700 in 1966 and $15,400 
in 1968 to $10,300 a decade later. 4JY This reflected declining start-up 
costs, restrictions in some services, particularly health care, erosion in 
the real value of allowances, and deferral of capital improvements, as well 
as increased efficiency. Real expenditures increased to $13,200 in fiscal 
1980, or $11,300 excluding capital costs, as a result of new center 
shart-up, a doubling of Corpsmember allowances, and needed capital 
improvements in existing centers.
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1. CETA Supplemental MIS Tables by Initial Program Assignment, New En- 
rollees During October 1979-September 1980(Washington,D.C.:ETTK 
ployment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and 
Research, 1981); and Job Corps in Brief, Fiscal Year 1980 (Washington, 
D.C.: Employment and Training Administration, Office of Job Corps, 
1981).
2. Ibid, and Employment and Training Administration. Quarterly Manage 
ment Information System Reports. Fiscal 1980. Service years 
calculated as average of end-of-quarter enrollments, except in case of 
Job Corps where calculated as average monthly enrollments.
3. Ibid, and estimates for classroom training, OJT, work experience, and 
PSE provided by Employment and Training Administration, Office of 
Community Employment Programs.
4. Charles Mallar eit. al. The Lasting Impacts of Job Corps Participation 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 42.
5. Joseph Mines and Brian Linder, "Job Corps Vocational Offerings: An 
Analysis of Performance Indicators by Training Area and Center 
Performance," Assessments of Job Corps Performance and Impacts (Wash 
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1980), p. 21.
6. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Office of 
Job Corps and Young Adult Conservation Corps. Unpublished information 
from Fiscal 1980 Job Corps Financial Reports.
7. Job Corps in Brief, Fiscal 1980, op. cit.
8. Charles Mallar et_. al. op. cit., p. 48.
9. Joseph Mines and Brian Linder, op. cit.
10. Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey of Fiscal 1977 CETA Enrollees. 
Unpublished tabulations from Westat, Inc.
11. Westat, Inc., Postprogram Experiences and Pre/Post Comparisons for 
Terminees Who Entered CETA During Fiscal Year 1976 (July 1975-June 
1976)(Washington,D.C.:EmploymentandTraining Administration, 
Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, 1979), Table 8; Richard 
Wagner, "Historical CETA Data for Titles IIABC (formerly Title I), 
Title IID (formerly Title II) and Title VI, Fiscal Years 1975 through 
1979," Employment and Training Administration, Office of Community 
Employment Programs, March 1980, mimeo.
The average allowances received per participant calculated from 
the CLMS were divided into the estimated classroom training allowance 
costs per service year calculated from management information system 
data for fiscal 1976 to yield the higher estimate, while the minimum 
wage prevailing most of the year was the denominator to derive the 
lower estimate. The higher estimate is probably more accurate since
51
some participants did not receive a full allowance, although others 
received stipends for dependents and extraordinary participation costs 
in addition to the hourly allowance noted in the CLMS.
12. Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey, Fiscal 1977 CETA Enrollees. 
Unpublished tabulations provided by Westat, Inc.
13. Employment and Training Administration, Management Information System 
Annual Summary Reports Fiscal 1980, unpublished.
14. Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey, Fiscal 1976 CETA Enrollees. 
Unpublished tabulations provided by Westat, Inc.; and Westat, Inc., 
CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry), Experiences in 
the First Two Postprogram Years, With Pre/Post Comparisons for Ter- 
minees Who Entered CETA During January-June 1975. (Washington, D.C.: 
Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation 
and Research, November 1980) Table 17.
15. Postprogram Experiences and Pre/Post Comparisons for Terminees Who En 
tered CETA During Fiscal Year 1976. op. cit. Appendix D, Table 9.
16. Ibid., Tables 10 and 11.
17. Richard Wagner, op. cit. It is to be noted that since cost pooling 
was adopted in 1979, prime sponsor administration under each title no 
longer is represented in the Program Status and Financial Summary and 
the allocation among titles and components must be inferred.
18. General Accounting Office, Job Training Programs Need More Effec 
tive Management (Washington, D.C.: GAO, July 1978).
19. Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey, Fiscal 1977 CETA Enrollees. 
Unpublished tabulations provided by Westat, Inc.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid, and Westat, Inc., CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 (36 Months After En- 
TryT, Experiences in the First Two Postprogram Years, With Pre/Post Com 
parisons for Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June 1975. 
op. cit., Table 17. ————
23. Postprogram Experiences and Pre/Post Comparisons for Terminees Who En 
tered CETA During Fiscal Year 1976! op. cit. Table 5.—————————
24. Ibid., Tables 10 and 11.
25. Richard Wagner, op. cit. Review of the estimation procedures suggests 
that the administrative costs were probably higher than 17.6 percent 
and the service costs lower.
52
26. General Accounting Office, op. cit.
27. Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey, Fiscal 1977 CETA Enrol lees. 
Unpublished tabulations provided by Westat, Inc.
28. Westat, Inc. Characteristics of Enrol lees Who Entered CETA Programs 
July 1976 Through June 1977(Washington, D.C.:Employment and 
Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, 
June 1978); Westat, Inc. Multivariate Analysis: 36-Month Follow-up 
of Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June 1975(Wash- 
ington, D.C.: Employment and Training Administration, Office of 
Policy, Evaluation and Research, November 1980), p. C-16.
The percentage of participants with each characteristic measured 
in the CLMS interview was multiplied by the regression coefficient 
associated with this characteristic and added to the constant. The 
coefficients for primary activity assignment, time in program, and 
placement were excluded.
29. Westat, Inc. Impact on 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in 
Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C.: Employment and 
Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, 
February 1981).
The estimated 1977 and 1978 earnings impacts for all enrollees by 
program assignment were subtracted from the 1977 and 1978 SSA earnings 
for participants in each program activity to estimate control group 
earnings.
30. Job Corps in Brief, Fiscal 1980, 0£. cit.; CETA Supplemental MIS 
Tables, op. cit.
31. Stuart Kerachsky, et. al. "An Examination of Job Corps Participants," 
in Assessments of Job Corps Performance and Impacts, Volume I (Wash- 
ington^D.C.:Government Printing Office,May1980),pp. 363-64; 
Charles Mallar, et. al. The Lasting Impacts of Job Corps Partici 
pation, op. cit., pp. 9-TT).
32. Charles Mallar, et. al. The Lasting Impacts of Job Corps Partici 
pation, op. cit., p. 45; Westat, Inc. Impact on 1978 Earnings of 
New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in Selected Program Activities, op. cit.
33. Estimates for 1963-1975 derived from Office of Management and Budget 
unpublished tabulations. Estimates for 1976-1980 provided by 
Employment and Training Administration, Office of Administration and 
Management, and Office of Job Corps and Young Adult Conservation 
Corps.
34. Unpublished estimates provided by Richard Wagner, Employment and 
Training Administration, Office of Community Employment Programs.
35. Manpower Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, April1974), Tables F-5 and F-10; Manpower Reports 
of the President, 1963 through 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Government 





38. Manpower Report of the President, April 1974, op. cit., Table F-9; Un 
published tabulations from the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower 
Survey.
39. Job Corps in Brief, Fiscal 1979 (Washington, D.C.: Employment and 
Training Administration, Office of Job Corps and Young Adult 
Conservation Corps, 1980); Sar A. Levitan, The Great Society's Poor 
Law (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), p. 
277; unpublished background data provided by Employment and Training 
Administration, Office of Job Corps and Young Adult Conservation Corp.
40. Job Corps in Brief, Fiscal 1980, op. cit.
41. Sar A. Levitan, op. cit.; and Employment and Training Administration, 
Office of Job Corps and Young Adult Conservation Corps, unpublished 








Training is an investment in the future. The purpose of CETA is "to 
assure that training and other services lead to maximum employment oppor 
tunities and enhance self-sufficiency ...." Thus, the basic issue in 
assessing CETA training activities is whether participants are able to 
secure and retain better jobs than similar individuals who do not par 
ticipate. The "bottom line" is increased post-program earnings.
The weight of evidence from studies of the categorical training 
programs which preceded CETA was positive. Almost all studies found that 
classroom training increased the earnings of participants in the first 
post-program year, with estimates of the earnings impacts ranging from up 
to $800 and a consensus ranging between $250 and $300 (Table 3.1). 
Previous studies concluded that OJT paid off even more, with participants 
experiencing post-program earnings increases of up to $2,200 and with most 
estimates ranging between $400 and $900 in annual earnings improvements. 
Past assessments of Job Corps reached very mixed conclusions, some finding 
earnings gains and others earnings losses. Adult basic education increased 
earnings according to available studies.
The impacts of CETA training are much more difficult to assess because 
under its comprehensive approach, training is intermixed with other 
activities. The intensity and types of training which occur within any 
single prime sponsor are diverse, and there is great variability among 
prime sponsors. In contrast, federally-directed categorical programs such 
as MDTA were relatively standardized and focused primarily on occupational 
training, with remedial education and training combinations largely occur 
ring in skills centers so that the relative effects of this variant could 
be isolated.
To try to separate the effects of the diverse components in CETA, a 
Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey (CLMS) was implemented to track the 
pre-program, in-program, and post-program experiences of participants in 
each major CETA program activity funded under grants to prime sponsors. 
Each year's entrants for a stratified sample of prime sponsors are inter 
viewed at entry and 9, 18, and 36 months later. The participants are 
classified according to primary assignment while in CETA, so that the 
relationship between activities and outcomes can be determined. _!/
The CLMS has tracked CETA entrants since fiscal 1975. There are, 
however, inherent time lags in gathering follow-up information at 18 and 36 
months after entry, and subsequently in the analysis of these findings. 
Only the 36-month follow-up results for 1975 entrants, and the 18-month 
follow-up results for this group and for fiscal 1976 entrants, were 
available for this analysis (i.e., through August 1981).
The CLMS does not include a control group of nonparticipants. 
Instead, the information gathered in interviews with participants at entry 
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for a representative sample of the national population. Based on a number 
of questions on age, race, sex, education, income, earnings, and employment 
status which are asked of both CETA participants in the CLMS and the 
general population in the CPS, a comparison group is selected from the CPS 
sample which matches the CLMS CETA sample in most regards. Earnings 
recorded in Social Security records are, then, compared for these like 
groups for the years after participants have left CETA. These comparisons 
are the basis of estimates of earnings impacts of CETA and its com 
ponents. 2J
The CPS-CLMS matching process is as rigorous as the interview 
questions will permit, but there is no way to assure comparability in all 
regards between the participant and control groups. The possibilities of 
mismatch are greatest for certain subgroups of participants and controls. 
The questions on education, income, employment and earnings which are used 
to compare individuals in the CPS with participants in the CLMS are 
probably better for matching adult male workers than for matching persons 
outside the labor force, or youth with limited prior work experience. For 
instance, many teenagers, but few adults, experience unemployment, so that 
two teenagers matched because they were both out of work for some weeks may 
be quite different in their likely future success while older individuals 
suffering from long-term unemployment are likely to have more comparable 
future experiences. Members of the comparison group drawn from the CPS may 
also currently or subsequently participate in CETA. If participation 
increases earnings, the gains estimated by comparing the earnings of 
controls and participants will underestimate the impacts to the extent some 
of the controls participated and shared in the earnings gains. Finally, 
Social Security records do not provide comprehensive coverage of earnings, 
particularly for youth in irregular jobs and for some local public sector 
employment. Undercoverage of public sector earnings particularly affects 
estimates of the gains realized by participants in public service em 
ployment and work experience, where a major effect is to increase the rates 
of unsubsidized post-CETA employment in the public sector. The technical 
reports of the CLMS present estimates of the magnitude of possible dis 
tortions and detail the techniques to minimize these biases. In general, 
the assumptions adopted in estimating impacts are consciously conservative 
so as not to exaggerate the benefits of participation.
Recognizing these caveats, the CLMS provides a massive volume of 
information about the employment and participation patterns of CETA en 
rol lees, as well as reasonable estimates of the minimum impacts of CETA as 
it operated in its early years.
According to this evidence, participation in training programs 
increased the post-program earnings of 1975 and 1976 CETA entrants. Among 
classroom trainees who entered in fiscal 1976 and had terminated prior to 
the end of calendar 1976, Social Security-covered earnings in 1977 were 
$347 or 10 percent above those of the comparison group. Participants in 
multiple activities, usually work and training combinations, experienced 
similar gains. On-the-job trainees gained even more, with earnings $839 
above controls, representing an 18 percent increment.
The impacts of classroom training increased over time. The estimated 
earnings gains for 1976 classroom trainees were $442 in 1978, representing
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a rise in real terms of almost a fifth over the participant-control 
differential in 1977. For all 1976 participants, including those who 
stayed longer and had not completed by the end of calendar 1976, who also 
apparently gained more from training, the 1978 earnings were $468 above 
those of controls. 3/ Less dependable estimates for fiscal 1975 partici 
pants suggest a similar pattern of increased returns from the first to 
second post-program year. 4/ This suggests that those "taught to fish" 
continue to use their skilTs. In contrast, the estimated benefits of OJT 
eroded over time. The second post-program year impacts for 1976 trainees 
were over a third less in real terms than the first-year impacts. _5/ Less 
dependable estimates for second-half 1975 participants evidenced the same 
fall-off. 6/ Apparently, some of the initial jobs secured through OJT were 
lost, and the skills were not transferable, or else the comparison group 
found employment and caught up.
























































These benefits might be contrasted with the estimated earnings impacts 
of the primary alternatives to training adult work experience and public 
service employment. Work experience participants had slightly lower 1977 
Social Security earnings than averaged by their control group, while the 
PSE participants had earnings $261 above controls. The rates of employment 
in the public sector increased substantially from the pre-entry to post- 
termination periods for PSE participants and somewhat less for work ex 
perience participants. Adjustments for the undercount of post-program 
public sector earnings increase the estimated 1977 gains for PSE partici 
pants to between $350 and $750. The maximum adjusted gain for work ex 
perience participants was $100, with a best guess that there was no net 
gain or loss from work experience alone. While participants in these 
various components differed significantly, the estimates compared each set 
of participants to matched controls.
Confirmation of these findings on the relative impacts of different 
components is provided by analysis of the employment and earnings changes 
between the pre-entry year and the second ppst-termination years for second 
half fiscal 1975 entrants. This analytical approach does not involve 
matching with a control group and uses interview data on earnings rather 
than Social Security records, thus avoiding the possible undercoverage and 
matching problems of the previous estimations. Comparing the second year 
earnings, as well as the increase in earnings from the pre-entry year for 
participants in different components, after adjusting through the use of 
regression equations for the differences between participants in sex, race, 
age, education, marital and family status, prior earnings patterns, 
barriers to employment, family income, and time in program, the estimated
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relative impacts of the components were of the same order of magnitude as 
the differentials calculated using the CPS-CLMS matching and Social 
Security records. If the absolute earnings increases for work experience 
participants are assumed to yield no net earnings gain relative to 
controls, then the relatively greater gains of participants in other 
components should have, and did, roughly parallel the net impact estimates 
for each component calculated from the CPS-CLMS match. TJ
Public
Service Classroom On-The-Job Combination 




















characteristics $+810 $+588 $+965 $+472
Estimates of the earnings impacts of Job Corps were provided by a 
follow-up of the two-year post-termination experiences of a stratified 
sample of 1977 entrants and a comparison group of eligible youth drawn from 
areas of limited Job Corps recruitment and matched through regression 
analysis to the enrol lee group. Over the two-year post-program period, 
civilian earnings were raised by $695, of which $487 was realized in the 
second-post termination year. This represented an 8 percent earnings 
increment in the first year and a 13 percent increment in the second. 8/
Earnings Per Week
by Length of Time
Out of Job Corps
(Months)
0-6 6-12 12-18 18-24
Expected weekly earnings of 
Job Corps enrol lees 1f 
had not participated 
based on experience 
of controls $43.82 $58.38 $72.48 $73.73
Weekly earnings of 
Job Corps termlnees $45.84 $64.J8 $82.17 $82.76
Absolute gain in 
weekly earnings $2.02 $6.00 $9.69 $9.03
Percentage gain In 
weekly earnings 4.6% 10.3% 13.4% 12.3%
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Benefits and Costs of Job Corps An Analytic Framework
One way to assess the magnitude of training program impacts is to 
compare the present dollar value of estimated benefits with the costs 
incurred to produce these results. The ratio of benefits to costs is an 
indicator of the rate of return on the investment in human resources.
Benefit-cost analysis necessarily rests on a range of assumptions. 
Benefits must be valued in dollar and cents terms. Gains measured in the 
immediate post-program period must be projected into the future. Any 
number of discount rates might be adopted in calculating the present value 
of projected future benefits. Thus, different and quite plausible 
assumptions can yield a range of estimates concerning the rate of return on 
the social investment. Recent analytic work has refined the procedures for 
valuing benefits and has helped to standardize alternative assumptions, yet 
estimates of absolute payoff of social programs remains as much art as 
science. Yet the same can be said of the business projections used in 
investment decisions. Rate of return calculations are no substitute for 
judgment, but they can help to organize and provide a better sense of the 
reasonableness of outomes in light of the resources needed to produce 
them. 9/
Job Corps is one of the programs which has been subjected to careful 
benefit-cost analysis utilizing the most refined techniques currently 
available. 10/ This analysis provides a framework for the assessment of 
other CETA training activities:
To begin with, benefits and costs can be estimated from a social 
perspective which includes the gains and losses for participants as well 
as nonparticipants--as well as from a taxpayer's perspective which focuses 
on the payoffs and costs for nonparticipants. From the social perspective, 
costs include all operating expenses, excluding allowances and other 
transfers, plus the output which is foregone during the period the enrollee 
is in training rather than available for work. The benefits include 
in-program and increased post-program output, any administrative cost 
savings from reduced transfer and drug treatment during and after par 
ticipation, and reductions in criminal justice, corrections, and victimiza 
tion costs to the extent crime is reduced as a result of participation.
In the two years following Job Corps, increased Corpsmembers 1 earnings 
(including estimates of military salaries) plus fringes (valued at 15 
percent of civilian earnings) were roughly $1000 more than those of 
controls. Discounted at a 5 percent real rate to the period of par 
ticipation when costs were incurred, the present value of these earnings 
and fringes was $925. As an estimate of the earnings gains beyond the 
two-year post-program period, the "benchmark" assumptions projected that 
the annualized earnings differential between participants and controls 
measured in the 18- to 24-month post-program period would decline 14 
percent a year in real terms over the future 43 years of worklife. ll/ 
Discounting at a 5 percent real rate, the earnings gains projected under 
these assumptions, added to the discounted gain in the immediate post- 
program period, sum to the estimated current value of post-program output, 
or $3896 for 1977 Job Corps enrol lees (Table 3.2).
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Table 3.2
Estimated Net Present Values Per Corpsmember
Under the Benchmark Assumptions
(1977 Dollars)
Benefits
Output Produced by Corpsmembers 
In-program output 
Increased post-program output 
Increased tax payments on
post-program income 
Increased utility due to 
preferences for work over welfare
Reduced Dependence on Transfer Programs 
Reduced transfer payments 
Reduced administrative costs
Reduced Criminal Activity
Reduced criminal justice system
costs 
Reduced personal injury and
property damage 
Reduced stolen property 
Reduced psychological costs
Reduced Drug/Alcohol Use
Reduced treatment costs 
Increased utility from reduced 
drug/alcohol dependence
Utilization of Alternative Services 
Reduced costs of training, educa 















Increased utility from redistribution + 
Increased utility from improved




Center operating expenditures, 
excluding transfers to 
Corpsmembers
Transfers to Corpsmembers 
Central administrative costs
Opportunity Cost of Corpsmember Labor 
Foregone output 
Foregone tax payments
Unbudgeted Expenditures Other Than 
Corpsmember Labor 
Resource costs 




























Source: Charles Mallar, £t aJL » Evaluation of the Economic Impact of the 
Job Corps Program Second Follow-Up Report (Washington, D.C.: 
Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Eval 
uation and Research, April 1980), p. 153.
61
Since Job Corps is a residential program dealing with high risk youth, 
the in-program and post-program reductions in crime and drug use are 
substantial. For the 1977 enrol lees, there were 11 per hundred fewer 
arrests for burglary and larceny during the period of participation, and 
nearly 3 per hundred fewer in the first post-program year. The costs of 
crime and its treatment are large--for instance, an estimated $4300 per 
arrest for larceny and $8500 per arrest for burglary--so that the savings 
from reduced crime amounted to $2260 in current value on the assumption 
that post-program effects measured in the second post-program year eroded 
completely after five years. Lesser reliance on transfers and alternative 
employment programs produced administrative cost savings with current 
values of $158 and $390, respectively, also under the assumption of a decay 
to zero after five years. Finally, the work components of the Job Corps 
program yielded output valued at $757 per Corpsmember during the period of 
participation.
The annual per participant cost of Job Corps was $4189 in fiscal 1977, 
excluding $1208 per Corpsmember for food and shelter. These were not 
considered a social cost because the losses of the nonparticipants who paid 
for these transfers were balanced by the welfare gains of participants. 
Society and Corpsmembers lost the output and earnings that would have been 
produced if the Corpsmembers had not entered the program. Based on the 
experience of the control group, this output would have been worth $881. 
Total costs per Corpsmember were, thus, $5070, or $2271 less than the 
estimated $7343 current value of benefits. The ratio of benefits to costs 
was, thus, 1.45.
Other assumptions yield different ratios. In light of the increase 
rather than decrease in estimated earnings impacts over the two years after 
termination, the benchmark assumption of a 14 percent annual deterioration 
in future earnings impacts may well understate longer-term payoffs. If no 
fade-out were assumed for the gains measured at the 18-24 month post- 
program point, the benefit-cost ratio would be 2.91. On the other hand, if 
there were no effects past those measured in the first two post-program 
years, the ratio would be only .81. Under a 10 percent, rather than 5 
percent, real discount rate applied to future benefits, the ratio would 
fall to 1.24; while a 3 percent rate would increase it to 1.56. 12/
Taxpayers may be more concerned with the effects on their own well- 
being rather than the benefits to participants. From the taxpayer's 
perspective, costs include all program operating and administrative 
expenses plus allowances and other transfers. The Treasury loses the taxes 
which would have been paid on earnings outside of Job Corps. On the 
benefit side of the ledger, the taxpayer gains from in-program output and 
the increased taxes paid in the post-program period by the participant. 
Reduced transfers, not just the administrative costs of transfer programs, 
are a savings to taxpayers. All savings from crime reduction and utiliza 
tion of alternative services (including allowances and transfer payments in 
these alternative services), are benefits to taxpayers.
From the taxpayer's perspective, the benefit-cost ratio for Job Corps 
under the benchmark assumptions comes close to, but is somewhat below, the 
break-even point relative to alternate uses of the resources, with a ratio 
of .96. If the earnings gains experienced in the immediate post-program
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period did not erode in dollar terms, the increased taxes would push the 
present value of benefits above costs, to a ratio of 1.54. If, on the 
other hand, the benefits lasted only the two-years post-program, the ratio 
would be .69. A 3 percent, rather than 5 percent, real discount rate of 
future benefits would yield a 1.01 taxpayer benefit-cost rate, while a 10 
percent rate would reduce the ratio to .87.
Benefits and Costs of Classroom Training
The earnings gains for CETA classroom trainees, as estimated from the 
Social Security earnings recorded for the CLMS and CPS matched groups, were 
$347 in fiscal 1977 and $442 in fiscal 1978 for fiscal 1976 participants 
terminating during calendar 1976. Alternatively, the estimated gains were 
$291 and $486 in 1977 and 1978, respectively, for all fiscal 1976 en 
trants a lower value in the first year because some were still in 
training, but a higher value in the second because training paid off more 
for long stayers. Following the assumptions of the Job Corps study, i.e., 
assuming that fringe benefits add 15 percent to the differential, the real 
discount rate is 5 percent, and the 1977 and 1978 gains are calculated in 
1976 dollars, the present value of the two-year post-program gains were 
$759 for participants terminating in 1976, and $742 for all 1976 par 
ticipants. Assuming an average age at termination of 26 and work until 65, 
there are 39 years of worklife. Under the benchmark assumptions, the 
current value of the projected earnings beyond the second year was $2040 
for participants terminating during calendar 1976, or $2244 for all par 
ticipants. Alternatively, if it is assumed that dollar earnings gains will 
not fade which is probably a more realistic assumption for classroom 
training than for Job Corps the current values of projected earnings were 
$4985 and $5485, respectively. 13/ If it is assumed that real earnings 
gains fade out by 14 percent annually, that they only last 10 post-program 
years, and using real a real discount rate of 10 percent, the current value 
of projected earnings were $1325 and $1458, respectively. Adding the 
current values of these alternative projected earnings to the current 
values of the estimated gains in 1977 and 1978 yields the following total 
earnings benefit estimates under varying assumptions:
Current Value of 
Post-Program Earnings Gains
Projecting from Projecting from
Benefit projection and 1978 estimate 1978 estimate
discounting assumptions for terminees in 1976 for all terminees
High Assume no fade-out of 
real do!lar gains, 5 
percent discount rate $5744 $6227
Intermediate Assume 14 per 
cent fade-out of real 
dollar gains, 5 percent 
real discount rate 
(benchmark assumptions 
in Job Corps evaluation) $2799 $2986
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Low—Assume 14 percent fade- 
out of real dollar gains, 
10 percent real discount 
rate and no benefits 
beyond 10 years post- 
program $2084 $2200
In estimating the taxpayer benefit-cost ratio, the Job Corps study 
assumed that tax payments would be 23 percent of earnings plus transfer 
income. If participation in classroom training had no effect on transfer 
receipt, the gains for the taxpayer under the various projection and 
discounting assumptions would have been as follows:
Current Value of 
Increased Post-Program Taxes

















The magnitude of other benefits from classroom training is speculative 
since there are no control group studies to make the necessarily careful 
estimates of impacts on criminal activity, reduced drug and alcohol use, 
and reliance on other transfer and training programs. The limited evidence 
suggests, however, that classroom training resulted in modest reductions in 
transfer incidence. For fiscal 1976 enrollees, the CLMS documented a 
slight drop in transfer receipt from entry to exit; while the follow-up of 
second half fiscal 1975 participants indicated a decline between the first 


























Proportions of Second Half 
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Based on the experiences of the Job Corps study control group and the 
control groups for the supported work experiment, it appears that benefit 
receipt declines over time for adult groups who have the highest proba 
bility of receipt, such as AFDC recipients, ex-addicts, and ex-offenders, 
but that receipt increases slightly over time for disadvantaged youth. 15/ 
If a! 1 of the in-program and post-program decline in usage for 1976 
enrol lees were attributed to CETA participation, and if this were valued in 
the same way as in the Job Corps study (which assumed that the savings 
fade-out would be 14 percent a year and discounting the savings at 5 
percent), the current value of reduced transfers was an estimated $635 
using the average transfer values in the Job Corps benefit-cost study, and 
the administrative costs savings were $78. Alternatively, if the average 
monthly dollar amount received by classroom trainees in the year prior to 
entry were used as a baseline, the current value of benefits was $925. 16/ 
This provides an upper bound "guestimate" of savings from reduced de 
pendency. It is equally plausible to assume no in-program savings but 
post-program savings in the same relation to those of Job Corpsmember as 
the ratio of earnings of classroom trainees compared to Corpsmembers. This 
produces a lower estimated $470 in transfer savings.
There is little evidence that community-based interventions (other 
than summer employment for young teenagers) reduce crime probabilities. 
The supported work demonstration found that during full-time work activity 
there was no reduction in arrest rates for long-term AFDC recipients, 
offenders, or dropout youth. Only drug addicts experienced reduced 
arrests, but drug addicts represented an insignificant portion of classroom 
trainees. 17/
Reduced participation in other programs may occur because of increased 
earnings, but increased participation might also result from continuance of 
schooling or greater likelihood of transition into other programs. The 
effect in either direction is sheer conjecture, but even in the case of Job 
Corps, this benefit was not a significant factor in overall social or 
taxpayer benefit-cost estimates.
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The cost of classroom training in fiscal 1976 was $1438 per partici 
pant, of which the allowance was $691 as estimated from the CLMS allowance 
receipt data or $607 per participant as estimated from national management 
information system totals. 18/ There was an estimated federal overhead 
cost of $66 per participant in fiscal 1976. The foregone earnings may be 
variously estimated. Prorating earnings in the year before entry over 146 
mean days of participation and adjusting for inflation, the foregone 
earnings were $573. Based on the experience of the CLMS controls, an 
estimated $1165 in Socal Security-covered earnings were foregone by 
participants. Another approach is to subtract the estimated gain from 
participation from the 1977 earnings of training participants; reducing 
this to 1976 terms by an inflation adjustment, the foregone earnings were 
$1307. Using these three alternative foregone earnings estimates, and 
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Under the "benchmark" assumptions considered most reasonable in the 
Job Corps evaluation, and under most of the range of further assumptions 
necessitated by the less refined information available for CETA classroom 
training, the social benefits from fiscal 1976 classroom training exceeded 
the social costs, even without inclusion of the transfer administrative 
costs savings:






































From the taxpayer's perspective, the benefit-cost ratios were less 
favorable, since the increased earnings did not result in tax payments or 
transfer payment reductions adequate to fully amortize allowances and 
training costs except under the high benefit assumptions. 19/
Benefit and Cost 
Assumptions



















































Benefits and Costs of OJT
Benefit-cost analysis of on-the-job training is even more equivocal 
because of uncertainties about the relative amount of output produced by 
trainees, the real training costs, and the degree of difference between 
CETA-referred clients and similar individuals who would have been hired 
without employer reimbursement.
There are also some thorny and unresolved methodological issues. The 
benefit-cost calculations for classroom training counted post-program 
earnings gains as the primary benefit to society and the training outlays 
and foregone earnings as the costs. Transfers were excluded on the 
supposition that the welfare benefits from added consumption of par 
ticipants were balanced by the welfare losses in reduced consumption by 
nonparticipants. For OJT, this methodology would count as costs the actual 
training outlays by employers plus services and administrative costs of the 
prime sponsors, and the differential between the output of OJT trainees and 
their foregone earnings. The OJT trainees are paid the same as regular 
entrants despite lower productivity, and the difference between their pay 
and the value of their output would be considered a transfer and excluded 
from social costs.
A different methodological approach is to assume that the cost of OJT 
equals training outlays by employers, services, and administrative costs of 
the prime sponsor, foregone earnings, plus the differential between trainee 
pay and output. If the job were filled in the normal way during the train-
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ing period, output would be higher by the amount of this differential, so 
that it might be reasonably counted as a social cost. This second approach 
is most often adopted, because under the assumption that the employer 
reimbursement just covers training costs and the deficient productivity of 
trainees, prime sponsors' costs can be equated with social costs. This 
methodology presumes that the individual who would normally be hired is 
subsequently not employed for the training period; if he or she gets 
another job, society may not be losing the increment in output during 
training. Presumably, also this displaced individual does not lose ground 
over the long run as a result. There is a further assumption that the 
employment and output foregone by the participant during training is not 
simply taken up by another unemployed worker. Finally, equating the 
employer reimbursement with the training cost plus the productivity deficit 
of trainees assumes that there is no windfall to the employer.
It is possible, however, particularly when OJT referrals are similar 
to regular hires that the normal reimbursement of one-half of wages more 
than covers the extra hiring and training costs. Some employers may be 
making a social contribution, but most are presumably profit maximizers, 
who will not contract for OJT unless the reimbursement leaves them as well 
or better off than regular hiring procedures. Unless there is a great deal 
of jawboning and public recognition for participating employers, windfall 
is more likely on balance than employer social contribution. Even under 
the assumption that the employer reimbursement just covers extra costs, the 
allocation between actual training expenditures and deficient productivity 
during training is still uncertain. Presumably, training costs are higher 
the more that output of the trainees falls short of the output of regular 
employees, but there is no way to know how the pie is split. An assumption 
is necessary because foregone output is the difference between what the 
trainee would have produced if he or she were not participating and the 
value of output in the OJT assignment. If substantial learning is required 
to do the new job effectively, the alternate output may be greater than the 
output during training; if there is no substantial training, or if the 
chances of unemployment are high in the absence of participation, the 
reverse could be true. The assumption is critical if transfer payments are 
further subtracted from costs (the first methodological approach) because 
they can offset much of the employer reimbursement, making the only cost 
the difference between OJT output and alternative output. Since the 
participants are usually drawn from the unemployed, OJT output, even at low 
hourly productivity, will usually exceed the alternative where hourly 
productivity may be greater in less skilled work, but there are fewer hours 
of likely employment. In other words, this first methodology usually 
implies that OJT has little real cost, just as job creation is assumed to 
have limited cost if otherwise idle resources produce output valued near 
the cost of wages, supervision, services, and administration.
An even more basic issue is how to count the post-program benefits. 
If there is a great deal of windfall for the employer, i.e., little 
training and little difference between the output of OJT trainees and 
regular hires, little net skill improvement could possibly result. The 
post-program earnings of the participant would be higher because he or she 
had the scarce job rather than another like individual who could have and 
would have performed equally, but society is not necessarily better off 
since the other individual's losses are the participant's gain. The post-
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program earnings increment is more likely to be a net benefit for society 
where there is a large difference between foregone earnings and OJT 
earnings, or more specifically, between the marginal productivity or 
earnings rate in the OJT job once hired compared to that in the most likely 
alternate employment. In plain English, if a trainee is very much like 
normal hires, but would have a high chance of unemployment because there 
are not enough jobs to go around, then the earnings gains post-program 
cannot be equated with social benefits. Only if increased earnings reflect 
skill enhancement for the individual will they represent net benefits.
Conventional benefit-cost procedures which count all increased 
post-program earnings relative to controls as a social benefit clearly 
stack the cards in favor of OJT, which provides immediate employment even 
if it offers no training. Job Corps graduates or classroom training 
completers may also get their jobs as a result of placement leverage rather 
than skill enhancement, in which case the earnings gains may not represent 
social benefits. However, the training activities and costs can still be 
documented, and there are no financial incentives for the employers to hire 
participants. In OJT, it is difficult to determine what training really 
occurs and whether the subsidies are basically for hiring rather than 
training.
The simplest benefit-cost calculations assume away these complications 
by equating the reimbursement to employers with extra training costs plus 
the output differential resulting from hiring less skilled trainees, and by 
counting all post-program earnings gains relative to controls as social 
benefits. The foregone output is estimated as the value of output in the 
OJT assignment minus the earnings foregone as a result of participation. 
Using the same projection and discounting assumptions as in the classroom 
training calculations, the intermediate estimate of the current value of 
increased post-program earnings for 1976 on-the-job trainees completing 
during calendar 1976 was $4085 or more than a third above the same estimate 
for classroom training.
Benefit Projection and 
Discounting Assumptions
High—Assume no fade- 
out of real gains 
gains, 5 percent 
discount rate
Intermediate—Assume
14 percent fade-out 
of real gains, 
5 percent dis 
count rate
Low—Assume 14 percent 
fade-out of real 
gains, 5 percent 
real discount rate 
and no benefits 





































$3107 $3057 $621 $611
69
The OJT cost per participant, including federal overhead, was an 
estimated $1556 in fiscal 1976. According to estimates from the national 
management information system, $428 of this represented services and 
administration provided by CETA. 20/ The estimated $1028 average employer 
reimbursement presumably equaled the extra training costs and reduced 
output. The CLMS reported annualized earnings of $5500 for participants 
while in OJT slots, which would translate into an estimated $2565 per 
participant in wages, salaries, and fringes. 21/
The foregone social product was the difference between likely earnings 
elsewhere and the output in the trainee position. The 1976 Social Security 
earnings of a simulated control group for the OJT sample were $1396, while 
the 1975 earnings of OJT participants, adjusted to 1976 prices, were $1113, 
providing two estimates of alternate output after adjusting for fringes, 
i.e., $1605 and $1280, respectively. 22/ Foregone social product under 
varying assumptions was as follows:
Assumption (1) OJT output valued at one-fourth 
wages and fringes; high 
alternative earnings assumption
Assumption (2) OJT output valued at one-fourth 
wages; low alternative earnings 
assumption
Assumption (3) OJT output valued at one-half
wages; high alternative earnings 
assumption
Assumption (4) OJT output valued at one-half 
wages; low alternative earnings 
assumption
Assumption (5) OJT output valued at three-fourths 
wages; high alternative earnings 
assumption
Assumption (6) OJT output valued at three-fourths 










Benefits other than earnings gains were less for OJT than for class 
room training because the participants were less disadvantaged. Savings 
from reduced criminal activity, drug treatment, and alternate program usage 
were probably minimal. The maximum transfer savings, calculated as for 
classroom training, were $36 in administrative costs and $294 in current 
value of reduced benefits as estimated using the Job Corps study benefit 
levels and $425 using the CLMS-reported levels. 23/
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From a social perspective, benefits substantially exceeded costs. 
Under the varying assumptions, the social benefit-cost ratio for OJT in 
fiscal 1976 ranged from a high of 8.48 to a low of 1.21, excluding any 














































These estimates did not subtract the transfer payments components of 
enrollee wages from social costs, which would be required for consistency 
with the classroom training estimates. The magnitude of transfers depends 
on estimates of the extra costs of training on the job, which presumably 
are related to the productivity of the trainees when they enter the door. 
The following are three sets of arbitrary cost assumptions:
Output equal one-fourth of
wages and fringes 
Output equals one-half of
wages and fringes 
Output equal three-fourths




















Using these training cost assumptions combined with the six sets of 
OJT output and foregone earnings assumptions, the benefit-cost ratios were 
higher than the estimates which did not subtract transfers. It is im 
portant to note that these assumptions permit the sum of training costs and 
the output differential between trainees and regular hires to exceed the 
employer reimbursement in some cases, while being less in others. Ob 
viously, there could be any number of assumptions which would dramatically 
affect the benefit-cost ratios.
Assumption (1) OJT output valued at 
one-fourth wages and 
fringes; high alternate 
earnings assumption
Assumption (2) OJT output valued at 
one-fourth wages; low 
alternate earnings 
assumption
Assumption (3) OJT output valued at 
one-half wages; high 
alternate earnings 
assumption
Assumption (4) OJT output valued at 
one-half wages; low 
alternate earnings 
assumption
Assumption (5) OJT output valued at 
three-fourths wages; 
high alternate earnings 
assumption
Assumption (6) OJT output valued at 
three-fourths wages; 





































925 1708 6.77 4.57
750 20.22 11.78









The taxpayer benefit-cost ratio includes taxes on post-program 
earnings and reductions in transfers and transfer administration. The 
costs include the OJT per participant costs plus foregone taxes (which are 
a negative on the cost side if OJT participants pay more taxes than they 
would under either of the alternate earnings assumptions).








































All these estimates rest on the supposition that the earnings gains 
measured in the post-program period reflect increased social output and 
taxes. Presumably, this is valid if training does occur and the gap 
between OJT output and normal productivity of entry employees is great. If 
trainees are just as productive as regular hires and there is no real
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training on the job, it is tenuous to ascribe any of the gain relative to 
controls as a net social benefit. A reasonable assumption is that the net 
social benefit is directly proportional to the gap between value of output 
and the wages received in the OJT assignment. For instance, if OJT is 
valued at one-fourth of fringes, the post-program gain might represent 
total social benefits. Where OJT output is equal to one-half wages, the 
net social benefit might be only one-half of the gain. Where OJT output is 
equal to three-fourths of wages, the net social benefit might be only 
one-fourth of gain. These assumptions would reduce the social benefit-cost 
estimates (which do not subtract in-program wage transfers and under the 




























All these manipulations suggest that the standard benefit-cost 
assumptions probably overstate the size of the positive payoff of on- 
the-job training, and that the range of uncertainty is much greater than 
for classroom training or Job Corps, since the training outlays on the job 
are difficult to identify and there is the possibility that subsidies are 
merely buying jobs. The benefit-cost ratios are relatively robust, i.e., 
restrictive assumptions can be made and positive ratios will still usually 
prevail given the magnitude of post-program earnings gains for 1976 
participants. Nevertheless, the calculations are largely simulative 
exercises. It is critically important in judging the payoff of OJT to 
isolate its training effects--!'.e., whether occupational change or earnings 
rate gains are achieved by participants, whether the OJT participants are 
different from usual hires, and whether the training actually occurring at 
the worksite is in excess of what is ordinarily provided to entry em 
ployees.
The Relative Payoffs
It is evident from the wide range of benefit-cost ratios resulting 
from plausible alternative assumptions that the rate of return on human 
resource investments cannot be calculated with any precision. There is 
less uncertainty when comparable activities are assessed using the same 
assumptions or when the rates of return are estimated over time for similar 
activities. 24/
There are, for instance, some interesting comparisons between the 
benefit-cost estimates for Job Corps and local CETA classroom training. 
Under the "benchmark" assumptions that produced a social benefit-cost ratio 
of 1.45 for 1977 Job Corps, the intermediate estimate for 1976 CETA local
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classroom training was 1.38 for all terminees. The costs of CETA training 
(net of allowances) were only one-fifth as great per trainee, and even 
though the foregone earnings were a third higher (reflecting the greater 
employability of the local CETA trainee population), the social costs per 
participant were two-fifths those of Job Corps. On the benefit side, the 
discounted post-program earnings gains for CETA participants were three- 
fourths those for Job Corps. In other words, the earnings payoff per 
dollar of expenditure was substantially higher for the local CETA programs 
than for Job Corps, reflecting the fact that classroom trainees were less 
disadvantaged on average than Corpsmembers. The big difference was in 
crime impacts. Job Corps had a very substantial immediate effect because 
it moved a high risk group from the streets into a structured environment. 
The socialization which occurred in centers lead to a substantial redt/ction 
in crime during the immediate post-program period. The estimated value of 
the crime savings produced by Job Corps almost equalled the present value 
of the earnings gains of CETA classroom trainees. By the same token, the 
estimated transfer effects were somewhat less in the case of classroom 
training than Job Corps, since the young people who entered Job Corps were 
more likely to rely on welfare because of their greater needs. Addi 
tionally, work activities which were part of the Job Corps treatment offset 
a seventh of Job Corps costs. In other words, both programs were worth 
while social investments. CETA training resulted in greater earnings gains 
per dollar but slightly less overall payoff because of lesser transfer and 
crime reduction effects.
From a taxpayer's perspective, the Job Corps yielded a greater payoff 
because of these reductions in crime and dependency. For CETA training, 
because of the less disadvantaged nature of the entering population and the 
less comprehensive treatment, the maximum estimated transfer savings were 
only two-thirds as large as the measured net savings produced by Job Corps, 
and a best guess is that there were little or no crime savings resulting 
from local programs. Thus, while both CETA training and Job Corps were 
worthwhile social investments, and while CETA produced more earnings 
increase per dollar of social or taxpayer expenditure, Job Corps came 
closer to paying back taxpayer outlays in visible ways reduced dependency 
and crime. It is understandable, then, why Job Corps has become more 
politically popular than CETA.
The taxpayer benefit-cost ratio of OJT was also substantially greater 
than for classroom training under the assumption that the post-program 
earnings gains represented the payoff of training rather than the simple 
purchase of a job for participants. Taxpayers are unlikely to give much 
thought to displacement effects and the esoteric arguments involved. They 
see more placements resulting from OJT, significant earnings gains for 
participants, and increased taxes paid. It is no wonder the public favors 
private sector approaches. In this case, however, the taxpayers' judgment 
may be faulty. The relative payoff of institutional training vs. on- 
the-job training depends critically upon the degree of real training 
involved at the OJT worksite and the productivity differential between 
trainees and regular hires. To the degree OJT participants are like 
regular hires and to the degree that OJT offers jobs more than training, 
the relative payoffs to the taxpayer are more apparent than real. If OJT 
usage is increased by being more generous with reimbursements or less 
restrictive about who is hired, it is entirely possible that the windfall 
element would increase and the real payoff would decline.
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The benefit-cost estimates for CETA training can also be contrasted 
with the results for the categorical training programs which preceded CETA. 
Two dozen studies of institutional training, on-the-job training, and work 
experience programs operating during the 1960s and early 1970s have been 
summarized using standardized benefit-cost analysis assumptions. 25/ 
Standard benefit estimates were based upon the increase in before-tax 
earned income from the year before training to the year after training. 
Studies which measured gains relative to controls were distinguished from 
studies which measured the gains in absolute terms for participants. 
Foregone earnings were not considered. Enrollee stipends were excluded as 
costs for institutional training but included for on-the-job training. The 
gains in the year following training were projected for a 10-year period 
with no fade-out and the present value was calculated using a 10 percent 
discount rate. Under these assumptions, the CLMS measured gains relative 
to controls were $347 for CETA classroom trainees, and $839 for OJT 
participants in the first post-program year. The absolute pre/post 
earnings gains were $1104 and $1882, respectively, after adjusting for 
minimum wage changes over the period. Using the measurements of gains 
relative to controls, the benefit-cost ratio for 1976 classroom training 
was 2.9, while based on the pre/post gains for participants alone, it was 
9.2. For OJT, the benefit-cost ratios were 1.7 and 3.9, respectively. For 
Job Corps, the first year earnings gain relative to controls was $209, 
yielding a current value of $1413 which did go far to amortize the $4189 
cost of the program. The pre/post gain of participants was $831, yielding 
a current value of $5618. The benefit-cost ratios were, thus, .34 using 
the control group estimation methodology and 1.34 based on the absolute 
gains of participants alone. The standardized methodology ignored the fact 
that earnings gains increased from the first to second post-program year, 
and that crime and transfer reductions offset much of the cost, thus 
understating the rate of return on the Job Corps investment in 1977 and 
probably in earlier years as well. Without arguing for the realism of the 
standardized estimation assumptions, it appears that classroom training 
under CETA in 1976 compared favorably with preceding institutional training 
efforts, while CETA OJT fell in the mid-range of earlier cost effectiveness 
estimates all of which showed positive benefit-cost results for OJT 





































AN ANATOMY OF IMPACTS
While Job Corps, local classroom training and OJT result in earnings 
increases for participants as a whole, the average includes some in 
dividuals who make major gains, many who gain incrementally, some who are 
not affected one way or the other, and a few who would have done better if 
they had stayed in the labor market looking for work. The distribution of 
impacts is as important as the average. If gains are concentrated so that 
one subgroup of participants gains a lot while most gain very little, 
training might be considered less favorably than if most groups gained at 
least modestly. There may also be variability in the duration of gains. 
For some groups the effects may be only short term, while for others the 
payoffs might increase dramatically over time.
Likewise, the sources of the gains are important. Earnings increases 
may result from movement into higher paying jobs in the same occupation and 
industry, from occupational mobility, from greater stability of employment 
or from increased labor force participation. Gains produced by stabilizing 
the work patterns of the disadvantaged have far different consequences than 
gains which reflect access to new career tracks. Training may serve 
different purposes for those who have worked steadily, but lost their jobs, 
those who have had unstable work patterns and need to get linked into the 
primary labor market or to become more dependable, and those who are 
entering or reentering the labor force after a long absence.
Who Benefits From Training? 26/
Almost everyone benefits substantially from on-the-job training, both 
in comparison to like participants in other CETA activities and relative to 
control groups. Among significant segments of the participant population 
identified by race, sex, age, and prior earnings patterns, the CLMS-CPS 
impact estimates suggest that only one subgroup of 1976 participants white 
females in PSE--benefited more from subsidized work than from OJT (Table 
3.3). Training on-the-job rather than in the classroom yielded greater 
gains for all subgroups except white females, participants with previously 
higher earnings patterns, and persons age 30 to 44; even in these cases, 
the OJT impacts were still substantial. The only negative aspect of OJT 
was that for all subgroups except participants with relatively higher 
earnings before entry, the net impacts declined from the first to second 
post-program years. While the second year impacts remained positive and 
substantial, the fade-out was significant for those groups who achieved the 
largest first-year gains and for subgroups with more severe problems such 
as low earners, black males and females, and persons less than age 20, for 
whom sustained impacts would have been most desirable.
All subgroups of 1976 classroom trainees gained relative to their 
controls. The gains are greatest for females, for persons with low or high 
but not intermediate earnings in the two years prior to entry, and for 
persons age 30 and over. Classroom training had more post-program impact 
than work experience for all groups except participants age 45 and over. 
Compared to PSE, classroom training was more effective for males but not
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Table 3.3 









































































































































































































































































*Low earners are defined as those with earnings below $2,000 in each of the two pre-entry years. High earners are those with 
earnings above $4,000. All others are intermediate and mixed earners.
Source: Westat, Inc. Impact of 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C. 
Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, February 1981).
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females, for high earners but not for low earners, and for prime working
age (30-44) participants but not for those younger. The gains for the 
30-to 44-year-old participants accounted for three-fifths of the 1977-1978 
aggregated earnings increases for all trainees even though they represented 
only one-fifth of classroom trainees. The gains of trainees age 30 and 
over accounted for nearly two-thirds of the aggregated gains though these 
mature participants accounted for less than a fourth of all trainees.
The earnings impacts of classroom training increased substantially 
from the first to second post-program years for female participants and for 
trainees age 22 to 29. However, the gains of previous low earners faded 
out, as did the limited initial impacts for black males. Females accounted 
for 78 percent of the aggregated first-year gains, but 85 percent of the 
second year gains. In contrast, previous low earners, representing half of 
classroom trainees, accounted for nine-tenths of the aggregated first year 
gains, but only half of the second year total.
Few surprises emerge from further disaggregation among classroom 
trainees, and the estimates become more speculative because of the small 
sample sizes and the sensitivity of the estimates to the matching pro 
cedures (Table 3.4). The big gainers were trainees age 30-44, whatever 
their race/sex category and previous earnings patterns. Minority youth 
tended to lose ground, as did participants in their twenties who had 
substantial prior earnings but interrupted employment. Individuals with 
intermediate or mixed earnings in the two years before entry had limited 
but positive improvements. For previously low earners, the gains were 
substantial.
Regression analysis of the annual earnings gains from the year before 
entry to the second year after termination provides confirmation of these 
net impact estimates. 27/ The relative gains of race/sex groups in the 
different program components estimated from follow-up interview data are 
similar to those estimated from the CLMS-CPS match. The differential 
between classroom training and work experience impacts was greater for 
whites than for blacks. Minority females benefited most from work 
experience relative to other components. Males gained more than females 
from classroom training rather than work experience assignments. The 
relative gains from PSE were larger than estimates from Social Security 
earnings of the the CLMS-CPS match groups which undercounted the earnings 
of PSE participants moving into unsubsidized public sector jobs.
Earnings Gains From Pre-Entry Year to Second Post-Termination
Year for Enrollees in Classroom Training, OJT and PSE 
as Measured Relative to Gains for Work Experience Participants
Classroom
Training OJT PSE
White males $1859 $1477 $1136
Minority males 431 1469 514
White females 820 1947 345





Estimates of 1977 Gains for Age/Earnings and 
Age/Race/Sex Subgroups of 1976 Classroom Trainees*
Gains $1000+ 30-44 low earners
30-44 high earners
30-44 minority males 
30-44 white females 
30-44 minority females
45+ low earners
19-21 white males 
26-29 white males 
17-18 white males 
26-29 white females 
22-25 minority females
17-18 low earners 
19-21 low earners 
22-25 low earners 
26-29 low earners
17-18 white males 
22-25 white males 
19-21 minority females 
26-29 minority females
19-21 mixed earners 
22-25 mixed earners 
26-29 mixed earners 
30-44 mixed earners
30-44 white males 
22-25 white females
22-25 high earners 
26-29 high earners
19-21 minority males 
22-25 minority males 
26-29 minority males 
17-18 minority females
*Includes only subgroups with more than 50 cases in the CLMS.
Source: Westat, Inc. Impact on 1977 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA 
Enrollees in Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C. 
Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, 




Underlying these net impact estimates are quite different employment 
and earnings changes from the pre-entry year to the second post-termination 
year for different subgroups of participants in different program ac 
tivities. The employment status of whites in classroom training improved 
much more than that of whites in work experience; conversely, for blacks 
and other Hispanics, training did not yield as great relative improvements 
(Table 3.5). Employment rates of classroom trainees with 12 or more years 
of education increased substantially compared to the modest increases for 
similar work experience participants. In contrast, participants with less 
than a high school education gained more in earnings from classroom 
training but more in employment from work experience. PSE had very little 
impact for persons with less than a high school diploma on entry.
Table 3.5
Employment and Earnings Changes From Year Before Entry to Second Post-Termination
Year for Subgroups of Participants In Different Activities
(Second Half Fiscal 1975 Entrants)






















































































Source: Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-Up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry), Experiences In the First Two Postprogram Years 
With Pre/Post "Comparisons For Termlnees Who Entered CETA During January/June 1975(Washington, D.C.: Employment 
and Training Administration, Oflce of Policy, Evaluation and Research, December 1980), Tables 58 and 60.
The Job Corps results suggest that even the most disadvantaged youth 
can benefit from training. Yet there are differences in the impacts for 
subgroups of the Corpsmember population. Females without children bene 
fited substantially in both employment and earnings rates, while males 
increased mostly in their employment rates. Females with children bene 
fited less along both dimensions. 28/
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Controlling for type of center, age, educational attainment, and race, 
Hispanic male Corpsmembers gained most in employment from pre-entry to 
post-termination, while white males gained most in earnings. High school 
graduates improved more in earnings. Younger participants did not gain as 
much in earnings. 29/ This does not mean that blacks, dropouts, and 
younger teenagers benefited less from Job Corps, since lesser improvement 
would have been expected net of treatment. No data are available to 
























































The Underlying Changes in Employment and Earnings
The aggregate patterns of employment and earnings change are quite 
different for participants in local classroom training, Job Corps, on- 
the-job training, and work experience. OJT results in a dramatic and 
immediate increases in employment rates. In the fourth quarter before 
entering CETA, fiscal 1975 on-the-job trainees were working 57 percent of 
the time. The employment rate rose to 73 percent in the first post-program 
quarter, increasing only gradually thereafter to 78 percent by the eighth 
post-program quarter (Figure 3.2). In contrast, classroom trainees and 
work experience participants just equalled their year earlier employment 
rates when they left the program. However, employment rates among the 
classroom trainees rose rapidly thereafter, from 44 percent in the first 
quarter after exit to 58 percent by the fifth quarter. Compared to this 14 
percentage point rise for classroom trainees, the employment rate of work 
experience participants increased only 10 percentage points over the 
post-termination year. Employment also declined in the second post- 
termination year for work experience participants compared to a slight rise 
for classroom trainees. For fiscal 1976 CETA participants, the patterns 
were similar in the first post-termination year. 30/
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figure 3 2
AVERAGE PERCENT TIME EMPLOYED PRE-ENTRY
AND POST-TERMINATION BY PROGRAM ACTIVITY

















1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
POST-TERMINATION 
QUARTER
Source: Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry) 
Experiences In the First Two Postprogram Years, with Pre/Post 
Comparisons, For Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June 
1975 (Washington, D.C.:Employment and Training Administration, 
Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, December 1980), Table 40
83
Classroom trainees must search for and find jobs to use their new 
skills, while on-the-job trainees, if successful in their training assign 
ments, already have jobs. For instance, immediately at exit, only 30 
percent of fiscal 1975 classroom trainees were employed, rising within a 
month to 41 percent and in two more months to 48 percent (Figure 3.3). 
Most of this gain was matched by a decline in the percentage not in the 
labor force. The subsequent employment gains beyond the first post- 
termination quarter were the result of a declining incidence of un 
employment. For OJT, in contrast, there was no period of post-program 
transition, and little post-program change in labor force participation.
The average annualized quarterly earnings of participants reflected 
these employment patterns. The second half fiscal 1975 OJT participants 
had average earnings in the first post-program quarter of $6,620, which 
then rose by a fourth to $8,370 at the end of the eighth post-program 
quarter (Figure 3.4). Classroom trainees had substantially lower earnings 
during the post-termination transition period, but they rose more sub 
sequently, i.e., from $3,660 to $5,880, or by three-fifths. Work ex 
perience participants were better off than classroom trainees during their 
first post-termination quarter, but earnings increased less, i.e., from 
$3,850 to $5,360, or by just two-fifths.
Another perspective on post-program changes is provided by estimates 
of full employment earnings—real earnings divided by percent time em 
ployed. The classroom trainees experienced a gain of 18 percent in full 
employment earnings from the first to the eighth post-termination quarters, 
work experience participants gained 19 percent, and OJT participants gained 
18 percent. This suggests that average earnings per week of employment for 
participants in OJT, work experience, and classroom training rose at 
roughly the same rates over the post-program period, so that the differen 
tials in annualized earnings gains were the result of differing trends in 
employment.
For Job Corps participants, the post-program transition is complicated 
by the readjustment in returning home or moving to a new labor market. It 
took several months for the weekly earnings of 1977 Corpsmembers to catch 
up to those of controls, and in the first quarter after exit their earnings 
were lower (Figure 3.5).
The earnings impacts of training programs are produced primarily by 
increased employment rather than increased earnings rates. For second half 
fiscal 1975 classroom trainees, the annual earnings (adjusted for in 
flation) rose 45 percent from the pre-entry year to the first post-termi 
nation year. The percent of weeks employed rose by 38 percent. Increased 
employment, thus, accounted for 84 percent of the gain in annual earn 
ings. 31/ From the first to second post-termination years, the annual 
earnings of classroom trainees rose by 25 percent in real terms and the 
weeks employed by 16 percent, so that employment increases accounted for 63 
percent of the earnings gain between the first and second year. Comparing 
the second year to the pre-entry year, the employment increases accounted 
for three-fourths of the real gain in annual earnings.
For 1976 classroom trainees, earnings rose by 91 percent from the 
fourth quarter prior to entry to the fourth quarter after exit. Adjusting
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Figure 3.3 
Pre-Entry and Post-Termination Employment Status of Terminees
__________ Second Half Fiscal 1975 Participants 
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Source: Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry), 
Experiences With the First Two Postprogram Years With Pre/Post 
Comparisons, For Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June 
1975 (Washington, D.C.:Employment and Training Administration, 
Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, December 1980), Table 
38; Westat, Inc. Postprogram Experiences and Pre/Post Comparisons 
For Terminees WhoTntered CETA During Fiscal Year 1976 (July 1975"- 
June 1976) (Washington, D.C.:Employment and Training Adminis- 




Earnings Gains Patterns for Second Half Fiscal 1975 CETA Participants
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Experiences With the First Two Postprogram Years with Pre/Post 
Comparisons, For Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June 
1975 (Washington, D.C.:Employment and Training Administration, 




Estimates of Time Path of Net Increases in 
Percent Time Employed and Earnings Per Week 
1977 Male Corpsmembers Compared to Controls
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Source: Charles Mallar, et. al. The Lasting Impacts of Job Corps Parti 
cipation (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1980) 
pp. 52-53.
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for minimum wage increases over this period, the gain was 65 percent. 
Adjusting for the increase in average wages in nonagricultural employment, 
the gain was 60 percent. The percent of time employed rose by 46 percent 
(from an employment rate of 37 percent a year prior to entry to 54 percent 
a year after exit), which thus accounted for between 71 and 74 percent of 
the real gain in annual earnings depending on the cost adjustment used.
Additional evidence is provided by hourly wage change patterns. Among 
1976 classroom trainees, those who were working the fourth quarter after 
termination averaged $3.70 per hour. The average for those working in the 
fourth quarter prior to entry was $3.05. The minimum wage increased by 12 
percent over this period (weighted by the varying entry dates into CETA), 
the hourly wage in private employment rose by 16 percent, and the cost of 
living 13 percent. If the average wage of participants had risen by these 
same percentages, the fourth quarter post-termination quarter wages would 
have averaged $3.42, $3.54, and $3.45, respectively, suggesting real wage 
gains of only 7 percent, 5 percent, and 7 percent, respectively, compared 
to the over three-fifths increase in real annualized earnings. 32/
For OJT the situation is even more dramatic. For 1975 participants, 
the increase in employment from the pre-entry year to the first post- 
termination year was 45 percent while the increase in real earnings was 
only 44 percent. From the first to the second post-termination years, as 
some 1975 OJT participants lost their jobs and others proved themselves and 
began to advance, real earnings increased by 15 percent, but employment 
rose only 4 percent, so that earnings rate improvements accounted for 72 
percent of the increase. Comparing pre-entry year to second post- 
termination year real earnings, however, employment gains still accounted 
for nearly four-fifths of the improvement.
Among 1976 on-the-job trainees, the fourth quarter pre-entry to fourth 
quarter post-termination gain in employment accounted for 92 percent of the 
earnings gain adjusted for the rising minimum wages, and 95 percent of the 
earnings gain adjusted for nonagricultural real wage increases. The hourly 
wage of OJT participants working in the fourth post-termination quarter was 
$3.86 compared to $3.31 the fourth quarter before entry. The wage would 
have been $3.84 if the hourly earnings for trainees had risen the same as 
the average for private employment, and by even more if the average had 
risen proportionately with the increase in minimum wages. 33/
Employment rates among nonparticipants also increased over the pre/ 
post period, so that the employment gains of participants may have 
accounted for a smaller share of their net earnings gains relative to 
controls than of their pre/post earnings increases. Yet the hourly wage 
data for participants indicated that, on average, there was very little 
improvement in real earnings rates. Unless it is assumed that the real 
average wage for controls would have gone down over the same period (a very 
unlikely development since controls had more time in the work force, more 
tenure in the post-program period, and more chance to advance because of 
seniority), or that the added labor force participants among program 
terminees earned drastically less than the minimum wage and depressed the 
post-program average wage and pre/post gain, then it is tautological that 
the net post-program earnings of participants relative to controls was 
mostly due to the differential in their employment gains from the pre 
program to post-program period.
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While for classroom and on-the-job training the factors generating net 
gains relative to controls must be inferred from absolute pre/post changes 
for participants, both employment and earnings rates of Job Corps par 
ticipants and controls were tracked. This evidence supports the inference 
for OJT and classroom training that the major impact of training is on em 
ployment probabilities rather than earnings rates. In the two post-program 
years, Corpsmembers earned 10.7 percent more than controls (Table 3.6). 
Over this same period, however, they worked 15.6 percent more hours. The
Table 3.6
Employment and Earnings of 1977 Corpsmembers and Controls 
The Two Years After Termination




























































































Source: Charles Mallar, et_ aK The Lasting Impacts of Job Corps Par 
ticipation (Washington, D.C.lGovernment Printing Office, 
May 1980), pp. 45-47.
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average hourly earnings over the period were $3.66 for Corpsmembers but 
$3.82 for nonparticipants. The lower earnings rates may have been due to 
the fact that more of the Corpsmembers worked, including those who could 
not command a high wage, that Job Corps made others willing to work for 
lower wages, or that some of the nonparticipants acquired tenure in their 
jobs and gained in earnings while Corpsmembers were participating. 
Whatever the explanation, the earnings gains of Corpsmembers relative to 
controls were totally the result of increased employment rather than 
increased wages. Furthermore, Corpsmembers did not catch up in wages 
during the post-termination period. The control group's earnings rate 
increased by 25 percent over the two years while rising only 22 percent for 
participants.
For classroom training and Job Corps which serve large numbers of 
participants who were previously outside the labor force, the employment 
gains of trainees are the result of increased labor force participation as 
much as reduced unemployment. For second half 1975 classroom trainees, the 
decline in the percentage outside of the labor force between the pre-entry 
and first post-termination years equaled two-thirds of the increase in 
employment over this period, while the decline in the percentage unemployed 
equaled just one-third. From the pre-entry to second post-termination 
years, the decline in the percent time unemployed equaled one-half the 
increase in employment and the decline in the percent time outside the 
labor force accounted for the other half. For 1976 classroom trainees, the 
increased time in the labor force accounted for three-fifths of the gain in 
employment from the fourth quarter prior to entry to the fourth quarter 
after termination. The same pattern holds for Job Corps. During the two 
year follow-up period, 1977 Corpsmembers were employed 48.0 percent of the 
time compared to 42.3 percent for nonparticipants, and were unemployed 24.7 
percent of the time compared to 26.5 percent for controls. The 1.8 
percentage point differential in time unemployed thus represented less than 
a third of the 5.7 percentage point differential in time employed, with the 
remaining two-thirds reflecting increased participation.
The pattern is somewhat different for OJT. For 1975 on-the-job 
trainees, the decrease in percent time unemployed equaled two-thirds of the 
increase in the percent time employed between the pre-entry and first 
post-termination years. The employment increase from the pre-entry to the 
second post-termination year was totally explained by the decline in 
unemployment, since the percentage not in the labor force was marginally 
higher in the latter period than before entry. Reduced time unemployed 
accounted for three-fourths of the increase in percent time employed from 
the fourth quarter pre-entry to the fourth quarter post-termination for 
fiscal 1976 classroom trainees.
These judgments, based on the averages for all trainees, are confirmed 
by detailed information on the pre/post changes for individual partici 
pants. Among 1975 classroom trainees, 22 percent experienced a decline of 
5 percentage points or more in the percent time employed from the pre-entry 
to second post-termination year. Another 22 percent experienced a change 
of less than 5 percent in either direction. The remaining 56 percent went 
up 5 percentage points or more in time employed. 34/ The increases in 
percentage time employed for those who had zero employment in the year 
before entry accounted for nearly three-fourths of the aggregated increases
90
in percent time employed for all trainees (Table 3.7). One-half of the 
aggregated increases were accounted for by those individuals who had no 
earnings before entry but were employed 90 percent or more of the time in 
the second post-termination year. Persons employed 75 percent or more in 








































































*Est1mated from shift in category; changes may have occurred within category but are not noted. Persons in category assumed 
to have employment equal to central point in category.
For on-the-job trainees, 17 percent of 1975 participants experienced a 
decline in percent time employed from the pre-entry to second post- 
termination year of 5 percent or more, 19 percent stayed roughly the same 
(neither declining nor increasing by over 5 percentage points), and 64 
percent gained substantially (by 5 percentage points or more). While only 
19 percent of OJT participants were not employed during the year before 
entry, their net employment gains accounted for 45 percent of the 
aggregated gains in employment for all OJT participants from the year 
before entry to the second year after termination.
In terms of hourly wages, 28 percent of classroom trainees who worked 
before and after experienced a drop of $.25 or more per hour from the last 
pre-entry job to the predominant job in the second post-termination year. 
Another 17 percent experienced an increase or decrease of no more than $.25 
per hour in either direction, even though a $.35 per hour increase in the 
average wage of classroom trainees would have been needed to keep up with 
inflation. 35/ Persons with zero earnings in the year prior to entry who 
subsequently secured jobs accounted for 70 percent of the aggregated dollar 
wage gains for all classroom trainees (Table 3.8). Excluding the third of 
enrol lees who were previously nonearners, only 38 percent of the classroom 
trainees had experienced substantial hourly earnings increases (defined as 
a move upward of two or more wage brackets as identified in Table 3.8) by 
the second post-termination year, while 18 percent stayed in the same 
bracket and 25 percent declined. Trainees who had jobs before entry that 
paid $2.50 or less per hour accounted for four-fifths of the aggregated 
wage gains among those previously employed--with most of this undoubtedly 


















































Changes in Annual Percent Time Employed From Year Prior to Entrv to 
Second Year After Termination for Second Half Fiscal 1975 Hassroom Trainees
Share of All Trainees with Specific Transition Pattern
Percent Time Employed Second Year Post-Termination 
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Percent Time Employed Second Year Post-Termination 









Share of All Trainees with Specific Transition Patterns
Percent Time Employed Second Year Post-Termination 
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Share of Trainees with Specific Pre-Entry Pattern 
Uho Had Designated Post-Termination Pattern
Percent Time Employed Second Year Post-Termination
Source: Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry), Experiences in the First Two Postpro
gram 
Years, With Pre/Post Comparisons, For Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June 1975 (Washington, D.C.: 



































































Earnings in Last Job Prior to Entry and Predominant Employment Second Post-Termination Year
Classroom Trainees 





































































































































































































*Aggregated wage gains are derived by summing the wage changes for all individuals. These are estimated by using the mid 
points in each wage category and the two-way matrix of post-termination wage distribution by pre-entry wage category.
Source: Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-Up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry), Experiences in the First Two Postprogram Years 
With Pre/Post Comparisons. For Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June 1975 (Washington. D.C.:Employment 
and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, December 1980), Table 56.
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Hourly Earnings Changes
From Year Before Entry to




Percent with no previous earnings
who secured employment during
the second post-termination
year 22.5% 
Percent with no previous earnings
who remained without jobs 11.9 
Percent with previous earnings
who moved up one or more
brackets* 37.9 
Percent who stayed in same bracket 11.8 
Percent who declined one bracket
or more 16.1








Among 1975 on-the-job trainees who worked previously, 29 percent 
experienced a decline of 5 percent or more in hourly wage from the job 
prior to entry to the predominant job in the second post-termination year. 
Another 16 percent changed less than 5 percent in either direction. In 
other words, nearly half did not keep ahead of inflation. 36/ This is 
roughly the same percentage as for classroom trainees. However, where the 
wage gains of the zero prior earners accounted for 70 percent of the 
aggregate wage gains for the classroom trainees, they accounted for only 56 
percent of those for on-the-job trainees. Among all OJT participants with 
prior earnings, half moved up two or more brackets compared to less than 
two-fifths among classroom trainees with earnings. Trainees who had jobs 
before entry that paid $2.50 or less per hour accounted for three-fifths of 
the aggregated wage gains among all trainees who were previously employed.
The changes in annual earnings for individuals reflect the combined 
effects of wage rate and employment rate changes. These change patterns 
further document the importance of increased labor force participation as a 
factor behind earnings gains. Among all second half 1975 classroom 
trainees, 22 percent had earnings declines of $500 or more, comparing the 
year before entry to the second post-termination year, 18 percent had a 
change in either direction of less than $500, and 60 percent went up $500 
or more. The comparable percentages for OJT were 18, 12, and 70 percent, 
respectively. 37/ Classsroom trainees with zero earnings in the year prior 
to entry accounted for 65 percent of the aggregated changes in earnings; 
while those who earned $8,000 or more in the year prior to entry had, on 
average, a loss in earnings. For the OJT participants, the zero earners 
accounted for a smaller but still substantial share of aggregated earnings 
gains. 38/
94
Percent of Aggregated Changes in Earnings Attributed 
to Changes for Persons in Different Pre-Entry Earnings Categories
Second Half 1975
Pre-Entry Second Half 1975 On-The-Job 
Year Earnings Classroom Trainees Trainees







$8000-$9999 -1.9 -3.1 
$10,000 or more
Among 1976 classroom trainees, only 18 percent worked in both the 
fourth quarters before and after termination and experienced more than a 10 
percent annualized earnings gain (during which time the average wage in 
nonagricultural employment rose 16 percent and the effective minimum wage 
by 12 percent) (Table 3.9). The major category of gainers, accounting for 
32 percent of all trainees, were those with no earnings prior who sub 
sequently found jobs. The average annualized earnings gains of this group 
exceeded the aggregated changes for all trainees. The remainder of 
enrollees stayed the same or lost ground. Among OJT participants, the 
first group accounted for a more substantial 27 percent of trainees and the 
second 34 percent. They accounted for two-fifths and nine-tenths, 
respectively, of the aggregated earnings gains.
It is obvious that individuals with no earnings are most likely to 
gain simply because they have more room for improvement. Yet the evidence 
from the CLMS suggests that the groups with the lowest (or no) earnings and 
employment prior to participation gained relative to like individuals who 
did not participate, and that their relative gains accounted for much of 
the net gain of all participants. Among 1976 classroom trainees, 53 
percent were classified as low earners (i.e., persons with under $2,000 
earnings in both 1973 and 1974). These individuals, who were predominantly 
unemployed or outside the labor force before entry, had average 1977 
earnings of $595 above like nonparticipants. Their net gains accounted for 
68 percent of the 1977 aggregated earnings gains for all classroom trainees 
terminating in calendar 1976. Likewise, the low earners, who accounted for 
39 percent of on-the-job trainees, gained an average of over $1,300 
compared to similar nonparticipants, accounting for 59 percent of the 
aggregated earnings gains for all on-the-job trainees. 39/ Among first 
half 1975 CETA classroom training entrants, those who worked less than half 
a year earned $855 above their controls; while those who had worked more 
than half a year earned $1025 less than controls. For OJT participants, 
the gains were $2574, $2139 and $36, respectively. 40/
95
Table 3.9
Annual1zed Earnings Change Patterns for 1976 Trainees 







Earnings in both quarters
which were within 10 percent 3%
Zero earnings in both quarters 27
Losers
Earnings post were at least
10 percent below earnings
prior 7
Earnings prior but no earnings
post 13
Gainers
Earnings post were at least
10 percent above earnings
prior 18





















































Earnings in both quarters
which were within 10 percent 6%
Zero earnings in both quarters 15
Losers
Earnings post were at least
10 percent below earnings
prior 10
Earnings prior but no earnings
post 8
Gainers
Earnings post were at least
10 percent above earnings
prior 27
Earnings post but no earnings
prior 34
Total 100
Source: Westat, Inc. Postproqram Experiences and

























Pre/Post Comparisons for Ternrinees




























Identifying the key factors which produce these employment and 
earnings changes is crucial both to improve the design and targeting of 
training efforts, and to understand the implications of the post-program 
earnings gains realized by trainees. Job Corps, local classroom training, 
and on-the-job training have several distinct elements which combine to 
yield measured outcomes. Occupational training which seeks to improve 
vocational skills is basic to all these activities, but they also include 
remedial education elements as well as activities to improve career 
awareness, motivation, appearance, dependability, confidence, and other 
dimensions of job seeking and job holding skills. Another largely un 
noticed element is sorting, which occurs under training programs in initial 
selection from the universe of need, in making assignments to different 
components, in setting and maintaining standards for completion, and in 
placing trainees subsequently. In some cases, credential ing may be 
involved, with participants receiving degrees or other certifications which 
document their achievements and help them to compete in the labor market. 
There may be varying degrees of job access. At one extreme, completers of 
institutional training may be simply left to find their own jobs, while at 
the other extreme, the employer reimbursement under OJT may be used to buy 
jobs for participants.
There is, presumably, an optimum mix of these elements, both on 
average and in different settings. One or the other of these factors may 
be given too much or too little attention, or may be inadequately designed 
and delivered. For instance, more placement (job access) might be 
necessary where credentials provided by training are not recognized in the 
labor market. Improvements in either placement or credential ing might 
improve employment probabilities in training-related jobs. Longer training 
might result in greater sorting because fewer can make it through the 
obstacle course, but longer training might also provide the time to achieve 
certifiable skills. Greater improvements in employability skills may be 
required in some cases to assure that occupational skills will be applied 
or recognized. To determine such tradeoffs, it is important to determine 
the interrelationships between these elements in producing the changes 
documented for Job Corps, classroom and on-the-job training.
As the benefit-cost analysis of OJT so vividly illustrates, the 
significance of the earnings gains produced by training is also dependent 
on the assumptions about causal factors. If, for instance, the impacts of 
OJT resulted from placement of highly-sorted individuals into OJT assign 
ments similar to their previous work, then the reimbursement to the 
employer would be a windfall, buying jobs for participants at the expense 
of like nonparticipants; in this case, the net benefits to society would be 
much less than the earnings gains of participants and the relative payoff 
of OJT would be less than suggested by the relative success of its par 
ticipants. Thus, the instrumental factors must be considered to give 
meaning to impact estimates.
It is difficult enough to isolate the employment and earnings changes 
produced by training programs; untangling the causal factors is even more
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challenging. While it is possible to get only a very general sense of the 
relative importance of these factors, on average, for Job Corps, OJT, and 
classroom training, these crude judgments are important in making pol-icy 
decisions and in weighing the impact findings.
Training and Occupational Mobility
Training results in modest occupational advancement, predominantly for 
those beginning at the lowest rungs of the occupational ladder who move to 
occupations which are more stable albeit not much better paying nor 
exciting career prospects. Among fiscal 1976 classroom occupational 
trainees with prior work experience, 19 percent were garage workers, 
transportation operatives, laborers, farm workers, or private household 
workers in their longest pre-CETA jobs (Table 3.10). One in ten worked in 
these occupations in their longest post-CETA job. Conversely, 20 percent 
of entrants worked in clerical occupations previously, but the proportion 
increased to 27 percent of post-program jobs. Craftsmen and welders rose 
from 11 percent to 17 percent.
Despite these changes, training did not always achieve its objectives: 
Less than 2 percent of occupational classroom trainees with prior work 
experience were trained for low level jobs as garage workers, laborers, 
household workers, or transportation operatives, even though 10 percent 
ended up in such work. Conversely, 36 percent were trained as clericals 
but only 27 percent of post-program employment was in clerical occupations; 
34 percent were trained as craftsmen and welders even though only half this 
percentage ended up in these occupations.
Occupational progress was even more limited for on-the-job trainees. 
Among trainees with prior job experience, 13 percent worked previously as 
farm and nonfarm laborers, transportation operatives, garage attendants, 
and private household workers; but 15 percent worked in those low level 
occupations in their longest jobs after termination. The proportion in 
clerical jobs did not increase at all, while the proportion in craft and 
welding jobs rose only slightly. The reason there was so little change is 
simple: The aggregate distribution of OJT assignments was very similar to 
the occupational distribution of prior work experiences. The only ex 
ception was that just 6 percent of OJT assignments were as laborers and 
farm workers compared to 18 percent of prior jobs; correspondingly, 21 
percent of trainees previously worked in nonconstruction crafts or as 
nontransportation operatives, but 27 percent of assignments were in these 
fields.
These aggregate patterns result from upward mobility for some in 
dividuals, no change for many and apparent declines for others. Three of 
ten 1976 classroom trainees were trained in the same broad occupational 
categories as their previous work experiences (Table 3.11). Among partici 
pants whose previous jobs were professional or managerial, 37 percent were 
assigned to clerical training, 16 percent to craft jobs and 23 percent to 
service jobs. In contrast, for females with clerical experience, 66 
percent were trained as clericals; while among entrants who had previously 
worked in construction crafts, 57 percent were trained in welding, con 
struction or other crafts. The upward mobility occurred primarily for
98
Table 3.10 
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those who were laborers or service workers. Nearly half of laborers and 
farm workers were trained in the crafts or welding while 45 percent of 
previous service workers were trained as clericals.
Less than half of 1976 classroom trainees who had post-program 
employment experience worked in the same broad occupational classification 
as their training. The correspondence was high for those trained in female 
clerical occupations, as transportation operatives, and as service workers; 
three-fourths of such trainees remained in the same broad category. The 
correspondence was low for professional and nonconstruction craft training, 
where only a third of trainees remained in the same broad occupational 
category.
For 35 percent of on-the-job trainees with prior work experience, OJT 
assignments were in the same broad occupational categories as their longest 
previous employment (Table 3.12). At the lower levels of the occupational 
hierarchy, the correspondence between prior work and the training assign 
ment was much greater than for classroom training. For instance, 47 
percent of persons who previously worked as nontransportation operatives or 
as assemblers were placed in similar assignments under OJT, whereas only 7 
percent of classroom trainees with this type of prior work experience were 
placed in the same category. Among OJT participants who were previously 
laborers, 19 percent were placed in assignments which "trained" them as 
laborers.
Only half of the OJT participants who subsequently worked had their 
longest post-program job in the same occupation as their OJT assignment. 
As with classroom training, correspondence was high in female clerical 
occupations; two-thirds placed in clerical OJT assignments who subsequently 
worked were in clerical positions. Among trainees in construction crafts, 
welding and other crafts, three-fifths of the subsequently employed had 
longest jobs in the same occupational category, a much higher transition 
rate than for classroom trainees in these same occupations. Those trained 
for the top and the bottom of the occupational distribution, i.e., pro 
fessional trainees and individuals assigned to "training" as farm and 
nonfarm laborers, were least likely to transition into the same occu 
pations.
Job Corps is basically a labor market entry mechanism. Few enrol lees 
have held regular full-time jobs for any length of time. Vocational 
training is an integral part of a comprehensive treatment which seeks to 
improve general employability and not necessarily to prepare for a specific 
career. Corpsmembers are young and extremely disadvantaged, and, there 
fore, both highly volatile in career aspirations and difficult to place in 
many occupations. Furthermore, less than a third of entrants stay long 
enough to fully complete vocational training. According to 1978 Job Corps 
placement records, less than half of these completers subsequently found 
jobs in the same occupation. In other words, only one in seven Corps- 
members ended up as a completer with a training-related job (Table 3.13). 
The placement rate for male completers was higher than that for female 
completers, and even though the females who were placed tended to more 
frequently get jobs in the vocation for which they were trained, the 
percentage of females ending up in training-related jobs was smaller than 
for males. Males earned more than females, but women trained in tra-
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Table 3.12
Relationship of Training Assignments to Occupation of Longest Jobs 
Before and After Training, Fiscal 1976 On-The-Oob Trainees
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OCCUPATION OF POST-PROGRAM EMPLOYMENT BY OJT ASSIGNMENT










































































































Source: Westat, Inc. Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey, Fiscal 1976 Entrants, unpublished tabulations.
Table 3.13 
Completion and Placement Rates by Occupation for 1977 Job Corps Enrol lees
All Enrol lees
Sub-professional 
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ditionally male occupations did better than their male counterparts. The 
converse was also true; males trained in traditionally female occupations 
did well relatively and absolutely. However, sex stereotyping was the rule 
rather than the exception. Seven of ten females who completed were trained 
in clerical or health occupations, while two-fifths of male completers were 
trained in construction and forestry.
The "best bets" for these young people, as judged by a composite of 
completion rates, placement rates, job/training match probabilities and 
wages in training-related jobs, were the manual occupations—forestry, 
farming and gardening, construction trades, and industrial production 
(Table 3.14). Clerical, sales and health training were the next best bets. 
Training for subprofessional jobs, service occupations, automotive and 
appliance repair, were less effective as judged by these measures. These 
aggregate data do not tell the whole story, however, since training 
assignments are made, in part, on the basis of ability and prior ex 
perience. For instance, persons in need of intensive remediation are 
usually placed in food service, though they may subsequently receive other 
training if they remain in centers. Adjusting for some of the differences 
in participants in the various clusters, and looking at the employment and 
earnings experience two years post-program, the attractions of the manual 
occupations dimmed, while transportation, clerical, and sales jobs in 
creased in relative payoff.
The conclusion to be drawn from this potpourri of evidence is that 
CETA training produces earnings gains without achieving substantial occu 
pational mobility for more than a small minority of participants. The 
occupational upgrading which occurs in classroom training is mostly from 
laboring and service jobs into craft and clerical work,, On-the-job 
training transforms some laborers into operatives and nonconstruction 
craftsmen. "Quantum leaps" into new careers are achieved by few.
Sorting, Certifying, Training and Placing
Longer classroom training has greater earnings impacts. The 1978 gain 
for 1976 classroom trainees who stayed in CETA over 40 weeks was more than 
six times the gain for those who stayed 11 to 20 weeks (Figure 3.6). The 
payoff of longer training was evident among all subgroups of trainees, but 
particularly so for females. 41/
Table 3.14 
Comparative Outcomes for Various Job Corps Training Occupations































































Source: Joseph Nines and Brian Linder, "Job
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Figure 3.6 
Earnings Impacts and Length of Training for Fiscal 1976 CETA Enrol lees
1978 Annual Earnlnos Differential of 
Classroom Trainees vs. Controls 
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Source: Westat, Inc. Supplement Number 1 to Net Impact Report No. 1, Impact on 1978 Earnings 
of New FY 1974 CETA Enrollees in Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C.: Em 
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Less dependable estimates of 1977 earnings impacts for first half 1975 
classroom trainees also suggest that long training pays off, but somewhat 
less substantially than for 1976 trainees and with most of this effect 
concentrated among individuals who were previously high earners: 42/
Estimated 1977 Earnings 
Differential Relative to 
Controls for First Half 
1975 Participants
Length of Classroom 
Training





















The earnings impacts of on-the-job training increase with length of 
participation up to a certain point, then decline precipitously. Success 
ful OJT ends when the participant is considered ready and is hired. Those 
staying longest may be individuals who are not working out or are hardest 
to train, and are therefore less likely to be employed on termination. On 
the other hand, those with short duration participation include individuals
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who are not able to perform, those who can find better jobs, and some who 
are so good they are immediately hired by the employer.
Length of stay has always been a key factor in Job Corps. Among 1977 
entrants, two-fifths dropped out within 90 days, another 30 percent stayed 
longer but did not complete their vocational training assignment; only 30 
percent were full program completers. During the 12-18 months period after 
termination, the annualized earnings per week of male completers were $1290 
above those of their controls, while those of partial completers were $65 
less. The percent of time employed was higher by 16 percent among male 
completers but only 4 percent for partial completers. The earnings gains 
of male completers accounted for six-sevenths of the aggregated earnings 
impacts accruing to male participants during the first two post-program 
years. Among females without children, completers had annualized earnings 
$1580 above controls compared to the partial completers who earned $760 
more. Female completers accounted for three-fifths of the earnings gains 
for all female participants. Thus, completion, as well as longer duration 
of stay, seemed to be a key factor in the aggregate Job Corps impacts. 43/
Differences Between Job Corps Terminees and Controls, 
12 to 18 Months After Termination, by Completion Status
Fraction of time employed 
Male dropouts +.047 
Male partial completers +.044 
Male completers +.155
Earnings per week 
Male dropouts $+3.92 
Male partial completers -1.25 
Male completers +24.79
Probability in military during 
Male dropouts+.032 
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Male dropouts +.049 

















The disproportionately greater payoff of longer institutional training 
in Job Corps or local classroom programs might result from several factors:
First, the training activity might improve skills and abilities in 
proportion to the length of stay. If such skills are accepted and utilized 
in the labor market not as a continuum but at certain benchmark levels such 
as a GED or ability to type 60 words per minute, longer training would be 
associated with more than proportionately greater gains in post-program 
employment and earnings.
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Second, the training activity might serve as a mechanism for sorting 
the "winners" from the "losers." Even though the previously-cited CLMS and 
Job Corps impact estimates compare like people as matched by control 
variables, participants with the same demographic characteristics and 
backgrounds might be different in their ability to perform in training. 
Those succeeding and staying longer might be the ones most likely to 
succeed in subsequent jobs.
Third, longer stay may lead to a higher probability of placement 
because those who are sorted and credentialed are easier to place, or 
simply because the delivery agent has more time to find a suitable job or 
to develop a commitment to the participant.
These factors are interrelated, but it is possible to get some sense 
of their relative importance. There is no doubt that training is an obsta 
cle course, that longer training is more demanding, and that the more able 
are more likely to be assigned to the longer courses in recognition of 
their greater chances of completion. Nevertheless, the degree of in- 
program sorting under local classroom training appears modest, according to 
evidence for 1977 training participants. Youths, blacks, high school 
dropouts, and persons with employment barriers were somewhat more likely 
than other more employable subgroups among participants to drop out of 
training before completion (Figure 3.7). When the characteristics of 1977 
dropouts and completers are weighted according to the post-program earnings 
increases related to these characteristics (as estimated from regression 
equations for all second-half 1975 CETA participants), the projected 
earnings of the dropouts were 89.0 percent of the mean for all nonsummer 
CETA participants while the projected earnings of completers are 91.4 
percent. 44/ It is important to stress, however, that three-fifths of the 
short-stayers who report on completion status are self-described completers 
not dropouts. Prime working age participants, whites, high school 
graduates, and persons who were previously not in the labor force were more 
likely to be assigned to long duration training as indicated by the 
duration-of-stay distribution among self-reported completers. These 
differences in duration of planned training and in probabilities of 
completion combined to determine length of stay. Trainees who were in 
their prime working years, whites, high school graduates, post-secondary 
students, primary earners, and persons who were predominantly employed 
before entry into CETA had longer duration of stay.
While sorting is evident, the end result is hardly an explanation for 
the massive gain differentials between long stayers and short stayers. The 
CLMS-CPS impact estimates control for most of the key variables in the 
employability equation, so that the long stayers, while somewhat different 
in identifiable characteristics from early leavers, are matched with and 
compared to individuals with similar characteristics who do not par 
ticipate. The CLMS-CPS matching variables may not pick up all the effects 
of sorting. Yet if additional factors were a major element in explaining 
the substantial gains for long stayers relative to early leavers, negative 
earnings impacts would be expected for short stayers relative to their 
controls; i.e., if the "losers" according to characteristics not considered 
in the CPS-CLMS matching were concentrated among the early leavers as a 
result of program sorting, they would do worse off in the post-program 
period than their controls selected according to the matching variables.
Figure 3.7 
Distribution of 1977 Classroom Trainees by Duration of Stay and Completion
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The annual earnings of short-duration stayers (1-10 weeks) in classroom 
training (among all trainees who left during calendar 1976) were only $3 
below those of controls in 1977 and $110 above in 1978. In no way, then, 
does sorting explain the estimated $1589 earnings gain in 1977 of classroom 
trainees staying over 40 weeks. 45/
The sorting which occurs in Job Corps is greater because of the longer 
duration of planned training, the competency standards for completion, and 
the residential nature of the program. Less than one in three Job Corps 
entrants completes compared to three of four classroom trainees. Entrants 
in 1977 who had a high school diploma were almost half again as likely to 
complete as high school dropouts. Having no children increased the chances 
by a fifth; having previous arrests reduced them by a tenth, while prior 
employment in a regular job increased the chances by the same pro 
portion. 46/
Again, however, the regression analysis used to estimate net impacts 
for completers, partial completers and dropouts compared them to like 
persons and thus considered most of the measurable differences resulting 
from the differing completion probabilities. The matching variables may 
not have captured all the differences between participants who completed 
and those who dropped out, yet if the substantial gains of completers were 
to be explained by the sorting which was not controlled by matching 
variables in regression equations, then early dropouts should have 
performed far worse than their controls during the post-program period. 
Excluding the first quarter transition period, dropouts had earnings above 
their controls. During the 12 to 18 month follow-up period, the annualized 
gains of male and female dropouts were $200 and $300, respectively, perhaps 
reflecting that the control variables did not fully capture the motivation 
and energy which led to enrollment in the first case, perhaps because some 
of the early leavers were go-getters who left Job Corps because it did not 
meet expectations, or perhaps because some dropouts benefited from the 
experience or a few got placement help; certainly, however, this does not 
suggest a degree of in-program sorting (over and above that captured by the 
regression techniques) which would explain the four and five times larger 
gains for completers.
If sorting occurs in classroom training and Job Corps but is not a 
major explanative factor in the estimated gains from longer duration of 
stay, this suggests that either credentials and skills improvements accrue 
and pay off disproportionately with length of stay, or else placement 
chances increase because of greater ease in placing long stayers or because 
of greater placement efforts on their behalf. Placement is, without 
question, a key factor. The benefits of training accrue chiefly to those 
who enter employment at termination. Those 1976 classroom trainees who 
were placed according to prime sponsor records earned $1400 more than their 
controls in 1977, compared to zero gain for individuals not placed (Figure 
3.8). Among on-the-job trainees, the gain was $1600 for those placed with, 
again, no gain for those not placed. The payoffs of placement were 
significant for all major race/sex subgroups among both classroom and 
on-the-job trainees.
It is not surprising that those who were placed had more employment 
and earnings immediately after termination. Yet the placement effect was
Placement at Termination as
Figure 3.8 
a Determinant of Post-Program Earnings Gains
Annual Earnings Differentials of 
Classroom Trainees vs. Controls 
(Fiscal 1976 Trainees Terminatina in Calendar 1976)
Annual Earnings Differentials of
On-The-Job Trainees vs. Controls
(Fiscal 1976 Trainees Terminating in Calendar 1976)
All Trainees, 
















































Source: Westat, Inc. Impact on 1977 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in Selected Program 
Activities (Washington, D.C.: Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, 
Evaluation and Research, December 1980); Westat, Inc. Supplement Number 1 to Net Impact 
Report No. 1, Impact on 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in Selected Program 
Activities (Washington, D.C.:Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, 
Evaluation and Research, February 1981).
112
not just a transitional one. Participants placed at termination from 
classroom training and OJT had earnings $1100 and $1200, respectively, 
greater than their controls in the second post-program year. There is 
further evidence to suggest that the payoffs of longer training were not 
primarily the result of greater initial employment resulting from place 
ment. For one thing, the employment gap between short stayers and long 
stayers increased over time, the opposite of what would be expected if 
placement were the sole factor in the payoff of longer stay. For instance, 
among 1975 trainees with less than 60 days stay, the percent of time 
employed rose from 44 percent during the quarter after exit to 50 percent 
during the first post-termination year and 55 percent during the second 
post-program year. In contrast, the employment rates for trainees with 
more than half a year of participation increased from 42 percent to 57 
percent and 66 percent, respectively. In other words, the employment rate 
differential between early leavers and long stayers increased from nothing 
in the first quarter to 7 percentage points in the first year, and then to 
11 percentage points in the second. 47/ The jobs secured through placement 
may have been more stable or the long stayers more successful in their 
initial employment, but long stayers were also apparently more able to 
secure jobs past the point when placement was a factor.
Placement chances increase with length of stay. Among 1977 classroom 
trainees, the prime sponsor placement rates were as follows for individuals 
with placement status recorded: 47/
Length of Stay Placement Rate




The evidence suggests that trainees who stay longer are more likely to 
complete, and that completion makes a person more employable. The 
proportion of persons placed among those reporting themselves as dropouts 
from training was the same for persons staying over 180 days as for those 
staying a shorter period. The placement rate among self-described 
completers increased only modestly with their length of stay in classroom 
training. The overall upward trend in placement with duration of stay was, 
thus, largely the result of increased chances that those with long duration 
of stay would be completers. These judgments must be hedged by the fact 
that participants may have considered themselves completers when they were 
placed and dropouts if they were not; moreover, half of participants did 
not even know whether they completed. Nevertheless, the data are 
suggestive. 49/
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Placement Rate for Fiscal 1977 Classroom Trainees 
With Record of Placement or Nonplacement
Length Self-Described Self-Described 
of Stay Completers Dropouts




The evidence from Job Corps is also suggestive, albeit limited. When 
asked whether Job Corps training, work experience, or education were 
helpful in obtaining at least one job, 63 percent of completers, compared 
to only 35 percent of partial completers and 26 percent of dropouts, 
responded affirmatively. Only 41 percent of Job Corps leavers reported 
contact with a Job Corps placement agency or the Employment Service; but 
the rate among completers was 46 percent compared to 38 percent among 
partial completers, after adjusting by regression for race, age, sex, and 
center type. For those reporting a contact, the proportions reporting a 
resulting placement were 45 percent and 39 percent, respectively, again 
after adjusting for differentials. In other words, the placement effec 
tiveness, although limited even for completers, was a third higher than for 
partial completers. 50/
Finally, length of stay has an independent impact after placement 
status is considered and these effects increase over the period out of the 
program. The marginal effect on quarterly annualized earnings of an extra 
month of classroom training has been estimated for males and females in the 
second-half fiscal 1975 enrol lee group, holding constant placement and 
adjusting for the differences between long stayers and short stayers in 
age, family size and marital status, race, barriers to employment, previous 
employment patterns, education, and veteran's status. After controlling 
for all these factors, the pre-entry earnings of those who stayed longer in 
classroom training were less for males but more for females than the 
earnings of the short stayers, i.e., the more employable males (after con 
trolling for measurable variables) apparently left early, while the more 
employable females stayed longer. 51/ The post-program earnings impacts of 
longer stay must be interpreted in this light. For males, the increases 
related to longer stay must be added to the lower likely earnings because 
of factors not controlled in the regression variables. For females, on the 
other hand, the gains in post-program must be discounted since those with 
higher earnings potential among female classroom trainees were more likely 
to stay. Nevertheless, it is clear that each extra month of training paid 
off for both males and females, peaking for males in the 6 through 12 month 
post-termination period while continuing upward for females.
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This does not diminish the importance of placement as both an 
independent and interrelated success factor. Besides the fact that 
placement by itself looms so large in predicting earnings gains, it is an 
instrumental variable that can be affected by policy and management 
decisions. Granted that placement is easier for longer duration stayers 
and those who have completed, and that length of stay and completion have 
their own strong effects independent of placement, it is important to 
understand how placement affects outcomes.
There is unquestionably a sorting effect in placement separate from 
the sorting which occurs in completion. More than a fourth of the Title 
IIBC terminees that prime sponsors recorded as placed in 1980 had found 
their own jobs. 52/ In the remaining cases, the prime sponsors may have 
worked harder for those more easily placed, or they may have had greater 
success with those who were more employable. At any rate, the placement 
chances were much greater for those who were more employable even before 
training (Figure 3.9). White males, family heads and married participants, 
high school graduates and trainees age 20 and above had noticeably higher 
placement from both OJT and classroom training. While the CLMS-CPS 
estimates of net impacts for those placed and not placed controlled for the 
differences, it is likely that placement reflected charac- 
or motivation not captured in the demographic and background 
This is suggested by estimated annualized earnings in each of 
pre-entry and eight post-termination quarters of second half 
classroom trainees who were placed and not placed after 







marital status, race, barriers to employment, previous employment patterns, 
education, veteran's status, and length of stay. Those who were placed, 
indeed, had higher earnings in the pre-entry period even after adjusting 
for these factors. The pre-program earnings for males who were placed were 
.8 percent higher than the average for male classroom trainees, while for 
females who were placed they were 5.3 percent higher. Yet the post-program 
payoffs for those who were placed were of a much larger order of 
magnitude--two-fifths higher for males who were placed than for those not 
placed, and nearly three-fourths more for female participants who were
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Figure 3.9
Placement Rate Fiscal 1977 Classroom and 
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placed than for those not placed. Moreover, the differentials in favor of 
those placed remained quite large up to two years after termination.
Annualized Quarterly Earnings Differential Between 









































The interpretation is that sorting does occur in placement which is 
separate from that occurring during participation and reflected in length 
of stay. The variables used in the CLMS-CPS impact estimates picked up 
some but not all of the differences, since even when the CLMS-CPS match 
variables and more were accounted for, those placed earned more than those 
not placed prior to entry. Yet the magnitude of these pre-entry differen 
tials was modest relative to the post-program earnings differentials which 
persisted past the immediate transition period when placement would have 
had its greatest payoff. This suggests, again, that placement accessed 
better paying and more stable jobs, or ones where trainees could apply 
their skills and advance more-rapidly.
The Invisible Ingredients
More than a third of local classroom trainees participate in non- 
occupational or other remedial activities. Occupational training is 
usually supplemented by some degree of basic skills training, job search 
assistance, and transition services. In Job Corps, expenditures for 
remedial education, counseling, world-of-work training, and health in 
struction exceed the costs of vocational training. These other activities 
have several basic missions: first, they seek to improve reading and 
writing skills and to provide academic credentials; second, they attempt to 
alter attitudes and behavior, motivating participants and helping them 
adjust to the mores of the labor market; and third, they aim to provide job 
knowledge and job seeking skills to facilitate labor market entry. 
Attitudinal change, basic skill gains, and employability skills improve 
ments are difficult to measure, and because service components designed to 
achieve these effects are usually short duration or supplementary ac 
tivities, the impacts are not large enough to be easily identified even if
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the measurements were refined. Further, the attitude and employability 
skill changes which are achieved may not be manifested in significant 
employment and earnings changes or occupational mobility. For these 
reasons, these "other" remedial activities have largely remained the 
invisible ingredients in the training stew. The available evidence, which 
is largely the product of the myriad research and demonstration activities 
mounted under the Youth Employment and Demonstration Act, suggests that 
these are not "extras," but rather basic ingredients, at least for the 
younger program participants (under age 22) who represented half of all 
trainees in CETA programs in 1980.
The Job Corps provides the best evidence concerning these factors, 
since the treatments are more intensive and the impacts most observable. 
The findings that Job Corps increases post-program employment but not 
wages, that only three in ten entrants complete vocational training, that 
placement activities are limited, and that the job/training match rate is 
modest, suggest that something else is happening other than vocational 
skills improvements and increased job access through placement leverage. 
But the evidence is more than inferential. During 1975 through 1977, a 
sample of Job Corps participants and a control group of applicants who did 
not participate were interviewed at the entry point for participants and 
approximately 18 months later, using a battery of questions scaled to 
address 22 different dimensions of job-related noneconomic impacts- 
including on-the-job behavior, job interests and attitudes, understanding 
of the value of work, attitudes towards self, peers, family and authority 
figures, as well as health and nutritional behavior. The study documented 
significant impacts on attitudes about self and society for participants 
who stayed more than 90 days in Job Corps. Self-esteem increased, par 
ticularly for females. Family relations improved both for males and 
females. Use of leisure time improved for males and somewhat for females. 
Attitudes toward authority improved while criminal involvement declined 
(Table 3.15).
Attitudinal changes, as measured by these psychometric test questions, 
were reflected more tangibly in behavioral changes. During the first year 
after Job Corps, 1977 Corpsmembers were a third less likely to be arrested 
than like nonparticipants (10.9 per hundred vs. 16.7 per hundred), with 
arrests for theft only a fifth as high (2.1 per hundred rather than 10.3 
per hundred). At the two-year post-termination point, Corpsmembers were a 
fourth less likely to be married, one-sixth less likely to be heads of 
families, a fifth less likely to have had children, and an eighth less 
likely to have had children out of wedlock. During the 18 to 24 month 
post-termination period, Corpsmembers spent 4.4 percent of weeks in 
college, vocational or technical school, or six times more than the control 
group. Cumulative moves between cities for job opportunities (excluding 
Job Corps relocations) were twice as high for Corpsmembers as controls in 
the first year and a half after termination, reflecting the maturation and 
greater self-reliance resulting from the residential experience. 53/
The evidence of substantial in-program and post-program gains for Job 
Corps can be contrasted with the findings of the supported work youth 
program which served dropouts very much like the Job Corps enrol lees, 
providing structured and well-supervised full-time employment in local 
communities. During the period of supported work participation there was
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Table 3.15 
Summary of Results of the Job Corps Non-Economic Impacts Study*
Impact 
Dimension
Results for Enrol lees
Who Stayed 
Three Months or 
More in Job Corps 
(Persisters)
Job-Related Impacts
Job seeking skills Improved 
Job holding skills No change 
Job knowledge No change 
Work relevant attitudes No change 
Work ethic No change 
Job skill confidence Declined 
Job satisfaction Improved 
Vocational aspirations
(right now) No change 
Vocational aspirations
(two years ago) No change 
Vocational aspirations
(two years from now) No change 
Social-Attitudinal Impacts




Family relations Improved 
Leisure time Improved
Health Impacts
Health information No change 
Nutrition information No change 



























Improvements and declines are those where statistical significance 
was achieved on the change measures.
Source: Abt Associates, "The Noneconomic Impacts of the Job Corps," 
Assessments of Job Corps Performance and Impacts, Volume I 
(Washington, D.C.:Government Printing Office, May 1980), 
pp. 407-565.
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evidence of a decline in hard drug usage relative to controls (11.3 percent 
of supported work participants compared to 14.2 percent of controls 
reported use of heroin, cocaine or psychedelic drugs), but an increase in 
marijuana and alcohol usage (56.9 percent compared to 52.4 percent, and 
68.1 percent compared to 65.5 percent, respectively). The average number 
of arrests was higher for participants (.26 vs. .20) and the percent 
arrested was higher (17.1 vs. 16.8). During the 10 to 18 month period 
after entry, by which time most participants had left supported work, 16.8 
percent of participants experienced at least one arrest compared to 15.2 
percent of controls. During the 19-27 month point, participants in the 
follow-up sample were less frequently arrested than controls (10.4 percent 
vs. 13.6 percent) but for the small group followed-up 28 to 36 months, the 
situation was again in favor of nonparticipants (23.1 percent vs. 16.7 
percent). The same patterns were evident in number of arrests. In the 
post-program period, participants and controls were about equally likely to 
use marijuana and alcohol and participants were more likely to use drugs 
other than marijuana and alcohol. 54/ In other words, it appears that 
during the period these young adults were employed they were more likely to 
use alcohol and marijuana, and more likely to be arrested, than when they 
were unemployed and searching for work. Likewise the post-program earnings 
effects of supported work were minimal for youth participants.
The differences between the Job Corps and supported work impacts may 
be due to either the residential factor or the greater impacts of a 
training rather than work approach. Indeed, it appears that training 
activities may be somewhat more likely to alter attitudes and behavior. 
For instance, the Career Intern Program was an intensive alternative 
education program for mostly poor and minority dropouts and dropout-prone 
youth, i.e., the same types who enter Job Corps and were in supported work. 
The CIP approach included low teacher-pupil ratios, individualized, 
self-paced and experienced-based instruction, linkages with the world- 
of-work, and an emphasis on student decisionmaking, peer group support and 
motivation. In other words, it shared many of the elements of Job Corps 
treatment. While CIP participants experienced rapid educational gains and 
improved employment, three other impacts were measured by pre- and post- 
program tests for participants and a control group using the Career 
Development Inventory (Super, 1970), the Self-Esteem Inventory (Coopers- 
town, 1967), and the Internal-External Scale (Rotter, 1966). These tests 
demonstrated a uniform and statistically significant effect on career 
planning, career development resources, but not career information. There 
was a slight positive effect on self-esteem, and no statistically sig 
nificant effect on locus of control. 55/
A test of the impacts of in-school guidance, counseling, motivation, 
and employability skills development efforts was provided by the Youth 
Career Development demonstration which consisted of 36 projects offering 
5-10 hours weekly of instruction and other activities for disadvantaged 
students during or after the school day. In each site, control groups were 
drawn from like individuals, and the participants and their controls were 
given a battery of tests at entry and exit (one school year) which included 
subsets of questions designed to measure changes in vocational attitudes, 
work-relevant attitudes, sex-stereotyped perspectives and self-esteem, plus 
job knowledge, job holding and job seeking skills. The participants gained
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significantly relative to controls in all areas except job knowledge, where 
their gains fell just short of statistical significance, and in self- 
esteem, where there were no changes for participants or controls.
Big gainers in employability skills and attitudes were more likely to 
have positive labor market outcomes than below average gainers. 56/
Status Three-Months After End of School Year For 
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Even though the transition services yielded statistically significant 
gains in employability skills and attitudes, and measurable gains were 
related to positive labor market outcomes, the compounding of the two 
modest relationships resulted in limited, though positive, post-program 
improvements for participants relative to controls. 57/
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Post-Program Employment and Education Status 
of Participants 1n School-to-Work Transition Projects
Three Months After Eight Months After 
End of School Year End of School Year
Participants Controls Difference Participants Controls Difference
Full-time work 27.6 26.5 +1.1 26.9 25.5 +1.4 
Part-time work 40.6 37.9 +2.7 50.5 42.6 +7.9 
Education and
work 32.6 32.2 -.4 40.5 33.7 +6.8 
Education and no
work 15.0 19.5 -4.5 16.3 21.7 -5.4 
No work, no
school, no
training 10.9 15.0 -4.1 5.1 9.4 -4.3
It appears that change on some of the dimensions was more critical to 
outcomes than change on others. As an example, the Jobs for Delaware 
Graduates (JDG) program was a variant of YCD. It used a specially-created 
business-oriented but broad-based intermediary to provide transition 
services very similar in hours of activity and costs to those of YCD to 
seniors in selected high schools in Delaware. JDG focused solely on 
students who wanted to go immediately into the full-time labor market after 
graduation but were expected to have problems. The aim of JDG was not 
personal or character development to the extent of most YCD projects, but 
rather the provision of the specific skills and help needed to get a job. 
JDG produced statistically significant gains for participants (measured 
relative to matched students in comparable high schools in Delaware which 
were not served by JDG) on only two of the seven measures, compared to 
statistically significant gains on five of the seven scales for YCD. Of 
critical importance, however, JDG participants gained more on the job 
seeking and job holding skills dimensions, i.e., where the program placed 
its greatest emphasis.
Difference Between Gains of Participants and Controls 
as Percent of Standard Deviation of Pretest Scores on Each Measure
YCD JDG
Self-esteem .004 .096
Sex stereotyping .239* .073
Job seeking skills .175* .227*
Work relevant attitudes .156* .012
Job holding skills .099* .160*
Job knowledge .077 -.021
Vocational attitudes .142* -.140
* Statistically significant
JDG also placed more emphasis on job development as well as arranging 
placements before the end of the school year. It did not rely solely on 
attitudinal changes in participants to yield improved labor market 
outcomes. There was, as a result, a substantial difference in post-program 
outcomes. JDG increased the chances of full-time employment three months 
after termination by 17 percentage points, compared to the less than 2
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percentage point increment attributable to YCD. On the other hand, JDG 
youth were less likely than their matched controls to be in school or 
training subsequently. 58/
The gains in employability skills documented for these in-school 
transition projects might be contrasted with the tested outcomes for 
participants in summer employment programs. The typical summer program 
emphasizes work experience with, at most, a day or half-day each week of 
"enrichments." The total summer treatments average 230 hours, or approxi 
mately one-half the hours in YCD. Several different evaluations of the 
summer program using the same tests as for YCD and JDG found no gains for 
summer participants relative to control groups on any of the measured 
dimensions. Even in summer demonstration programs which mixed work and 
transition services half and half, or provided full-time vocational 
exploration activities or transition services during the summer months, 
there was no evidence of statistically significant gains on the same tests 
where impacts were noted for YCD and JDG. There is some evidence that 
these summer interventions reduced in-program but not post-program arrest 
rates. They increased modestly the chances of returning to school and of 
working while in school. 59/ But they did not, apparently, have a major 
impact on employability skills and attitudes.
The Job Search Assistance demonstration provided short (one to four 
week) interventions coupling formal instruction in job search techniques 
with supervised job search activities for youth already looking for work 
but with little success. There was almost no emphasis on personal or 
character development, occupational guidance, or vocational exploration. 
Yet the evidence suggests that the help provided made a substantial 
difference. In one site, an average of 83 hours of activities included 
supervised "work" in searching and applying for jobs combined with 
instruction in resume writing and employer interaction. The same set of 
pre- and post-tests were applied as for YCD. There was no evidence of 
improvement over the short period of the intervention even on the job 
seeking skills subtests where a gain would be most likely. 60/ Yet the 
post-program labor market outcomes were impressive:




(10.5 weeks post-termination) 63.6% 47.7% 
Second follow-up
26.5 weeks post-termination) 77.1 73.2 
Third follow-up
(37.5 weeks post-termination) 79.3 78.0 
Fourth follow-up
(45.5 weeks post-termination) 79.2 81.8
An even shorter-duration intervention was tested which provided two 
days of non-stipended job search assistance to young Employment Service 
applicants who were matched to a control group of nonparticipants. At the 
six-week follow-up point, the actual employment rates were 51 percent for
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participants and 42 percent for controls, even though the latter were more 
employable. At the three-month follow-up point, some of the effect had 
faded but there were still noticeable differences. Finally, a study of job 
search assistance programs under the Work Incentive Program found that 
among persons under age 21 who participated, the employment rate after 
leaving the program was 48 percent compared to 25 percent among youth 
enrolled in routine WIN services. 61/
In summary, "other" training activities can result in documented 
changes in employability skills and attitudes as well as altering behavior, 
such as criminal activity, which may undermine successful performance in 
the labor market. While improvements along these dimensions are associated 
with greater post-program success, the changes achieveable with short- 
duration local interventions are not of a magnitude to dramatically alter 
employment and earnings. Quite reasonably, long-duration and intensive 
programs have greater measurable impacts. Structured environments in a 
residential setting or in alternative schools appear to change attitudes 
and skills more than when activities are provided in regular work and 
learning environments. There is little evidence that work activities per 
se change attitudes and awarenesses. Post-program benefits can be realized 
without measurable changes in employability skills or attitudes. This is 
the case with job search assistance. Here the key is providing the minimum 
necessary at the point it is needed. The behavioral and motivational 
interventions also appear to work best when the intervention is "going with 
the flow." For instance, there are rapidly increasing probabilities of 
labor force participation in employment with each passing teen year. 
Disadvantaged youth lag behind more advantaged youth in the time of first 
part-time in-school work, the time of first summer employment, and the 
point of the first full-time bridge job. Apparently it is possible to 
speed up this entry process by providing first summer employment ex 
periences. High school graduates entering the full-time work force will 
almost always get full-time jobs after a period of search. Focusing on 
those who are interested in work rather than continued study and providing 
the needed tools can apparently hasten this process without marked changes 
in measurable employability skills. Likewise, there is a dramatic decline 
in the propensity for crime and illegitimacy over the teen years and early 
twenties. A program such as Job Corps is apparently able to speed up the 
maturation process somewhat while providing a constraining setting for the 
most critical part of this at-risk period.
All these judgments are highly speculative because the measures of 
change are suspect, because the changes produced are modest, and because 
the relationships between in-program changes and pos -I rc9 ram outcomes are 
complex. Nevertheless, it does seem that motivation, maturation, and 
employability skills are malleable and that interventions can produce 
improvements which affect short-term labor market success, at least for 
younger CETA participants.
The evidence on remedial education is somewhat more dependable because 
changes can be measured using refined and relatively accepted standardized 
tests, and since credentials are awarded which document achievement- 
academic credit for work experience, the GED and the diploma.
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Among all persons 14-21 who participated in CETA programs during 1978, 
19.0 percent reported receipt of basic education services, 2.3 percent 
English language training and 12.6 percent GED training, although the same 
individuals may have participated in both GED and basic education, and 
although the total hours of treatment varied widely. Among young high 
school dropouts participating in CETA, a third reported receipt of basic 
education and a third reported GED training (the same individuals may have 
received both). 62/ All Job Corpsmembers except those with a high school 
diploma and with tested competencies at an adequate level--all but a tenth 
of entrants—participate in either basic education or remedial education 
usually half-day or 20 hours weekly. How effective are these remedial 
education offerings?
In a recent Job Corps experiment with various education approaches, 
over 8000 Corpsmembers were tested at point of assignment to education 
programs and after 90 and 150 hours of instruction, representing approxi 
mately 19 and 30 weeks, respectively, of Job Corps participation. Ninety 
hours in the traditional Job Corps reading and language arts classes 
yielded a gain of 1.5 years in reading achievement (according to the SAT 
test). Over the same period in mathematics classes, the gain was 1.0 years 
in mathematics. At the 150 hour point, the reading gain was 2.1 years, 
i.e., the gain rate per hour from 90 to 150 hours was only three-fifths of 
that in the first 90 hours, but still quite substantial. 63/ For the 
1972-1974 period when gains tests were a regular part of Job Corps, the 
monthly gain rates of Job Corpsmembers averaged 2.0 and 2.3 months of 
reading and math achievement, respectively. 64/ The more current data 
translate into monthly gain rates of 3.3 and 2.2, respectively (assuming a 
10-month school year to achieve one school year's increase on the SAT 
tests).
The Career Intern Program offered a test of an alternative education 
approach emphasizing individualized learning, high teacher-student ratios, 
and infusion of education materials with work-related information in a 
setting designed to maximize positive reinforcement and peer interaction. 
This approach apparently increased the learning rates of dropout-prone 
youth. Over half a year of treatment, youth in the alternative schools 
moved from the 36.57 percentile in the distribution of the Metropolitan 
Achievement Test to the 40.08 percentile, or by 3.51 percentage points, 
whereas the control groups (in regular schools) advanced from 36.60 to 
37.97 or by 1.37 percentage points. In mathematics, the increase for 
treatment was 26.20 to 30.11 or 3.91 percentage points compared to an 
increase from 28.55 to 29.18 or by .63 percentage points for controls. In 
both cases, the gains of the participants were statistically signifi 
cant. 65/ If no extra intervention had occurred, it is assumed that the 
youth would have the same position on the distribution at post-test as at 
pre-test.
While remedial education activities can advance tested reading and 
math competencies substantially, only a minority of CETA participants with 
educational deficiencies can be brought up to the level where they can be 
credentialed with a high school equivalency (GED) certificate. As an 
example, because Job Corpsmembers have an average tested reading capability 
below the sixth grade level at entry into the program, and because the 
average duration of stay is only six months, an increase of two grade
125
levels achievable in this time brings the average up only to the eighth 
grade level. Only one-sixth of enrol lees are eligible on entry or attain a 
seventh grade level of reading during their stay, which is considered the 
minimum to begin GED preparation. Two-thirds of these participate in a GED 
program, 65 percent complete, and nine of ten who complete take and pass 
the state GED test. 66/ Thus, only 7 percent of Job Corps participants 
acquire a GED, which translates into a 5 percentage point higher likelihood 
of having a GED or diploma than for like nonparticipants. 67/
In local CETA programs, which serve a less disadvantaged youth 
population containing more individuals closer to the GED standards, the 
record of success is roughly the same as for Job Corps. Under the Youth 
Employment and Training Programs and Youth Community Conservation and 
Improvement Projects, the number of GEDs received equalled 7.8 percent of 
all dropouts who participated in fiscal 1980. 68/
There is some evidence that the GED certificate pays off in the labor 
market, albeit less than a regular diploma. Adjusting for race, age, 
occupational training cluster, and entry education status, 1977 male Job 
Corps participants who completed a GED had a 68 percent chance of em 
ployment at 18 months after exit, compared to 63 percent for others. For 
females without children, the employment rates were 60 percent for those 
with a GED compared to 51 percent for those without one. Male GED 
recipients had the same post-program employment rates, but lower earnings, 
than individuals who entered Job Corps with a high school diploma; while 
for females without children, the employment rate for those entering with a 





Work can serve a training function, and the historical emphasis on 
subsidized employment activities under CETA has, in part, been defended by 
the claim that work experience will increase future employability. This 
might occur in several possible ways: Some individuals lack job ex 
perience. They do not know how to interact with coworkers and supervisors, 
how to accept and follow-through on instructions, or how to conform to 
worksite mores. They may have fears about the unknown or may be unable to 
get a job because they lack any work experience on their resumes. For such 
individuals, a subsidized job might teach employability skills, help to 
overcome fears and provide an employment reference. Work can also be 
structured in combination with education or training components. There are 
some individuals who may not be willing to sit in a classroom all day, but 
will participate a few hours daily if this is required to secure a job the 
remainder of the time. A subsidized job may also be used as a structured 
training site to upgrade skills and credentials, in which case the aim will 
be learning not just output. Alternatively, there may be part-time work 
and part-time training, or a sequence of work and training, which may be 
coordinated to provide specific skills. Finally, the subsidized job may 
also be used to screen and train workers for permanent entry into regular 
unsubsidized jobs in the public or nonprofit sectors, which account for as 
many as one-third of all jobs in our economy. Because the subsidy for work 
experience or PSE equals the full wage plus training costs, rather than the 
subsidy of half the wages plus training costs available to private em 
ployers under OJT, greater risks and a wider gap between hiring require 
ments and the credentials of those hired can, in theory, be achieved in the 
public sector.
While in all these cases, the subsidized work experience can be 
assumed to have some positive post-program effects, there are other factors 
which might minimize employability impacts. A subsidized job in the public 
or nonprofit sector may simply utilize existing skills, providing a wage 
which is largely offset by output. This occurs when job requirements are 
well-matched with the skill levels of participants. It is possible, in 
fact, for skills and productivity to exceed wages, so that the public and 
nonprofit employers reap a double windfall benefit from putting the 
unemployed to work. Work experience of this sort may help to avoid the 
deterioriation of skills or motivation, and it may be a better reference 
than an extended period of joblessness, so that it could increase the 
likelihood of employment subsequently. On the other hand, the jobless 
person can look for work full-time while the worker in a subsidized job 
must only search in off-hours or upon termination. Even if the work 
experience improves the chances of finding work after the temporary job, 
persons who do not participate are more likely to be employed in the 
post-program period because at least some of them found continuing jobs 
during the time they might otherwise have participated. In this case, 
higher earnings rates are likely because of accumulated senority. The 
subsidized jobs may also be "makework," without any training or meaningful 
work experience, with slack supervision and limited worksite discipline. 
The jobs might be considered nothing more than constructive activities to 
keep youth off the streets or simply a substitute for income transfers of
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relief recipients and older workers. Where the jobs do not provide 
structured, supervised work settings, they will not offer a very good aging 
vat, nor serve as effective entry and reentry mechanisms. They might, in 
fact, have negative impcts, instilling bad work attitudes, eroding skills, 
and providing a black mark rather than a reference on the resume of the 
participant.
The impact on employability is, thus, dependent on the match-up of 
each worker with each job, the designed level of on-site or off-site 
training, the transition mechanisms, and the effectiveness of the manage 
ment. The major categories of subsidized work-in-school and summer jobs, 
year-round work projects for dropouts, welfare recipients, offenders, 
handicapped, and drug addicts, supported work and public service employment 
for the structurally and countercyclically unemployed—all subsume a range 
of local activities which vary widely in these dimensions. " Some summer 
projects are training oriented while others are idle leaf-raking. Some PSE 
employees are in makework jobs while others may serve in highly-skilled 
positions where transferrable skills are learned. As a generalization, 
however, the Summer Youth Employment Program emphasizes the aging vat and 
constructive activity/income transfer approach, PSE Title VI places more 
emphasis on the productive work and OJT approaches, while Title IID and 
work experience under Title I IB more often emphasize work and training 
combinations.
Providing Structured Work Experiences for the Hardest-to-Employ
The supported work experiment was a five-year demonstration and 
research effort to determine the impact of work experience on the immediate 
and future employability of four hard-to-employ groups: long-term AFDC 
recipients, ex-addicts, ex-offenders and young school dropouts. Supported 
work projects were designed--! ike most good work projects—to provide 
increasing demands, close supervision, and peer support with the aim of 
gradually improving the employability of the disadvantaged up to competi 
tive labor market standards. While the actual work done in the 15 projects 
nationwide paralleled the types of activities undertaken under most CETA 
work experience programs—housing rehabilitation, painting, health care, 
building maintenance, day care, and park maintenance—there was also a 
limited degree of manufacturing and sale of services to the private sector, 
as well as an attempt to involve business and labor in the activities. The 
projects were run by carefully-selected operators under the oversight of 
the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. Where three-fourths to 
four-fifths of most CETA-funded work experience program expenditures go for 
wages and salaries, less than half of the full costs (net of research) of 
supported work were for income support, reflecting greater supervision and 
more careful management. The projects operated for three to five years and 
were, thus, more stable than the normal subsidized work projects. The 
average length of stay for participants was 6.7 months, compared to 5.0 for 
Title IIB work experience participants and 11.3 months for Title IID PSE 
participants in fiscal 1977-1979. In other words, the post-program impacts 
of supported work are indicative of the effects of well-run, stable, "en 
riched," and more targeted work projects. TO/ Any observed impacts are, 
thus, likely to be more positive than the average for CETA work experience, 
and similar to that portion of public service employment activities tar 
geted to similar clienteles.
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Overall, supported work had minimal impacts on post-program labor 
market success. During the period 19-27 months after enrollment (after 
adjusting for the fact that some of the participants were still in 
supported work), the average employment rates of the ex-addict, youth, and 
ex-offender groups were all below those of carefully matched control groups 
(Figure 3.10). Only the AFDC cohort experienced employment gains. Monthly 
hours of employment changed little for any of the groups, except again for 
the AFDC cohort. Average wage levels rose noticeably for the AFDC group, 
modestly for youth, and minimally for ex-addicts and offenders, as compared 
to their respective control groups.
The gains of the AFDC group were primarily the result of increased 
post-program public sector employment. During the 19-27 month post- 
enrollment period, the employment rate for the AFDC participants who had 
left supported work was 6.5 percentage points higher than for controls. 
The chances of being employed and in public sector jobs subsidized by CETA 
or WIN were 2.8 percentage points higher for ex-participants than controls 
during this period. The differential in employment rates in unsubsidized 
public sector jobs was 8.1 percentage points. In other words, post-program 
public sector jobs accounted for all of the employment gains relative to 
controls. 71/
Another perspective is to consider the sources of average monthly 
earnings for experimentals and controls during the 19-27 month period. Of 
the estimated differential of $71 monthly in favor of the AFDC supported 
work participants, 88 percent resulted for greater CETA, WIN, supported 
work or other public sector earnings. 72/
Average Monthly Earnings of AFDC Supported Work 
Cohorts and Controls During 19-27 Month Period After Enrollment
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The lack of significant post-program employment impacts for the other 
supported work client groups was, in turn, related to their lack of 
transition into public sector jobs. For instance, supported work youth and 
ex-offender participants were .2 percent and .6 percent, respectively, less 
likely than their respective control groups to be employed in unsubsidized 
jobs in the public sector during the 19-27 month post-enrollment period. 
The likelihood of post-program subsidized employment was higher by 1.4 
percentage points and .4 percentage points, respectively, but even these 
differentials were substantially less than those between AFDC participants 
and controls. The limited transition rates for the youth and ex-offenders 
compared to AFDC participants reflected their relative employability. The 
likelihood of unsubsidized public sector employment was 12.0 percent for
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Figure 3.10
Employment Experience of Supported Work Partictpants 
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Source: The Board of Directors, Manpower Demonstration Research Cor 
poration, Summary and Findings of the National Supported Work 
Demonstration (Cambridge, Mass.: Bal linger Publishing CbTT 
1980);Rebecca Maynard, The Impact of Supported Work on Young 
School Dropouts, Stanley Masters and Rebecca Maynard, The 
Impact of Supported Work on Long-Term Recipients of AFDC Benefits,^Katherine Dickinson and Rebecca Maynard, The Impact of Supported 
Work on Ex-Addicts, and Irving Piliavin, The Impact of Supported 
Work on Ex-Offenders (New York, New York: Manpower Demonstration 
Research Corporation, 1981).
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the AFDC control group, 7.0 percent for the youth control group and 4.3 for 
the ex-offender controls. In other words, even in the absence of supported 
work and its placement/OJT effects, long-term AFDC recipients were con 
sidered more favorably by the public sector employers than offenders or 
dropout youth. 73/
This evidence suggests that supported work served as a try-out or OJT 
mechanism for AFDC recipients but not for the other groups. Absent this 
effect, it seemed to have little impact on employability. The effec 
tiveness of supported work as a transition mechanism was limited since even 
for AFDC participants, less than seven in a hundred more than expected 
entered unsubsidized public sector jobs, while for the less attractive 
ex-offender and youth groups, there was no increase in transition into un 
subsidized public employment. 74/
Why PSE Yields Earnings Gains and Work Experience Does Not
For work experience participants in 1976, the Social Security covered 
earnings in 1977 were an estimated $149 less than those of matched 
controls, and $187 less in 1978. For PSE participants, the post-program 
earnings were $261 and $326, respectively, higher than those of controls. 
Adjustments for undercoverage of post-program public sector earnings 
increase the differentials even more in favor of PSE. Why did PSE have 
such positive effects while work experience did not?
An obvious consideration is that PSE served a more employable 
population. The individuals who entered PSE in fiscal 1976 had Social 
Security-covered earnings during 1974 which were double those for in 
dividuals subsequently entering work experience. The 1977 average earnings 
of the control group for 1976 PSE terminees were half again those of the 
work experience participants. 75/ Yet this alone is not an explanation for 
the differences, since the net impacts for PSE and work experience were 
estimated by comparison with individuals having similar characteristics. 
Moreover, most demographic groups, including the more disadvantaged among 
PSE participants, experienced greater post-program employment than when 
they participated in work experience (Table 3.16). Estimates of the 
earnings of subgroups of PSE and work experience participants measured 
relative to control groups suggest that annual earnings gains (the 1978 
levels for all fiscal 1976 terminees) were higher for almost all cohorts in 
the CETA population (Table 3.17).
The "extras" received along with PSE were certainly not an explanation 
for these more favorable post-program outcomes. In fiscal 1976, before 
training was required as a component of public service employment, only .3 
percent of PSE funds were spent on training, so this was certainly not a 
cause of the difference. 76/ Likewise, 9 percent of adult work experience 
participants, compared to 8 percent of PSE particpants, received supportive 
services (health or child care, transportation or residential support), 
while 40 and 37 percent, respectively, received manpower services 
(counseling, orientation, coaching, job referral, follow-up, or other).
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Table 3.16
Employment Rates Three Months After Termination of Fiscal 1976 
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Estimated 1978 Participant/Control Earnings Differentials For 




(1) Gains of Public Service 
Gains of Public Service Employment 
Work Experience Employment Participants and 
Participants Participants Work Experience 
Relative to Relative to Participants 
Controls Controls [(2) - (1)]
17-18 $249 $ 966 $ 717
19-21 -621 483 1104
22-25 -121 187 308
26-29 -716 723 1439
30-44 -436 113 549
45+ 563 732 169
White males -471 429 900
Minority males -197 -562 -365
White females -34 1192 1226
Minority females 442 1098 656
Low earners -195 834 1029 
Mixed and intermediate
earners -228 331 559 
High earners -228 153 381
Source: Westat, Inc. Impact on 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees 
in Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C.:Employment and 
Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, 
February 1981).
The major explanation for the differing earnings impacts of PSE and 
work experience lies in their relative effects on transition rates into 
unsubsidized public sector employment. For second half fiscal 1975 work 
experience participants, the percentage engaged in unsubsidized public 
sector work rose from 11 percent one year prior to entry to 24 percent one 
year after termination (Figure 3.11). For PSE participants, the increase 
was from 12 to 35 percent. The employment rate of work experience par 
ticipants rose from 53 to 59 percent over this period, while for PSE 
participants, the increase was from 55 percent to 68 percent. Thus, the 
increases in post-program public sector employment (13 percentage points 
for work experience participants and 23 percentage points for PSE) 
accounted for all of employment gains for both work experience and PSE 
terminees, while the difference in the increases in public sector em 
ployment rates for PSE and work experience participants equalled the 
differential in post-program employment rates. Among both groups, the 
probability of employment one year after termination for participants not
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FIGURE 3.11
EMPLOYMENT RATES BY SECTOR FOR SECOND HALF FISCAL 1975 
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parisons, For Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June 1975, 
(Washington, D.C.: Employment and Training Administration, 
Office of Policy, Evaluaton and Research, December 1980), Table 
39.
subsequently employed in the public sector remained about the same as the 
probability one year before entry.
For fiscal 1976 participants in work experience and PSE, the one-year 
post-termination public sector employment rates were 18 percent and 24 
percent, respectively. The differential between the employment rates of 
the two groups was 8 percentage points in favor of PSE terminees. In other 
words, the differential in public sector employment rates accounted for
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three-fourths of the overall employment differential. Alternatively, the 
employment rate increases from one year pre-CETA to one year post-termina 
tion were 7 percentage points for work experience participants and 16 
percentage points for PSE participants. Assuming, as was the case for 1975 
participants, that both groups had the same chances of public sector em 
ployment a year before entry, the 6 percentage point difference between the 
increases in public sector employment rates for work experience and PSE 
terminees accounted for a major portion of 9 percentage point differential 
in overall employment rate gains. 78/
Despite the negative post-program earnings impacts estimated from the 
CLMS-CPS analysis, work experience had positive effects for the half of 
participants who were placed at exit, of whom over half were working in the 
public sector according to data for 1975 participants. The estimated 1977 
earnings of 1976 work experience participants who were placed were $577 
higher than those of controls. For 1975 PSE participants, 57 percent were 
placed and 61 percent of these were employed in the public sector. Among 
1976 participants placed, the earnings were $1433 higher in 1977 than for 
matched controls. 79/
The conclusion is that the benefits of PSE or work experience accrue 
primarily where it functions as a try-out or training ground for entry into 
the public sector. The transition rates from work experience are lower 
than for PSE, and hence the benefits less. PSE, in this sense, operates 
like OJT, albeit with a lower transition rate. Fifty-five percent of 1976 
PSE participants were employed one month post-CETA and only three-fifths of 
those in public sector jobs, compared to 75 percent of OJT participants of 
whom seven-eighths were in private sector jobs. It might be speculated 
that PSE does not have as high a batting average as OJT because a segment 
of PSE activities are very much like work experience—short-term project 
work which is not directly linked to unsubsidized public jobs. This raises 
the possibility that more recent PSE efforts, which emphasize the project 
mode and are targeted to the most disadyantaged, may not achieve the sub 
stantial net impacts of PSE as operated in fiscal 1976.
Work and Training Combinations
A small proportion of CETA participants are enrolled in "multiple 
activities," i.e., they move from one primary activity to another. Among 
fiscal 1976 entrants (excluding those in direct referral and summer youth 
programs), 6 percent participated in activity combinations broken down as 
follows: 80/
Classroom and on-the-job training 19%
Classroom training and subsidized work 48
Subsidized work and OJT 11
Work experience and PSE 16
Three or more activities 6
The estimated post-program earnings gains of these multiple-activity 
participants were less than for classroom and on-the-job trainees, but more 
than for participants in subsidized employment, i.e., work experience and 
public service employment combined (Table 3.18). The benefits of multiple
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Table 3.18
1978 Estimated Earnings Relative to Controls For Significant Segments of 
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Source: Westat, Inc. Impact on 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees 
In Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C.:Employment and 
Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, 
February 1981).
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activities, even more than those of classroom training, were dependent on 
length of stay, in part, perhaps, because the amount of classroom training 
was diluted and in part because the multiple assignments may have reflected 
transfer from stop gap components to treatment activities with only the 
latter having earnings impacts. It appears that persons with mixed earn 
ings patterns, minorities, and older participants benefited most from 
multiple activities. However, these conclusions are extremely tentative 
because of the small sample sizes in multiple activities.
Where the gains of classroom training increased from the first to 
second post-program years, they declined for multiple activity recipients. 
In this regard, multiple activities had an impact pattern more like 
OJT. 81/
Estimated Annual Earnings Increment 
For Fiscal 1976 Trainees Terminating in Calendar 1976
Change 
1977 1978 1977-1978
Multiple activities $356 $164 $-192 
Classroom training 347 442 +95
Work experience
and PSE 58 71 +13
On-the-job Training 839 574 -265
The proportion of time that enrol lees in multiple activities spent in 
each separate component is unknown. Suggestively, if each component in the 
various multiple activities combinations is assigned equal weight, and the 
earnings gains estimated for participants in each separate activity are 
multiplied by their incidence in the various combinations, the 1978 
weighted gain for the multiple activity category would be $196, or very 
close to the actual $164 gain. One might speculate that the separate 
effects of the components in the various combinations were additive.
The Service Mix Alternatives demonstration mounted under the Youth 
Employment and Demonstration Projects Act sought to determine the relative 
effectiveness of different training and work combinations for out-of-school 
youth. In two sites, dropouts were randomly assigned to equally intensive 
work, work and remediation, and strictly remediation components. In the 
third site, they were assigned to either work or a work and remediation 
combination. These alternative interventions yielded noticeably different 
post-program outcomes. Participants in the training-oriented components 
worked full-time more frequently in the post-program period but attended 
school or training less frequently. Participants in combination activities 
had patterns closer to the work experience component participants than the 
training component participants. 82/
137
Post-Program Status of Randomly Assigned Out-of-School 
Youth Participants in the Service Mix Alternatives Demonstration
Site 1 and 2
Full-time work 30% 26% 23% 43% 
Work/training
combination 31 28 28 21 
Full-time training 38 14 41 11
Site 3
Full-time work 46 18 
Work/training
combination 42 13
Worksites as Training Sites
The Ventures in Community Improvement (VICI) demonstration in nine 
sites was designed to provide intensive vocational skills training in the 
workplace, and through linkages with unions and employer groups, to use 
publicly subsidized work as a transition mechanism into construction jobs 
and apprenticeships. Targeted to out-of-school youth, and providing work 
activities such as refurbishing public facilities and repairing homes 
occupied by the poor and elderly, the VICI program was similar to work 
experience activities funded under the Youth Community Conservation and 
Improvement Projects (as well as supported work for youth). Yet there were 
also several important differences: VICI projects were larger (60 par 
ticipants vs. an average of 8 under YCCIP); they were funded for two years 
(vs. one for most YCCIP projects); they had more supervisors (one 
supervisor for every six participants, compared to a 1 to 10 ratio in 
typical YCCIP projects); much greater effort was placed on linkages with 
labor unions and apprenticeship programs, including the hiring of journey 
men as supervisors; the projects were better planned and managed than most 
youth work projects; and, most importantly, the work activities were 
structured to provide occupational skills training. 837
The differences between VICI and regular work projects are best 




Cost per person year $13,833 $7,793
Cost per participant $6,917 $2,985 
Cost components
Administrative 14% 20%
Wages, salaries, and fringes 38 59
Worksite supervisors 32 9
Training 15 7
Services 1 6
The basic question addressed by the VICI demonstration was whether 
this greater emphasis on supervision and training would increase the impact 
of the work experience on participant labor market success- without 
sacrificing the output generated by menial work projects.
The costs of VICI and YCCIP were both offset by the productive output 
of participants. In the case of VICI, the estimated ratio of value of 
output (as judged by independent appraisers) to total costs including 
overhead was $.42, and the value added per dollar of participant wages was 
$.32. 85/ For a sample of YCCIP projects, the estimated output per dollar 
of costs was $.50, with $.46 in value added per dollar of participant 
wages. 86/ The simpler YCCIP projects had a higher output payoff because 
they were organized to do the type of work which youth could already 
perform or could master with very little effort, and there was limited 
expense for training and supervision. In contrast, the VICI projects 
involved work which required skills training and in which youth were 
relatively less productive. Output improved dramatically as VICI projects 
ran their course and participants acquired skills, whereas the productivity 
of YCCIP projects did not improve with time. For instance, over the course 
of a year, the value of output per hour in one of the VICI projects most 
carefully studied rose by 15 percent reflecting the learning of par 
ticipants. 87/
The post-program employment rates of VICI participants three months 
after termination were roughly the same as those of a control group of 
youth not selected for VICI and participants in comparably large-scale work 
projects not emphasizing training, although they were higher than for 
regular YCCIP participants. However, the hourly wages were higher for VICI 
terminees because they more often found their way into construction jobs 
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Source: Corporation for Public/Private Ventures. Ventures in Community 
Improvement demonstration, unpublished findings.
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The VICI experience demonstrates that organizing work projects as 
training sites, and establishing linkages into the labor market through the 
hiring of journeymen as supervisors will increase the likelihood that 
competencies will be gained and translated into job and apprenticeship 
access. While only a minority of participants actually realize these 
opportunities, the extra gains of this minority account for net impacts 
from enriched projects which probably justify their added costs (assuming 
that regular work experience activities such as YCCIP have no post-program 
net impact).
Expediting Work Force Entry
The Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP) was initially developed and 
continues to be supported primarily as a way to "keep the streets quiet." 
By providing a first work experience to young people who would not other 
wise find work until later in their teens, the summer jobs will hopefully 
ease the school-to-work transition problem. It is also anticipated that 
the provision of income and earnings will to some degree forestall 
economically motivated early school leaving.
Evidence suggests that summer employment does keep the streets 
quieter. The arrest rates of participants in one large multi-site summer 
demonstration focused on high-risk youth (one-fourth adjudicated offenders) 
were 1.5 per hundred among participants but 3.2 per hundred among controls 
during the summer months. For the offender subgroup, the rates were 4.9 
per hundred for participants compared to 6.7 per hundred for matched 
nonparticipants. The summer enrol lees age 14-17 at entry had a 1.4 per 
hundred rate compared to 4.1 per hundred for controls. 88/ These results 
might be contrasted with the negative findings of the supported work 
experiment. Supported work served an older group (seven of ten par 
ticipants were age 18 or over, compared to just one in five summer 
enrol lees). It appears that the type of trouble with the law which occurs 
for young teenagers during summer idleness can be deterred by constructive 
options even though the types of crime committed by older, out-of-school 
youth are not affected by work.
Summer jobs also have a positive impact on return-to-school proba 
bilities. Only a minority of the summer enrollees are at risk of dropping 
out, but a significant share of these are affected. Among a national 
sample of 1979 summer participants, 6.1 percent did not return to school, 
compared to 9.4 percent of a comparison group of nonparticipants. 89/ The 
multi-site summer demonstration with high risk youth found the portion not 
in school or training at the three-month follow-up point was 26 percent for 
the participants compared to 30 percent for matched nonparticipants. 90/ 
Under the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects, the guarantee of a 
summer and part-time school-year job for all poor youth remaining in or 
returning to school increased the share of dropouts reentering school the 
next fall from 22 percent to 36 percent and the proportion of underclassmen 
returning the next school year from 76 percent to 80 percent. 91/ Since 
many enrol lees chose to work only in the summer, the vast majority of 
employment hours under Entitlement were in the summer months; thus, the 
school retention and return effects were largely the result of summer 
employment.
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The basic issue, however, is whether the summer work experience 
accelerates entry into the work force. There is no question that the 
disadvantaged youth served by the summer program would otherwise have few 
employment opportunities. In 1980, 43 percent of the 700,000 summer 
participants were age 14 or 15, and an additional 39 percent were age 
16-17. Among these disadvantaged and largely (66 percent) minority youth, 
53 percent had no earnings in the previous year, and 37 percent had 
earnings less than $1,000. Only 29 percent worked in the previous summer, 
and since 17 percent were previous CETA participants, it is a safe bet 
that, for many, the previous employment was in the summer program. 92/ In 
contrast, 25 percent of all 14-15 year-old students reported empToyment 
while in school in March 1979, as did 48 percent of 16-17 year-olds. 
Three-fourths of 16-17 year-olds, six-sevenths of the 18-19 year-olds, and 
half of 14-15 year-olds held a job at some point over the course of the 
previous year, which would yield a weighted work experience rate of 66 
percent in contrast to the 47 percent rate for summer program entrants. 93/
The opportunity to begin working at an earlier age or more nearly at 
the same time as nondisadvantaged youth, accelerates the labor market entry 
process, increasing the likelihood of combining school and work. Three 
months after the end of the 1979 summer program, 25 percent of par 
ticipants, compared to 19 percent of nonparticipating controls, reported 
that they had worked since the summer or were currently working in 
part-time jobs. The part-time employment effect was most marked among 
14-to-16-year-old black males with low reading skills, limited knowledge of 
the world-of-work, and low self-esteem, as well as for black and white 
females this age sharing these employment handicaps at entry. Among such 
participants, the rate of post-program part-time work was 34 percent, 
compared to 10 percent for controls. 94/ The large-scale demonstration 
program with high risk youth also documented an increase in part-time 
employment over the three-month follow-up period, with a rate of 14 percent 
for experimentals, compared to 8 percent for controls. 95/
In summary, work experience can be useful for young people in 
advancing the process of workforce entry. It can be combined with training 
activities in a sequence, with benefits roughly proportional to the degree 
of training in the activity mix. A worksite may be structured as a 
training site and can yield some of the benefits of classroom and on- 
the-job training while producing useful output, but this model is the 
exception rather than the rule in local work experience programs. In most 
other circumstances, the subsidized work will only have post-program 
impacts if it serves as a try-out or on-the-job training mechanism for an 
existing unsubsidized job in the public or nonprofit sector.
Benefits and Costs for Work Programs
The limited post-program earnings impacts of work experience do not 
necessarily mean that it is a poor investment. For instance, adminis 
tration, services, and training under public service employment amounted to 
less than 5 percent of the total cost in fiscal 1976. If participants 
produced an output valued at close to their wages and salaries, and if the 
post-program gains of $350-$750 annually were, indeed, net benefits to 
society, there is no doubt that benefits exceeded the costs. The un 
certainty is whether the post-program gains--which resulted largely from
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increased unsubsidized public sector employment—were, indeed, net 
benefits. If the employment of PSE participants in regular public sector 
jobs resulted in displacement of other similar workers who would have been 
hired, there was no net social benefit. If the participants were more 
disadvantaged than those ordinarily hired, and the jobs were secured 
through leverage, these workers might have performed less effectively so 
that the increased post-program employment would not necessarily represent 
a social benefit. Only if the subsidized work experience provided training 
for the subsequent job, so that skills improved, and only if the par 
ticipants subsequently performed at the same levels as other hires, would 
the post-program earnings gains equal benefits (and, then, only to the 
extent that wages in the public sector were not inflated).
The supported work experiment provided the only careful benefit-cost 
estimates for project-type work programs for the severely disadvantaged. 
Using essentially the same methodology as in the Job Corps evaluation, 
benefits and costs were calculated for each of the separate target groups 
of supported work:






















The output produced by the supported work projects was estimated to 
offset 65, 77, 68, and 64 percent, respectively, of the costs of serving 
each of these target groups. For the AFDC group, the present value of 
in-program and projected post-program earnings gains were 32 percent above 
the costs. However, for ex-addicts the present value of post-program gains 
represented only 15 percent of costs, and for youth only 1 percent. But 
for ex-addicts, the present value of crime reduction was estimated to equal 
the cost. Clearly, then, work experience can pay off even if it produces 
meager post-program changes in employment and earnings if the value of 
output substantially offsets the costs, and if the groups served are high 
risk so that their foregone earnings are limited and the chances of 




The purpose of training is to improve the ability of individuals to 
compete and perform in the labor market. The impact of training is 
ultimately determined not only by its quality, intensity, and targeting, 
but also by the characteristics of the labor market in which it functions. 
Where there are few job vacancies and an excess of already trained workers, 
training will obviously have less payoff for participants and the economy 
than in a dynamic labor market experiencing rapid employment growth and 
technological change. Where discrimination is prevalent, the payoff of 
training will be limited for its victims. To the degree that skills and 
potential are measured by credentials rather than demonstrated capacities, 
those trained but without acceptable credentials may not get jobs while 
those who attain credentials even though lacking commensurate skills may 
reap the rewards. Where firms limit hiring to entry jobs, filling all 
advanced opportunities from within, or where the only available jobs are in 
a secondary labor market characterized by low wages, high turnover, and 
constrained opportunities for advancement, then the options for training 
may be very limited. If career paths are a series of stepping-stones 
rather than tracks, if the trainees enter a competitive labor market with 
their chances improved but training-related jobs not assured, if employment 
chances are rationed according to past accomplishments as much as current 
abilities, and if job requirements are unstated, then training payoffs will 
not be as direct or certain as when job requirements are known and workers 
will be hired if they have the necessary skills whatever their backgrounds.
There are a number of theories and concepts describing the labor 
market and how it functions. These give differing weight to competitive 
processes, discrimination, firm-specific job structures, knowledge on the 
part of employers and jobseekers, employment barriers, and other factors. 
As a result, these theories have significantly different implications 
concerning the impact and effectiveness of training.
The neoclassic marginal productivity theory, and the human capital 
investment notion which is based on this theory, provide a reasonable 
description of the aggregate levels and broad distributions of employment, 
earnings, and wages. However, the assumptions of these concepts become 
less realistic and the applications less predictive as the focus narrows. 
The theories of credential ing, discrimination, labor market segmentation, 
and internal labor markets or job structures have been introduced to 
explain the anomalies in neoclassic predictions. They suggest that labor 
is anything but homogeneous, that skills and abilities are not easily 
determined, that acquired skills may not be recognized without credentials, 
that they may not pay off equally for different groups, that the labor 
market may not recognize training which occurs outside the workplace, or 
even worse, may seek to maintain an unskilled, high turnover labor force. 
Probablistic and Markovian labor market theories suggest that the chances 
of employment and skill utilization at any one point in time affect those 
at the next point in time in a cumulative fashion for each individual and 
group. As a consequence, there are limits to what can be achieved by 
limited duration interventions that can only alter a few variables in the 
complex probablistic equation which predicts labor market success. While
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immediate chances can be improved, and while this may lead to cumulative 
and positive effects, there are no certain routes and the future cannot be 
easily rewritten.
Each of these sets of labor market theories and concepts is ap 
propriate in certain circumstances and for certain purposes. Yet they 
offer differing and sometimes contradictory guidance vis-a-vis the role and 
impacts of training. Some conceptual integration of these theories is 
needed to provide a framework for the diverse information about the 
substance, impacts, institutional arrangements and outcomes of training. 
One possible integration is as follows:
Ranking Jobseekers According to Documented Employability
Workers and would-be workers at any point in time can be ranked in 
terms of "documented employability"--a combination of academic credentials, 
vocational training, work experience, and employer recommendations, along 
with age, race, sex, and other demographic characteristics. The mix of 
factors used to document employability, and the weight they are given, will 
vary in different situations. At the lower end of the employability 
ranking, evidence of dependable work habits, a high school diploma, and the 
lack of black marks such as a criminal record, make one individual a better 
bet than another who has no work experience and a GED rather than a regular 
diploma. At the upper end of the scale, the differentiating factor may be 
a sheepskin from an Ivy League rather than community college, or previous 
employment with firms recognized for their strict hiring and employment 
standards or their high quality staff development programs.
While these employability determinants and rankings cannot be 
translated into specific mathematical functions, there is no doubt that 
employers undertake such calculations each time they make a hiring 
decision. The factors which enter into their rankings are those that can 
be documented or observed, i.e., the types of information usually found on 
applications for work. Essentially, the employer must make a judgment 
about each individual based on the averages for persons with similar 
characteristics. Until persons are placed in a job, it is hard to tell 
whether they will perform better or worse than the averages for similar 
persons. A variety of supplementary approaches may be used to discriminate 
beyond what is readily observable--for instance, extensive interviews, 
reference checking, and test batteries--but these screening devices merely 
narrow the range of uncertainty, rather than eliminating it.
Persons who are available for work at any point in time—the un 
employed and discpuraged--will have, on average, a lower level of docu 
mented employability than those who are employed and will be more con 
centrated in the lower tail of the employability distribution. This is 
because entrants and reentrants into the labor force who have limited prior 
work experience and skills, as well as the long-term unemployed who are 
unable to find work in the competitive labor force, are overrepresented 
among the unemployed and discouraged. Yet the available work force also 
includes some individuals with significant employability who are simply 




DOCUMENTED CMPLOYABILITV DISTRIBUTION OF AVAILABLE WORK FORCE 
AND OF TOTAL WORK FORCE
TOTAL WORK FORCE 
(EMPLOYED, DISCOURAGED AND UNEMPLOYED)
AVAILABLE WORK FORCE 
(UNEMPLOYED AND
DISCOURAGED)
LOW «——— EMPLOYABILITY ———, HIGH
The individuals at the lowest tail of the documented employability 
distribution of the available work force include the mentally retarded, 
emotionally disturbed, drug addicts and others who have the most severe 
impediments to employment. Next are young school dropouts with limited 
work experience, ex-offenders and perhaps long-term welfare recipients and 
the physically handicapped. The bulk of high school graduates who have 
only a few years work experience and no post-secondary or on-the-job train 
ing, are concentrated in the next segment, along with female re-entrants 
into the labor force who may have a higher level of education but have not 
had substantial or recent work experience. Prime age workers with 
measurable skills and longer work histories occupy the central portion of 
the distribution. The upper tail consists of professionals, managers and 
technical workers with increasingly specific skills and credentials.
These segments of the distribution are not demarcated. For instance, 
a high school dropout with limited work experience and with a criminal 
record might be considered a better bet than others with the same back 
ground if he or she completes a pre-apprenticeship program, acquires a GED, 
or serves honorably in the military. Conversely, the dropout with a 
dishonorable discharge or an unsuccessful training experience might be 
shunned by employers willing to hire other dropouts. An experienced worker 
with an obsolete skill will rank lower than an inexperienced entry worker 
trained in a new technology.
Varying Potential of Individuals with Similar Credentials
Individuals in the available work force who are ranked at the same 
level of documented employability may nevertheless vary in their ability
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and readiness to function in the typical job which will hire them. They 
may also differ in their capacity to learn once on the job, to improve 
their skills and productivity by outside experiences, and to advance in the 
internal labor market. As an example, young dropouts ranked at the lower 
end of the documented employability distribution include some individuals 
who left school because of the lack of challenge, who will blossom in the 
work place and who have the potential to complete college or to master the 
most demanding skills. Others may be "street-wise" youth who talk a good 
game but lack the brains or "sticktuitiveness" to perform adequately on the 
job or to gain high school level competencies. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to distinguish at the hiring door between these individuals. 
As another example, three high-school graduates may each have had five 
years of intermittent experience in construction work. One may be an 
extremely hard worker, another may do just enough to get by and not be 
fired, and the third may have been fired from jobs, but in another city 
where references cannot be easily checked. The differences cannot be 
ascertained until after the hiring decision.
The labor market, the education system, and time itself serve as 
sorting mechanisms and proving grounds which test potential and document 
success or failure, translating potential into documented employability. 
Thus, there will probably be less variance in potential among individuals 
ranked at the upper end of the documented employability distribution. 
Because the stakes are greater for the employer hiring for more skilled 
jobs and the individual seeking more skilled work, much more care is taken 
in specifying requirements and determining individual skills and abilities. 
But the frequent turnover of even the highest level executives suggests 
that uncertainties remain.
Varying priority may be placed on the two basic factors determining 
potential employability--the ability to perform immediately and the 
capacity to improve and advance. At the lowest end of the employability 
distribution, the capacity to learn and advance may be given modest weight 
by employers who are concerned with present needs and expect little more 
from employees. For instance, employers hiring teenagers during the summer 
or the hard-core unemployed for transient jobs are rarely doing so with the 
expectation that such workers will stay and advance. Future potential is 
probably given more weight at mid-levels in the employability distribution, 
but less at the highest levels where the individual is paid to deliver the 
skills and abilities which are more precisely documented. Employers hiring 
workers at any specific documented employability level will also vary in 
the weight they give present vs. future potential. Some employers are more 
concerned with immediate capacity, others with the future capacity, but in 
setting the documented employability level required for the job, they 
implicitly accept the average immediate and future potential among persons 
at this level.
The weight given in employability documentation to any observable 
factor depends on its ability to distinguish between the likely performance 
of individuals with and without this feature. Thus, dropout youth are al1 
ranked low because, on average, they are poor bets. It is difficult to 
distinguish between them and thus risky to hire them directly into 
career-entry job since there is a high chance of failure, even though a 
large percentage might also be able to succeed. Obviously, individuals
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with high potential, but characteristics usually associated with negative 
performance or simply greater uncertainty, will suffer. Race or sex may be 
used as a shorthand in identifying likely performance, disregarding that 
the variance among persons of the same race will be quite large. Such sta 
tistical discrimination, which assigns to each person with an attribute the 
average potential of all persons with this attribute, may be justified from 
the employer's perspective to the extent it is based on experience rather 
than prejudice, yet the result is to handicap those minorities or females 
with above average potential. Such discrimination may also be compounded 
by racism or sexism. For instance, an employer may act on a stereotype 
concerning a race or sex group without a statistical experience base to 
document these judgments. Likewise, where employment experiences are 
cumulative, past statistical discrimination can have cumulative impacts, 
i.e., those victims of discrimination with innate potential have less of a 
chance to prove themselves and to develop.
The distribution of potential employability among individuals at each 
level of documented employability can be illustrated by an overlaid 
distribution (Figure 3.13). Those with documented employability level A
FIGURE 3.13
POTENTIAL EMPLOYABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS AMONG PERSONS WITH LOW, MEDIUM 
AND HIGH DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY
LOW EMPLOYABILITY HIGH
can be ranked according to potential employability as represented by the 
curve intersecting the documented employability distribution at this point. 
The distribution of potential at documented employability level C illu 
strates the lesser variance in potential posited at higher levels of 
documented employability.
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The Demand for Workers with Each Level of Documented Employability
The employment opportunities available at any point in time, which are 
reflected in want-ads and job vacancy measures, may also be ranked 
according to the standards that the employers set for entry workers, i.e., 
their "documented employability requirements" for the jobs (Figure 3.14). 
At the high end of the distribution are the most technical, desirable and 
remunerative jobs with the "best" employers. In the lower tail of the 
distribution are the menial, undesirable and low-paid "secondary labor 
market" jobs which can utilize workers who lack training or previous 
experience. These jobs are often structured in the expectation of high 
turnover. By reaching far down the labor queue, they will accept workers 
of widely varying potential, fire those with limited ability, and not be 
concerned when the workers with greater ability soon leave for greener 
pastures. There is a minimum employability requirement—individuals with 
documented employability below this level will not be hired without 
subsidy. The floor is determined, in part, by the minimum wage, but more 
significantly, by the aggregate balance of jobseekers and jobs, and by the 
fact that workers with severe handicaps are likely to subtract from, rather 
than add to, output because of the high probability of turnover and the 
need for extra training and supervision.
FIGURE 3.1A 









The pressures of supply and demand in the labor market determine the 
requirements which are established for any set of jobs. Every employer 
wants the best possible workers but must settle for an average skill level 
among new hires which, in neoclassical terms, will earn its marginal 
revenue product. If the overall labor market is slack, and a firm can get 
more qualified or lower risk workers at the same compensation, the employer
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will usually increase the documented employability requirements. Con 
versely, in tight labor markets, when there are fewer skilled workers 
available and they must be paid more, the employer will accept workers who 
in normal times would be considered inadequately qualified.
Varying Potential Among Jobs With Similar Entry Requirements
Among the employment opportunities requiring any specific level of 
documented employability, there is significant variance in "career po 
tential," i.e., the chances that the average worker who is hired will 
perform satisfactorily and be satisfied, and that he or she will be able to 
use this experience as a stepping stone for advancement. One firm may 
utilize lower level, entry positions to sort among individuals who have low 
levels of documented employability in order to identify the more able and 
motivated for training and assignments which will lead to advancement 
within the internal labor market of the firm. Other firms hiring similar 
workers provide few rewards for extra effort or continuing employment. A 
menial job with a compassionate supervisor and friendly coworkers may be 
much more attractive than a similar job with excessive discipline and an 
unruly work force. Individual jobseekers will vary in how much they weigh 
present vs. future considerations. The immediate work conditions are of 
most importance to the majority of job applicants, since few will stay 
around for the future opportunities if the job is intolerable, and since 
future benefits must be discounted to present value. However, those who 
know they have above average ability compared to others with similar 
credentials are likely to place more weight on the longer term, and are 
willing to live with the present if the prospects look good. To the extent 
positive employment conditions or greater advancement opportunities can be 
demonstrated, the employer can increase the minimum hiring requirements. 
However, knowledge is imperfect among applicants, and there is uncertainty 
whether promises of advancement potential are a "come-on." Moreover, the 
career potential is not determined solely by the conscious policies of em 
ployers. A firm may have high turnover because of suddenly bad labor rela 
tions or a few harsh supervisors despite an internal training program and 
advancement policy, or it might be experiencing business fluctuations which 
foreclose normal career tracks. A job may offer access to other oppor 
tunities without, itself, being attractive, for instance, a job in a 
placement agency which exposes the agency personnel to a variety of job 
offers. In other words, the potential of a particular job for the average 
applicant with requisite skills, or for any particular applicant, cannot be 
fully determined until after employment.
It is reasonable to assume that the range of career potential in jobs 
requiring higher levels of documented employability is relatively narrower 
than for jobs requiring less skills. Because of the higher stakes in 
volved, applicants will invest more time in assessing career possibilities 
and work settings, while employers with better opportunities will try 
harder to document and advertise them, so that these factors are more 
likely to be factored into documented employability requirements. Most law 
school graduates know which firm to clerk for, or medical students, where 
to intern, in order to get ahead. Likewise, the outstanding research 
hospital or law firm can set higher entry standards for recruits because 
more students v/ant this opportunity. A person choosing between retail jobs
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in a variety of local retail stores will have a harder time determining 
which will offer the greatest opportunity over the long run; one store may 
have little advantage over another paying the same wage but not offering as 
many management trainee positions.
While the distribution in career potential of jobs is a hypothetical 
construct, it can be represented by an overlay at any employability 
requirements level on the distribution of available opportunities (Figure 
3.15). If, as posited, the variance in career potential is greater among 
entry jobs with lower documented employability requirements, the career 
potential distribution at point C will be narrower than at point A, as 
illustrated.
FIGURE 3.15
CAREER POTENTIAL DISTRIBUTIONS AMONG EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES WITH LOW, 
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Supply and Demand: The Match-up Between Job Requirements and Applicant Skills———————————————— —————————— —————————— ————
The supply of workers in the labor market can be visualized as a dis 
tribution of the available work force ranked according to documented em 
ployability, while demand can be visualized as a distribution of employment 
opportunities ranked according to documented employability requirements 
At higher levels of documented employability, the number of 
exceeds the number of workers; while at the lower end, there 
workers than jobs. This is a reflection of structural 
the lower end and skills bottlenecks at the upper end. The 
an indicator of the structural mismatch between supply and 
skill levels. There are unfilled jobs which could employ
(Figure 3.16). 
jobs probably 
are far more 
imbalances at 
ratio A/B is 
demand at low
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some of the unskilled unemployed and discouraged workers, but not nearly 
enough to employ all of them. The larger the gap between vacancies and job 
seekers with the required skills, the harder and more discouraging it is to 
find work and, hence, the greater the probability of long-term joblessness 
among persons with this skill level. The shaded area at the lower end of 
the distribution represents the portion of the available work force which
FIGURE 3.16
DISTRIBUTION OF AVAILABLE WORK FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
BY DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY AND EMPLOYABILITY REQUIREMENTS
DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY 
OF AVAILABLE WORK FORCE
DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS OF EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITIES
CONSIDERED' NOT ' 
EMPLOYABLE
LOW EMPLOYABILITY HIGH
is considered superflouous or nonemployable under existing conditions, 
i.e., they fall below the minimum employability requirement. At higher 
levels of employability, the ratio C/D reflects "skill bottlenecks" where 
employers are chasing workers who have desirable skills—computer software 
experts, geologists, engineers, or persons with demonstrated management 
ability. In this situation, joblessness is usually temporary and transi 
tional among unemployed individuals with advanced skills.
These curves may be used to portray conditions at any point in time in 
the national economy or a local labor market. Economic conditions, tech 
nology, demography, past and present human resource investment policies, 
structural barriers, and the efficiency of labor markets determine the 
shapes of and the gaps between, the distributions of employment oppor 
tunities and available workers. Some of the likely interrelationships are 
suggested by the following alternative scenarios:
Scenario 1: A severe recession will shift the employment opportuni 
ties distribution downward, moreso at the lower end of the skills distri 
bution (Figure 3.17). As the ratio of total opportunities to available
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workers declines, employers can and do raise minimum hiring standards. The 
available work force at all levels increases, exacerbating the structural 
problems at the lower end of the distribution, and in particular, In 
creasing the number of individuals ranked below minimum employability 
requirements. But the recession reduces the number of employment oppor 
tunities below the number in the available work force even at the highest 
skill levels, so that the professionals who lose their jobs have a hard 
time finding new ones at the same level even though the number without work 
may be small relative to the total employed and the unemployment rate low 
relative to that for unskilled workers.
Figure 3.17
Available Work Force and Employment Opportunities 
Distributions in Severe Recession and Under Normal Circumstances
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Scenario 2: In a wartime economy, the available work force is reduced 
by military conscription, affecting mostly young men otherwise concentrated 
at the lower end of the documented employability distribution (Figure 
3.18). At the same time, there is a significant increase in the manu 
facture of military consumables, with greatest impact at the lower and 
mid-ranges of the employment opportunities curve as manufacturing jobs 
expand. Employers tend to lower their documented employability require 
ments, gladly accepting "Rosie-the-riveters" who would be excluded in 
normal times. The employment opportunities curve may shift above the 
available work force curve even at low levels in the employability distri 
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Scenario 3: A central city 
the national economy 
skill levels (Figure 3.19). A large 
no real chance of employment. The city might also
economy, contrasted with a microcosm of 
has an abundance of available workers at the lowest 
share of central city residents have 
have a disproportionate
number of highly skilled and professional workers, because these workers 
are able to afford the high costs of residing in protected central city 
enclaves, because they are attracted by the city's amenities, or because 
professional employment opportunities are concentrated in the city. The 
middle class workforce is less in evidence because manufacturing, wholesale 
and retail jobs, along with the workers who fill them, have moved to the 
suburbs.
Scenario 4: An 
number of job seekers 
remunerative, but it 
ments of employers 
just above the
increased minimum wage will probably increase the 
at the low skill levels because work is made more 
will also raise the threshold employability require- 
while increasing the opportunities which require skills 
threshold as labor intensive firms go out of business,
substitute capital for workers, or workers whose productivity is slightly
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Figure 3.19
Available Work Force and Employment Opportunities 
Distributions in Central City and Microcosm of National Labor Market
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above the minimum for those slightly below (Figure 3.20). The result is to 
increase the portion of the population considered nonemployable. If the 
employment opportunities distribution is steeply sloped but not "cliffed" 
at the minimum, which is the most realistic assumption, the effect is to 
increase the difference in employment probabilities between those below and 
those above the juncture where the employment opportunities distribution 
begins to slope steeply. (For convenience, the minimum employability 
levels in the other charts are portrayed by perpendicular lines.)
Figure 3.20
Available Work Force and Employment Opportunities 
Distributions Before and After Increase in Minimum Wage
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Scenario 5: Demographic and labor force participation changes 
projected for the next two decades will shift the available work force 
distribution (Figure 3.21). There will be a decline in the absolute and 
relative size of the youth cohort, as well as a reduction in the annual 
number of female labor force entrants as the increase in labor force 
participants deaccelerates and as more women maintain steady work patterns. 
At the same time, the numbers in the mid-to-upper ranges of the em 
ployability distribution should increase as the post-war baby cohort ages 
into the prime working years, and as females who have steady labor force 
attachment compete more equally and forcefully for career advancement. The 
result will be an increase in the probabilities for employment among those 
at the lowest end of the distribution and a reduction in bottlenecks at 
higher levels.
Figure 3.21
Likely Shifts in Available Work Force 







The Match-Up of Job and Worker Potentials
The available jobs requiring any given level of documented em 
ployability vary in career potential, while the available work force with 
any level of documented employability vary in potential employability. The 
firms offering jobs with greater career potential resulting from their 
conscious internal labor market policies would prefer to hire workers drawn 
from the high end of the potential distribution among applicants meeting 
entry requirements. Likewise, workers who know they have potential and are 
motivated would like to find the jobs which will offer career ladders and 
stepping stones. All employers would prefer those workers at any level of
156
documented employability who will perform better immediately in the job, 
and all persons in the work force would like the jobs which will prove most 
compatible and amenable. The problem lies in the inability of either the 
employers or jobseekers to precisely determine immediate and future 
potential beyond what is already factored into documented employability 
requirements of jobs and the documented employability determinants for 
workers. What occurs, instead, is that high potential workers at any 
documented employability level have the same chances as low potential 
workers of finding high potential jobs (Figure 3.22). For a worker tfith 
documented employability level A but potential employability B, the chance 
of matching with a job that fully utilizes potential is proportional to the 
ratio of the lined area to the total area under the career potential curve 
(and is, of course, also related to the gap between employment oppor 
tunities and the number of available workers at documented employability 




THE CHANCES OF MATCH-UP BETWEEN HIGH POTENTIAL 
WORKERS AND CAREER POTENTIAL JOBS
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Those workers with greater potential who chance to make the match with 
jobs which offer commensurate career potential will perform well and 
subsequently move up, translating potential into documented employability. 
Many of those who do not get into high potential jobs will become dis 
satisfied with the lack of advancement and will try again, giving them 
another chance for a higher career potential job match. Over time, an 
increasing portion of those with higher employability potential will match 
with career potential jobs and will acquire work experience and training 
that moves them forward in the documented employability ranking. In 
contrast, individuals with less potential will be more likely either to 
stabilize in the jobs in which they are initially hired or to be fired and
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to subsequently bump from one position to another. These "failures" may, 
in fact, move down the documented employability ranking over time. Thus, 
frequent unemployment and menial jobs will count against a 35-year-old, 
whereas joblessness or unskilled work would not be as much of a black mark 
against a 20-year-old. This matching and iterative process is far from 
perfect. Some individuals with high potential may never make an ap 
propriate match; after repeated attempts to find a career ladder, they may 
give up or else become identified inescapably with the losers who had a 
chance but failed, so that they move down the documented employability 
ranking. For these unfortunates, there is an increasing rather than 
narrowing gap over time between documented employability and initial 
potential, i.e., they are among the persons occupying the upper tail of the 
potential distribution among those at lower levels of documented em 
ployability, along with individuals who have not had the chance yet to 
document their ability and who will experience, on average, a declining gap 
over time between potentials and credentials.
The Role of Employment and Training Programs
These analytical tools can be used to describe the setting and func 
tions of the CETA system. The subset of the available work force that 
participates in CETA is concentrated at the low end of the employability 
distribution. This is a consequence of eligibility requirements, i.e., all 
participants must be from poor families and must be unemployed for a period 
of time, and priority among those eligible is determined by need factors 
which are many of the same determinants used by employers to screen put 
applicants. The low level of subsidized wages and allowances also 
discourages participation by all but the most needy. Yet among CETA 
participants, there is variance in both potential and documented em 
ployability. Some participants are employable and have reasonable 
potential, but their employment probabilities are limited because of the 
depressed labor markets in which they reside. Some have documented 
employability below the minimum required for unsubsidized employment, yet 
they have potential to develop if provided help. Others have severe 
problems which reduce both documented and potential employability below the 
minimum.
The CETA system in each locality has working relationships with and 
usually some leverage over a subset of employers—those that are socially 
motivated, who depend on government contracting, or who are subject to 
affirmative action pressures, as well as employers who find it cheaper to 
recruit from CETA than other sources. Conceivably, the employment 
opportunities which can be accessed by CETA through these relationships and 
this leverage could equal or exceed the number of participants, since 
except in the most depressed areas, the number of low-level job vacancies 
in the entire community will exceed the number of CETA participants, who 
are usually only a small proportion of the residents with limited employ- 
ability. More realistically, the prime sponsor will have working re 
lationships with and leverage over a marginal complement of employers, and 
the jobs it can access add to the employment opportunities available to any 
person of limited employability, but do not guarantee placements for par 
ticipants.
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These relationships can be illustrated with the documented em 
ployability and employment opportunities constructs (Figure 3.23). Among 
individuals in a local labor market, the number with documented employa- 
bility level x is represented by E. A subset of these represented by C are 
participants in CETA. The number of employment opportunities in this labor 
market for workers with documented employability level x is represented by 
D. If CETA had no special relationships or leverage with employers, the 
participants would have the same chances of employment as others with the 
same documented employability. The employment opportunities for them would 
be a subset of D represented by A, and the ratio of (A-C) divided by A 
would equal (E-D) divided by E. But CETA is able to access some of these 
job opportunities for its participants, represented by B minus A. The more 
effective the prime sponsor's job development and employer relations, the 
greater the relative chances for employment among participants compared to 
nonparticipants, i.e., the more the ratio B/C will exceed the ratio D/E. 
The larger the share of participants who fall below minimum levels of 
documented employability as represented by the darkened area, the lower the 
placement rate that can be achieved by job access alone. Thus, the 
expected placement rate from CETA, disregarding the quality of human 
resource development activities which it offers, is affected by its ability 
to "access" jobs, by the portion of its participants who fall below minimum 
employability, by the distribution of documented employability among 
participants, and by the gaps between availability opportunities and the 
available work force at these levels of employability.
Institutional Training Impacts
Under this scheme, focusing on the subset of employment opportunities 
and documented employabilty curves for CETA participants as portrayed in 
the previous figure, the possible effects of CETA institutional training 
are threefold: first, to increase the documented employability of 
individuals; second, to sort and certify the individuals at any documented 
employability level who have greater potential; and third, to increase 
potential employability so that the individuals will be more likely to 
succeed once hired, thereby increasing documented employability in the 
future.
1. Increasing documented employability. As an example of this 
effect, a six-month CETA course might serve AFDC recipients who lack a 
diploma and are thus ranked at documented employability A; its aim is to 
prepare them for entry clerical jobs requiring documented employability 
level B (Figure 3.24). There are some participants (represented by an 
individual at point 1 on the potential employability distribution) who do 
not have the capacity—they failed in the schools or turned to welfare 
because they did not have the mental or behavioral characteristics to learn 
the basics, and they still lack these traits. They do not gain at all from 
training because it becomes clear that they do not have the necessary 
foundation. If the failure to complete training is noted when they apply
FIGURE 3.23
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for a secretarial job, 
employability level A, 
job can be secured by 
changes the commitment
for the next job, and the employer considers the individual as a higher 
risk, it may result in a regression along the documented employability 
distribution; they would thus have documented employability B- the next 
time they seek work. There are some participants (represented oy point 2 
on the potential employability distribution) who can learn some skills 
required for a clerical job within six months of training, but not up to 
the 60-word-per-minute typing standard. If this is the minimum required
such an individual will remain at the documented 
benefiting not at all from training. If a lesser 
attaining 40 words per minute, or if the training 
or attitude of the participant, then the training 
might lead to advancement to B either immediately or after securing a job 
and proving commitment. A nunroer of trainees (represented by point 3 on 
the potential distribution) may just reach the 60-word-per-minute standard 
because this equals their potential or because it is as far as the course 
goes. The demonstrable ability to type, or a certification of this skill, 
will add to their resume and to their attractiveness to employers. They, 
then, forward in the documented employability distribution to B as 
intended. Finally, some of the trainees (represented by point 4 on the 
potential distribution) may advance beyond the scope of the training within 
the six-months and have potential for even further improvement. If the 
training is individualized competency-based, if the job requirements are 
strictly specified, and if there are no institutional barriers, then the 
quality of training determines the gains in documented employability and 
the individual could be hired for a job at documented employability level
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B.. However, these conditions are the exception rather than the rule. 
Even if one of the AFDC recipients advances to 80 words a minute in the 
six-month course, he or she may be placed in the same job as the one typing 
60 words per minute because welfare recipiency and childrearing responsi 
bilities are considered negative factors or because the employer does not 
believe in the quality of training or that other skills such as reading and 
writing are commensurate with typing. This individual would be hired at 
level B, although, perhaps, subsequently advancing to B. by proving greater 
capacity.
If the training is inadequate, the graduates, on average, will fall 
short of the skill levels averaged by persons at documented employability 
level B. If testing is used to document competency, no participants will 
be accepted at this level because employers will immediately note the in 
adequacies. If graduates of training lack needed skills but these cannot 
be easily tested, employers will later discover the deficiencies and will 
subsequently discount all graduates of the training program, i.e., par 
ticipation will not be accepted in documenting B-level skills.
2. Sorting. An activity which is nominally labeled as training may, 
in fact, do little to improve individual skills but may rather serve as a 
sorting mechanism to better document potential employability. This may 
work in several ways. The training program may require a waiting period, 
participation in a pre-entry activity, or simply an extended period of 
attendance. It may provide the means for closer observation and more 
detailed assessment than is feasible at the hiring door. Likewise, 
training may require performance in a set of structured activities which 
have little relevance to actual jobs but help to identify those who can and 
cannot master simple tasks. Sorting may also be self-initiated. For 
instance, a training program may become recognized based on its past track 
record as a meaningful opportunity, attracting those from the upper end of 
the potential employability distribution. These individuals know their 
innate capabilites and are attracted to training which opens advancement 
opportunities even though employers or program screeners could not 
distinguish them from persons with lower potential but the same documented 
employability. On the other hand, if allowances were too high they might 
attract participants who wanted a free ride, not just persons interested in 
improving future prospects.
If the sorting occurs before entry into the training activity, the 
trainees will do better in the labor market than nonparticipants because 
they have greater potential employability even if the training does not 
increase either potential or documented skills. Further, it might be 
possible to market these sorted individuals to employers identified as 
offering above-average career-potential jobs. This identification is 
possible if the delivery agent's long-term experience with employers 
enables it to track the career patterns of individuals hired by different 
employers, or if employers putting more emphasis on the advancement 
potential of recruits are attracted to a program which identifies high 
potential candidates more effectively than can be determined by the 
employers' own screening devices. In this sense, the training institution 
is intermediating between the high potential workers and career potential 
jobs at any employability level in order to increase the successful match-
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up chances (Figure 3.25). For an individual at documented employability 
level A but potential employability level B, the chances of matching with a 
job equal to or greater than his or her ability is represented by the ratio 
of the darkened area to the total area under the career potential 
distribution for employment opportunities at level A. The chances will be 
increased to the ratio of the darkened area to the lined area if the 
program sorts above average individuals and matches them with above average 
career potential jobs. This individual will not immediately move up the 
documented employability distribution but will have a higher probability of 
moving up in the future (i.e., post-program follow-up would show evidence 
of gains which may increase with time).
FIGURE 3.25 
SORTING AND PLACEMENT WITHOUT IMPROVEMENTS IN SKILLS
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3. Improving Potential Employability. Training may increase poten 
tial employability without immediately altering documented employabllity. 
For instance, an individual might be taught job mores, his or her self- 
esteem, maturity, and motivation might be increased, or basic academic 
skills might be improved (although not to the point where the individual 
could be academically credentialed). In these cases, an employer would not 
necessarily be able to differentiate at the hiring door between individuals 
who had previously received or not received training; but once on the job, 
performance and advancement would differ and improved potential would be 
translated over time into increased documented employability. To the 
extent success breeds success, the initial impact of "getting off on the 
right foot" might even be magnified.
As an illustration, the training might move the individual from point 
A to point B on the potential employability curve for persons with docu 
mented employability x at time T, (Figure 3.26). The participant would not
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be observably better than similar individuals not trained, nor would he or 
she have improved employment chances initially. However, the likelihood of 
success once on a job are represented by the darkened area under the career 
potential curve if no training occurred, but the lined area if the in 
dividual's potential were improved. Success on the job or a series of jobs 
will move the individual or trainee to a higher documented employability 
curve to equilibrium at B by time T ; without training the individual 
would fall to A over time as repeated failures would be translated into a 
negative resume factor. If initial success or failure magnifies, then the 
equilibrium might be illustrated by B" or A", respectively. In other 
words, for training focused on improving maturity, attitudes, or the like, 
one would expect little immediate post-training differential in employment 
or earnings rates, but the trainee would have greater employment stability 





4. Combining Training and Sorting. Training and sorting almost 
always occur simultaneously because only a portion of the individuals at 
any level of documented employability have the potential to be prepared for 
and to function at a higher level. The portion who can accomplish training 
goals diminishes with the ambitiousness of the training effort, i.e., the 
increment in documented employability it seeks to achieve. This may be 
visualized by focusing on the employability potential curve at a given 
point X on the documented employability distribution (Figure 3.27). In a 
short-term training program aimed at improving documented employability 
modestly, from X to Y, the percentage in the lined area under the potential 
employability distribution have the capacity, with training, to perform at 
or above the average of persons already at documented employability level
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FIGURE 3.27
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Y. If the aim is to achieve a "quantum leap" to documented employability 
level Z through more intensive training, only those in the darkened area 
have the necessary potential. In other words, the sorting—the ratio of 
the unshaded or unlined area to the total area under the potential 
employability level--will necessarily be greater for longer-term training 
aimed at a greater increase in documented employability. If the training 
program is inclusive so that it does not involve pre-screening and if its 
standards are strict, all participants with inadequate potential will 
drop-out or be terminated unsuccessfully during the course of the program. 
If there is some type of pre-screening activity to identify individuals 
with greater potential, the batting average will improve. In other words, 
noncompletion is to be expected and accepted, and will be higher if the 
goal of training is more ambitious (although high termination rates might 
also result from ineffective operations rather than ambitous training and 
effective sorting).
Training programs may differ in their standards. A rigorous training 
program may aim to assure that all completers can perform above average for 
persons with the documented employability level required in the occupation 
of training. A less Draconian goal would be to assure that, on average, 
the immediate skills and advancement potential of graduates equals the 
average for those who are normally hired for the target jobs. If the 
training program does not maintain at least these standards, the graduating 
cohort will be judged by its average, which will be below the expectations 
of employers. Trainees will either not find jobs, or will experience high 
failure rates once on jobs, discouraging employers from accepting sub 
sequent graduates (Figure 3.28). As an example, if a training program for 
persons at documented employability level A "graduated" all those who were 
advanced to within a standard deviation of the average potential of persons 
at the targeted after-training documented employability level B, the 
average post-program potential level for the graduates would equal that of 
individuals with documented employability level C. Employers would, then, 
discount the certification for future trainees, ranking them at documented 
employability C rather than B.
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FIGURE 3.28 
TRAINING WITHOUT ADEQUATE SORTING
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There are, then, inherent limits to employability development. To the degree that the sorting and documentation mechanisms in the labor market and the schools are effective, the potential distribution at any documented employability level will be narrower and a smaller proportion of in dividuals at this level will have the potential to make a quantum leap. Even if there is a significant variance in potential among individuals at any documented employability level, so that many have the capacity to perform at higher levels, employers offering career ladders may view with some skepticism individuals who have been brought a long way just to meet minimum entry requirements. This may be true regardless of the quality of training or the degree of sorting for the very good reason that the individuals who graduate may be at the high end of the employability potential distribution for those who started at a lower level of documented employability, but will have less potential to move ahead compared to those already at the more advanced level of documented employability (Figure 
3.29). For instance, the lined area under the potential distribution at documented employability level A represents individuals who have par ticipated in a program and have been trained and sorted so that, on 
average, they can perform at average for the workers at the higher documented employability level B. Among these trainees, 1 few have the potential to advance further so that employers in the upper tail of the career potential distribution, certainly those beyond point C, will not be interested. On the other hand, these same trainees may be a good bet for the employers who do not offer advancement opportunities and who want 
someone who will show up for work, perform adequately and not be motivated to move on to greener pastures.
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FIGURE 3.29 
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On-the-Job Training Effects
The mix of sorting, documented employability improvements and changes 
in potential employability differ when training is on-the-job rather than 
in an institutional setting, and another element is involved—the hiring 
subsidy. All else being equal, training which takes place on the job has 
three basic advantages over institutional training: First, the individual 
who leaves institutional training has to find a job, while the OJT 
participant is already hired. Second, training which occurs in the work 
place is accepted by the employer so there is no documentation problem and 
no waste from overtraining. Third, the sorting which occurs is consistent 
with the needs and expectations of the particular employer so that there is 
less uncertainty about the potential employability or career potential. 
These same features can be disadvantages. If a firm does not hire a 
participant after a training assignment, he or she is then back at square 
one. The "training" on the job may not be recognized by other employers. 
Failure in an OJT assignment may, itself, be a black mark even though the 
individual might perform better in another setting. If the initial 
assignment is in a dead-end position or one which does not add to 
documented employability, the individual may eventually be worse off than 
if training were in an institutional setting and provided some credential 
which would help him or her compete more effectively for high potential 
jobs. The payoffs of OJT relative to institutional training are, thus, 
determined by the relative strength of these various factors. OJT will be 
more effective the wider the proportionate gap between the available work 
force and employment opportunities distributions at the point of targeted
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training, and, hence, the less the chances of securing a training-related 
job after institutional training. OJT will be more beneficial the less 
specific and objective the factors in employability documentation for the 
targeted jobs.
OJT is also a system for subsidizing risk and altering employers' 
documentation requirements so that they will reach further back down the 
labor queue than usual and take more chances. The subsidies become 
windfalls if training is limited, risks are not taken, nor hiring standards 
changed. In such cases, the net impacts of OJT may be modest compared to 
those of institutional training, even though on-the-job trainees will 
evidence gains relative to like nonparticipants. The several possible 
patterns of impact can be illustrated by the same analytic schema:
Scenario 1: The employer subsidy is just buying a job if the OJT 
employer would have hired individuals with the same qualifications as those 
of assigned participants, and if the subsidized employers are typical of 
all firms hiring at this documented employability level (Figure 3.30). The 
employment chances of the participant are increased (from the ratio of E/F 
to the ratio of D/F), but this reduces the employment chances for non- 
participants commensurately (from ratio B/A 1 to C/A 1 ).
FIGURE 3.30
OJT SUBSIDIES MERELY INCREASE CHANCES OF EMPLOYMENT 
AT SAME DOCUMENTED EMPLOYABILITY LEVEL
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ABILITY LEVEL A IF CETA DOES NOT 
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LOW EMPLOYABILITY HIGH
Scenario 2: If the agency contracting for the OJT slot is able, 
where an individual jobseeker is not, to distinguish those employers whose 
jobs have more career potential, then the subsidy buys each participant a 
greater probability of finding a job as well as an increased probability 
that the job found will have higher career potential (Figure 3.31). The 
employer in this case still gains a windfall, while nonparticipants lose 
both employment opportunities and chances to match with high career
FIGURE 3.31 




EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR NONPARTICIPANTS 
SUBTRACTING CETA ACCESSED JOBS
CAREER POTENTIAL DISTRIBUTION ALL JOBS 
REQUIRING EMPLOYABILITY LEVEL A
CAREER POTENTIAL DISTRIBUTION FOR NONPARTICIPANTS 
SUBTRACTING CETA ACCESSED JOBS
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE TO CETA PARTICIPANTS 
INCLUDING ACCESSED JOBS WITH ABOVE AVERAGE POTENTIAL
CAREER POTENTIAL OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR PARTICIPANTS 
BECAUSE OF ABOVE AVERAGE POTENTIAL OF JOBS ACCESSED BY CETA
EMPLOYABILITY HIGH
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potential jobs. In both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, there is no gain 
overall for the economy, pure windfall for employers, and immediate gains 
for participants; in Scenario 2, however, the continuing gains for 
participants are greater since they are more likely to secure good jobs.
Scenario 3: If CETA uses its special knowledge of participants or 
pre-screening activities to sort out those individuals who have more 
employability potential and, then, matches them to jobs with greater career 
potential, the high potential individual represented by B in the potential 
employability distribution for participants with A level documented 
employability will be assigned to a high career potential job represented 
by B" in the career potential distribution for employment opportunities 
requiring documented employability level A (Figure 3.32). This matching 
allows the labor market to operate more effectively. Lower potential 
nonparticipants have reduced chances of getting higher potential jobs, but 
their losses are modest since they could not benefit from the career 
opportunities; the upper tail of the potential employability distribution 
for nonpartici pants is reduced to the extent OJT sorts in the high 
potential individuals.
Scenario 4: If all the OJT reimbursement is used to subsidize the 
extra risks of dealing with a less advantaged population and the extra 
costs of training, there is no windfall to employers (Figure 3.33). In 
this case, the group in the lined area of the potential employability dis 
tribution at documented employability level A has the average potential of 
those at the higher employability level B; the risk is the cost of hiring, 
trying to train and eventually firing those below the cutoff point, as well 
as training those above, in order to get to the average which already 
exists among persons at documented employability level B. The darkened 
area represents the portion of trainees initially at level A who, as a 
group, can be brought up to the average of level C employability. As a 
crude approximation, the subsidy to employers hiring at level C must be 
larger than the subsidy to employers hiring at level B in proportion to the 
greater numbers who must be hired, trained but eventually sorted out, as 
suggested by the ratio of the nondarkened to the unlined area under the 
employability potential distribution at documented employability level A.
FIGURE 3.32
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Scenario 5: If C is the equilibrium point where a given OJT subsidy 
level will just cover the extra costs to get a group of trainees indicated 
by the darkened area up to the average potential of persons already at 
documented employability level C, as well as to cover the hiring and firing 
of all participants with lower potential employability, then either an 
extra subsidy or a lower equilibrium point is necessary if the employer is 
expected to retain a larger share of the participants (Figure 3.34). If, 
for instance, there is a rule of two—that one of every two trainees must 
be permanently retained, as a minimum, or else the employer will no longer 
be eligible for subsidization—then the average post-program potential for 
the trainees will be at the B rather than C level, and a subsidy will be 
required to offset this reduced productivity. The larger the gap between B 
and C, the larger the necessary hiring subsidy to make up for below average 
performance.
In actual operation, OJT is a melange of all five scenarios. For 
instance, where the CETA prime sponsor pre-screens to those at the upper 
end of the potential employability distribution, a "rule of two" may be the 
means to avoid a windfall profit, since risk is already minimized by the 
pre-screening. For institutional training, the sorting occurs in the 
program and the costs are absorbed in the differential between cost per 
participant and cost per completer. For on-the-job training, where the 
employer must hire first, he bears this cost, and the subsidy can be 
reduced if the sorting occurs prior to hiring. If the OJT employer gives 
greater weight to growth potential relative to current performance, the 
fact that completers of on-the-job training can perform but are more likely 
to be at the peak of their potential will discourage the employer's par 
ticipation or necessitate a larger subsidy. Such employers are more likely 
to participate if they can determine either through a try-out on the job or 
successful completion of some screening activity, that the participants 
will have high potential.
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FIGURE 3.34
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Conceptual Implications of the Model
The implications of the conceptual framework are heavily dependent on 
the labor market and programatic realities which determine the levels and 
slopes of the distributions and the relative importance of different 
patterns of impact for institutional and on-the-job training. It is 
impossible to precisely determine relative and absolute magnitudes and to 
sort out interacting factors—just as it is impossible to definitively 
measure the elasticity or equilibrium of supply and demand curves, or the 
marginal revenue products of individual workers. However, to the degree 
the conceptual framework itself makes intuitive sense and squares with what 
is known about labor markets and training impacts, it highlights some 
important considerations and perspectives for training programs and 
policies.
Most critically, the model suggests that there is variability among 
individuals and jobs which cannot be determined at the hiring door. Jobs 
with the same entry requirements, pay levels, and other observable 
characteristics may offer enormously different immediate and long-term 
prospects. Available workers with similar education and work experience 
can differ enormously in potential to perform immediately, to improve, and 
to advance. There is certainly not a homogeneous labor supply or demand. 
For interventions which prepare individuals for and match them with 
specific jobs, these differences are of critical importance.
There is not perfect knowledge in the labor market. The immediate and 
potential productivity of applicants cannot be determined precisely by 
employers even if they supplement all the background information which can 
be gathered with test batteries, interviews and the like. Potential can
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only be determined with greater certainty when the individual is observed 
in a work or activity setting where performance is required and there are 
opportunities for learning and developing. The best place to determine 
potential is in the worksite, since the setting of each job and the 
standards for determining potential vary. But some degree of determination 
is possible in a training program. By the same token, individuals looking 
for work cannot know in advance the comparability of the conditions they 
will encounter in different jobs and where the different opportunities will 
lead them. Part of the uncertainty is inherent. But an agency that keeps 
a track record of employers can make a better decision than an individual. 
The increased knowledge can be used to improve the match-up rates between 
higher potential individuals and higher potential jobs.
The conceptual framework suggests that the placement is not an end to 
itself, nor does the acquisition of a skill or competency provide a 
permanent career passport. Particularly at the lower levels of the 
documented employability distribution, where the job is usually an entry or 
reentry step, the issue is not just employment, but where the job may lead 
in the future. Once a skill is acquired that is documented, the in 
dividual's chances of finding jobs are improved but not certain, and entry 
into a job setting which does not utilize and develop the skill may reduce 
or eliminate its long-term payoff to the individual. In other words, there 
is a great deal of slippage in a probablistic world where there is a wide 
gap between employment opportunities and the available work force at any 
given documented employability level, and the variance in the potentials of 
workers and jobs is large. This makes it all the more important to couple 
bridging mechanisms and placement with skills training if a payoff is to be 
realized.
"Employability" is not an absolute. Employers do use batting averages 
to guide hiring decisions, weighting characteristics by their perceived 
validity in predicting individual performance. But this is not a sta 
tistical exercise. Skills and competencies are not always measurable and 
certifications may be discounted to varying degrees. Sticks or carrots in 
the tax structure, public appeals or social mores may influence per 
ceptions, while experience over time may change an employer's decision 
weights. Prejudice may exist, although hidden in the weighting structure 
of different characteristics rather than directly tied to color or sex; for 
instance, race may be related to a 5 percent lower performance, on average, 
as may the lack of a high school diploma, but the employer may give greater 
weight to the race factor as a predictor. In general, however, there is a 
rationale for the process and employers will not be convinced they are 
discriminating, particularly when the cumulative effect of stunted 
opportunities is to leave the victims of discrimination far short of their 
innate potential. Long-term changes can only be achieved by identifying 
individuals with more potential, improving their competencies, and 
documenting this in a way that can be demonstrated to employers. If 
employers are coerced or persuaded to hire trainees with lesser credentials 
or those whose credentials have been upgraded, and if these trainees do not 
meet, or perhaps even exceed, average performance, the effect will be to 
reinforce the employer's standards even if some of the referred individuals 
are better than average. Few credentials are accepted at face value, and 
in most cases they serve merely as another factor in the hiring equation. 
Credentials will be given varying weight depending on their source, and
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this depends to a large extent on the the average performance of those with 
the credential.
If an effort is made to improve the employability of a group of 
individuals who have the same measurable characteristics, their varying po 
tential will result in varying success in the acquisition of skills and 
competencies. Where the aim of a training program is to produce completers 
who can perform as well as or better than the average of individuals with 
greater documented employability, then sorting is unavoidable. Even if 
individuals can acquire entry skills which are commensurate with the 
average for individuals with the same credentials, they may have reached 
the upper limits of their potential, so they will be at the low end of the 
employability potential distribution for all individuals with similar cre 
dentials.
Training can raise earnings in very different ways with very different 
implications. The skills and abilities of individuals may be improved 
without increasing documented employability; in this case, the individuals 
will be no more likely to get a job or a better job when they complete 
training, but they may search more diligently or may perform more effec 
tively once they are employed. Society gains marginally by more effective 
performance in lower level jobs, as do the trainees. The matching process 
may be improved so that individuals with more potential are matched to jobs 
with more potential rather than relying on a random iterative process in 
the labor market. This may modestly ease frictional problems. Earnings 
may increase in the short-run if documented employability is increased and 
the skills that are documented are demanded in the labor market; earnings 
will increase over the long-run if the skills and credentials lead to 
career ladders. Society will benefit from better performance in entry jobs 
if training is of limited ambition; it will benefit from reductions in 
skills bottlenecks if the training leads to "quantum leaps." But em 
ployment and earnings may also be improved without any gains in skills or 
competencies through the leverage or subsidies of the hiring agencies. 
Buying or accessing jobs increases the chances of participants by reducing 
the chances of like nonparticipants; in other words, there is simply a 
real!ocation among those in need. Thus, earnings gains are prima facie 
evidence that training has impacts on participants but not that it has the 
same degree of impacts on the economy or on those in need.
Fleshing Out the Conceptual Framework
While these perspectives are important in their own right, the impli 
cations are heavily dependent on the underlying labor market and opera 
tional realities concerning documentation factors, the employability 
distributions of jobs and workers, the gaps between available opportunities 
and job seekers at each skill level, the patterns of sorting and skill en 
hancement, and the like. These issues have received very little attention 
in the research and evaluation literature and much more work is required. 
Nevertheless, the preceding volume of evidence provides some sense of 
general magnitudes and relationships for a few of the key factors:
First, evidence suggests that although CETA serves individuals from 
the lower end of the employability distribution, there is a fairly sub-
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stantial range in documented employability among participants. As a 
proxie, documented employability might be measured in terms of annualized 
earnings in the year before entry. The fiscal 1979 enrol lees in nonsummer 
CETA programs were concentrated in the lower tail of the earnings dis 
tribution for the entire labor force for the obvious reason that entrants 
were unemployed for some time before entering CETA. Yet they were also 
concentrated at the lower end of the distribution for labor force par 
ticipants with less than full-year employment, i.e., labor force entrants 
and reentrants during the year as well as persons experiencing some un 
employment (Figure 3.35). Among 1979 entrants, 35 percent had no earnings 
at all in the year before entry and another 15 percent had earnings less 
than $1000, while a fifth had earnings above $4000.
Of equal importance, CETA serves only a small proportion of the labor 
force in any earnings category. CETA entrants with no earnings represented 
only one of every twenty persons in the labor force who earned less than 
$1000 in 1978, and only one in forty of those who earned less than $4000. 
In a given local labor market, the percentage might be higher, particularly 
since CETA funds are distributed in part on a severity-of-needs basis, but 
it is likely that in most communities there are enough job vacancies with 
low documented employability requirements to absorb most of the CETA 
clients if the jobs were allocated to them rather than to nonparticipants. 
For instance, there were over 10 million jobs listed with the Employment 
Service in 1980, compared to the less than 2 million total CETA enrollments 
and 1.2 million nonsummer enrollments. The disadvantaged might not be eli 
gible for all these jobs, or might not be trainable up to the entry 
standards, but only a small portion of all job vacancies are listed with 
the Employment Service. The point is that CETA could get jobs for all or 
most of its clients simply by taking them away from similar nonpartici- 
pants. This makes it all the more critical to determine whether access and 
placement efforts, rather than human resource development, account for the 
major impacts of training.
Second, there is some evidence to suggest that the variation in 
potential employability is quite significant among individuals at the low 
end of the documented employability distribution where CETA is targeted. 
The data on characteristics gathered at CETA entry and in evaluations of 
employment and training programs are at least as inclusive as the in 
formation which employers might request in job applications and use to make 
hiring decisions. Most of these characteristics are predictive of 
subsequent employment and earnings success, both for participants and 
control groups. Thus, it is possible to construct an employability scale 
for each individual. The regression coefficients in equations relating 
demographic and background characteristics to future earnings suggest how 
much each factor contributes or detracts from earnings when all other 
factors are held constant; the employability of any individual can be 
estimated by weighting his or her characteristics by these coefficients. 
Likewise, the square of the correlation coefficient in regression equations 
predicting future earnings success suggests the strength of these charac 
teristics and factors in explaining or predicting future successes. In 
almost all studies of CETA participants and controls, the characteristics 
and job histories are predictive enough to separate groups of likely 
winners from likely losers, and the differences in future earnings (which 
reflect, at least in part, differences in ability and skills) are large
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FIGURE 3.35
ANNUAL EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION OF THE LABOR FORCE 
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enough to justify hiring on the basis of these factors. On the other hand, 
the residual of the correlation coefficient suggests the differences in 
individual potential which are not picked up by the observable experience 
and background variables, as well as chance factors. There is substantial 
unexplained variance in even the most detailed regression equations 
predicting the future labor market success of employment and training 
program participants:
t Among second half fiscal 1975 CETA participants, a regression 
equation relating the annual earnings two years after participation to 28 
variables including sex, race, age, education, family and marital status, 
family income and size, veteran status, previous employment and earnings 
levels and patterns, program activity, and time in program, explained 
(i.e., the square of the correlation coefficient equaled) 28 percent of the 
variance in earnings. 97/
t Where annualized earnings in the four quarters before and eight 
quarters after participation were estimated for second half 1975 CETA 
participants in classroom training using an equation which included 68 
documenting variables (such as age, barriers to employment, family and 
marital status, race, length of stay, placement status at exit, prior 
employment pattern and education), the factors explained 28 percent of the 
variance in earnings for males and the same percentage for females. The 
same equations for fiscal 1975 on-the-job trainees explained 32 percent of 
the variance in earnings for males and 36 percent of the variance for 
females. 98/
• Regression equations relating the percent of time 1977 Job Corps 
participants and controls were employed in the 18-24 month post-termination 
period to 23 characteristic and pre-program experience variables (including 
age, education, race, health status, previous employment, arrests, and drug 
use) explained 37 percent of the variance in percent time employed for male 
participants and 42 percent for female participants. 99/
As these equations suggest, more detailed information far a narrower 
range of participants will increase the portion of variance explained, yet 
in all cases the unexplained variance remains quite large. No doubt chance 
is involved, including the fact that the individuals secure jobs with 
varying career potential so that some are forced to move from one to the 
next or find themselves subsequently out of work, while others find jobs 
which turn out to have career potential, matching their own potential 
employability. Unquestionably, however, much of the unexplained variance 
is related to the differences in potential of individuals with like 
characteristics and backgrounds; and it is significant that the unexplained 
variance is so large.
Third, the evidence suggests the relative importance of improvements 
in documented and potential employablity, sorting and job access in pro 
ducing the aggregate results for classroom training, on-the-job training, 
and Job Corps. The impacts of classroom training are concentrated among 
long stayers and those participants who are placed at termination. 
Negative sorting occurs before entry, i.e., those CETA entrants who have 
more limited employability characteristics are assigned to classroom train 
ing; but sorting on the basis of positive characteristics occurs there-
178
after. The more employable are more likely to complete training, as well 
as to be placed, whatever their duration of stay. However, this sorting is 
not enough to explain the extraordinarily large gains for the long-stayers 
and those placed. Because of the short duration of treatment and the lack 
of completion standards, only a fourth of participants drop out, and 
although dropouts have more limited employability than completers, the 
differences are not major. Those who do not complete usually leave within 
the first few weeks. It is significant that the post-program earnings of 
early leavers are almost the same as those of their controls in the first 
post-program year and slightly higher in the second. The early leavers 
include positive terminees as well as dropouts, but if in-program sorting 
which identified the winners and losers among those with like charac 
teristics were to explain the substantial gains of the long-stayers, it 
would be necessary for the earnings of the short stayers to be much lower 
than those of their matched controls.
Longer-term classroom trainees are more likely to be placed at 
termination. It is not surprising that placement has an effect on post- 
program earnings after controlling for length of stay and other variables, 
since those moving immediately into jobs will surely have higher post- 
program earnings than those who undergo a period of job search. However, 
the differential related to placement remains substantial in the second 
post-program year. Either the immediate post-program jobs use the skills 
taught, are more stable and higher paying, or else the persons placed have 
greater potential employability which is identified during the course of 
participation. The latter possibility is discounted by the fact that 
classroom trainees not placed earned the same as their controls the second 
year after termination. This would not have occurred if those not placed 
were the "losers" whose lesser potential was discovered or emerged during 
participation. Hence, the gains of the "winners" who were placed were not 
primarily the result of their inherently greater potential
The individual and aggregate patterns of employment and earnings 
changes and occupational mobility suggest that the primary effect of 
classroom training is to secure primary labor market jobs with greater 
stability for those who are placed. The first post-program year earnings 
gains are largely the result of increased employment, which in turn is 
largely the product of greater labor force participation. In the second 
post-program year, higher earnings rates and less unemployment are more 
important factors. The greater stability of employment may result in part 
from improved potential. No matter what the duration of stay, placement is 
a major factor in explaining earnings levels in the post-training period, 
so that this must be seen as a key mechanism in securing the more stable 
jobs. Yet the long-term stayers experience substantial gains independent 
of placement. Those who stay long enough apparently secure credentials or 
skills that are accepted in the labor market independent of placement 
efforts, although also making placement easier.
For Job Corps, the annual earnings gains result not from higher wages 
but from increased employment and labor force participation. Most 
Corpsmembers who find jobs do so without placement assistance. There is a 
range of evidence demonstrating the effects of Job Corps on behavior and 
maturity. Improvements in mobility are also a factor. Corpsmembers are 
more likely to move where jobs are available for persons with their skills.
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On the other hand, the effects on documented employability are concentrated 
on a small minority of total participants. The completers of vocational 
training account for a substantial share of post-program earnings gains and 
are far more likely to receive placement assistance than the 40 percent of 
entrants who drop out within 90 days and the 30 percent who stay longer but 
do not complete training. Yet even for completers, less than two-fifths 
are subsequently placed and in training-related jobs, and they represent 
less than one in seven total enrol lees. Corpsmembers who acquire a 
credential such as a GED have higher earnings, all else being equal, but 
they account for only one in fourteen Job Corps entrants. Job Corps works 
for this minority by moving the individuals directly into career tracks and 
by providing transferrable certificates, and this minority of participants 
accounts for a disproportionate share of gains. Nevertheless, the major 
effect on most participants is to increase maturity and mobility.
Sorting does occur. The demands of a residential program result in 
self-sorting, while the individualized, competency-based curricula does not 
permit individuals to graduate from training and education unless they 
acquire competencies. Yet the dropouts do not earn less than controls in 
the post-program period after they get over their immediate transition 
problems, so that inherent differences in potential between noncompleters 
and matched controls do not account for a major share of the higher 
earnings of the completers.
For OJT, a good deal of sorting occurs prior to participation. The 
persons assigned to OJT are the most employable among CETA participants. 
Sorting also occurs on the job, since somewhere between 30 and 40 percent 
of participants according to different estimates either leave their 
assignment or are not retained at the end of the training period. The 
participants who are not placed are more disadvantaged than those who 
remain with their jobs, and matched to comparison groups on measurable 
characteristics, they earn noticeably less in both the post-training years, 
suggesting that the employers do separate winners and losers during the 
try-out period. Many of the OJT assignments are in the same occupation as 
previous employment, while in only a few cases representing clear occu 
pational advancement. There is no evidence whether training really occurs 
on the job. The decline in net impacts between the first and second 
post-program years suggests that some OJT participants subsequently lose 
their jobs and are unable to secure other employment, i.e., they have not 
secured transferrable skills and credentials to the degree these are 
provided in classroom training, where impacts increase over the post- 
program period. It is difficult to determine whether OJT subsidies are 
buying jobs that would have otherwise gone to the same types of in 
dividuals, but the evidence suggests that this is a good possibility.
Fourth, since the number of entrants and reentrants into the labor 
force is a major determinant of the relative levels and slopes of the 
available work force and employment opportunities distributions, dramatic 
changes over the next two decades can be predicted with a fair degree of 
certainty. These will affect the role of CETA and CETA training. During 
1980, entrants and reentrants accounted for nearly two-fifths of the un 
employed. Thus, the gap between the available work force and employment 
opportunities distributions in the ranges where CETA activities are focused 
is highly sensitive to labor force entry and reentry patterns. The changes
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which can be predicted with reasonable certainty are massive. The average 
number of youth and adult female labor force participants rose by 16.5 
million from 1970 to 1980. Net employment growth absorbed only 14.2 
million of these extra entrants and reentrants, so that the number of unem 
ployed females and youth rose by 2.3 million (Table 3.20). From 1980 to 
1990, according to projections by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, youth and 
adult female labor force participants will grow by only two-fifths the 
absolute increase over the previous decade. If employment opportunities 
for these participants expanded at the same rates as over the entire 1970s, 
there would be an excess of 4.4 million jobs in 1990. If they grew at the 
1975-1980 rate, there would be an excess of 8.9 million jobs. If jobs for 
youth and women only increased at the rate of total employment growth in 
the 1970s, there would be a shortfall of 2.7 million jobs, but this would 
represent about half of their job deficit in 1980. Such simplistic 
projections are not meant to suggest that jobs will be available for all 
entrants and reentrants, or that production functions will remain static 
with no effort to substitute the greater numbers of mid-level workers for 
entrants; but it is clear that there will be a substantial change from the 
1970s.
These bits and pieces of information do not go far towards fleshing 
out the theoretical framework, but they certainly lend credence to the 
underlying notions and suggest at least the rough magnitudes of some of the 
primary factors. Even though CETA is concentrated among individuals with 
severe problems, there is wide variation in both the documented and 
potential employability of its participants. Training improves skills and 
productivity which can improve employment chances and subsequent earnings, 
but this is only one of the processes producing the measured training 
impacts. Much of the gain results from easing the transition into the 
labor force of entrants and reentrants. Placement is a key variable, and 
not just because of its immediate effect on earnings. Apparently more 
stable jobs are secured. Sorting is evident in Job Corps, as well as 
improvements in potential employability as a result of maturational 
experiences. OJT might, to a significant degree, achieve its impacts 
simply by buying jobs rather than training. All these findings relate to 
training as it operated in the climate of the 1970s. The demographics of 




Labor Force Projections and Alternative Employment Scenarios
Actual Projections
Civilian labor force
Civilian employment if grew at 1970-1980 rate
Job gap (labor force-employment)
16-24 labor force 
16-24 employment 
Projection 1 if grew at 1975-1980 rate
for youth employment 
Projection 2: if grew at 1970-1980 rate
for youth employment 
Projection 3: if grew at 1975-1980 rate
for all employment 
Projection 4: if grew at 1970-1980 rate
for all employment 
16-24 job gap (labor force-employment)
Projection 1. if grew at 1975-1980 rate
for youth employment 
Projection 2: if grew at 1970-1980 rate
for youth employment 
Projection 3: if grew at 1975-1980 rate
for all employment 
Projection 4: if grew at 1970-1980 rate
for all employment
Adult female labor force 
Adult female employment
Projection 1: if grew at 1975-1980 rate
for adult females 
Projection 2: if grew at 1970-1980 rate
for adult females 
Projection 3: if grew at 1975-1980 rate
for entire population 
Projection 4: if grew at 1970-1980 rate
for entire population
Adult female job gap (labor force-employment) 
Projection 1: if grew at 1975-1980 rate
for adult females 
Projection 2: if grew at 1970-1980 rate
for adult females 
Projection 3: if grew at 1975-1980 rate
for entire population 


































































































Source: Employment and Training Report of the President, 1980 (Washing 
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981); Howard N. 
Fullerton "The 1995 Labor Force: A First Look," Daily Labor 
Reporter (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, January 
21, 1981).
This theoretical interpretation is descriptive more than predictive. 
The curves and constructs do not, of themselves, suggest appropriate train 
ing policies and approaches. They do, however, forcefully argue for 
attention to a number of issues which have been given minor attention in 
labor market and human resources research and policymaking, such as (1) the 
factors which document employability and are the basis of hiring decisions 
for different jobs; (2) the distribution of jobs and workers according to 
such standards; (3) the variance in potential among individuals sharing 
certain sets of characteristics; (4) how potential can be better measured 
and documented; (5) the career pathways which are provided by different
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jobs and occupations with similar entry requirements; (6) the variance in 
immediate employment conditions in jobs and occupations with similar entry 
requirements; (7) how many can be moved how far by human resource develop 
ment activities; (8) what competencies are acquired by trainees and the 
reference systems which best structure and document competency attainment; 
(9) the iterative post-program experiences of trainees beyond the immediate 
outcomes; and (10) the perceptions of employers towards the trainees and 
training programs, as well as the realisim of these perceptions and how 
they can be altered.
It is also necessary to very carefully examine management and delivery 
systems, regulations, performance standards, and the other real-life 
factors which provide the structure for decisionmaking and delivery. 
Relative magnitudes and interrelationships of the key factors in the 
theoretical framework cannot be inferred from analyzing outcome and impact 
information alone. The nuts and bolts issues such as performance indi 
cators and management information systems provide incentives for different 
patterns of behavior at the delivery level. It is these factors which are 




1. The CLMS evaluation has produced a series of reports detailing 
methodologies as they have evolved over the years. The preponderance 
of the long-term follow-up data available for analysis in this volume 
relates to fiscal 1975 entrants. A capsule description of the 
procedures and assumptions used for the fiscal 1975 survey are 
provided in:
Westat, Inc. CLMS Followup Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry), 
Experiences in the First Two Postprogram Years With Pre/Post Compari 
sons, For Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June, 1975. (Wash- 
ington, D.C.: Employment and Training Administration, Office of 
Policy, Evaluation and Research, December 1980), Appendices A-C.
2. Westat, Inc. Impact on 1977 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in 
Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C.: Employment and Train 
ing Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, 
December 1980).
3. Ibid.
4. Westat, Inc. The Impact of CETA on Participant Earnings: Entrants 
During the First Half of 197"5 (Washington, D . C . : Employment and 
Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, 
January 1980), pp. 3-39.
5. Westat, Inc. Impact on 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in 
Selected Program Activities (Washington, D.C.: Employment and Train- 
Trig Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, 
February 1981).
6. Westat, Inc. The Impact of CETA on Participant Earnings: Entrants 
During the First Half of 1975, op. cit.
7. Westat, Inc. Multivariate Analysis: 36 Month Follow-up of Terminees 
Who Entered CETA During January-June 1975 (Washington, D.C. : Employ- 
ment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and 
Research, November 1980).
The coefficients in the text were from unpublished tabulations. 
These equations do not consider placement as a variable, since this 
would pick up some of the differential placement chances related to 
participation in different primary activities.
8. Charles Mallar, et. a! . The Lasting Impacts of Job Corps Participa 
tion (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1980), pp.
9. Robert Taggart, "Considerations in Cost-Benefit Analysis of Job 
Corps," Assessments of Job Corps Performance and Impacts, Volume I 
(Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, May 1980), ppT 
110-129.
184
10. Charles Mallar^t. aj_. op_. cit., pp. 119-163.
11. The assumption of a 14 percent a year fade-out of real earnings gains 
was based on a study of MDTA which estimated a 50 percent fade-out of 
impacts for adult males after five years, and no fade-out for adult 
women. The Job Corps benefit-cost study, in its benchmark assump 
tions, projected that the gains for both males and females would 
fade-out at the same rate as previously estimated for adult males 
participating in MDTA. The earlier study was a five-year follow-up of 
1970 MDTA participants. Inflation then was about half of the rate 
which has prevailed over the last five years, and it is uncertain how 
fast real earnings gains eroded in the late 1970s.
12. Charles Mallar et. al. Evaluation of the Earnings Impact of the Job 
Corps Program Second Follow-Up Report (Washington, D.C.: Employment 
and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and 
Research, April 1980), p. 153.
13. The high benefit assumptions are more plausible for classroom training 
than for Job Corps. As noted previously, the 14 percent fade-out 
estimate was based on a finding for MDTA that the gains of males 
eroded by 50 percent over five years, but those for females did not 
erode at all. Females represented half of classroom training enroll 
ments in fiscal 1976 compared to only a fourth of Job Corps par 
ticipants. According to the CLMS-CPS impact estimates, females also 
accounted for four-fifths of the 1978 net gains for all classroom 
trainees, whereas females in Job Corps accounted for only a third. In 
brief, the use of the same discounting and fade-out assumptions in the 
Job Corps and classroom training benefit-cost studies may not be ap 
propriate and probably understates the relative effectiveness of 
classroom training.
14. Westat, Inc. Postprogram Experiences and Pre/Post Comparisons for Ter- 
minees Who Entered CETA During Fiscal Year 1976 (July 1975-June 1976) 
(Washington, D.C.:Employment and Training Administration, Office of 
Policy, Evaluation and Research, March 1979), Table D-8. Estimates on 
spending by functional activity under classroom training were provided 
by Employment and Training Administration, Office of Community 
Employment Programs.
15. Ibid. Tables D-2 and 14; Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 op. 
cit., Table 34.
It is important to note that the interview data for second half 
fiscal 1975 trainees suggested an increase from entry to exit in 
transfer usage, contradicting the more dependable findings for fiscal 
1976.
16. The Board of Directors, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, 
Summary and Findings of the National Supported Work Demonstration 
(Cambridge,Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co.,1980); Charles Mallar 
op. cit., p. 45.
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The public benefits receipt rates for Job Corps and supported 
work controls were as follows:
Proportion 1n Control Groups Receiving Benefits
Baseline 
(1-9 Months)
Supported Work AFDC Controls
Unemployment compensation 2.0% 
Welfare 97.7 
Food stamps 94.6
Supported Work Ex-Addict Controls
Unemployment compensation 7.4 
Welfare 50.7 
Food stamps 45.7
Supported Work Youth Controls
Unemployment compensation 4.0 
Welfare 17.0 
Food stamps 32.4
Supported Work Offender Controls










































17. Charles Mailer op. cit., p. 135.; Westat, Inc. Postprogram Exper 
iences and Pre/Post Comparisons for Terminees Who Entered CETA During 
Fiscal Year 1976 (July 1975-June 1976J op. cit., Table 8.
The in-program savings were calculated by dividing annualized 
cost by the percent of the year the average participant was in the 
program, and then multiplying by the percentage reduction in receipt 
of each benefit. The percentage decline in receipt from the first to 
second post-program year was multiplied by the proportion receiving 
each benefit at exit, and this was multiplied by the average 
annualized benefit to estimate post-program savings which were then 
assumed to fade-out at 14 percent a year and were discounted at 5 
percent. Without question this is a very crude "guestimation" 
technique. The real issue is whether the benefits would have declined 
in the absence of participation. The above evidence from supported 
work suggests that much of the decline would have occurred in the 
absence of participation.
18. The Board 
op. cit.
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of Directors, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation,
It is important to stress that these findings apply to CETA training 
in fiscal 1976. Two developments since then may have increased the 
payoff of classroom training. First, the female proportion of 
trainees increased, from 50 percent in fiscal 1976 to 57 percent in 
fiscal 1980. The CLMS estimated earnings gains relative to controls 
were two and a half times greater for females than males. All else 
being equal, the shift in the sex composition of trainees would in-
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crease the benefit-cost ratio 6 percent, adjusting for the somewhat 
longer stay of females. Likewise, it is estimated from the CETA 
management information that the duration of classroom training under 
Title IIBC (formerly Title I) increased from 4.3 to 5.1 months from 
fiscal 1976 to fiscal 1980. This would have raised the benefits and 
the per participant costs, but the former more than the latter. 
Recent administrative cost increases would somewhat lower the 
benefit-cost ratio, all else being equal.
20. Richard Wagner, "Historical CETA Data for Titles IIABC (Formerly Title 
I), Title IID (Formerly Title II) and Title VI, Fiscal Years 1975 
Through 1979," (Employment and Training Administration, Office of 
Community Employment Programs, March 1980), unpublished.
21. Westat, Inc. Postprogram Experiences and Pre/Post Comparisons for Ter- 
minees Who Entered CETA During Fiscal Year 1976 (July 1975-June 1976) 
op. cit., Table D-4.
22. Westat, Inc. Impact on 1977 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrol lees in 
Selected Program Activities op. cit. The 1976 earnings for each of 
the match lists were weighted in proportion to their share of OJT par 
ticipants.
23. Charles Mallar op. cit., p. 135; Westat, Inc. Postprogram Experiences 
and Pre/Post Comparisons for Terminees Who Entered CETA During Fiscal 
Year 1976 (July 1975-June 1976) op. cit., Table 8. ————
24. As noted previously, the 14 percent fade-out assumption is less 
appropriate for classroom training than Job Corps. Counting post- 
program earnings as a social and taxpayer benefit is more appropriate 
for Job Corps and classroom training than for OJT. Based on the CLMS 
net impact estimates, fade-out appears to be greater in OJT than Job 
Corps or classroom training. In other words, the uniform "benchmark" 
assumptions in the benefit-cost methodology will upwardly bias 
estimates of the OJT rate of return and downwardly bias the relative 
payoffs of classroom training.
25. Joe N. Nay, John W. Scanlon and Joseph S. Wholey, Benefits and Costs 
of Manpower Training Programs: A Synthesis of Previous Studies With 
Reservations and Recommendations (Washington, D.C.:The Urban Insti tute, 1971), p. 7.————————
26. The uncertainties in assessing net impacts for all classroom trainees 
are magnified with each level of disaggregation. For instance, in the 
large sample of the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey of fiscal 
1976 CETA entrants—the data base used to calculate net impacts—there 
were 876 classroom trainees who terminated by the end of calendar 
1976; only 128 of these were minority females, of whom just 13 were 
under age 19. Obviously, the matching of these 13 individuals with a 
correspondingly small number of minority, female teenagers in the 
Current Population Survey cannot yield very dependable estimates of 
net impact. The statistical estimation problem is compounded by the 
matching problem. The controlling variables may be more appropriate 
for some subgroups than others. For instance, there are doubts about
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the comparability of youth who participate in CETA and those with 
equal background or experience in the CPS national sample. A key 
factor, for instance, is the desire to continue education. The CETA 
group may be less likely to want to go to college, which is why they 
entered CETA. If a few more of the comparison group go to college and 
have low earnings during the post-program period, the earnings of 
participants will be higher than the earnings of controls, at least 
for a few years, even if the program had little impact. Educational 
plans are not queried in either the Current Population Survey or the 
Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey. Changes in the priority 
given to different matching variables can also change the comparison 
group and, hence, the estimated gains. A small sample may also 
overrepresent a particular area of the country or a particular type of 
activity. Most significantly, classroom training is not the same for 
different subgroups. Youth may be receiving short-duration re 
mediation while 30-44 year-old participants are receiving intensive 
occupational training. A finding that youth would benefit less than 
the rnid-career participants does not suggest what would occur if they 
were provided similar training. Furthermore, a gain of $1000 income 
for a youth cohort otherwise earning $2000 might represent a much more 
significant accomplishment than a $1000 increase for a cohort 
otherwise earning $7000.
27. Westat, Inc. Special tabulations from CLMS follow-up of second half 
fiscal 1975 entrants excluding placement as a variable in regression 
equations.
28. Charles Mallar_et. a]_. 0£. cit., pp. 47-48, 115.
29. Charles Mallar, et. al. Evaluation of the Economic Impact of the Job 
Corps Program: First Follow-up Report," in Assessments of Job 
Corps Performance and Impacts, Volume I (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, May 1980).
30. Westat, Inc. Postprogram Experiences and Pre/Post Comparisons for Ter- 
minees Who Entered CETA During Fiscal Year 1976 (July 1975-June 1976) 
op. cit., Table 56.
31. This assumes no change in weekly hours. In all probability, weekly 
hours also increased with weeks of employment, so that real hourly 
wage gains accounted for an even smaller portion of annualized 
earnings increases.
32. Westat, Inc. Postprogram Experiences and Pre/Post Comparisons for Ter- 
minees Who Entered CETA During Fiscal Year 1976 (July 1975-June 1976) 
op. cit., Table 58.
33. Ibid.
34. Westat, Inc. Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey, Second Half 





38. Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Termination op. cit., Table 57. ———————————————
39. Westat, Inc. Impact on 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in 
Selected Program Activities, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
40. Westat, Inc. The Impact of CETA on Participant Earnings, Working Paper
#2., Entrants During the First Half of 1975(Washington,D.C.: 
Employment and Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation 
and Research, June 1980), pp. 3.49-3.50. The matching methodology was 
not as refined as in estimating the gains for fiscal 1976 par 
ticipants, but the relative magnitudes of the gains for the par 
ticipants or different program activities are probably dependable.
41. Westat, Inc. Impact on 1977 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in 
Selected Program Activities op. cit., Table 68.
42. Westat, Inc. The Impact of CETA on Participant Earnings, Working Paper
#2, Entrants During the First Half of 1975 £p_. cit., pp. 3.41-42.
43. Charles Mallar et. al. The Lasting Impacts of Job Corps Participation 
op. cit., p. 169.
44. Westat, Inc. Multivariate Analysis: 36-Month Follow-up of Terminees 
Who Entered CETA During January-June 1975 op. cit., p. C-16.
The percentage of participants with each characteristic measured 
in the CLMS interview was multiplied by the regression coefficient 
associated with the characteristic and added to the constant. The 
coefficients for primary assignment, time in program and placement 
were excluded.
45. Westat, Inc. Impact on 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in Selected Program Activities, op. cit'.——————————————————
46. Charles Mallar ^t. al. op. cit., p. 175.
47. Westat, Inc. Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey, Fiscal 1977 New 
Enrollees, unpublished tabulations.
48. Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry pp. 
cit., Table 43.
49. Westat, Inc. Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey, Fiscal 1977 New 
Enrollees, unpublished tabulations.
50. Charles Mallar, et. al. "Evaluation of the Economic Impact of the Job 
Corps Program: First Follow-up Report," op. cit., pp. 312-314.
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51. David Finifter An Analysis of Two Year Post-Program Earnings Paths of 
CETA Participants Using the Early CLMS Cohorts (January 1975-June 1975 
Entrants (Washington, D.C.:Employment and Training Administration, 
Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, October 1980), p. 53.
52. Employment and Training Administration. Management Information System 
Fiscal 1980 Annual Summary, unpublished.
The MIS separates placements
terminees who are referred to jobs
services, and two groups of indirect
receiving services, those "placed by
direct placements." In fiscal 
percent of indirect placements.
1980
into "direct placements"--! .e., 
without receiving substantial 
placements who get jobs after 
the prime sponsor" and "other 
the latter accounted for 28
52. David Finifter cit. , p. 57.
53. Charles Mallar ^t. al . , The Lasting Impacts of Job Corps Participation 
op_. cit., pp. 45-46, 70-72, 109-111.
54. Rebecca Maynard, Enhanced Work Projects—The Supported Work Approach 
for Youth (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, May 1980), 
pp. 119-158.
55. Peter Treadway et. al . "Study of the Career Intern Program," and 
Richard Gibboney Associates, "The Career Intern Program: An 
Experiment in Career Education That Worked" in Alternate Education 
Models; Interim Findings from the Replication of the Career Intern 
Program (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1980), pp. 
235-242, 682. Unpublished data provided by RMC for recent cohorts in 
CIP.
56. Educational Testing Service, School -to-Work Transition Services—The
Initial Findings of the Youth Career Development Program 
D.C.:Government Printing Office, May 1980), p. 27.
(Washington,
57. Youth Career Development demonstration. Unpublished tabulations 
provided by the Educational Testing Service.
58. Jobs For Delaware Graduates demonstration, 
provided by the Educational Testing Service.
Unpublished tabulations
59. Brian Nedwek et. al. 
Exploration Program," 
Employment Program, Volume
"Interim Report on the Summer 1978 Vocational 
Compilation of Reports on the 1978 Summer Youth
I (Washington, D.C.: 
Inc. Evaluation of
Government Printing 
the 1979 Summer YouthOffice, 1979.; A.L. NelTurn, ________________________ 
Employment Program (Washington, D.C.: Employment and Training 
Administration, Office of Youth Programs, December 1980); Opportun 
ities Industrialization Centers of America, Career Exploration 
Program Final Report and Summer Court Involvement (Washington, D.C.: 
Employment and Training Administration, Office of Youth Programs, 
March 1981); unpublished tabulations provided by the Educational 
Testing Service on additional summer program demonstrations.
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60. Andrew Hahn and Barry Friedman, "The Effectiveness of Two Job Search 
Assistance Programs for Disadvantaged Youth," Brandeis University, 
Waltham, Massachusetts, June 1981, unpublished.
61. Ibid.
62. Michael Borus et. al. Findings of the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Young Americans, 1979 (Washington, D.C.:Government Printing Office, 
May 1980), pp. 91-160.
63. Barry Argento et. al. Alternative Education Models--Pre1iminary Find 
ings of the Job Corps Educational Improvement Effort(Washington, 
D.C.:Government Printing Office, May 1980), pp. 160-227.
64. Sar Levitan and Benjamin Johnston, The Job Corps: A Social Experiment 
That Works (Baltimore, Md.: TheJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress, 
1975), pp. 84-86.
65. Career Intern Program demonstration. Unpublished tabulations from RMC 
Inc. covering recent cohorts in CIP.
66. Barry Argento et. al. "Assessment of Center Educational Programs in 
Job Corps," "Assessment of Job Corps Performance and Impacts Vol. II 
(Washington, D.~c7i Government Printing Office, May 1980), pp. 245- 
312.
67. Charles Mallar, et. al. The Lasting Impacts of Job Corps Participation 
op. cit., p. 58.
68. Employment and Training Administration, Management Information System 
Summary Reports Fiscal 1980, unpublished.
69. Charles Mallar, et. al. The Lasting Impacts of Job Corps Participation 
op. cit., pp. 175-76.
70. Westat, Inc. Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey, Fiscal 1976 
Entrants, unpublished tabulations.
71. Stanley H. Masters and Rebecca Maynard, The Impact of Supported Work 
on Long-Term Recipients of AFDC Benefits (New York,New York:Man 
power Demonstration Research Corporation, 1981), pp. 78-81.
72. Ibid.
73. The Board of Directors, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, 
op. cit.
74. Stanley H. Masters and Rebecca Maynard, The Jmpact of Supported 
Work on Long-Term Receipients of AFDC Benefits op. cit., pp. 78-81.
The MDRC report interprets the data as follows:
"The conspicuous part played by public sector em 
ployment raises questions concerning the mechanisms through 
which Supported Work has this effect. One possibility is
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that the main mechanism is the access Supported Work can 
provide to post-program public sector jobs—access that 
could result mainly from the 'connections' or other 
placement efforts of the program operators. If this 
hypothesis is correct, then displacement of other workers by 
Supported Work graduates may be high and the effort to 
differentiate Supported Work from other employment programs 
by instituting such concepts as graduated stress and peer 
group support may be much less important than such factors 
as the political relationships between operators and public 
sector officials.
Over 40 percent of the experimentals who obtained 
post-program jobs indicated that they learned about their 
first post-program jobs through Supported Work. Thus, the 
placement mechanism may well be part of the story. It is 
not likely to be the whole story, however, since the 
experimental effect might diminish somewhat over time if the 
program's only effect were to help participants obtain an 
initial job.
A second hypothesis is that the program had its effect 
largely through a screening mechanism. This argument 
suggests that the access of participants to unsubsidized 
public sector jobs depends not primarily on the placement 
efforts of program operators, but rather on the opportunity 
Supported Work gives its participants to show other 
employers how well they can perform on the job. Employers 
can then hire those who prove themselves to be good workers.
Since a high proportion of program jobs was in the 
public sector, the screening hypothesis may help account for 
the experimental effect being concentrated in public sector 
employment. Like the placement hypothesis, the screening 
hypothesis suggests that displacement may be high and that 
such program elements as graduated stress may not play a 
major role in the program's success.
Although both the screening and placement hypotheses 
may have validity, the magnitude of the wage rate dif 
ferential between experimentals and controls in the post- 
program period suggests that Supported Work also tended to 
increase the ability of its participants to work effec 
tively. Empirically, however, it is very difficult to 
distinguish among these hypotheses."
75. Westat, Inc. Impact on 1978 Earnings of New FY 1976 CETA Enrollees in 
Selected Program Activities op. cit.
76. Employment and Training Administration, Management Information System 
Annual Summary Report, unpublished.
77. Westat, Inc. Postprogram Experience and Pre/Post Comparisons for Ter- 
minees Who Entered CETA During Fiscal Year 1976 op. cit., Tables 9-11.
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DIVERSITY IN LOCAL TRAINING EFFORTS
Patterns of Variation
Cost averages, national participant counts, aggregate employment and 
earnings change patterns, statistically-derived gains measures, benefit- 
cost and theoretical analyses, all provide an orderly and comprehensive 
picture of the CETA training system, its general impacts and effectiveness. 
They achieve this order and comprehensibility by averaging out, rounding 
off, assuming away, cleansing, massaging, and sometimes ignoring the 
diversity, volatility, and complexity of operational realities. The 
aggregates which are summarized and analyzed are the product of the actions 
of 484 local decisionmaking units, under the oversight of ten Department of 
Labor regional offices offering varying interpretations of the diverse 
regulations and guidance issued by relatively independent national 
bureaucracies in the Employment and Training Administration which have 
responsibility for the separate categorical programs under CETA. Below the 
prime sponsor level, there are thousands of subagents and tens of thousands 
of delivery agents which have their own interests, objectives, and inter 
pretations. Decisionmakers at each separate level share some perspectives 
and concerns, and answer more to some drummers than others, but there is 
also great diversity. The national fiefdom in charge of Title IV youth 
programs has different interests than the office in charge of Title IIBC 
that serves both adults and youth. Regional offices have varying styles 
and perspectives. State governments serving as prime sponsors have 
different decisionmaking procedures and concerns than multi-jurisdiction 
consortia, which, in turn, may differ from small city prime sponsors. 
Community-based organizations, schools and union organizations vary in 
their interests and comparative advantages as delivery agents. National 
ly-linked community-based groups may, in turn, differ from indigenous 
neighborhood organizations, and in the same local area, one indigenous 
organization will be different from another.
All decisionmakers must consider the federal law and the regulations, 
but both consciously leave room for a range of differing interpretations. 
Sticks and carrots—both financial and bureaucratic—affect decisionmakers 
at each level. Institutional history, linkages, and personality all play a 
role. Real needs and perceptions of these needs vary widely, as do the 
institutional conditions which affect how these needs can best be met. 
Varying contractual and planning procedures influence the substance as well 
as the form of decisions. It is not surprising, then, that in almost every 
dimension of CETA activity and performance there is enormous variability.
To begin with, there is widely-varying emphasis on training vs. job 
creation. Prime sponsors have the authority to use almost all their 
CETA-allocated funds for training. The usual alternative is to support 
subsidized jobs of one sort or another. Some prime sponsors do' almost no 
training, relying primarily on job creation and to some extent, on direct 
referral and transition services. Others focus almost exclusively on 
training. As an average among prime sponsors, half of participants under 
Title IIBC of CETA in fiscal 1980 were enrolled in classroom training, but 
a fifth of prime sponsors enrolled less than 30 percent of participants in 
this component, while a tenth enrolled over four-fifths (Figure 4.1). The
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Figure 4.1
Variations in Prime Sponsor Training Activity 
Under Title IIBC, Fiscal 1980
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Management Information
standard deviation for the classroom training shares among prime sponsors 
was 43 percent of the mean (this ratio is a statistical measure of 
variability called the coefficient of variation). On-the-job training 
enrollments averaged 11 percent of Title IIBC participants, but over half 
of sponsors had less than 10 percent of enrol lees in OJT, while one in ten 
sponsors enrolled more than 30 percent.
There was even greater variation among prime sponsors in their 
emphasis on training under the other titles of CETA (Figure 4.2). Under 
Title I ID, the average prime sponsor enrolled 38 percent of participants in 
mostly part-time training, using 11 percent of PSE expenditures for this 
purpose. \] The coefficient of variation—the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the mean--was 74 percent for the participant share and 92 
percent for the cost share. Under Youth Employment and Training Programs—
196
Figure 4.2
Variations in Prime Sponsor Training Activity 
Under Title IID PSE and Title IV YETP Programs
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which offer the same comprehensive service possibilities as IIB--the 
proportion of participants in classroom training or OJT averaged 17 
percent, but the coefficient of variation was 130 percent.
Prime sponsors may also choose to invest intensively in a few in 
dividuals or to spread resources by using less costly treatments. In 
fiscal 1980, there was enormous variance in costs per participant—much 
more than could be explained by the differences in the costs of providing 
similar training in different areas. A fourth of prime sponsors spent less 
than $1000 per classroom trainee under Title IIBC, while one in eight spent 
over $2000, even though the average was $1328 (Figure 4.3). The OJT cost 
per participant averaged $1130 across prime sponsors, but the standard 
deviation among prime sponsors equalled three-fifths of the mean.
Figure 4.3
Distribution of Prime Sponsors by Cost Per Participant 
In Title IIBC Training Programs, Fiscal 1980
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Management Information
Prime sponsors also varied enormously in the outcomes from the 
services they offered. While data do not permit a determinaton of the 
outcomes for participants in each separate component of Title IIBC, the 
average outcomes in 1980 were obviously related to the outcomes from 
training since three-fifths of IIBC participants were in OJT or classroom 
training. The "positive termination" rate (i.e., the proportion of 
terminees who were either employed, returned to school, entered training or 
the military, or achieved program objectives) averaged 67 percent across 
prime sponsors, and the coefficient of variation was a relatively low 18 
percent (Figure 4.4). But "positive termination" is a catch-all category, 
and the differences between placement or "entered employment" rates were 
more significant. As an average for all prime sponsors, only two-fifths of 
Title IIBC terminees entered employment, but a fourth of prime sponsors 
placed less than 30 percent while another fourth succeeded in placing over 
half. Given the variance in both costs per participant and in successful 
termination rates, it is no surprise to find vast differences in the cost
. . Figure 4.4 
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per positive outome. While prime sponsors averaged $3170 cost per positive 
termination, the coefficient of variation was 61 percent. The cost per 
placement averaged $6508 but had a coefficient of variation of 70 percent.
Possible Causes for Diversity
In light of the preceding evidence that OJT is an extremely effective 
strategy, that classroom training, particularly of long-duration, pays off, 
that placement upon termination is a key factor related to long-term as 
well as immediate gains, and that work experience has little post-program 
impact, these disparities in service mix, costs, and placements take on a 
critical importance. A primary thrust of the Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act was to localize decisionmaking under federally-funded manpower 
programs so that choices concerning who would be served and how would be 
based on the needs of each community, its economic conditions, and delivery 
capacities.. The instrument for promoting rational local decisionmaking was 
the annual plan. Each year the prime sponsor must assess local labor 
market conditions and the universe of need, deciding on the participants 
and services for the coming year. The federally-required planning pro 
cedures place a heavy emphasis on presentation of labor market data and 
assessment of labor market trends, as well as of the relative needs of 
various population segments. One would expect, then, that the variations 
in local conditions, and in target groups selected on the basis of needs 
analysis, would be major factors explaining the diversity in training 
levels and intensities. Since unemployment rates are used to allocate 
funds, and since this is probably the best available indicator of relative 
labor market conditions, it would be reasonable to expect different service 
patterns in high unemployment areas—for instance more OJT in tight labor 
markets, or a priority on job creation in areas facing severe job deficits. 
If target groups were selected on the basis of need, with subsequent 
decisions about how best to serve them, it would also be reasonable to 
expect differences in service mix paralleling differences in participant 
mix. The youth share should, in particular, be a primary factor, con 
sidering that OJT may not be appropriate where education is not completed 
or career plans are uncertain, and that nationwide, youth are less 
frequently assigned to classroom training than other CETA entrants. The 
Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 froze the youth 
share under Title IIBC to the level of fiscal 1977 in order to avoid 
slippage in the existing service levels under comprehensive programs as new 
resources were added specifically for youth programs. A constant complaint 
from advocates of decentralization was that this federal intervention not 
only resulted in services to youth out of proportion to need in some local 
areas, but that it necessitated a continuing emphasis on work experience. 
To the extent these complaints were valid, there should have been a 
negative relationship between the youth share among participants and both 
on-the-job and classroom training levels.
Surprisingly, local unemployment rates and the youth shares among 
participants bore almost no relationship to prime sponsors service mix 
decisions. Regression equations relating the OJT and classroom training 
shares of prime sponsors under Title IIBC in fiscal 1980 to their youth 
shares among IIBC participants and iheir unemployment rates yield very low 
coefficients of determination (or r which is a measure of the percent of
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variance in the dependent factor explained by the variance of the inde 
pendent factors), as well as low regression coefficients (the degree that 
change in one variable is associated with change in another): 2J
Equation 1. Prime sponsor IIBC classroom training par 
ticipants as percent of total IIBC participants = a + b (prime 
sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent of IIBC participants who 
were under age 22).
r2 = .08 
a = 30.3 
b = -.60 
c = -.55
Interpretation—The unemployment rate among prime sponsors 
averaged 7.0 percent in 1980 and the standard deviation was 2.6 
percentage points (i.e., two of three prime sponsors had un 
employment rates between 4.4 and 9.6 percent). A prime sponsor 
with an unemployment rate a standard deviation above average was 
likely to have a 1.6 percentage point lower proportion of IIBC 
participants enrolled in classroom training. This increment 
represented less than a tenth of a standard deviation in the 
classroom training shares of prime sponsors. In other words, a 
very large relative difference in the local unemployment rate was 
associated with a relatively much smaller difference in the 
classroom training share. The 1980 youth share was 48.3 percent 
with a standard deviation of 7.8 percentage points. A prime 
sponsor with a youth share a standard deviation above average was 
likely to have a 4.3 percentage point lower proportion of IIBC 
participants enrolled in classroom training, which represented 
only a fifth of a standard deviation in the classroom training 
share. However, variations in unemployment rates and in the 
youth shares among prime sponsors explained only 8 percent of the 
variation in classroom training shares. Other factors clearly 
predominanted in determining the emphasis on classroom training.
Equation 2. Prime sponsor IIBC classroom training ex 
penditures as a percent of total IIBC expenditures not including 
administration = a + b (prime sponsor unemployment rate) + c 
(percent of IIBC participants who were under age 22).
r2 = .06 
a = 69.9 
b = -.42 
c = -.40
Interpretation—A prime sponsor with an unemployment rate a 
standard deviation above average was likely to have a 1.1 per 
centage point lower proportion of IIBC funds committed to class 
room training. This increment represented only 6 percent of a 
standard deviation in classroom training expenditures. A youth 
share one standard deviation above average was associated with a 
3.1 percentage point lower classroom training expenditure share, 
an increment representing less than a fifth of a standard de-
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viation. However, the variance in unemployment rates and youth 
shares among prime sponsors explained only 6 percent of the 
variance in classroom training expenditure shares.
Equation 3. Prime sponsor IIBC on-the-job training par 
ticipants as a percent of total IIBC participants = a + b (prime 
sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent of IIBC participants who 
were under age 22).
r2 = .03 
a = 9.9 
b = .61 
c = -.05
Interpretation—A prime sponsor with an unemployment rate 
one standard deviation above average was likely to have a 1.6 
percentage point higher on-the-job training share. While this 
represented less than a fifth of a standard deviation in the OJT 
shares of prime sponsors, the relationship was contrary to the 
hypothesis that lower employment would facilitate more OJT. A 
standard deviation increment in the youth share was associated 
with a .4 percentage point decrement in the OJT share, or less 
than a twentieth of a standard deviation. In other words, in 
creased youth service levels did not appear to constrain OJT 
levels. Together, the variations in the unemployment and youth 
shares explained very little of the diversity in OJT levels.
Equation 4. Prime sponsor IIBC on-the-job and classroom 
training participants as a percent of total IIBC participants = a 
+ b (prime sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent of all IIBC 





Interpretation—A prime sponsor with an unemployment rate a 
standard deviation above average was likely to have a .9 per 
centage point greater share of participants in training. 
Although this represented less than 5 percent of a standard 
deviation in the training share, the finding is contrary to the 
expectation that work experience rather than training would be 
emphasized in areas with larger job deficits. An increment of a 
standard deviation in the youth share was associated with a 9.0 
percentage point decrement in the training share, representing 
almost two-fifths of a standard deviation. The differences among 
prime sponsors in unemployment rates and youth shares offered 
more explanation for the variations in the overall training 
emphases than they did for the OJT or classroom training shares 
alone. In other words, economic conditions and particularly the 
youth enrollment affected the decision to emphasize training vs. 
work more than the decision over which type of training to pro 
vide.
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The prime sponsor receives funds under several different titles which 
authorize similar activities. As noted, both YETP and Title IID provide 
for the same services available under I IB (i.e., excluding upgrading and 
retraining). It is plausible that prime sponsors would make decisions on 
how to use Title IIBC funds in consideration of the services provided under 
these other titles. One reasonable hypothesis is that prime sponsors with 
higher levels of training under Title IIBC would need to put less emphasis 
on training under PSE and YETP. This hypothesis is not supported by the 
evidence:
Equation 5. Prime sponsors' classroom and on-the-job 
training expenditures as a percent of Title IIBC expenditures = a 
+ b (prime sponsor's PSE expenditures for training as a percent 
of total PSE expenditures) + c (prime sponsor YETP expenditures 
on training as a percent of total YETP expenditures) + d (percent 
of Title IIBC participants who were under age 22).
r2 = .20 
a = 60.35 
b = .19 
c = .28 
d = -.24
Interpretation—Prime sponsors offering more training under 
PSE and YETP also emphasized training under Title IIBC. A prime 
sponsor with a PSE training expenditure share a standard de 
viation above average was likely to have a Title IIBC training 
expenditure share 1.9 percentage points above average, which 
represented an eighth of a standard deviation among prime 
sponsors Title IIBC training shares. A standard deviation 
increment in the YETP training expenditure share was associated 
with a 5.6 percentage point increment in the Title IIBC training 
share, or nearly a third of its standard deviation.
Prime sponsors consist of units of government serving populations of 
100,000 or more, consortia of governmental units with a combined population 
over 100,000, and states which serve all the remaining jurisdictions with 
lesser populations. The governmental decisionmaking units, thus, include 
states, cities, counties and consortia (and a few hybrids such as trust 
territories and rural CEPs). These prime sponsors vary enormously in 
population and population density. Government structure and size might be 
expected to have some impact on service decisions. For instance, smaller 
jurisdictions might be more aware of local employers and more capable of 
forging OJT linkages, but might be less likely to have classroom training 
facilities. Large cities or counties with high unemployment rates might 
emphasize job creation moreso than state governments because the political 
benefits are greater than when jobs are so widely distributed that they 
have negligible impacts in any location. Consortia--created to take 
advantage of job and training opportunities throughout a labor market- 
might be expected to put greater emphasis on OJT and training.
Service patterns do vary by governmental unit and prime sponsor size, 
but the patterns of variation are complex (Table 4.1). First, it appears 
that consortia and states generally place less emphasis on classroom train-
Table 4.1 
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Source: Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor, unpublished Management Information 
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ing, as judged by expenditure and participant shares, than do cities and 
counties. Second, there is modestly increasing emphasis on classroom 
training up through the 200,000-500,000 prime sponsor size range and then a 
decrease beyond that point. Third, OJT activity is most prevalent under 
balance-of-state programs, and tends to be lower in cities. Fourth, there 
is no clear relationship between prime sponsor size and OJT activity, 
although the OJT emphasis appears to be least in cities and counties with 
labor forces of 200,000-500,000, i.e., the same areas where classroom 
training is given greater emphasis.
Regression analysis helps to sort out these patterns, adjusting for 
differences in unemployment rates and youth shares between prime sponsors 
of differing sizes and governmental structures:
Equation 6. Prime sponsor classroom and on-the-job trainees 
as a percent of total IIBC participants in fiscal 1980 = a + b 
(size of prime sponsor labor force: 1 if less than 200,000; 0 if 
200,000 or more) + c (prime sponor unemployment rate) + d (per 






Interpretation—The labor force size of a prime sponsor had 
very little impact on the training shares after considering the 
differences in unemployment rates and youth shares. The re 
lationship between unemployment rates and training levels was 
slightly negative but inconsequential, since a standard deviation 
increase in unemployment was associated with a .3 percentage 
point increase in training share.
Equation 7. Prime sponsor on-the-job trainees as a percent 
Title IIBC participants fiscal 1980 = a + b (size of prime 
sponsor labor force: 1 if less than 200,000; 0 if 200,000 or 
more) + c (type of government unit: 1 if state; 0 if city, 






Interpretation—Larger prime sponsors had on-the-job 
training shares 1.47 percentage points above smaller, nonstate 
prime sponsors. This differential represented a fifth of a 
standard deviation in the OJT share. State prime sponsors had 
OJT share 5.53 percentage points higher after controlling for the 
effects of size and unemployment. This increment represented 
nearly two-thirds of a standard deviation. This would suggest 
that small balance-of-state jurisdictions and small prime spon 
sors have more access to employers or greater preference for OJT.
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Equation 3. Prime sponsor classroom trainees as a percent 
Title IIBC participants = a + b (size of prime sponsor labor 
force: 1 if less than 100,000 labor force and 0 if greater) + c 
(prime sponsor unemployment rate) + d (percent IIBC participants 
who were under age 22).
r2 = .14 
a =36.1 
b = +4.02 
c = -.10 
d = -.74
Interpretation—Small jurisdictions were apparently not 
lacking in classroom training facilities, or at least this was 
not reflected in their service mix. Prime sponsors with less 
than 100,000 labor force had a slightly higher percentage of 
classroom training participants after controlling for differences 
in unemployment rates and youth shares.
Another factor which may explain the diversity in service mix is 
variance in interpretation and enforcement of national policies by the 
Department of Labor regional offices. The regions must review and approve 
plans, and could, presumably, pressure the prime sponsors into undertaking 
more OJT or classroom training. Performance monitoring efforts might also 
vary. For instance, ambitious OJT targets are seldom met. If a region 
pressures prime sponsors to maintain or improve OJT shares from year to 
year, and if it follows through with enforcement efforts, the result may be 
a greater incidence of OJT for sponsors in the region. It is also possible 
that prime sponsors in different areas of the country share different 
perspectives, or institutional and historical factors which lead to simi 
larities in behavior. For instance, the prime sponsors in Region IX (San 
Francisco) are largely concentrated in California and might, therefore, 
uniformly take advantage of the extensive and low cost state post-secondary 
education system. The 1960s categorical jobs programs concentrated 
disproportionate funding in the large Northeast cities, so that historical 
patterns may have been established which have only gradually been altered 
under CETA.
There are significant differences between regions in the levels of 
training activity (Table 4.2). In fiscal 1980, prime sponsors in Regions 
III (Philadelphia), IV (Atlanta), VII (Kansas City), and IX (San Francisco) 
put the most emphasis on classroom training. Sponsors in Regions II (New 
York), VIII (Denver), IX (San Francisco), and X (Seattle) gave greatest 
priority to OJT. Total expenditures for training were lowest among prime 
sponsors in Regions VI (Dallas), X (Seattle), and V (Chicago). There was a 
16 percentage point differential between the regions with the highest and 
lowest shares of participants in training.
Regression analysis suggests that the variability among regions was 
not the result of differing unemployment rates or youth shares for the 
prime sponsors within the various regions.
Table 4.2
Variations Between Department of Labor Regions in Training Activities 
of Prime Sponsors Under Title IIBC, Fiscal 1980
Classroom Training 
Participants as 
Share of Total 
Participants
Region I (Boston)
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*The training activity levels for each Region are the mean of the activity levels for each prime sponsor rather than a weighted average. 





Equation 9. Prime sponsor classroom and on-the-job trainees 
as a percent Title IIBC participants = a + b (region in which 
prime sponsor located: 1 if Region II, VII, VIII or IX; 0 if 
other) + c (prime sponsor unemployment rate) + d (percent IIBC 
participants who were under age 22).
r2 = .18 
a = 96.5 
b = 4.00 
c = .33 
d = -.78
Interpretation—The greater emphasis on training (and hence, 
less on work experience) in the regions averaging the higher 
training shares was not a reflection of the youth shares or 
unemployment rates of prime sponsors in these regions.
Equation 10. Prime sponsor on-the-job trainees as a percent 
of IIBC participants = a + b (region in which prime sponsor 
located: 1 if Region II, VIII or X; 0 if other)+ c (prime 
sponsor unemployment rate) + d (percent of IIBC participants who 
were under age 22).
r2 = .07 
a = 10.6 
b = 4.0 
c = .29 
d = -.04
Interpretation—The prime sponsors in Regions II, VIII or X 
had a half a standard deviation higher OJT share than prime 
sponsors in other regions, after adjusting for differences in 
unemployment rates and youth shares.
Variations in the per participant costs are affected by idiosyncratic 
participant flow patterns (i.e., some prime sponsors may have stable 
participation levels for an entire year while others have phased up in the 
latter part of the year) and by differences in costs for training of a 
given type and intensity. But since the cost of training per se is usually 
related to duration per participant and the intensity per week, par 
ticularly since allowance components increase with hours of treatment, the 
per participant cost variations are primarily related to variations in 
intensity and duration of training.
For all prime sponsors, the cost per participant for IIBC classroom 
training in 1980 was negatively related to the percentage of participants 
in training (correlation coefficient = -.18) and the cost-per participant 
in classroom training bore very little.relationship to the cost-per par 
ticipant in on-the-job training (correlation coefficient = +.05). 
Differences between prime sponsor unemployment rates and the youth shares 
had very limited relationship to variations in per participant costs:
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Equation 11. Prime sponsor cost per participant in Title 
IIBC classroom training = a + b (prime sponsor unemployment rate) 
+ c (percent IIBC participants who were under age 22) + d 
(classroom trainees as a percent of total IIBC participants).
r2 = .07 
a = $1698 
b = $24.5 
c = -$3.4 
d = -$7.2
Interpretation—A prime sponsor with an unemployment rate a 
standard deviation above average was likely to have a classroom 
training cost per participant 4 percent above the average, which 
could reflect lower dropout rates due to limited alternatives, or 
could be related to more intensive training as a policy in higher 
unemployment areas. A prime sponsor with a youth share a 
standard deviation above average was likely to have a $37 lower 
cost, probably because less expensive "other classroom training" 
was provided more frequently to youth. A standard deviation 
increment in the classroom training share was associated with a 
$157 decrement in cost, which represented 11 percent of the mean 
cost or three-tenths of a standard deviation.
Equation 12. Prime sponsor cost per participant in Title 
IIBC OJT = a + b (prime sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent 
IIBC participants under age 22) + d (prime sponsor on-the-job 






Interpretation—An unemployment rate a standard deviation 
above- average was associated with an OJT cost $67 or 6 percent 
below average. While this represented only a tenth of a standard 
deviation in OJT costs, there was apparently no premium to secure 
OJT slots in high unemployment areas. Likewise, a prime sponsor 
with an OJT participant share a standard deviation above the mean 
was likely to have average costs $120 or 6 percent below the 
mean, suggesting that generosity in employer reimbursement was 
not the means they used to secure more OJT slots.
The average cost for classroom training was a sixth higher among 
primes with a labor force of 500,000 or more than among those with a labor 
force less than 100,000 (Table 4.3). OJT costs were lower in the smallest 
primes. States had lower costs for classroom training than other units of 
government (perhaps because of the use of state-funded training and 
education facilities), and for OJT (perhaps because costs were less in 
rural balance-of-state operations). There were some substantial cost 
differences between the prime sponsors in different regions (Table 4.4). 
Regions II (New York) and III (Philadelphia) had the highest cost per
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Table 4.3
1980 Title IIBC Training Costs by Size 
and Structure of Prime Sponsors







































































































































*The training cost levels for each classification are the average of the 
levels for the various prime sponsors in this classification rather than 
a weighted average.
Source: Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor, 
unpublished management information system data for fiscal 1980,
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Table 4.4
Variations Between Department of Labor Regions in Title IIBC
Training Costs, Fiscal 1980
Classroom Training OJT Cost
Cost per Participant* per Participant*
Region I (Boston) $1335 $ 991
Region II (New York) 1509 1660
Region III (Philadelphia) 1480 1060
Region IV (Atlanta) 1411** 916**
Region V (Chicago) 1278 1203
Region VI (Dallas) 1380 1105
Region VII (Kansas City) 1332 920
Region VIII (Denver) 1069 1139
Region IX (San Francisco) 1335 1219
Region X (Seattle) 1407 1078
*The training cost levels for each region are the average of the levels 
for the prime sponsors in the region rather than a weighted av 
erage.
**Excludes one balance-of-state prime sponsor with extraordinarily high 
cost per participant.
Source: Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor,
unpublished management information system data for fiscal 1980.
classroom training participant. Region I had by far the highest costs per 
OJT participant, while Regions VII (Kansas City) and IV (Atlanta) had the 
lowest. The difference in classroom training costs from the lowest- to 
highest-cost region was more than two-fifths, while for OJT it was four- 
fifths.
The variation in outcomes as measured by placement rates, positive 
terminations, costs per placement and costs per positive termination may be 
explained by differences in service mix, service intensity, participant mix 
and local economic conditions. Presumably the residual reflects either 
real differences in the effectiveness of services and placement or else 
aberrations in the data.
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The degree of emphasis on training is only a minor factor in ex 
plaining outcomes (Table 4.5). A prime sponsor with Title IIB OJT levels a 
standard deviation above the average for all prime sponsors in 1980 was 
likely to have a .6 percentage point higher positive termination rate. 
Differences in classroom training shares had almost no relationship to 
positive termination rates.
Table 4.5 





Percent age 14-15 
Percent age 16-19 
Percent age 45-54 
Percent age 55+ 
Percent black 
Percent Hispanics 
Percent other minorities 
Percent AFDC recipients
Program Mix Variables 
Percent participants in OJT 
Percent participants in classroom
training—skill 
Percent participants in classroom
training—other 
Average length of stay
Cost per enrollee
Local Economic Variables 
Unemployment rate 
Employment growth rate
Percentage point change in posi 
tive termination rate associated 
with a 1 percentage point change 













A one-month increase in length of 
stay was related to a 1.47 percent 
age point decrease in the positive 
termination rate.
A $100 increase in cost per 
enrollee was related to a .04 
percentage point increase in 
the positive termination rate.
-.34 
.15
Source: Department of Labor, Office of Assistant Secretary for Policy,
Evaluation and Research, unpublished calculations for performance 
indicators work group.
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Several simpler regressions focusing on the training intensity also 
find little relationship to positive termination rates:
Equation 12. Prime sponsor Title IIBC positive termination 
rate = a + b (prime sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent IIBC 
participants under 22) + d (percent IIBC participants in class 
room training or OJT).
r2 = .04 
a =64.1 
b = .05 
c = .15 
d = -.05
Interpretation—More training was associated with a slightly 
lower positive termination rate while an increased youth share 
was associated with a higher rate (because return to school for 
in-school programs is counted as a positive termination). 
However, the service mix factor was negligible. A standard 
deviation in the training share was associated with only a 1 
percentage point difference in the positive termination rate.
Equation 13. Prime sponsor Title IIBC positive termination 
rate = a + b (prime sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent IIBC 
participants under age 22) + d (cost per participant in IIBC 
classroom training and OJT) =
r2 = .03 
a = 60.19 
b = -.13 
c = +.19 
d = -.00
Interpretation—More intensive or expensive training was not 
related to increases in the positive termination rate.
In light of the earlier evidence that placement status at termination 
as recorded by the prime sponsor was a powerful predictor of individual 
earnings gains relative to matched controls, the variances in placement 
rates among prime sponsors are of considerable interest. Differences in 
service and participant mixes and local economic conditions explained 
nearly two-fifths of the variance among prime sponsors in their fiscal 1980 
placement (entered employment) rates (Table 4.6). However, program mix 
factors were only a minor part of the picture. OJT contributed to higher 
placement rates, but a prime sponsor with an OJT share one standard 
deviation above the mean had a predicted placement rate only 2.5 percentage 
points higher, which represented less than a fifth of a standard deviation 
in the placement rate. Placement rates were slightly higher where more 
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A one-month increase in length of 
stay was related to a .33 percent 
age point decrease in entered em 
ployment rate.
A $100 increase in cost per 
enrollee was related to a .06 





Source: Department of Labor, Office of Assistant Secretary for Policy,
Evaluation and Research, unpublished calculations for performance
indicators work group.
Several simpler regressions focusing on the training variables support 
the conclusions from the more detailed regressions:
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Equation 16. Prime sponsor IIBC placement rate = a + b 
(prime sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent IIBC participants 
under age 22) + d (classroom and on-the-job trainees as percent 
total IIBC participants).
r2 = .16 
a = 71.3 
b = -1.16 
c = -.51 
d = .00
Interpretation—While the unemployment rates and the youth 
shares strongly affected placement rates, there was no observable 
relationship between the training share and the placement rate.
Equation 17. Prime sponsor IIBC placement rate = a + b 
(prime sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent IIBC participants 
under age 22) + d (classroom and on-the-job training expenditures 






Interpretation—There was almost no relationship between 
variations in training expenditure shares and placement rates.
Equation 18. Prime sponsor IIBC positive termination rate = 
a + b (prime sponsor unemployment rate) + c (percent IIBC 
participants who were under age 22) + d (expenditures per 






Interpretation—A prime sponsor with training costs 
(intensity) a standard deviation above average was likely to have 
a 1.7 percentage point higher placement rate. The coefficient is 
so small that this is not a dependable estimate, but it is 
consistent with the higher placement rates noted in the CLMS for 
long stayers in training.
The cost per placement from Title I IB was also affected very modestly 
by the program mix (Table 4.7). A standard deviation increase in the OJT 
share was associated with a 6 percent lower average cost per placement. 
Conversely, a standard deviation increase in skill training shares was 
associated with a 4 percent increase in costs per placement, and other 
classroom training with a 3 percent increase, presumably because classroom 
trainees returned to school rather than entered the labor market.
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Table 4.7 
Title IIB, Cost Per Entered Employment FY 1980 (N = 399)
r2 = .39
Dollar change in cost per 
entered employment associated with 
a 1 percentage point increase in 
Local Factors the factor (except as noted)___
Enrollee Chacteristies
Percent female 8.65
Percent age 14-15 46.23
Percent age 16-19 6.85
Percent age 45-54 -96.81
Percent age 55+ -43.52
Percent black 1.61
Percent Hispanics -7.31
Percent other minorities -22.40
Percent AFDC recipients -.73
Program Mix Variables
Percent OJT -44.42 
Percent classroom training—skill 14.52 
Percent classroom training—other 12.79 
Average length of stay A one-month increase in length of
stay was related to a $551.36 
increase in cost per entered 
employment.
Local Economic Variables
Unemployment rate 438.06 
Employment growth rate -2.4 
Quit rate -459.31
Source: Department of Labor, Office of Assistant Secretary for Policy,
Evaluation and Research, unpublished calculations for performance
indicators work group.
In summary, state and local decisionmakers are responsible for the 
service mix choices for the majority of CETA dollars. In 1980, prime 
sponsors chose to use less than a fifth of the total resources available to 
them for classroom and on-the-job training, instead emphasizing job 
creation. Yet among prime sponsors, there was enormous variance in the 
degree of emphasis on training. According to net impact estimates, OJT had 
a very high payoff; yet under Title IIBC, less than one in nine par 
ticipants were in OJT. Again, the range in emphasis among prime sponsors 
was significant. Longer classroom training paid off in greater net gains, 
but the average length of stay under Title IIBC was only 5.1 months. The 
intensity of training, as proxied by the cost per participant, also varied 
enormously. Finally, placement was a key success factor in classroom 
training and all other CETA components. Only two-fifths of Title IIBC 
terminees in fiscal 1980 entered employment upon termination, but, again, 
there was great variability among prime sponsors.
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The unemployment rate and youth share among participants are not major 
explanatiye factors for the service mix decisions of prime sponsors. While 
the statistical analysis is crude, these variables do not bear much 
relationship to classroom training and OJT participant or expenditure 
shares under Title IIBC. In many cases, the relationships are the opposite 
of a priori expectations. For instance, OJT levels are apparently higher 
in prime sponsors with higher unemployment rates. Other factors such as 
type of jurisdiction, size and region have more explanative power. Area 
conditions and participant mix are much more powerful predictors of 
outcomes. However, outcomes are not significantly affected by service mix 
decisions. In other words, prime sponsors would be more likely to alter 
the mix of participants than the mix of services if they wanted to increase 
placement and positive termination rates. After considering a significant 
number of service and participant mix as well as area economic factors, the 
unexplained variance in placement among prime sponsors is still very large.
Thus, despite the very significant variation between prime sponsors in 
their decisions and outcomes, the patterns of variation provide few clues 
as to why prime sponsors on average put so much emphasis on work ex 
perience, why they emphasize classroom training more than OJT, why 
classroom training is usually short-term rather than longer-duration, why 
there is extensive creaming into the few OJT opportunities, or why 




Elegant assessments of local needs and the findings of esoteric 
research and evaluations have little relevance at the delivery level. The 
realities which dominate prime sponsor decisons are much more pedestrian. 
Judgments concerning what works for whom are quite different at the 
delivery level than when propounded from the ivory tower. The accounting 
system mandated for CETA activities provides an inadequate foundation for 
decisionmaking and management, biasing service and participant mix 
decisions. Even if prime sponsors could determine what worked best for 
whom and could accurately measure activities and outcomes, rational 
decisions are undermined by an uncertainty and volatility of funding and 
the constant changes in federal policy.
Can Effectiveness Be Judged Locally?
Even if a prime sponsor had the resources and the interest to 
duplicate the procedures of the national evaluations, net impacts could not 
be accurately assessed at the local level. To measure a 5 or 10 percent 
difference in post-program earnings requires a large sample size of 
participants and substantial control groups of nonparticipants. If the aim 
is to isolate the effects of a component of a total program, or even more 
specifically, to determine its relative effectiveness in serving different 
subsegments of the participant population, the sample size for each 
activity/participant combination and the related control group must be 
large enough to discern these marginal impacts. Even with the large 
samples in the CLMS (with its concomitantly large pricetag), the con 
clusions become quite "iffy" when disaggregated to significant segments or 
to detailed components such as occupational vs. nonoccupational classroom 
training. Most prime sponsors do not have enough enrol lees in activity/ 
participant cells to determine in any statistically reliable way the 
relative payoff even if all were tracked. Furthermore, the control group 
in the CLMS is drawn from other quite expensive samples—the Current 
Population Survey and the Social Security records. Neither are feasible as 
controls for evaluating local activities.
But prime sponsors are supposed to be running programs not evalua 
tions; they lack the resources and reason to conduct long-term follow-up 
and to maintain control groups. To the extent they consider effectiveness 
at all, they must necessarily focus on absolute rather than net impacts, 
and on immediate post-program outcomes rather than longer-term results. 
Even if the information about the costs and benefits which is available 
from national evaluations were calculable locally, prime sponsor's inter 
pretations and decisions might differ, since the resources (costs) are 
federal rather than local, and since the prime sponsor is a governmental 
unit with responsibilities for delivering goods and services which can, in 
part, be provided by CETA participants. Local decisionmakers might be 
quite rational in their decisionmaking and quite concerned with the 
effectiveness of local services, and yet still reach decisions which are 
less than optimal from a national, ivory tower perspective.
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The heavy emphasis on work experience in local CETA programs is a case 
in point. The national data suggest that adult work experience has no 
post-program earnings impacts whereas classroom training substantially 
increases earnings relative to controls in the two post-program years. 
According to the CLMS interview data for the fiscal 1976 participants, 54 
percent of the adult work experience participants were employed at exit, 
compared to only 29 percent of classroom training participants (Figure 
4.5). Three months later—the maximum time over which CETA will usually 
follow-up participants—the percentages were 52 percent and 46 percent, 
respectively. Because the adult work experience group was more likely to 
be working a month before entry, the gains in employment were about equal 
at the three-month point but significantly in favor of the work experience 
participants at exit. It was not until a half year after termination that 
the pre/post gains for classroom trainees noticeably exceeded those for 
work experience participants. If the prime sponsor judged effectiveness by 
termination results, work experience would be preferred. If the judgment 
were based on 90-day follow-up, the average results for the first three 
post-program months would still favor the work approach. Rarely does a 
prime sponsor track beyond this point.
From a local budgetary perspective, work experience also makes more 
sense. In fiscal 1980, the prime sponsor cost for a classroom training 
person-year under Title IIBC was half again the cost for work experience. 
Both pay the minimum wage but classroom training must purchase the training 
in addition to the stipend. Because work experience has a shorter duration 
of stay than classroom training, its average cost per participant in fiscal 
1980 was only three-fifths as great. More exactly, for every 100 par 
ticipants in classroom training, the prime sponsor could serve 159 persons 
in work experience.
From the prime sponsor's perspective, however, the cost must be offset 
further by the value of work product. Classroom trainees do not produce a 
social product, whereas work experience participants, if worked hard and 
matched to useful jobs they can perform, may pay back all of the wages and 
fringes. Assume, however, the productivity equals 75 percent of the slot 
cost. The per participant cost of the program from the local perspective 
is, thus, only one-sixth that of classroom training. In another sense, the 
work experience pays back the local jurisdiction 75 cents on the dollar in 
output, plus local taxes on the in-program wages which are three-fifths of 
expenditures, plus reductions in locally-financed income transfers; in 
contrast, training results in no output, local income taxes are usually not 
paid on the allowances which are only two-fifths of expenditures, and there 
is less reduction in locally-financed income transfers because allowances 
are reduced where public assistance is received. The jurisdiction will 
benefit from the discounted value of future local taxes relative to the 
increased future earnings but this would amount to only a few dollars a 
year on the $400 increment in earnings resulting from clasroom training 
according to national studies (although not observable at the local level).
It is understandable, then, why prime sponsors do not favor training 
over work approaches. Local decisionmakers are the ones who feel the 
pressure of needs which exceed resources, and will want to serve as many as 
possible. There is little evidence locally that training produces more 
earnings impacts and some indication that the opposite is true. The local
Figure 4.5
Post-Program Employment Status of Fiscal 1976 Work 
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Post-Program Times
Increase in Percent Employed Relative 
to Status One Month Before Entry
Source: Westat, Inc. Postprogram Experiences and Pre/Post Comparisons for Terminees Who Entered 
CETA During Fiscal Year 1976 (July 1975-June 1976) (Hashinqton, D.C.:Employment and 
Training Administration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, March 1979), Table 51
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government gains nothing from trainees whereas it gets some useful output 
from work experience participants.
Training on the job appears effective from both the local and national 
perspectives. For 1976 on-the-job trainees, the employment rate one month 
after termination was 62 percent compared to the 50 percent rate among work 
experience participants, at three months the differential was as great, 64 
percent vs. 52 percent, respectively. The employment rate gains measured 
relative to the labor market status of participants three months prior to 
their CETA entry were 29 percentage points for OJT, compared to only 23 
percentage points for work experience, at one-month post-program; or 31 and 
25 percentage points, respectively at three-months post-program. 3_/ The 
cost per slot for OJT in fiscal 1980 under Title IIBC was essentially the 
same as the cost of work experience. While OJT produces no public product, 
OJT slots will benefit local employers or may in some cases serve as an 
economic development tool.
The problem is not the desirability of OJT to local decisionmakers but 
the difficulty of arranging it. First, work experience slots are usually 
secured in clusters. The summer program, for example, averaged eight 
participants per worksite. On-the-job training is usually arranged for one 
or two placements at a time. Second, work experience slots tend to be 
refillable and a bank of "good" work experience slots can be cumulated over 
time. OJT is a treadmill. A small firm may need a press operator. It 
cannot afford to have more trainees than its job needs, since the firm 
receives only 50 percent subsidy, in contrast to the public sector where 
employing agents can easily take on several PSE or work experience 
participants who are fully subsidized in order to find one who can 
ultimately fill an available job. The on-the-job trainee has a one in two 
chance of making it into the job permanently, in which case there is no 
need for another trainee. This contrasts with a transition rate less than 
half as high for work experience. If the first trainee is a failure, the 
firm may decide not to go the OJT route again, whereas work experience 
slots, which are free to the public or nonprofit agency, will usually be 
refilled even if some of the workers prove ineffective. Third and most 
critically, the OJT formula does not provide much incentive to employers 
and most are uninterested. Many do not want to get involved whatever the 
subsidy. As an example, a five-site demonstration program, which aimed to 
compare the benefits of work in the private sector vs. work in the public 
sector, provided a full wage subsidy for firms hiring out-of-school 
disadvantaged young adults, i.e., it equalized the reimbursement to 
private-for-profit or nonprofit employers. In the public sector, 53 
percent of contacted employers ended up providing at least one worksite 
compared to 35 percent of those in the nonprofit sector but only 25 percent 
of those in the for-profit sites. On average, it required 1.2 contacts to 
develop a single job in the public sector, 2.0 in the nonprofit sector, and 
3.4 in the private sector. 4/ The administrative effort to market the same 
clients to the private sector with only a 50 percent subsidy would have 
been incredible.
Prime sponsors are most conscious of the difficulties of marketing 
OJT. They do not set higher goals because they are frequently unable to 
attain even the modest targets currently set in their plans. For instance, 
actual IIBC OJT enrollments realized by prime sponsors in fiscal 1980
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averaged 83 percent of planned enrollment (after modification probably had 
reduced originally planned figures when it became apparent they could not 
be attained). In marked contrast, the actual classroom training en 
rollments averaged 111 percent of plan. Only one in five prime sponsors 
fell short of its classroom training enrollment goals by more than 10 
percent, and just one in twenty achieved less than 75 percent of the 
planned figure. Even though OJT goals were quite modest in most cases, 
half of prime sponsors fell short by 10 percent or more and three in ten 
fell short by 25 percent of more. j>/
If work experience is emphasized because it looks more effective when 
judged from the local perspective than from national studies, while OJT is 
downplayed because of marketing difficulties, the absence of long-duration 
classroom training results from both the difficulties of mounting such 
programs and the dubious payoffs as judged by solely short-term outcomes. 
The national net impact estimates suggest that there is a very substantial 
gradient in the relationship between length of stay and post-program net 
earnings gains. But the prime sponsor sees a quite different picture. 
During the immediate post-program period, employment prospects are not much 
better for long-term vs. short-term trainees. For instance, for fiscal 
1975 classroom trainees staying less than 60 days, the employment rate in 
the first quarter after termination was 44 percent, compared to 43 percent 
for trainees staying 60 days or more (Table 4.8). It was only over the 
course of time that the benefits of longer duration training became more 
evident. During the second year after termination, the employment rate for 
participants with less than two months stay was 5b percent, compared to 60 
percent for trainees staying over two months, and 65 percent for those 
staying half a year or more. The differences are best visualized by 
showing the change over time in the differential between the annualized 
earnings of trainees in each length of stay category and the average for 
all trainees in the first post-program year (Figure 4.6). Over time, the 
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Source: Westat, Inc. CLMS Follow-up Report No. 3 (36 Months After Entry), 
Experiences for the First Two Postprogram Years, With Pre/Post Com 
parisons, for Terminees Who Entered CETA During January-June 1975
(Washington, D.C. 
Office of Policy, 
Table 43.
Employment and Training Administration, 
Evaluation and Research, December 1980),
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of Policy, Evaluation and Research, December 1980), Table 47.
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While prime sponsors do not see the impacts of longer-duration 
training, they are unavoidably faced with its cost. Assuming a uniform 
training cost of $500 per month, the cost per participant and cost per 
placement would have been as follows in 1976: 6/


































































The net earnings gains for long-duration stayers more than make up for 
the costs of longer-duration training. For instance, 1976 participants who 
stayed one to ten weeks in classroom training essentially experienced no 
gains while those who stayed 40 weeks or more gained in the neighborhood "bT 
$1400 annually through the second post-program year. The prime sponsor, 
however, does not observe net impacts but only post-program outcomes; a 
great deal of faith in the efficacy of long-term training is necessary to 
justify costs per placement for long-term training which are six to seven 
times those for short-term training.
Finally, the short-duration stayers for whom net impacts are minimal 
include those enrolled in short-term courses, those who drop-out of 
long-term courses because they fail, and those who leave training because 
they find better immediate opportunities. It may well be that the 
graduates of short-term training do better than those who fail in long-term 
training. For instance, the dropout from a two-year registered nurse 
training program may remain an orderly, whereas the participant in a short 
English-as-a-second-language course will gain entry into the labor market 
by learning language fundamentals course. Since the chances of failure 
increase with the duration of training (even though there is a rapidly 
declining increment in failure rates after the first 30 days), and since 
the costs of failure (both programmatic outlays and foregone earnings) 
increase- with duration of time before failure, then if the dropouts 
experience no earnings gains, the long-duration training will appear even 
less worthwhile to the prime sponsor. In such a case, the local viewpoint 
would be more appropriate than the conclusions drawn from aggregated 
national data. Given the fact that the majority of short-stayers are 
scheduled short-stayers, the likelihood that those who fail to complete 
longer training will realize at least some gains, and the fact that the 
dropouts include some who left to take advantage of better opportunities, 
it is unlikely that the payoff of scheduled short-duration training is much 
higher than the average return for all trainees who stay a short-duration. 
But it surely is another factor seen at the local but not national level 
which adds to the arguments for short training.
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The assignment patterns for different subgroups of participants may 
also be explained, in part, by the differences between the ivory tower and 
delivery level perspectives. For instance, both younger and older par 
ticipants are underrepresented in training and overrepresented in work 
experience. 7J

























Based on the estimated 1978 earnings gains for all 1976 participants, 
it appears that the 17-18 and 19-21 cohorts could benefit most from OJT, 
and the 19-21 group does better in classroom training than work experience, 
although not particularly well from either. 8/
























It also appears that minority males, and particularly young adults, 
benefit from OJT but from little else. 9/





















Yet for minority male CETA entrants in 1980, the chances of assignment 
to OJT were far below those of white males. 10/
Percent Black Percent White
Male Enrollees Male Enrol lees
in 1980 Assigned in 1980 Assigned




Unquestionably, one reason for the low relative rates of OJT par 
ticipation for these groups is their lower success probability in OJT 
assignments. Among 1976 minority male participants in OJT, the post- 
training placement rate was 52.9 percent, compared to 57.5 percent for 
white males. Among 17-21 year-old OJT participants, the placement rate was 
45.4, compared to 64.1 percent for 22-25 year-olds, ll/ These placement 
differentials parallel those from other service components; for CETA as a 
whole, 31.9 percent of all minority males, compared to 34.4 percent of all 
white males, were placed, as were 29.6 percent of 17-21 year-olds compared 
to 36.2 percent of 22-25 year-olds. However, where the consequences of 
nonplacement fall on the participant in the case of work experience or 
classroom training, a negative termination in OJT can turn the employer 
against the system, affecting the possibilities for subsequent placements. 
This residual effect may explain—although not justify—the reluctance of 
prime sponsors to assign high risk participants to OJT even though they 
benefit substantially. Another factor may simply be that employers will 
more likely reject minority referrals, or will not be inclined to sign up 
in the first case. Additionally, minority enrollees are probably more 
concentrated in poverty areas where it is difficult to arrange OJT 
placements.
There is also a heavy emphasis on classroom training and work 
experience for participants with limited earnings histories (less than 
$2000 in each of the prior two years), and little emphasis on classroom 
training for high earners ($4500 or more in each of the prior two years). 
Yet the low earners gain most from OJT where they are least likely to be 
placed, whereas the high earners benefit relatively more from classroom as 
opposed to on-the-job training: 12/
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Fiscal 1976 Participants 
Low Earners High Earners
Percent in classroom training 36.0% 28.9% 
Percent in on-the-job training 10.9 20.6
Percent i n work ex Perience > 
PSE or multiple activities 53.1 50.5
Estimated 1978 earnings gains 
relative to controls
Classroom trainees $420 $1061 
On-the-job trainees 811 400 
Participants in work 
experience, PSE or 
multiple activities 334 -52
For 1976 OJT terminees, the employment rate three-months after 
termination was 73 percent for individuals who earned $4000 or more in the 
year before entry, compared to 58 percent for the lower earners, despite 
the fact that the low earners gained more relative to low earner con 
trols. 13/ Again, in allocating the scarce OJT slots there is apparently 
an emphasis on reducing the risk of failure even though some in the higher 
earner group might be better served by classroom training and many in the 
low earner group would be better served by OJT. In these judgments about 
what works best for whom, the pronouncements from the ivory tower are 
hedged with uncertainties because of the difficulties of accurately 
estimating net impacts for subgroups. Certainly local prime sponsors can 
make no better estimates. In light of the difficulties of developing OJT 
slots, and the evidence from both national and local experience that all 
participants benefit from OJT, it is understandable that decisions might be 
made on the basis of employer preferences and institutional expediency 
rather than distinctions between the relative gains.
The Management Misinformation System
Planning, contracting, performance measurement, and management 
decisions by prime sponsors and delivery agents (as well as those of the 
regional and national offices of the Department of Labor), rest on a set of 
definitions, counting rules, and report formats detailed in the Forms 
Preparation Handbook. 14/ This management information system categorizes 
participants, services, expenditures, and outcomes. There are three 
primary reports counting up the dollars and bodies assigned to the defined 
categories. Each report is required from prime sponsors quarterly and 
annually covering each of the CETA subparts (YETP, YCCIP, Title IIBC, Title 
IID, Title VI, SYEP and PSIP). The annual prime sponsor plans prepared 
before the start of each fiscal year for each of these subparts include 
quarterly and annual projections of the elements in these reports. Below 
the prime sponsor level, subagents are usually required to provide the same 
information, frequently on forms which duplicate the prime sponsor's 
reports.
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1. The Financial Status Report (FSR) categorizes expenditures by 
functional activity and by program component (Table 4.9). The functional 
activities are "administration," "allowances," "wages," "fringe benefits," 
"training," and "services." These functional activities are defined so 
that they are mutually exclusive and cover all outlays. The program 
components are "classroom training," "on-the-job training," "public service 
employment," "services," "work experience," "transition services," 
"vocational exploration," and "other activities." These categories are 
also designed to be mutually exclusive and to sum to total of expenditures. 
The wages and allowances, fringes, services, training, and administration 
which are necessary to support each of these program components are 
allocated to it. Thus, a service year of classroom training in 1978 under 
Title IIBC, included $1,950 (42 percent) for allowances, $835 (18 percent) 
for administration, $975 (21 percent) for training and $452 (16 percent) 
for services. 15/ Training, as a functional activity, included the $975 
for each service year of classroom training provided under Title IIBC, but 
also included OJT employer payments as well as the training expenditures 
including worksite supervision tor Title IIBC participants whose primary 
activity was work experience.
2. The Program Status Summary (PSS) records the current and 
cumulative quarterly enrollment, termination and termination status data 
for each subpart, as well as the current and cumulative participation 
levels, but not termination results, for each of the program components 
supported under the subpart (Table 4.10). Individuals are enrolled from 
the day they receive employment and training services and must be 
officially terminated within 90 days of the point when they leave a program 
component. Ihe major termination classifications include entry into 
unsubsidized employment, transfer to other subparts of CETA, other 
"positive terminations" such as return to school or achievement of intended 
participation goals, and "nonpositive" terminations.
3. Ihe bummary ot Participant Characteristics (SPC) identifies par 
ticipants, terminees, and terminees who enter unsubsidized employment 
according to sex, age, education, income, family and previous employment 
status (Table 4.11). For each of the CETA subparts, each prime sponsor, 
thus, reports quarterly and annually on the number of male and female 
participants, the number of school dropouts, students and graduates, the 
number of mentally or physically handicapped, and the like. There is no 
reporting on the characteristics of participants in different components of 
each subpart, tor instance, classroom training under Title IIBC, and no 
reporting according to characteristics combinations, such as the number of 
dropout youth served.
As a basis for these reports, the prime sponsor must maintain a record 
for each participant which includes an application form (which must have at 
least the detail necessary for the Survey of Participant Characteristics), 
the necessary background information and documentation for determining and 
reviewing eligiblity, an individual employability development plan, plus a 
record ot entry and exit tor each program component, along with enough 
detail to track total hours of work experience over a five-year period and 
cumulative weeks of participation in other activites. The individual 
record must also note the occupation of training or work, the wage or 
allowance provided, and the termination status data (at least in the detail
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Source: Forms Preparation Handbook For Prime Sponsors Under the Compre 
hensive Employment and Training Act Amendments of 1978 (Wsh- 
ington, D.C.: Employment and Training Administration, May 1980).
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hensive Employment and Training Act Amendments of 1978 (Washing 
ton, D.C.: Employment and Training Administration, May 1980).
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Table 4.11 
Summary of Participant Characteristics Report Format
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of the Program Status Survey) with verifying placement information. 
Follow-up at three months is required for all placements into unsubsidized 
employment, although the prime sponsor may choose to follow-up a sample of 
other terminees as well.
Mountains of paper are, thus, collected on each participant and each 
activity. Prime sponsors use this information to generate the three 
federal reports for each subpart which are dispatched quarterly to the 
regional offices of the Department of Labor, where they are reviewed, 
entered into an automated system, and transmitted to the national office 
with between a six and nine month lag for reporting on the full complement 
of prime sponsors. Unfortunately, this massive effort does not provide 
very accurate information about what is happening to whom, at what cost, 
and with what outcomes. Decisions based on this management information 
system are distorted in several ways:
The problems begin with the program component descriptors. "Classroom 
training" may be five hours a week or forty hours a week. Participants and 
expenditures for both intensive and limited training are reported in the 
same categories. But classroom training may also be in combination with 
work experience. If the training accounts for less than half of par 
ticipation time, the expenditures and participants are assigned to work 
experience; otherwise, they are assigned to classroom training. It is not 
possible to sort out these combinations from the separately reported 
functional activity totals. For example, the allowances paid under 
classroom training are counted along with those paid during transition 
services or during training hours supplementing work experience. There is 
no way of determining from the FSR what proportion of the aggregate 
allowances were paid as part of classroom training. An individual who 
participates in a sequence of activities is either a transfer between 
subparts or titles, in which case the program components of previous 
participation are impossible to track in the aggregate reports, or is 
catalogued according to the major component over the period of par 
ticipation (unless, as is sometimes the case, he or she is double counted 
by separate delivery agents).
Another extremely critical problem is the lack of accounting for 
non-CETA public expenditures. Unless the funds are actually administered 
by the prime sponsor, there is no record whatsoever. A prime sponsor in a 
state with free or heavily subsidized post-secondary education may pay very 
little for training, and hence the classroom training expenditures recorded 
on the FSR include mostly allowances. In another state, there may be few 
post-secondary training institutions or these institutions might exclude 
CETA types, so the prime sponsor will pay to establish separate training 
facilities as well as covering allowances. A third possibility is that the 
CETA resources simply substitute for those that would otherwise be provided 
from another source, for instance, stipending students already enrolled in 
training and subsidizing the costs of this training. All three activities 
may have the same outcomes and have the same public costs. The prime 
sponsor in the first case would look good from a unit cost perspective, 
while in the second case, where probably doing the most good, the costs 
would appear high and indistinguishable from the third case where the CETA 
outlays would be having no net effect. Similarly, one prime sponsor might 
serve primarily unemployment compensation recipients and thereby reduce
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allowances, while another might face a situation where few of the CETA 
participants were covered by unemployment insurance and hence most 
allowances would have to come from CETA funds. The MIS-recorded unit costs 
would be higher in the latter case even though public costs would be the 
same.
The termination status categories are obfuscated by three major 
issues: First, a participant may receive no service for 90 days and still 
be carried on the records. In fact, if he or she were called back for a 
short treatment such as job search assistance, termination would not be 
required for another 90 days. Because the chance of employment increases 
with time for any unemployed person, it pays to keep participants on the 
books in order to increase the "entered employment" tally. Since no funds 
are expended, this also reduces the recorded person-year cost for the 
activity, and hence, has a double effect on cost per placement and cost per 
person year. There is no way to determine how many persons are in holding 
at any point in time since they continue to be identified with the last 
program activity. It is entirely possible, for instance, that the in 
creased average duration of stay for classroom training, which is indicated 
by the MIS data over the last few years, reflects increasing use of this 
loophole by prime sponsors rather than longer training.
Second, there is no recording of whether an unsubsidized job, if 
secured, is appropriate considering the type and duration of training. A 
graduate of law school would hardly be considered a positive outcome if 
placed as a janitor, but any placement is counted the same under the CETA 
MIS. While the wages averaged before entry and after termination are 
dutifully recorded, the pre-program mean depends on how many worked and how 
long ago. For instance, the earnings of young participants who may have 
held casual jobs as babysitters or lawnmowers, or refugees who last worked 
in Asia, are computed in the average.
Third, there is great confusion concerning what constitutes a positive 
termination. Returning to or continuing in school is a positive termina 
tion—even if the terminee dropped out of an in-school work or vocational 
exploration assignment, failed to graduate or enrolled because of the 
inability to find a job. Achievement of an activity objective is rated as 
a positive termination, but there are no hard-and-fast rules about what are 
reasonable activity objectives. Where youth are participating heavily in a 
program, the positive termination rates go up and the placement rates go 
down.
There are also problems with the participant characteristics in 
formation. Even though the categories are relatively detailed, the body 
counts reported to the feds--which are frequently all that is calculated 
and considered by the prime sponsor—do no permit classification by 
mulitiple characteristics. It cannot be determined from reported MIS data 
how many teenage dropouts are being served, or welfare mothers, or female 
college graduates. Hence, it is almost impossible to determine from the 
SPR whether the clientele of one delivery agent or prime sponsor is more or 
less employable than the clientle of another.
The separate reporting of costs, activities and participant charac 
teristics for each subpart makes it impossible to determine what services
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are received by specific individuals and how well they are doing as a 
result. For instance, in the planning process, there is much attention to 
the equitable distribution of resources according to participant shares. 
Yet the participant share measure is almost totally meaningless without 
knowledge of the program component and its cost. As an example, Hispanics 
in a prime sponsor area may represent 20 percent of the universe of need 
and 20 percent of Title IIBC participants, while whites represent the same 
shares of both. It is entirely possible that the Hispanic participants are 
all 16- and 17-year-old students in a vocational exploration component with 
an annual unit cost of $1,000, while the whites are all 22- to 44-year-olds 
enrolled in two-year apprenticeship or licensed practical nurse training 
with an average expenditure of $20,000 per individual.
A primary use of the MIS is for budgeting both at the federal and 
local levels. To maximize cost-effectiveness, it is important to reduce 
the outlays for any unit of service as far as possible without reducing 
quality. Yet while all subparts of CETA provide for a range of possible 
activities and activity intensities, the MIS provides no clear specifica 
tion of either mix or intensity. Hence, cost cutting can be and usually is 
achieved by shifting to less expensive and less intensive interventions. 
The easiest route is to reduce average hours of participation, which are 
not even noted in the MIS. In work experience, where there is apparently 
little post-program effect, reduced intensity will mean reduced output for 
society and reduced earnings and well-being for participants, although it 
will not make much difference in long-term earnings. Given the strong 
relationship between intensity of treatment and outcomes for classroom 
training, fewer hours may substantially lower net impacts. Another 
cost-cutting approach is to shift to job search assistance or other 
placement-oriented strategies, and to keep more individuals in holding. 
The placement rates may actually improve and costs will fall, even though 
the net lasting impacts would be reduced since less human resource 
development activity occurred.
Another obvious way to "economize" is to serve more individuals who 
cost less to bring up to a level of employability. Refugee populations, 
for instance, may be able to get jobs easily after a few weeks of English- 
as-a-second-language training. Serving three or four refugees in classroom 
training may cost the same as serving one native disadvantaged youth with 
severe remedial needs. All may be classified as disadvantaged, all may be 
school dropouts (in the sense that the refugees do not have diplomas 
although sometimes well educated in their own countries), and all may come 
from public assistance recipient families. The refugees, however, may also 
have been more likely to make it without any help. The prime sponsor who 
wants to look good on paper will focus on those who can be effectively 
served at lower cost.
Finally, there will also be an incentive to piggyback on other 
activities; for instance, paying allowances to persons already training in 
vocational institutions and regular schools, since the training costs are 
already covered and do not count in the CETA MIS. Cooperation is to be 
encouraged, but piggybacking reduces the net effect of CETA dollars and 
increases the chances of fiscal substitution.
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There is too much play in the system to achieve improvements through 
emphasis on placement alone. As with cost-cutting pressures, the response 
to placement pressure will be a shift within the system to treatments which 
have the best placement rates even if these are short-term results (un- 
subsidized placements are to be followed-up, but only at 90 days, and there 
is no record of the follow-up submitted to the Department of Labor). 
Because there is no emphasis on training-related placements, any job that 
can be found for classroom or on-the-job trainees will count. As long as 
significant segments are served, it is possible to enroll the most employ 
able in each segment in order to increase placements, and then to tran 
sition them into jobs they could have secured on their own. If gains in 
average wages are used to assess job quality, it will pay to work with 
participants who have been out of the labor force for some time and 
therefore are sure to have a substantial wage gain. Obviously, "quantum 
leap" treatments and the sequencing of services over time are not likely 
when there are either cost-cutting or placement pressures and when there is 
no recognition of intensity or of the starting point of the individuals 
involved.
There is no question, then, that the current management information 
system is fundamentally inadequate and that its use for planning, 
budgeting, performance monitoring and evaluation pushes the system in the 
direction of low-cost, short-duration services, creaming, and shell games. 
Those most knowledgeable about these inadequacies are also the ones who 
have a stake in maintaining the status quo, whether they are prime sponsors 
wise in the ways of maximizing placements or 0MB budgeters seeking 
substantive cuts while arguing for improved efficiency. It is not an 
overwhelming challenge, however, to design a management information system 
that would overcome most of these problems:
First, it is necessary to more accurately identify the human resource 
input into the system. An employability index could be derived for each 
individual, summarizing the characteristics data already gathered in a way 
which would better suggest whether programs are reaching those most in 
need. The marginal effect of each participant characteristic on placement 
and positive termination chances could, for instance, be calculated based 
on regression analysis of the CLMS data. The characteristics of each CETA 
entrant could be multiplied by these marginal weights and an aggregate 
score calculated. The scores would, then, be averaged for significant 
segments, participants in different treatments, or for all participants in 
a prime sponsor's program. If a short, standardized reading and math test 
were required at entry, and perhaps an employability skills test, combined 
with employment and earnings pattern variables used in the CLMS, the 
predictive power of these indices could be increased. This would help to 
reduce the amount of creaming within significant segments; it would improve 
the assessment process; and it would facilitate comparison of the effec 
tiveness of different agents and prime sponsors in serving similar in 
dividuals.
Second, the treatments need to be better identified by streamlining of 
the activity descriptors. For instance, the descriptors might include:
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Occupational training in a classroom






There could also be nationally-established service codes for each of 
these activities further specifying the occupation of vocational classroom 
training, OJT, and worksite training or work experience; and for remedial 
education specifying ESL, basic reading, basic mathematics, GED or college 
preparation. The prime sponsor might have further identifers for the 
various local delivery agents.
Third, intensity measures are needed. The most direct approach is to 
record weekly or monthly hours in each activity for each participant. For 
instance, someone with 60 percent classroom training (half in skills and 
half in remedial education) and 40 percent worksite training during 40 
hours weekly participation would be recorded as receiving 12 hours of 
occupational training, 12 hours of remedial education, and 16 hours of 
worksite training in that week. If the individual were shifted to OJT 
after two months of such participation, 40 hours of OJT would be recorded 
for each week in the third month. In other words, at the end of the 
quarter, this individual would be noted as having:
Occupational training—96 hours 
Remedial education—96 hours 
Worksite training--128 hours 
OJT--160 hours 
Total—480 hours
Aggregating the individual records, it would then be possible to 
report cumulatively and in the current week the number of participants and 
the average hours in each of these components, as well as the distribution 
by hours of treatment and the percentage within different activity com 
binations. For terminees, it would be possible to identify the averages, 
distributions and percentages cumulated for the entire period of par 
ticipation.
For each hour of participation, the allowance or wage and fringes 
received by the individual would be noted (and perhaps also the supportive 
services). In the contracts negotiated with each service deliverer for the 
coming year, the projected hours of treatment could be calculated, the 
costs allocated, and parameters developed which could be entered into the 
individual account for each hour of participation with the delivery agent. 
Where the hours of participation included treatments paid for from non-CETA 
public funds, they would be valued at the cost to the providing agency and 
would be entered under a separate category. Thus, the record for the 
prototype individual might be fleshed out with cost figures such as the 
following:
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Fourth, an individual would be considered a terminee immediately upon 
leaving one of these activity units without planned transfer to another 
within 30 days. A 90-day follow-up would be required for a sample of all 
terminees to track experiences over the three-month period. It would 
include identification of the relation of post-program employment to the 
training or work assignment during participation. The individual record 
would be open-ended so that in the event of later reapplication to CETA, an 
employment log would be filled in, backdating to the time of previous 
enrolIment.
Finally, the individual record would also note the beginning and 
ending point of the participant relative to standard competency hier 
archies. For instance, the SAT score at entry and the SAT score at 
completion of remedial education would be noted. In the major occupations 
of training, such as carpentry, there would be standard competency level 
hierarchies established as part of the MIS and the beginning and ending 
skill levels would be noted on the individual record.
Fifth, the service, cost, and outcomes data, presented in the various 
distributional arrays and with the averages, would be calculated for 
cross-classified groups such as dropouts under age 22, high school 
students, black males age 22 to 45, and the like. The distributions and 
averages would also be presented according to groupings on the employa- 
bility scale.
Since most of these data elements are already gathered but utilized in 
different ways, and since the concepts are so straightforward, the opera 
tional burdens of the reformed MIS would be less than, or certainly not 
greater than, the current system. The result would be a better ability to 
track service combinations, to assure that creaming did not occur, to 
identify service intensity and real costs, to assure that public resources 
were more equitably distributed among significant segments; and to permit 
assessment of delivery agent performance.
However, redesign of the MIS would be traumatic. The entire system 
from top to bottom has grown familiar with current approaches and has
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developed the analytical, information processing, and programming systems, 
in light of current report formats and activity definitions. Short of such 
total reform, there are several immediate steps which might improve the 
effectiveness of the current system. First, categories could be created 
for long-duration occupational and "other" training, respectively, so that 
budgetary pressure would not simply reduce the intensity of services. For 
instance, there might be a distinction between entry, intermediate, and 
career training based on intended treatment lengths—perhaps defined as 
less than 350 hours, 350 to 1000 hours, and 1000 hours or more. Second, 
for public service employment, there is currently an identifier of the 
training which supplements work, including a distinction between training 
costs with and without stipends. This could be adopted for work experience 
to isolate work/training combinations. Third, participants for whom 
placement is not an intended goal in the employability development plan 
could be identified on the intake form and on the Program Status Summary in 
a special category, so they are not confused with those for whom placement 
is intended but not achieved. Fourth, outcomes and participants could be 
reported for each major program component, i.e., classroom training as 
subclassified above, OJT, work experience, and a category including 
transition services plus vocational exploration and other services. Fifth, 
a subcategory of unsubsidized placements might be added noting whether the 
job is related to the occupation of training or subsidized work experience.
The choice between a complete overhaul and more modest reform largely 
depends on the degree of change envisioned in the organization and manage 
ment of the employment and training system. If there are only modest 
changes in the groundrules for operating different components and for 
moving participants through the system, and if the organization remains the 
same at the local level, then the massive disruption which would result 
from implementation of a new MIS may not be worth the costs. If the CETA 
system is totally realigned, however, the MIS should also be altered, which 
can help to realign thinking and decisions at the local level. A com 
promise would be to begin with measured changes in components and ac 
tivities at the local level, combined with the moderate reforms of the MIS, 
and then to implement the more comprehensive modifications as the capacity 
developed locally to mount long-term training and to move individuals 
through the system in a more orderly way.
Uncertainty and Instability
The decisions of prime sponsors may, in part, be based on their 
perceptions about what works and what does not as judged from a local 
perspective. Some may consciously design and manage programs to look good 
on the management information system reports. Overwhelming both of these 
factors, however, is the uncertainty and instability in funding, legis 
lation, and federal policy which makes rational decisions or by-the-numbers 
management almost impossible.
Between fiscal 1975 and 1976, the increase in job creation expendi 
tures (measured in constant dollars) equalled 90 percent of cumulative 
increases since the beginning of the War on Poverty. Between 1977 and 
1978, the increase in a single year was again equal to 90 percent of the 
cumulative increase in all preceding years. The constant dollar declines
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in the next two years erased three-fourths of this growth even though the 
aggregate level of unemployment hardly improved. In 1978 and 1979, massive 
youth programs were mounted and then abruptly phased down in 1980 and 1981. 
There were side ventures such as PSIP, STIP, and HIRE, as well as varying 
emphases on CETA and weatherization, CETA-and-the-Arts, CETA and economic 
development, and the like. Such staggering fluctuations in funding, 
activity mix and focus have ruptured the delivery system. Any private 
sector business doubling in size every four years would have growth pains, 
but if the product mix were substantially altered each time without 
warning, while the organizational structure and accounting procedures were 
constantly changing, there is no way it could perform effectively. This is 
what has been asked of the employment and training delivery system, which 
has then been blamed for failures of management.
National funding volatility and ever-changing missions are not the 
only problems. Resources are allocated according to relative unemployment 
rates, and, as a result, there are dramatic year-to-year fluctuations in 
local activities even when the aggregate funding levels do not change, and 
even though structural problems do not fluctuate dramatically from year- 
to-year in either absolute or relative terms. Each year, the local prime 
sponsor must prepare an annual plan dividing its slice of the pie into 
smaller pieces, and must await approval of this plan before contracting 
with delivery agents. This one-year planning and contracting horizon 
generates enormous instability and has severe consequences. Even if 
federal budget levels were decided, the funding levels for local areas 
would not be known until very near the start of the fiscal year in October 
because unemployment data for the previous year are not available until 
Spring. The uncertainty has been compounded by the failure of Congress to 
act on the budget in a timely fashion. Thus, none of the delivery agents 
at the local level knows for sure whether or for how much they will be 
funded until the start of the year or later. For subagents receiving 
support for the first time or launching modified or expanded activities, 
new staff and materials must be secured in a rush once notification is 
given. Enrollment must be increased as quickly as possible to get up to 
planned operating levels. Training of staff and shakedown must occur at 
the same time. Enrollment must subsequently be surged in order to achieve 
contracted person-years, since there will be many dropouts and since the 
phase-up takes some time. Staff tends to remain at a stable level over the 
year while enrollment surges. As the year progresses, administrative staff 
must begin to focus on the competition for the next year's funding. There 
are significant costs involved in annual application. The operating 
personnel realize the uncertainty and wonder about their own futures; some 
look for and take other jobs. As participant termination occurs, there is 
a hard choice between carrying a smaller number of enrol lees with fixed 
overhead or bringing on new enrol lees who might receive only a limited 
period of service. If money has not been spent or enrollment goals met, 
there is usually a hasty effort to bring on more participants and meet 
goals. If the activity is refunded, then there is either a gradual 
phase-down as dropouts occur over the next year, or a build-up if en 
rollment has been allowed to decline. If subagents are not refunded, all 
remaining participants must be transferred. Delivery agents may, in fact, 
hold participants hostage in order to secure refunding by the threat of 
sudden dislocation of large numbers of persons in need.
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This instability almost totally disappears in the national data. 
Monthly enrollments are not recorded in the management information system, 
and end-of-quarter enrollments are "fixed" by most prime sponsors by 
concentrating terminations a few days later. Prime sponsor data average 
out the instability of subgrantees, while national data average out the 
anomalies among prime sponsors. At the delivery level, however, chaos 
rules.
This is suggested by the detailed evidence for a set of school-to-work 
transition projects (which would be classified primarily as "transition 
services" if funded under YETP and "other classroom training" if funded 
under Title IIBC) where the aim was to prepare youth over the school year 
for employment the next summer and beyond. All the projects were targeted 
to start up coincident with the 1978-79 school year, i.e., just like most 
other new activities initiated by the Youth Employment and Demonstration 
Projects Act of 1977. The aggregated enrollments for 60 of these school- 
to-work transition projects show a steady phase-up, a drop associated with 
the end of the school year, and then maintenance of enrollment over the 
second year (Figure 4.7). This is the predictable and orderly pattern 
reflected in national MIS totals. The underlying reality is suggested by 
the monthly enrollment patterns illustrated for three sets of six projects 
typical of the larger sample. There are incredible fluctuations from 
month-to-month, with the patterns significantly different for each project, 
reflecting unique circumstances, problems and accomplishments:
t During the 1978-1979 school year, when implementation was 
intended to coincide with school schedules, 85 percent of 
projects had their first enrollments in November or later 
and a fourth not until January or later, suggesting the 
difficulties of new program implementation at the local 
level.
t Over a third of the projects took a half year or more to 
reach 75 percent of planned enrollments. Only a third ever 
reached their planned maximum enrollments, and a third did 
not reach half of their planned maximums.
• After a year's operations, the projects still had average 
enrollments less than half of peak enrollments during the 
1979-1980 school year.
t Over three-fifths of projects experienced significant modifi 
cations within their two school years of operation.
t Half the projects had at least one change of directors, and 
one in ten had three directors or more. The annual staff 
turnover rate averaged 50 percent over two years of opera 
tions. 16/
Instability affects not only operational performance, but equally 
important, it influences the types of activities which are mounted and the 
choice of service deliverers. Programs with the lowest common denomina 
tor—those with the least complexity that are extensions of existing 
efforts and which can be expanded or reduced with little problem are un-
Figure 4.7 
The Hidden Instability of CETA Local Activities
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avoidable. The interventions selected are short-term so that they can be 
surged and can have an immediate impact. Such interventions rarely 
anticipate multi-year or longer-term sequences for individual participants. 
Sequences could only be arranged by the prime sponsor by linking together 
separate activities, but these all have very uneven enrollment patterns 
dictated by annual funding schedules. Staffing patterns are also affected. 
Only certain types of persons are willing to live with the uncertainty or 
can be found on a moment's notice. They are usually uncredentialed and 
frequently ready to leave for other jobs, undermining stability of program 
delivery. Finally, the stop and go pattern, and the annual division of 
spoils among competing claimants, almost foreordains the use of existing 
community resources rather than the development over time of improved 
training programs since their continuity cannot be guaranteed. Even when 
existing community institutions are utilized, however, they are unlikely to 
be used optimally. For instance, employability skills projects cited 
previously were supposed to be initiated in the schools and linked to the 
educational offerings. Yet the contracting cycle from CETA does not 
provide funds until the start of the fiscal year (October 1) or later, 
while school staffing and assignment plans are made in the summer. 
Likewise, post-secondary institutions may mount CETA training, but given 
the uncertainty in funding, their efforts usually entail short-term special 
classes to fill idle capacity rather than integrating CETA clients into 
regular training activities. In the last few years, there has been a great 
deal of uncertainty whether CETA would even be reauthorized, so that 
long-term treatments and the institutional linkages needed to achieve them 
have been further undermined.
The solutions are quite straightforward. Aggregate funding levels for 
CETA human resource development activities should be stabilized. The al 
location formula distributing these resources to prime sponsors should be 
based on structural factors, which do not change rapidly from year to year. 
Two-year contracting at the local level should be encouraged rather than 
reallocating unspent funds each year in a punitive way. Alternatively, 
half of local contracts might be revolved each year on a two-year funding 
cycle. Plans should include long-range institutional development and 
linkage goals as well as one-year activity commitments.
These steps are as unlikely as they are sensible. Congress is not 
predisposed to committing money in advance. Present allocation formulae 
are the result of political compromises and any changes would be con 
troversial. Planning and contracting procedures have become institution 
alized and will be difficult to change. Yet the fact remains that un 
certainty and instability are a major reason why programs are not and 
cannot be, more effectively and rationally designed, managed and targeted 
at the local level. The responsibility is at the federal level. The 
problem can be overcome. And this solution may be more important than any 
possible legislative or administrative repackaging of CETA programs.
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SECTION 3. 
FEDERAL OVERSIGHT AND INTERVENTION
Although the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act was intended to 
decentralize decisiomnaking and management, the authority of prime sponsors 
is far from absolute. The prime sponsors must spend the federal funds they 
are allocated consistent with the law and the federal regulations inter 
preting the legislation. They are subject to Department of Labor review to 
assure the regulations are obeyed and, further, that adequate performance 
is achieved. Finally, there are several set-aside and special-purpose 
programs where the activities are selected and managed locally but the 
Department of Labor keeps its thumb in the pie.
In theory, the regulations, federal performance monitoring, and 
set-aside or special-purpose programs apply equally to all prime sponsors 
except for some limited exceptions. While the preceding analysis of 
patterns of variation among prime sponsors raises possibility that regional 
offices of the Department of Labor are not uniform in their interpretations 
and enforcements of the rules, federal oversight and intervention are more 
determinant of the averages than the variances. A uniform complaint of 
state and local decisionmakers is that federal requirements and second- 
guessing restrict their flexibility to respond to local needs and con 
ditions. If prime sponsors were asked why they avoid long-term training, 
why they do not achieve more OJT, why they emphasize subsidized work 
experience, why their placement rates are low, or conversely, why they 
cream from among eligible participants, they would point to one villain— 
"the feds". It is difficult to sort out the rhetoric from the reality. 
Yet it is critical to determine how federal policies and enforcement affect 
the levels, types, targeting, and effectiveness of training at the local 
level.
The Regulations
The law and the regulations are surprisingly nonrestrictive when it 
comes to training, particularly classroom training. Under the Title IIBC, 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Services subpart, prime sponsors have 
the regulatory freedom to use all of their allocated resources for 
training. Under Title IV Youth Employment and Training Programs, they may 
also use all of their allocated resources for training. Under the Title 
VII, Private Sector Initiative Program, they are encouraged to use all 
their funds for training activities. Under Title IID, Structural Public 
Service Employment, prime sponsors have the authority to use all funds for 
training and are required to use a legislatively-specified portion of funds 
for this purpose. Under Title VI, Countercyclical Public Service Em 
ployment and the Title IV, Summer Youth Employment Program, they also have 
the authority to use all allocated funds for training. The fact that less 
than a fifth of all locally-allocated CETA funds in fiscal 1980 were 
utilized for classroom and on-the-job training was not a result of legal or 
regulatory restrictions, and the fact that some prime sponsors had training 
shares under all their local 1980 allocations which were double or triple 
those of other prime sponsors with the same unemployment rates and youth 
shares among participants offered proof that more training was allowable
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and could have been achieved. If anything, the law and the regulations 
emphasize the use of training, particularly since the 1978 amendments which 
added the PSIP training title, required training under Title IID, and 
increased set-asides for vocational education and for linkages with state 
education systems. The regulations further require that transition 
services be provided to all participants in the summer program, while and 
encouraging training and remedial education. While employment is offered 
to students under YETP, it must be coupled with counseling, placement, 
occupational information, and efforts to overcome sex-stereotyping.
The regulations provide few restrictions or prescriptions for the 
types and targeting of classroom training. Occupational skills training is 
limited to those occupations where there is a reasonable expectation of 
employment, but is not allowed for "high" turnover, "low" wage jobs. 
"High" and "low" are defined in relative rather than absolute terms, i.e., 
relative to other local jobs which participants might secure. The training 
of sewing machine operators is proscribed except under specified con 
ditions. Skill training is restricted to occupations that require more 
than two weeks of preparation.
The only specificity is about allowances, not about the content of 
training. Classroom training participants are entitled to an hourly allow 
ance equal to the federal, state, or local minimum wage, whichever is 
higher, for the time spent in classroom training. An additional $5 weekly 
is provided for each dependent over two, up to a maximum of $20 for six or 
more. The basic allowance is reduced by the amount of unemployment 
compensation if this is received by the participant for the same week. If 
Basic Education Opportunity Grants are received during participation, they 
may be subtracted at the option of the prime sponsor. Public assistance 
recipients are provided a $30 weekly incentive allowance supplementing 
their welfare check in lieu of an hourly stipend. For all categories of 
classroom trainees, additional payments cover transportation or other 
extraordinary participation costs. There is limited flexibility in these 
allowance requirements. The basic allowance can be waived, but only if the 
waiver applies to all participants in a course, does not discourage 
participation of individuals with limited means, and increases the number 
of participants served or the intensity of services. Individual waivers 
are permitted only with the written agreement of the participant and only 
if funds allocated for allowances have been obligated and unfilled training 
opportunities are available. Dependent and incentive allowances cannot be 
waived.
On-the-job training rules are much more specific, and there is no 
doubt that these affect the marketability of this approach to private 
employers. The training assignment must provide opportunities not 
otherwise available for the participant which promote upward mobility and 
lead to economic self-sufficiency. In matching participants and jobs, 
prime sponsors are to assure that the participant lacks the normal 
education, training, or work experience required for the job, although the 
employer is entitled to the final selection among individuals referred by 
the prime sponsors. Individuals who do not have serious skill or ex 
perience deficiencies are to be referred to OJT only when there are no 
other suitable placement, work or training opportunities.
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The OJT participant is hired first and trained later. Employers are 
compensated for the cost of extra supervision and training needed for the 
CETA client as compared with usual entry employees. The regulations 
indicate that the reimbursement should usually equal 50 percent of the 
participant's wage during the period of training. The employer may also be 
reimbursed for the actual costs incurred for classroom training or other 
allowable employment and training services and supportive services 
purchased for OJT participants. The total reimbursement may be provided on 
a declining schedule over the period of training if there are higher 
initial training costs. In special circumstances, the employer subsidy 
(net of the reimbursement to cover any outside classroom training and 
services) may be more than half the wage if the characteristics of the 
participant indicate greater obstacles to employment than those of the 
normal CETA participant or if the training is at an unusually high skill 
level. In such cases, however, approval of the Department of Labor is 
needed.
The wage paid to the OJT participant cannot be lower than the federal, 
state, or local minimum, or the rate required by an applicable collective 
bargaining agreement. It must be "reasonable" considering such factors as 
industry, geographical region, and the participant's skill. OJT partici 
pants are to be provided workers' compensation and other benefits to the 
same extent as regular workers. Unemployment compensation coverage may be 
provided at the election of the prime sponsor if otherwise not required 
under state law. Working conditions may not be unsanitary, hazardous, or 
dangerous to the participants' health and safety.
The subsidies to employers come with some strings attached. Each 
assignment requires a contract detailing the length and nature of training, 
the method and amount of reimbursement, the number of participants, a job 
description and a statement of the duties, participant wage rates, costs to 
be reimbursed above the wage subsidy, and procedures for tracking attend 
ance. The employer must comply with the Act and regulations, including 
equal employment opportunity provisions. OJT contracts may only be awarded 
to employers who have not been seriously deficient in their conduct of or 
participation in any Department of Labor program.
These restrictions make OJT a none too attractive package for em 
ployers, and certainly less attractive than available options. Under the 
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit, for instance, an employer can get essentially the 
same amount for hiring welfare recipients, ex-offenders, poor Vietnam 
veterans, disadvantaged out-of-school youth, and cooperative education 
participants. Under TJTC, the employer may screen and sort his own candi 
dates, narrowing them down to those acceptable, sending them for certifi 
cation, and thus avoiding all the paperwork and governmental oversight 
associated with OJT.
Experiments with alternative OJT formulations have documented that in 
order to increase penetration into the private sector, it is necessary both 
to enrich and to alter the groundrules for OJT subsidization. Under Youth 
Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects, the law authorized 100 percent wage 
subsidies in the private sector, i.e., payroll ing youth from CETA while 
they worked in private sector assignments and subsequently reducing the 
subsidy level if they became more employable. In other words, the employer
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could try the youth before making a hiring commitment and before getting 
involved in any paperwork. Entitlement was targeted to a group from the 
lowest end of the documented employability distribution--16-19 year-old 
poor students or dropouts who had returned to school. It was a saturation 
program in the demonstration sites, providing jobs to al 1 eligible youth 
and, thus, requiring a three- or fourfold expansion of CETA youth jobs in 
some sites. Yet even at this intensive level, one-fifth of the work 
provided was in the private sector. In contrast, OJT enrollments under 
YETP represented only 3 percent of total participants. In fiscal 1979, 
when there were 5100 participants in OJT under YETP nationwide, there were 
over 6000 under YIEPP in just 17 of 484 prime sponsors.
In order to determine the importance of the subsidy levels and 
formats, an experiment was initiated under Entitlement which offered either 
100 percent, 75 percent, or 50 percent wage subsidies to stratified 
representative samples of private businesses. Participation rates of 
businesses, adjusted by multiple regression to control for differences in 
employer characteristics, were 18 percent for firms offered a full-wage 
subsidy, 10 percent for those offered a three-fourths wage subsidy, and 
less than 5 percent for firms offered a one-half wage subsidy. The levels 
and elasticity would unquestionably be different if the jobs were for older 
workers and were other than part-time school-year and full-time summer, but 
the evidence suggests that there is a responsiveness to the subsidy level 
and that the 100 percent subsidy, which eliminates much of the paperwork 
burden by keeping the workers as CETA employees during a try-out period, 
can increase the employer participation level substantially. IT/ Further 
confirmation was provided by the five-site demonstration program for 
out-of-school youth which fully subsidized a six-month period of full-time 
employment in the private sector. Although it was more difficult to 
develop jobs with private than public or nonprofit employers, 900 place 
ments were secured for dropout youth in just five sites, compared to less 
than 10,000 OJT slots nationwide for dropout youth under PSIP and Title 
IIBC combined in fiscal 1979. 18/
There is nothing in the regulations which encourages short-duration 
training interventions. Classroom training may last no more than two and a 
half years (of which only 104 weeks may be stipended). Since only .9 
percent of 1977 entrants who subsequently completed classroom training 
stayed more than 15 months, the duration limitation can hardly be con 
sidered a real constraint on local discretion. The length of on-the-job 
training is limited to the period of time generally required for the 
acquisition of skills needed for the assigned position, as specified in the 
Specific Vocational Preparation Codes in the Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles. Whether anyone ever refers to this reference is doubtful, but the 
guidance it provides concerning the primary occupations of CETA training is 
sobering. All but the most menial entry jobs in each occupation require 
more than six months of occupation-specific training. In addition, 
language and mathematical competencies are usually required which are 
beyond the reach of many disadvantaged CETA clients (Table 4.12) As an 
example, a clerk typist job requires dexterity, good vision and three to 
six months specific skill training. But this assumes the individual 
already has math, reading, and writing abilities equivalent to a functional 
high school level. If the trainee has educational deficiencies, then these 
need to be addressed first. The successful education methods in Job Corps
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Table 4.12
Competency Requirements and Training Times for 

























































































































Over 6 months up to
and including 1 year
Over 6 months up to
and including 1 year
Short demonstration
Over 1 year up to and
including 2 years
Over 2 years up to and
including 4 years
Over 2 years up to and
including 4 years
Over 1 year up to and
including 2 years
Over 4 years up to and
including 10 years
Over 2 years up to and
including 4 years
Over 2 years up to and
including 4 years
Anything beyond short
demonstration up to and
including 30 days
Over 2 years up to and
including 4 years
Over 2 years up to and
including 4 years
Over 1 year up to and
including 2 years
Over 6 months up to
and including 1 year
Over 3 months up to
and including 6 months
Over 3 months up to
and including 6 months
Over 1 year up to and
including 2 years
Over 1 year up to and
including 2 years
Anything beyond short
demonstration up to and
including 30 days
Over 3 months up to
and including 6 months
Over 3 months up to
and including 6 months
Over 3 months up to
and including 6 months
Over 1 year up to and
including 2 years
Over 3 months up to
and including 6 months





Add and subtract two digit numbers. Multiply and 
divide 10's and 100's by 2, 3, 4, 5. Perform the 
four basic arithmetic operations with coins as 
part of a dollar.
Perform operations with units such as cup, pint, 
quart; inch, foot, and year; and ounce and pound.
Add, subtract, multiply, and divide all units of 
measure. Perform the four operations with like 
common and decimal fractions. Compute ratio, 
rate, and percent. Draw and interpret bar 
graphs. Perform arithmetic operations involving 
all American monetary units.
Language Skills Needed
Reading:
Recognize meaning of 2,500 (two- or three-syllable
words. Read at a rate of 95-120 words per minute.
Writing:
Print simple sentences containing subject, verb, and
object, and series of numbers, names, and addresses.
Speaking:
Speak simple sentences, using normal word order, and
present and past tenses.
Reading:
Passive vocabulary of 5,000-6,000 words. Read at
rate of 190-215 words per minute. Read adventure
stories and comic books, looking up unfamiliar
words in dictionary for meaning, spelling, and
pronunciation.
Read instructions for assembling model cars and 
airplanes.
Writing:
Write compound and complex sentences, using cursive 
style, proper end punctuation, and employing 
adjectives and adverbs.
Speaking:
Speak clearly and distinctly with appropriate pauses 
and emphasis, correct pronunciation, variations in 
word order, using present, perfect, and future tenses.
Compute discount, Interest, profit, and loss; 
commission, markups, and selling price; ratio 
and proportion, and percentages. Calculate 
surfaces, volumes, weights, and measures.
Algebra:
Calculate variables and formulas, monomials
and polynomials; ratio and proportion variables;
and square roots and radicals.
Geometry:
Calculate plane and solid figures, circumference, 
area, and volume. Understand kinds of angles, and 
properties of pairs and angles.
Reading:
Read a variety of novels, magazines, atlases, and
encyclopedias.
Read safety rules, Instructions in the use and 
maintenance of shop tools and equipment, and methods 
and procedures in mechanical drawing and layout work.
Writing:
Write reports and essays with proper format, punctu 
ation, spelling, and grammar, using all parts of speech.
Speaking:
Speak before an audience with poise, voice control, 
and confidence, using correct English and well- 
modulated voice.
Algebra:
Deal with system of real numbers; linear 
quadratic, rational, exponential; logarithmic, 
angle, and circular functions, and inverse 
functions; related algebraic solution of equa 
tions and inequalities; limits and continuity, 
and probability and statistical Inference.
Geometry:
Deductive axiomatic geometry, plane and solid;
and rectangular coordinates.
Reading:
Read novels, poems, newspapers, periodicals, journals
manuals, dictionaries, thesauruses, and encyclopedias.
Writing:
Prepare business letters, expositions, summaries,
and reports, using prescribed format, and conforming
to all rules of punctuation, grammar, diction, and style.
Speaking:
Participate in panel discussions, dramatizations, and
debates. Speak extemporaneously on a variety of subjects.
Algebra:
Work with exponents and logarithms, linear 
equations, quadratic equations, mathematical 
induction and binomial theorems, and permuta 
tions.
Calculus:
Apply concepts of analytical geometry, differenti 
ations, and integration of algebraic functions 
with applications.
Statistics:
Apply mathematical operations to frequency distribu 
tions, reliability, and validity of tests, normal 
curve, analysis of variance, correlation techniques, 
ch1-square application and sampling theory, and 
factor analysis.
Reading:
Read literature, book and play reviews, scientific and 
technical journals, abstracts, financial reports, and 
legal documents.
Writing:
Write novels, plays, editorials, journals, speeches.
manuals, critiques, poetry, and songs.
Speaking:
Conversant in the theory principles, and methods of 
effective and persuasive speaking, voice and diction, 
phonetics, and discussion and debate.
Source; Dictionary of Occupational Titles (Washington, D.C.: U,S, Government Prvnting Office, 1979); and
Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined In the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S, Government Printing Office, 1981).'
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require 150 hours of reading instruction to advance skills two grade 
levels. Assuming four hours daily in reading instruction (and the 
remaining time in math), it would take at least two months to move a person 
with a tenth-grade equivalent reading level up to twelfth-grade competency. 
This would add on to the total training time, pushing it over six months 
for most CETA clients assuming they learn typing skills as fast as the 
nondisadvantaged. And most other occupations require longer skill 
training. An arc welder needs six months to one year of skill-specific 
training and a high school functional level. Interestingly, the sex- 
stereotyped occupations on which females are usually trained and placed 
require less training time than the construction and other craft jobs 
usually targeted for males.
In other words, there is nothing in the "bible" which would suggest 
that short-duration institutional or on-the-job training is reasonable for 
the types of jobs which are the primary emphasis of CETA training, par 
ticularly when considering the beginning deficits of trainees. Certainly, 
the limited guidance offered by the Department of Labor does not constrain 
the duration of training.
Performance Monitoring
Each fiscal year prime sponsors must submit plans to the Department of 
Labor indicating how they will use the funds allocated under each CETA 
subpart. The plans include numerical goals for the coming year—total new 
enrollments and average enrollments by quarter and cumulatively for each 
activity component and for each subtitle; projected expenditures for each 
category of activities; the characteristics of those who will be served; 
and the outcomes expected. These data are used to derive projected 
performance indicators, particularly, placement and positive termination 
rates, as well as costs per placement, per participant and per positive 
termination. Each quarter, performance is reviewed relative to the 
numerical goals in the plan and relative to the derived performance 
indicators. At the end of the year, there is a top-to-bottom review of 
each prime sponsor by the regional offices of the Department of Labor which 
identifies problems in need of corrective action and determines eligibility 
and conditions for funding the subsequent year. Thus, federal leverage 
could be exerted at the initial point of plan review before its approval, 
at the end-of-the year when performance relative to plan is ultimately 
assessed, and during the year whenever there is an extreme variance from 
quarterly projections. The degree of actual leverage depends on how much 
attention is paid to design issues, service mix, and performance indicators 
in the initial plan review, the degree of flexibility allowed during the 
course of the year, and the rewards and punishments for performance as 
assessed at the end of the year.
The enormous variance among prime sponsors in service and participant 
mix, service costs, and performance as judged by placement and positive 
termination rates, costs per placement and costs per positive termination, 
is prima facie evidence that the federal performance monitoring system has 
not forced prime sponsors into a Procrustean bed. On the contrary, it 
appears that the monitoring system generates a lot of paper and workload 
with very little constructive outcome.
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To begin with, performance goals in each prime sponsor's plan are to 
be set based on the previous year's experience, with the aim of improving 
each year, unless there is some justification such as locally rising 
unemployment. There are some guidelines supposedly used by regional 
offices during plan review. Yet the variance in classroom training and OJT 
shares for Title IIBC approved plans in 1980 was almost as great as the 
variance in actual classroom training and OJT shares; and the same held for 
expenditure levels. Prime sponsors are also free to modify their approved 
plans during the course of the year, and apparently this is a regular 
occurrence. For instance, during fiscal 1979 under Title IIBC, actual 
current enrollment in OJT was 66 percent of plan in the first quarter 
before modifications could be made, but then rose to 77 percent of modified 
fourth quarter targets. For the entire fiscal year, the ratio of current- 
to-planned OJT enrollment (as reported after modification of plans 
throughout the year) was 72 percent. In the first quarter the cumulative 
OJT enrollment was reported to be only 70 percent of plan. By the end of 
the year it was up to 82 percent of plan. There is no way current 
enrollment could have averaged 72 percent of plan, never rising higher than 
77 percent, and yet achieved 82 percent of the cumulative goal unless this 
final goal reflected substantial mid-course corrections. This same 
quarterly pattern is evident for aggregate IIBC enrollments and ex 
penditures in fiscal 1979, as well as for other years. Obviously, both 
current and cumulative planned enrollments are modified substantially over 
the course of the year. The usual practice is simply to approve modifi 
cations of planned service levels and expenditures unless they represent 
some massive breakdown in local performance or unless the prime sponsor is 
otherwise in the doghouse. Thus, even if approved plans at the start of 
the year required improved performance over the previous year, the plan in 
force at the end will usually be less ambitious as a result of "mods." For 
instance, the end-of-year approved placement rate for Title IIBC in fiscal 
1980 was 48.6 percent, compared to 50.8 percent in 1979, while the positive 
termination goal was 68.6 percent vs. 76.2 percent. 19/
The end-of-the-year review which is the "big stick" of the Department 
of Labor turns out to be a weak reed. All titles of activity are assessed 
by the regional offices. In each case, the design, management, and 
statistically measured outcomes are weighed according to a quantitative 
rating system. Based on the point ranking, prime sponsors are classified 
as eligible for immediate funding, having problems that need corrective 
action but do not hold up funding for the next fiscal year, and having 
serious problems that must be addressed before refunding. In fiscal 1980 
under Title IIBC, seven of ten prime sponsors were rated as eligible for 
immediate funding, a fifth as having problems identified, and one in ten as 
having serious problems. Averaging the scores for all CETA titles, one in 
twenty primes were rated as having serious problems overall.
It would appear, then, that federal review is serious business. Yet 
only two prime sponsorships in the history of CETA have been reconstituted 
under federal mandate. No other primes have been refused funding for a 
fiscal year. One of the major shortcomings of the present system is that 
there are no marginal penalties for poor performance. It is essentially an 
either/or proposition. Problems are never so severe that the feds can 
justify holding up or cancelling allocations which would turn those in need 
out on the streets. So the usual recourse is to generate a corrective
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action plan, to demonstrate some progress in alleviating the most visible 
abuses, and to operate under conditional approval. The only marginal 
incentives and penalties lie in the use of the Secretary of Labor's 
discretionary funds, but they are too small a share of total resources to 
make a difference, and prime sponsors with serious problems have frequently 
received discretionary funds despite inadequate management of their 
formula-allocated resources.
Moreover, a detailed look at the review format reveals that it has 
less to do with the quality of programming and performance than with the 
acceptability of procedures and the adequacy of required paperwork. The 
federal priorities are manifest in the weights for different aspects of 
management, design, and numerical performance (Table 4.13). Correct 
planning formats, eligibility determination procedures, and equal op 
portunity and complaint handling systems together account for more points 
than placement performance. Even when numerical goals are judged, the 
prime sponsors must be 25 percent below modified plan levels in order to 
get no points. The qualitative, substantive aspects of employment and 
training activities account for only 18 of the 150 points. On-the-job and 
classroom training programs of a prime sponsor are not likely to be 
reviewed in the same year, and when they are, the review criteria focus 
almost exclusively on procedures rather than the substance of the training 
activities. There is no necessary monitoring of actual training sites or 
training curricula. For instance, the key points in the assessment of OJT 
are an analysis of OJT contracts or agreements to assure that they contain 
information on the skills to be learned, the training time, the employer 
reimbursement, a job description, and an assurance that the employer will 
comply with the regulations; there is no way of knowing from review of 
these pieces of paper whether the indicated conditions are actually being 
met. The prime sponsor must have written standards for selecting OJT 
opportunities; whether or not these standards are utilized is unknown. 
Based on interviews with staff, the reviewer must determine whether 
procedures are used to select participants who are in need of OJT. The 
prime sponsor must evidence procedures for follow-up on OJT participants. 
If enrollment goals are not being achieved, the reviewer must determine 
whether there is a reasonable justification and whether corrective action 
is being taken. For classroom training, the review focuses on whether the 
activities are the same as those in the plan, if the training occupations 
are adequate (presumably self-evident if the plan is met since the training 
courses were already approved), and a determination whether corrective 
actions are being taken if enrollment goals are not being met.
With these assessment criteria and this weighting schema, it is not 
surprising that among the 28 prime sponsors rated as having serious 
problems over all titles in 1980, the quality or quantity of training was 
mentioned as one of the deficient aspects only three times (one prime 
sponsor totally failed to comply with the 15 percent training requirement 
under Title IID; the IIBC performance indicators were inadequate for 
another; and the third underutilized the vocational education set-aside). 
In comparison, inadequate EEO compliance systems were mentioned nine times 
and inadequate monitoring or eligibility determination systems were a 
factor in 21 of the 28 prime sponsors. For the prime sponsors with serious 
problem rankings on Title IIBC, the quality or management of training was 
not mentioned once as a primary factor.
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Table 4.13 
1981 Performance Assessment Factors and Weights
Management 50 
Independent Monitoring Unit 6 
Eligibility Determination, Verification
and Tracking 6 
Financial Management 8 
Planning (composition of council
and procedures) 4 
Subagent Management (includes having a
system for performance management as
well as procedures to assure special
consideration for community-based groups) 8 
Equal Opportunity 6 
Complaints Procedures 5 
Corrective Action Procedures 7
Program Design 50 
Recruitment and Selection of
Participants 7 
Assessment and Employability Development
Plans 7 
Job Development and Transition Services 7 
Services to Youth 4 
Program Activities (two of the four
reviewed in any year) 18 
OJT (9) 
Classroom Training (9) 
Upgrading and Returning (9 
Work Experience (9 
Corrective Action Follow-Up 7
Numerical Performance Individuals 50
Positive Termination 5
Entered Employment Rate 8
Indirect Placement Rate 10
Private Sector Placement 5
Cumulative Enrollment 5
Accrued Expenditures 5
Cost Per Positive Termination 4
Cost Per Entered Employment 4
Cost Per Indirect Placement 4
Total 150
Eligible for immediate funding 105
Corrective Action needed 76-104
Serious Problems 75 or less
Source: Fiscal Year 1981 National CETA Assessment Handbook, Employment 
and Training Administration, Department of Labor (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Labor, November 1980).
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There will be increased priority on performance and less on process in 
the future. For the fiscal 1982 cycle, performance goals have been estab 
lished by regression estimates which consider participant mix, service mix 
and area employment conditions. Prime sponsors will be rated relative to 
predicted performance rates. Whether this will have a major effect on 
quantitatively measured performance depends on several things: First, the 
weights in the annual review which are given to numerical performance 
indicators must be increased much more substantially. Second, the points 
awarded for numerical performance along different dimensions must be sorted 
out. For instance, more youth services may yield a higher positive 
termination rate, lower cost per positive terminations, and higher enroll 
ment rates, but lower placement rates, and higher costs per placement. As 
this example suggests, any mix or management decision will affect some in 
dicators differently than others, sometimes in contradictory directions. 
Third, plan modification policies must be tightened and applied uniformly. 
Fourth, the performance assessment system must be accurate enough that it 
does not dictate who is served or how intensively, i.e., does not cause 
prime sponsors to cream the most employable and to provide band-aid 
services. Fourth, the system must assure that net impacts are maximized 
and not just immediate outcomes. Finally, there must be marginal in 
centives for good performance and penalties for poor performance. It is 
questionable whether such conditions can be met. Regression estimates 
built on management information system averages for each prime sponsor 
cannot capture the variances in severity of need, service mix and 
intensity, or labor market conditions in a reliable enough way to justify 
heavy penalities except in cases of extremely and unquivocably poor 
performance. The data are not adequate to protect against creaming and 
band-aid approaches if placement performance is stressed. The possible 
outcomes are too variable to limit attention only to immediate placement, 
and the placement rate alone does not assure maximization of net impacts. 
No doubt, then, marginal changes in weighting and incremental penalties for 
the extremely poor performers will somewhat increase the torque of the 
monitoring system. But this will take time. There is no evidence that 
federal oversight and secondguessing has been a major factor so far in the 
history of CETA despite the exaggerated protestations of prime sponsors and 
boasts of federal managers.
Set-Asides and Categoricals
Much of the classroom training provided by CETA is the result of, or 
at least funded through, set-asides. The Governor's Supplemental Voca 
tional Education Assistance grant, representing 6 percent of Title IIBC 
funds, provided over a tenth of the expenditures for training activities 
(i.e., not including allowances, services, or administration) under al1 of 
CETA and nearly a fourth of the training purchased under Title IIBC. The 
leverage of these funds is even greater since they are used almost entirely 
for the training itself, with the allowances, services, and administration 
provided by the prime sponsors out of their Title IIBC allocations. The 
increase in the vocational education set-aside from 5 percent to 6 percent 
in the 1978 CETA amendments was a significant factor in the increase in 
classroom training under Title IIBC from 46.5 percent of expenditures in 
1978 to 52.3 percent in 1979 and 57.1 percent in 1980. In fiscal 1979, 
this extra 1 percent represented $19 million, which, when matched by al-
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lowances and services, equalled half of the increase between fiscal 1978 
and 1979 in outlays for classroom training under all local CETA programs.
Another important set-aside was the training requirement under Title 
IID public service employment program mandated by the 1978 CETA amendments. 
In the belief that structural PSE should offer more than temporary em 
ployment, Congress required that a minimum of 10 percent of Title I ID funds 
for each prime sponsor in fiscal 1979 be used for training, increasing to 
15 percent in fiscal 1980 and 20 percent in fiscal 1981. Training had 
always been an allowable activity under public service employment, but the 
share of funds used for this purpose only became substantial after the 
training requirement took effect. 20/ By 1980, training expenditures under 
Title IID and VI represented one-fifth of expenditures for training 
activities under all CETA local programs. The increase in classroom 
training (as a full-time activity) under Title IID from fiscal 1978 to 
fiscal 1979 accounted for one-fourth the increase between fiscal 1978 and 
1979 in total classroom training under all CETA local programs. This 
occurred despite the fact that three-fourths of prime sponsors fell short 
of the 15 percent target under Title IID in fiscal 1980, and two-thirds 
used less than 10 percent of funds for training. 21/
Training activities
as share of public
service employment 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Title IID .3 .3 .3 2.8 7.5 
Titles IID and VI .3 .3 .3 2.3 5.5
A variant of the set-aside approach is a categorical program which 
distributes funds for specific purposes either on a competitive application 
basis or on a formula basis with specifications concerning how these can be 
used by prime sponsors. The Skills Training Improvement Program or STIP is 
an example of the first approach. The Secretary of Labor's discretionary 
funds were specifically augmented to support "quantum leap" activities of 
longer duration which would not ordinarily be provided locally. Prime 
sponsors applied and were awarded grants on a competitive basis, with 45 
percent eventually receiving funds. These grants were monitored by the 
feds as a separate local categorical program.
STIP resulted in more and longer duration training. The program 
phased up rapidly in 1978, reached a peak in 1979, and declined rapidly in 
1980. Between 1978 and 1979, it accounted for one-fourth of the increase 
in classroom training expenditures under CETA local programs. The duration 
of training averaged 5.9 months in fiscal 1979, compared to 5.2 months for 
participants in IIBC classroom training. The cost per service year was a 
seventh above the level of IIBC classroom training (excluding adminis 
tration in both cases); and because of the longer duration of stay, the per 
participant costs were more than a fourth above those in Title IIBC 
classroom training. 22/ Apparently the program had the expected payoffs. 
Although there was some creaming into the STIP program, the post-program 
success rates for STIP participants exceeded those for similar individuals 
under Title IIBC (Table 4.14). Almost half (49.7 percent) of all STIP
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Table 4.14 
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Source: Employment and Training Administration, Management Information 
System Fiscal 1979 Summary Reports, unpublished and Westat, Inc. 
Characteristics of Enrol lees Who Entered Adult-Oriented CETA Pro 
grams During Fiscal Year 1979 (October 1978-Through September 1979) 
(Washington, D.C.: Employment and Training Administration, Office 
of Policy, Evaluation and Research, February 1981).
participants were reported as having entered employment, which might be 
contrasted with the 43.5 percent figure for 1977 CETA classroom trainees 
reported by the CLMS. 23/ The median wage before entry into STIP for 1980 
temn'nees was $3.43, and the median wage at placement was $4.78. This 
two-fifths gain contrasts with the one-fifth increment for IIBC and PSIP 
terminees in 1980.
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The Private Sector Initiatives Program authorized in 1978, and highly 
tauted by both Democratic and Republican administrations, was an attempt to 
increase private-sector-linked local training activities, particularly OJT, 
through both a set-aside of funds and changes in the delivery and decision- 
making systems locally. Private Industry Councils were mandated in each 
prime sponsorship. These councils required predominant representation from 
the business sector. They were to dictate the use of the local Title VII 
allocation, and were permitted to manage these activities.
Despite the favorable rhetoric, the record of PSIP has been anything 
but impressive by the standards and performance measures usually applied to 
employment and training programs. The 1978 amendments to CETA were to take 
effect no later than April 1979, and the PICs had a head-start with money 
reprogrammed from PSE. Although Private Industry Councils had been 
established in most prime sponsor areas by fiscal 1981 and were approving 
plans for the expenditure of the funds allocated under Title VII, a 
qualitative assessment based on case studies was that in mid-1981 only 
about one in ten PICs was really an active body separate from normal prime 
sponsor operations. 24/ Allowing for start-up in fiscal 1979, the 
activity levels achieved in fiscal 1980 were not overwhelming. A fourth of 
prime sponsors reported no PSIP activity. Total participants in fiscal 
1980 were also less than three-fourths of plan, completions only two- 
thirds, and unsubsidized placements only two-fifths. More significantly, a 
primary aim of PSIP was to increase OJT levels. It was originally planned 
in fiscal 1980 that two-fifths of cumulative enrollments would be in OJT. 
In fact, less than half of this target was achieved, compared with more 
than one-hundred percent of the original classroom training goal. In 
fiscal 1980, PSIP accounted for only 11,800 person years of service, which 
represented just 3 percent of classroom training service years provided by 
prime sponsors and 8 percent of OJT service years. The mix of OJT vs. 
classroom training was only slightly different for PSIP than for Title IIBC 
training activities; OJT accounted for three-tenths of the PSIP years of 
service and enrollment in 1980 (the remainder being classroom training) 
compared to one-fifth of Title IIBC training (i.e., disregarding work 
experience). In other words, the PICs apparently did not find it much 
easier than the prime sponsor to access private employers through OJT, and 
had a modest effect overall on the aggregate OJT placement activities at 
the local level.
The very early returns suggest that PSIP has been able to achieve 
somewhat better outcomes than Title IIBC. In 1980, 42.4 percent of PSIP 
terminees entered employment compared to 37.2 percent for Title IIBC; the 
private sector employment rates of terminees were 34.1 percent and 26.1 
percent, respectively. Yet these results were the result, in part, of 
higher expenditures and significant creaming (as well as the proportion 
ately higher level of OJT since PSIP has very little work experience 
compared to IIBC). The cost per service year of PSIP in 1980 was $9400--or 
a fifth above a like mix of services under Title IIBC. A comparison of the 
1980 PSIP enrollees with those in IIBC overall as well as its classroom 
training and OJT components, documents that PSIP was more selective (Table 
4.15). If PSIP had the same age mix of participants as Title IIBC, and the 
entered employment rates for each age group were the same as among PSIP 
participants in fiscal 1980, the entered employment rate differential 
between IIBC and PSIP would have been reduced from 5.2 percentage points to
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Table 4.15 



















































































Source: Employment and Training Administration, Management Information
System, Fiscal 1980 Summary Reports, unpublished and CETA Supple 
mental MIS Tables by Initial Program Assignment, New Enrollees Dur 
ing October 1979-September 1980 (Employment and Training Adminis- 
tration, Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research, 1981).
1.7 percentage points. Similar weighting for differences in educational 
attainment and status would reduce the differential to 1.2 percentage 
points. Other factors were less critical but in the same pattern. 
Adjusting for sex of participants would reduce the placement differential 
by .4 percentage points while race would change it to .2 percentage 
points. 25/
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The thrust of this analysis is not to negate the value of PSIP over 
the long run, but simply to suggest that there is no reason to believe that 
the "private sector" linkage approach, using PICs, can make more than 
minimal changes in service levels and mixes. It may be able to "cream" 
and, hence, get more OJT placements, but it has not, by its achievements, 
demonstrated that linkages are major factors impeding involvement of 
employers in OJT or, if they are, that they can be successfully forged 
through Private Industry Councils. The payoff, instead, is simply more 
training because the funds are categorized for this purpose, and perhaps 
more payoff from the classroom training which is undertaken because it may 
come closer to employer standards so that private sector placements more 
often result for trainees.
Thus, if more training is desired in the CETA local programming mix, 
it appears that either set-asides or categorical approaches will achieve 
this outcome. The upward trend in CETA training in the last several years 
is almost totally explained by the increase in the vocational education 
set-aside, by the training requirement under PSE, by HIRE and STIP, and the 
new PSIP program. The choice among different set-aside and categorical 
approaches depends on the aim. The vocational education set-aside is an 
effective way to achieve more classroom training and to link with existing 
institutions, although the product may be "more of the same." There is a 
possibility of substitution, with prime sponsors reducing training ex 
penditures from locally-allocated funds if they get more from Governor's 
grants, but this does not appear to be a problem overall. Federal 
specification and leverage is apparently needed to produce longer-term, 
higher cost investments which yield higher placement rates but also serve 
the more employable segments of the eligible population. Process changes 
can be encouraged through set-asides such as PSIP which dictate insti 
tutional arrangements locally, although the short-term yield is apparently 
modest and limited to those areas and dimensions where process is really 
the problem. The earmarking of funds for specific purposes does not 
significantly alter the potentials for different approaches. For instance, 
there are apparently omy a suFset of state and local areas with the 
capacity or opportunity to mount long-duration intensive training programs, 
whether they are selected by competition as in STIP, or they seize 
initiative within broad flexibility as a few PICs have done under Title 
VII. Where the aim is to take advantage of targets of opportunity, the 
competitive approach may be best. Where the aim is to gradually change the 
system, the formula-funded categorical approach is probably better. 
Likewise, there are apparently no delivery alternatives or funding 
arrangements that can drastically increase the use of OJT as currently 
designed. It is hard to sell to employers, whether the marketer is an 
employee of a PIC or a prime sponsor staff. However, earmarking may make 
the local decisionmakers work harder to achieve specified goals by 
foreclosing the paths of least resistance, such as work experience when OJT 
cannot be marketed, or "other" classroom training when quality occupational 
training is not feasible.
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SECTION 4. 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION-LESSONS FROM JOB CORPS
In its history, philosophy, targeting, design, and management, Job 
Corps contrasts markedly with local CETA training efforts. These contrasts 
raise some important issues. While the transferrability of Job Corps 
approaches to a local setting is uncertain, the lessons are worth con 
sideration in light of the evidence concerning some of the shortcomings of 
local operations and decisionmaking.
Investing A Lot In Those Who Need It Most
The Job Corps offers comprehensive and intensive services to the 
hardest-to-employ segment of the CETA-eligible population—dropout youth 
from impoverished backgrounds who have limited or no work experience, 
minimal reading and math competencies, and frequently health or behavioral 
problems. Job Corps has not wavered from this mission and approach in 16 
years of operation.
Without question, separate categorization and national direction have 
led to greater targeting and more intensive investments. Among the 1.2 
million participants in local CETA nonsummer programs in fiscal 1979, less 
than one of every seven was a disadvantaged, dropout youth. Such in 
dividuals unquestionably needed training because their employability was so 
limited. Yet only a third were assigned to training (and only one in 
twenty to on-the-job training). The remainder were placed in work 
experience positions (despite the compelling evidence from supported work 
that out-of-school work experience has little or no impact on post-program 
employability). The classroom training slots locally were allocated to 




Training Job Corps 
1980 1980
Under age 22 42% 100% 
16 or under 7 25
Minority 51 69
High school dropout 39 86
Offender 7 19
Put another way, one of every three disadvantaged, dropout youth who 
received CETA authorized employment or training services in 1980 (other 
than summer only employment) was a Job Corps enrol lee even though Job Corps 
participants represented only 3 percent of all CETA entrants. The number 
of dropouts entering Job Corps in 1980 was half again the number of dropout
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youth entering classroom or on-the-job training as a primary activity under 
all local CETA programs. 26/
Differences in dropout rates and placement prospects may be reasons 
why prime sponsors choose not to serve dropout youth, but another factor is 
that they are unwilling to concentrate resources in order to make the sub 
stantial investment required to permanently increase employability. The 
total cost of Job Corps in fiscal 1980 was three-fifths higher than the 
service year cost of classroom training and almost two and a half times the 
service year cost of work experience. Given the average length of stay of 
6.0 months in Job Corps, 5.2 months in local classroom training, and 4.6 
months in work experience, each Job-Corps type enrollment was, thus, the 
equivalent of two classroom training positions, three work experience 
opportunities, six summer employment opportunities, or three school-to-work 
transition slots. There are more claimants than resources at the local 
level, and hence an understandable inclination in a politically-oriented 
delivery system to spread the loaves and fishes among the multitudes.
There are over 100 Job Corps centers and 484 prime sponsors. Job 
Corps studies suggest that the optimal center size is between 400 and 600 
enrollees, and that smaller centers experience severe diseconomies. Few 
prime sponsors serve enough disadvantaged dropout youth, of whom only a 
portion might want Job Corps treatment, to maintain a residential facility. 
During 1980, there were 1300 Job Corps recruits from New York city, 850 
from Baltimore and 340 from Detroit. 27/ A typical 500-bed center will 
have 1000 enrollees a year. In the rural poverty areas from which many of 
the recruits are drawn, state-operated residential facilities are a possi 
bility, but only a few of the states with Job Corps centers provide enough 
recruits to fill the centers located within the state; likewise, few of the 
states currently without centers recruit enough Corpsmembers to fill a 
400-600 enrol lee center if it were established.
There is also some question whether locally-based operations would be 
appropriate. Perhaps the most important element in a nationally-operated 
residential program is the inherent impact on mobility. All local training 
programs are based on training for jobs in the locality, and it is there 
that placements must be made. Funds are allocated on the basis of need so 
that training resources become concentrated where there are the fewest jobs 
to train for, as well as the greatest pressures to provide immediate aid 
for large numbers. Job Corps provides an exit route from ghettos, barrios 
and depressed rural areas. As noted previously, increased mobility is a 
major factor behind Corpsmembers 1 success. In the first 18 months post- 
program, 35 percent of 1977 Job Corps terminees moved between cities for 
job-related reasons and a total of 41 percent moved for some reason (ex 
cluding Job Corps moves). Among matched nonparticipants, the rates were 23 
and 24 percent, respectively. Other than the military (where enlistments 
increased from 5 percent to 9 percent as a result of Job Corps partici 
pation), there is no other institutional mechanism for achieving mobility 
offered by CETA. 28/
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Standards and Standardization
Another very important feature of Job Corps is the use of standardized 
competency-based curricula for basic and advanced education and world- 
of-work training, structured around standardized measurement and tracking 
frameworks for vocational and educational activities.
The Job Corps reading program is a self-paced individualized approach. 
Based on a 13 minute preliminary reading test, students can be identified 
as beginning readers (0-3.5 grade levels), intermediate readers (3.5 to 7.5 
grade level) or advanced readers (7.5 grades or higher). They are then 
provided more detailed tests to be placed in one of the eight levels in 
beginning reading or eight levels in the intermediate category (each equal 
to roughly half a school grade), and seven sublevels for those in advanced 
reading. There are separate unit and section tests at each level and, to 
advance, a participant must first pass the separate unit tests and then 
pass a level test. In each level, there are a variety of reading selec 
tions cross-referenced so that specific materials are prescribed depending 
on the specific problems identified in the tests. The mathematics program 
operates in the same way. The GED program, which serves students who 
achieve the 7.5 grade level or above, is based on the five subject areas of 
the GED. Each student is given a GED practice test and, based on scores on 
the five subtests, is assigned to individualized, self-paced units.
Using the detailed competency assessment and prescription system, Job 
Corps has been able to screen alternative educational materials and 
cross-reference them to the system, so that the best available in the 
private and public sectors can be utilized. Job Corps has also developed 
some of its own materials in order to fill the gaps. The reading and 
mathematics placement tests have been validated to other national tests 
such as the SAT and Gates reading tests, and have proven effective during 
years of applications. The documented learning gains of Corpsmembers in 
the reading and math programs dramatically exceed their own previous 
achievement rates, as well as school norms, providing proof that the Job 
Corps treatment works.
Given the evidence that existing remedial education approaches can 
increase the gain rates of the educationally disadvantaged, and that 
improvement up to credential able levels is necessary to realize a greater 
payoff in the labor market, it is significant that only a minority of 
participants with educational deficiencies are receiving remediation under 
local CETA programs and that the short-duration of participation in CETA 
limits the chances that those who receive education services will be able 
to advance to the certifiable high school equivalency. What would make 
sense is either to increase the length of stay in full-time educational 
components, or else to combine education and work or training activities in 
a way that a person participating in CETA at several different points could 
gradually progress towards a GED. The educational system in Job Corps— 
structured as an open-entry, open-exit system offered several hours a day 
in combination with other activities—could easily be adapted for use in 
remedial components integrated with local work activities. Furthermore, 
there is exciting potential for local delivery through the use of com 
puters. One of the experiments under Job Corps was a test of computer- 
assisted instruction (CAI)--where lessons were provided on a terminal
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linked to a minicomputer or on a stand-alone microcomputer, and computer- 
managed instruction (CMI)--where the diagnostic tests were taken on the 
terminal, the results analyzed by the computer, and the individual assigned 
to either computer-assisted lessons or printed materials. The reading gain 
scores of Corpsmembers who received CAI as a supplement to the traditional 
Job Corps materials were half-again the substantial gains of students in 
the regular reading programs. Where GED materials were provided through a 
CMI-CAI combination, the preparation times were substantially shortened. 
Attendance also increased. 29/ There were experiments with a network of 
terminals tied into a single" minicomputer in order to serve surrounding 
local communities or several Job Corps centers. Several prime sponsors 
have now mounted and are currently operating similar systems, with 
terminals provided to the schools capable of delivering a pre-screened set 
of CAI lessons, along with the written materials constituting the basic Job 
Corps reading and mathematics program. These have been supplemented by a 
competency-based world-of-work package, and several vocational training 
packages are being prepared which can be delivered in a combined CAI-CMI 
mode. Because of the rapid decline in minicomputer and terminal prices, 
and with the increased diversity of materials that are presently available, 
it is possible to delivery self-paced, individualized educational in 
struction and basic life skills training in any setting where there is a 
telephone to link a terminal to a central minicomputer, i.e, at almost any 
site where employment and training activities are taking place. Micro 
computers with parallel CAI lessons can be used whenever such minicomputer 
networks are infeasible. The costs of such offerings, particularly the 
marginal costs of adding extra terminals to minicomputer systems, are 
extremely low. They are further reduced when the management information 
system uses these same terminals and technical assistance for staff is 
provided along with CAI lessons for participants.
Vocational training in Job Corps is also competency based. Each 
occupation of training has a standardized Training Achievement Record which 
itemizes a hierarchy of skills and knowledge steps (Table 4.16). Each 
participant is judged on the basis of performance and knowledge relative to 
this hierarchy. The TAR is the framework for structuring individualized 
instruction so that each trainee can move at his or her own pace which is 
necessary because Job Corps is open entry and exit. Each center contractor 
develops its own vocational curriculum, but it must be structured to 
provide, as a minimum, the competencies outlined in the TAR. The TAR 
approach, thus, provides some standardization of the programs developed by 
diverse operators, as well as a way to measure and check the performance of 
training at different centers. With such a standardized framework, it is 
possible to interchange the materials developed at different centers. 
Individual performance can also be judged when Corpsmembers apply for 
advanced vocational courses. In some cases, particularly welding, the TAR 
has been used by employers to determine the skills and appropriate 
placements for terminees.
Most other dimensions of center operations are also subject to uniform 
guidelines specifying minimum components and qualitative standards. For 
instance, centers are required to provide a comprehensive medical examina 
tion within two weeks of entry. All Corpsmembers staying over 90 days are 
to receive dental examinations and appropriate treatments. The facilities
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Table 4.16
An Example of the Vocational Competency Assessment and 
Tracking Framework--The Training Achievement Record for Carpentry
TTTCS————————
Carp»nter, ConstructionSOCIAL SECURITY 
NO.
DATE TRAINEE EHTERED 
TRAINININC
A CM 11 PEHFORMANCE
I 3 J 4
1 Ptacuot safety oa th> job ..... ... ...... . . . ....... ., . . 4d
• 2. Kaow ud tu> aft pacuoi hudlmg toots, woodworking nucnbMry .... .... 4d
Ghasrai
3 Kaow aad imbnuad cuptBtat tnmLulofT ....................... *l
4. Us. "*** M**.m>m COCUDOQ hud IDOll .............»***.*. ....... Jc
5. Urn tad maintain ntuunaq tools ud •qulpraal .................... 5=
6. Un ud ""•""'" power optnud woodworking marhlrnt ............... 3c
7 R«*d. undtntand ud interpret buildup sketches .................... 2b
Fouadauaas. Walls, Floor* aad Sun
8. Lay out building linn and set cukn lor grading .................... Se
9 BuUd and plan straight ooocrtt. forms .... ..................... Sc
10. Lo>* up and brao* concnt. wallj tod columns .................. ... 3c
11. L«y out footui^i, bujld or plac* formi ud bna .................... 3c
12. Bxuld im^ulu coocnn forms ...... ....................... 3c
13. L^y out «nd cut sum 4nd tnuds; mstaU nfliags .................... 2b
fr*nw9 (Toundjoonj and VaillJ
14. Lay out ud fnnM tills ind fmltn............................. 5«
15. FnoM ud tH floor jo«> . ................................ 3c
16. Lay oat walls and paruuofls ................................. 3c
1? End valis aad paruuoiu .................................. 3c
18. imuB tiMMing ud ptuttr youadj ............................. 3c
Root* 
19 Fam. ud «t oonunon nftm................................ Sc
20. FOOM ud •! nlky nflin ................................. 3o
21 Fain, ud m hip nften .................................. 3o
22. FnuiM ud stt >ack ra/ren .................................. 3c
i3. Appty tlijaihnq, oomponuon AloqUi aad o(b«r typm of roof coming ....... 3c
Brunar >Uiwo/k 
24. DtttmuM comet tools ud -"' <*<«. tupolm for talk ................ 2b
li. Op«4it itill aw. dectnc dnll ud under ...... ................. 3c
26. Sn up and oocrau Unch aw . .... ....... ................. 3c
twtnor WaJ Cowing 
27 Apply wood co<«lDgi........... ......................... Jo
23. Apply composition. ibMt rock or ttbtr board ...................... So
29 lonall bavoouds ........ .......................... ... 3c
Floan
30 Uay cub-Hooruig ........ .................. . ......... 3c
31 Lay rub flooring . ....................... . Ic
32 Build And plan forms for concnt. floors .... .............. . 3c
lourjor fiAuh
33 Cut and Dl baj. ud mouldings . . . ...................... . Jc
34 S4| door jambs, Hi and rung doors . .................... .... 3c
35 Fit and hang windows . ................................ Jc
36 Fit and fania hardwar* . ...,......,,,....,,.......... Jc
Rtmootltnq
37 Install aluminum aad nnyl siding .... . ......... ........... Jc
M. Install comouuuon norm windows and doors .......... ... ... . . Jc
39 Lay nrw tooling maintals . . . . . . ..................... Jc
40. Install aluminum porch tndosurcs. awnings, pauo covtn . . ...... 3c
41. Install m«ul porch rails and stair mil . . ...... Jc
42. Iniull o*rfhfaa qar*g< coori ano ragic^controlled ttirag* door opener 3c
COUCATIOH TtCHNICAI. KNOXLf OCE-JOB PHYSICAL PROFILl
1 Us. mitrucuoru fumuhcd in wntien, oral, diagram or schedule form . . . . , 
2. Us. anthmcuc. apply practical alegrbn and geomltry . . . . . .
3 Rtad and innrpnt ttchmcal maittvali . . . ...... ........... d
4 Prvpan npom and summanci. conforming to good English usag* . . . . .
1. Abl« to Uft 50 Ibs. mammum, carry to 2i Ibs, walk and stand conODuoully . . ,
2. Abl. to cumb and us. back muacl.f and 1*93 to stoop, knt«l. crouch, crawl
3. Abl. to ua fingers, hands, arms to nach, handl., fe«l . . . .....
4. Abl* to SM «fficuntly. . . ... .................
5. Work both mdoon and outdoon when physical hazards udst ..........
Source: Employment and Training Administration, Office of Job Corps and Young 
Adult Conservation Corps.
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on center or those secured under contract must meet very specific re 
quirements covering such things as the number and types of dental chairs, 
x-ray equipment, nursing personnel, and the like. Information on medical 
facilities utilization and costs are required in detail each quarter and 
are used as a management tool. In addition, medical experts review each 
center once a year to determine the adequacy of treatment. Likewise, there 
are standards for the food served at centers specifying the number of 
entrees, vegetables, and calories at each meal. There are guidelines 
concerning the types of recreational activities which must be provided, as 
well as for counseling and psychiatric assistance, and student government. 
The financial and activity reports for each Job Corps center provide 
detailed statistics on most of these dimensions, and there is top-to-bottom 
on-site review each year by a team of federal personnel to assess 
compliance with qualitative and quantitative standards for each component. 
In other words, maintenance of these minimum standards can be and usually 
are assured by federal monitoring.
Standardization of minimum components also means that performance can 
be meaningfully assessed from a few key indicators. In comparison to prime 
sponsor operations which consist of an incredible melange of activities 
provided to a diverse participant group with enormous variability in the 
match-ups of service types and clients from prime sponsor to prime sponsor, 
the variance in participants and treatments from center to center is quite 
modest. Thus, comparison of centers according to performance indicators is 
much more meaningful. For instance, there is no question that longer stay 
in Job Corps is associated with greater post-program gains, so that length 
of treatment is a reasonable indicator of impact (as long as it is assured, 
as it is by regulation and monitoring, that Corpsmembers are free to exit 
if they choose). In contrast, long stay in a work experience, job search 
assistance, or even an ESL component under a prime sponsor's operation may 
not be desirable. In centers where beds need to be filled and student- 
teacher ratios are established to achieve maximum efficiency, the capacity 
utilization rate is a meaningful indicator of performance. In contrast, 
prime sponsors may be operating programs with large fluctuations in 
enrollments, as witnessed by the utilization figures in the school-to-work 
transition projects cited earlier, yet these fluctuations are averaged out 
in the aggregated, quarterly data for the prime sponsor and there is no way 
to determine utilization of available resources. Since Job Corps re 
cruitment and placement activities are usually outside the aegis of the 
center, the placement results, on average, tend to reflect the quality of 
treatment on center; in contrast, good placement results for a prime 
sponsor might result from creaming of participants or a job access emphasis 
which masks ineffective treatments. Thus, where a center differs sub 
stantially from Job Corps norms concerning duration of stay, capacity 
utilization, or placement, there is reasonable certainty that a problem 
exists. A one- or two-month rise in the weekly termination rate of a 
center will usually tell as much as a ream of CETA management information 
system reports from a prime sponsor.
This is suggested by comparison of some of Job Corps and CETA 
performance indicators. As noted previously, the coefficients of variation 
for prime sponsor Title IIBC performance indicators in 1980 (i.e., the 
standard deviation in the indicator divided by the mean for all prime 




Plan/actual OJT enrollment 56.4
Plan/actual classroom training enrollment 35.2
OJT cost per participant 61.7
Classroom training cost per participant 43.7
Cost per placement 70.3
Entered employment rate 35.3
These might be compared with the coefficients of variation for the 




Weekly termination rate 19.4
Capacity utilization rate 4.7
Placement rate 4.2
Moreover, it is possible to get immediate corrective action, par 
ticularly in the case of contract centers where poorly performing operators 
can be replaced. Among the ten centers ranked lowest on each of the four 
Job Corps indicators in fiscal 1978, half had moved out of the bottom ten 
for each particular indicator by fiscal 1979. In three-fourths of the 
cases performance on the relevant indicator improved noticeably from one 
year to the next. 30/
Contracting for Management
Most prime sponsors utilize contract delivery agents, but the over 
whelming majority of such agents are not-for-profit groups. A few prime 
sponsors contract for delivery of whole segments of their operations, such 
as youth programs, to community groups, but the prime sponsor usually 
retains management responsibility. In Job Corps, both management and 
delivery may be contracted, and frequently the contractor is a private- 
for-profit operator. In 1979 there were 53 contract centers in addition to 
the 35 conservation centers operated by the Departments of Interior and 
Agriculture on federal land (plus two centers in Puerto Rico operated by 
the Commonwealth); among the contract centers, 43 were operated by 
private-for-profit groups. 31/ Over the life of the Job Corps a number of 
major U.S. corporations have served as managing agents, including Litton 
Industries, Packard-Bell Electronics Corporation, Teledyne, General 
Electric, Burroughs, Thiokol, Philco-Ford, Westinghouse, Bendix, RCA, AVCO, 
and Singer. In recent years, several smaller and minority-owned firms have 
also become center operators.
Managing and delivery agents are selected by a competitive process. 
Each contract center is competitively bid every two years, although a 
contract may be extended for a third year if operations are adequate, or
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rebid before two years if performance is totally inadequate. In the early 
years of Job Corps, many companies were involved because of federal 
pressure or to demonstrate corporate citizenship. Not surprisingly, there 
was a high turnover among contractors. In the 1970s, this turnover 
declined as the corporations which remained active developed expertise and 
extended operations to multiple sites. From 1976 to 1980, there were only 
three cases where rebidding led to changes in for-profit contractors of 
particular centers, compared to 7 changes between 1971 and 1976. However, 
there have been frequent changes in the staffs of particular centers, in 
response to poor performance and under threat of losing out in the next 
competition. Private sector contractors are able to fire personnel more 
easily than the public sector operators as well as to shift individuals to 
centers where their talents can be most effectively utilized. Most of the 
contractors also achieve economies of scale and standardization of 
offerings through management and operation of multiple sites. For 
instance, in 1979, Thiokol managed four centers, RCA managed eleven, Singer 
managed nine, Teledyne five, and AVCO five.
The cost of private sector participation includes a fee—usually 4 
percent of the center's operating expenses—and a government approved 
administration and overhead rate. In 1977, fees and overhead amounted to 
10 percent of center operating costs per Corpsmember year in contract 
centers, or 7.5 percent of the total Corpsmember year costs including 
allowances, recruitment and placement, transportation, union contracts, and 
federal administration. 32/
The performance of the contract centers can be compared with that of 
conservation centers, operated by the Departments of Interior and Agri 
culture. These conservation centers are generally smaller and have a lower 
female enrollment than contract centers, so that economies of scale cannot 
be as easily achieved. The conservation center costs also include work 
project expenses, which are offset by output. Finally, unions operate 
training programs in the conservation centers under national contracts. 
Adding the union costs and subtracting the higher work project costs per 
Corpsmember, the average expenditure in conservation centers in 1977 was a 
sixth above that in the contract centers, without counting the extra 
federal overhead in the Departments of Agriculture and Interior. The 
evidence from the 18-month follow-up of male enrollees suggests that after 
adjusting for size of centers, location, coed status, race, age, and high 
school status of enrol less, that the employment increases from pre- 
enrollment to the week prior to follow-up were 17 percent for contract 
center enrollees and 11 percent for conservation center enrollees. Among 
terminees, the portion who reported that the training had helped in 
obtaining at least one job was 27 percent for participants in contract 
center compared to 24 percent for participants in conservation centers. 33/ 
If the figures on union placements are at all accurate, the union operated 
programs in conservation centers must account for a substantial share of 
the placements, and conservation centers enrollees who do not participate 
in these programs apparently do not fare well.
Within contract centers, the performance of for-profit contractors can 
be compared with the performance of public and nonprofit contractors in 
cluding state and local education departments, community-based organi 
zations, and special-purpose groups such as the Texas Education Foundation.
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While there are no data on the costs of public and nonprofit versus 
private-for-profit operators in contract centers, the limited evidence from 
the Job Corps impact study is that participants in publicly-run contract 
centers do better in terms of post-program employment and earnings, all 
else being equal. 34/ In part this may reflect the effects of competition 
which results when there are viable alternatives. There has been turnover 
in public and nonprofit contractors: two centers run by public contractors 
were closed, and managing agents in two other cases were changed between 
1971 and 1976. Another change occurred in 1978 when an otherwise effective 
public contractor chose not to rebid, because with the rise in public 
salaries, it could no longer operate within Job Corps cost limits. Most of 
the public and nonprofit contractors were able to hire staff outside local 
civil service procedures so that they had many of the advantages of for- 
profits. Some also operated multiple centers, achieving economies of 
scale. Thus, while the evidence suggests that there is no magic in private 
sector management per se, competitive contracting assures options in the 
case of poor performance and some incentives to maintain the performance of 
staff as well as flexibilities to replace operators if they are not 
adequate.
Many CETA programs have smaller annual budgets and no more complicated 
operations than large Job Corps centers. The use of private sector 
management agents working under contract to local units of government might 
improve performance in some areas or at least provide needed options. 
Administrative costs now average nearly a fifth of expenditures under local 
CETA programs, and have skyrocketed since the advent of "cost-pooling" 
which allowed prime sponsors to take a cut off the top of allocations under 
each title with very little accounting for outlays. It appears that 
private sector fees and overhead would not represent any significant cost 
increase and might help to achieve greater effectiveness in some cases. 
Certainly this approach is worth trying where prime sponsors have performed 
unacceptably as managers.
Opportunity Ladders
The fundamental approach of CETA local programs is to provide work, 
training, or other services for a limited period, and then to place the 
participant as soon as possible into a job. Job Corps, from its inception, 
has aimed to provide comprehensive, individualized, self-paced human 
resource development activities over an extended treatment period in order 
to assure each participant the opportunity to advance as far and as fast as 
possible. Job Corps has also sought to provide as many training and 
education options as feasible so that the needs of each individual can be 
accommodated. One of the inherent advantages in having a national network 
of centers, and provision for transportation and residency, is that it 
permits specialization in training at specific centers to service par 
ticipants with special interests and abilities drawn from all centers. 
While the range of basic Job Corps vocational offerings are roughly the 
same from center to center, advanced programs have been instituted at 
various centers which focus on reclamation, solar energy, marine trades, 
high level automotive mechanics, clerical training for the transportion 
industries, and computer training. Additionally, certain centers have 
developed special adaptations of education and other programs in order to
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deal with special needs segments of the eligible population such as 
handicapped youth and the learning disabled, Indochinese refugees, single 
parents and the like.
The Advanced Career Employment and Training Program (ACET) is the most 
ambitious of the "quantum leap" training efforts. Under a contract with 
the Job Corps, Control Data Corporation (CDC) trains Corpsmembers as 
computer operators and customer engineers. Trainees are selected from Job 
Corps centers throughout the nation. To be eligible for this advanced 
program, the Corpsmembers must have participated at least three months in 
regular centers and have attained an eighth grade reading level and a GED 
or high school diploma. CDC tests are also used to determine interest and 
ability, with the highest scorers placed in customer engineer training, the 
more advanced of the offerings.
The training occurs at the Control Data Institute in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, and the work experience assignments are within CDC branches 
around the country. The computer operator training component is eight 
months and the customer engineer training 14 months. Trainees utilize the 
PLATO computer-based education system developed by CDC and the University 
of Illinois. This system provides self-paced, individualized instruction 
so that more capable students can move more rapidly through training. The 
courses cover remedial education, electronics, binary math, computer logic, 
the fundamentals of data processing and computer equipment. During the 
period of training, Corpsmembers receive full Job Corps benefits including 
room and board, training and counseling, transportation, a clothing 
allowance, and other special services. The training is followed by 
full-time subsidized internships for up to one year, but less if the 
trainee becomes fully productive earlier. During the internships, the 
trainees are responsible for their own support but receive the entry salary 
for customer engineers ($1083 monthly in 1980) or computer operators ($885 
monthly). Jobs are then guaranteed by the Control Data Corporation for all 
completers. The guarantee stipulates a minimum beginning salary ($12,000 
for customer engineers in 1980 and $9,300 for computer operators). The 
occupations of training were selected because of the availability of 
employment opportunities but also the salary progressions experienced by 
previous trainees. Annual salaries for customer engineers in CDC in 1980 
ranged from $12,000 to $28,000, and those for computer operators from 
$9,300 to $14,400. The usual entering employee in these fields experienced 
a real increase in salary of at least a fifth over two years.
The first cohort of ACET trainees entered in March 1979. Of the 113 
participants 90 completed—an incredibly low dropout rate compared to the 
overall Job Corps program. The rate of progress through training was 
faster than expected, and the needed internship period proved to be less 
than a year. The significance of the Corpsmember success rate is suggested 
by the fact that enrollments in regular Control Data Corporation training 
programs are predominantly persons with 2 years of college or more in the 
case of customer engineer training, or high achievers among high school 
graduates for computer operator training. Prior to ACET, the Control Data 
Institute trained almost no individuals with the disadvantaged background 
of the Corpsmember participants, and the chances for these individuals 
getting into such growing job areas in the absence of ACET would otherwise 
have been nonexistent.
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Such advanced training in corporate facilties is expensive, with a 
comprehensive cost for the first cohort of trainees of almost $20,000 for 
each completing computer operator and $33,000 for a customer engineer. The 
subsidized internship accounted for half of the cost in the first case, and 
two-fifths in the latter. Since this was an experimental program involving 
start-up costs and uncertainties about the abilities of disadvantaged young 
people to complete training, the costs were high. Under the extension of 
ACET, per slot costs were reduced by about a fifth in real terms, including 
a shortening of the internship period, but the pricetag for customer 
engineer training remains more than four times the per participant cost of 
Job Corps and ten times the per participant cost of local classroom 
training. Is such an investment warranted?
Based on normal salary projections and the placement rates of the 
first ACET participants, the full cost would be recouped in state and 
federal taxes within six years and the training costs net of the internship 
in less than three years for computer operators and less than four for 
customer engineers. 35/ Completers in Job Corps who participated in 1977 
(and did not enter the armed forces) averaged roughly $5000 in annual 
earnings over the first two years out of the program, or a gain of 
approximately $1250 over controls. 36/ The average annual earnings of ACET 
completers were roughly $11,500. Net gains relative to controls could, 
thus, have been as much as $7250 annually, which would cover the extra cost 
(as judged from a social benefit-cost perspective) in just three years. 
Moreover, because the training occupations were selected on the basis of 
career potential, the relative payoffs are likely to increase over the 
years. In other words, even these crude calculations suggest that the 
advanced training, despite its high pricetag, was cost-effective compared 
to regular Job Corps programming (which itself was cost-effective), at 
least for the minority of Corpsmembers who had greater potential.
Advanced training is also provided in union-affiliated programs oper 
ated mainly in conservation centers but also in some contract and special 
centers. In fiscal 1979, the union programs accounted for 12 percent of 
all training in Job Corps, including programs with the carpenters, brick 
layers, plasterers and cement masons, painters, operating engineers, rail 
way and airline clerks, autoworkers, and the Appalachian Council. These 
programs have higher entry standards, taking only those Corpsmembers who 
have performed in regular training, and in some cases requiring a GED or 
diploma as well as a minimum age. Only 40 percent of entrants complete 
union training (compared to over half of persons staying more than 90 days 
in regular center training programs) although half of the noncompleters are 
transferred into less demanding nonunion Job Corps training. But among 
graduates in 1979, two-thirds were placed in training related jobs and 15 
percent in school or the military, with the unions handling these place 
ments. This contrasts favorably with the Job Corps-reported 40 percent 
training-related placement rate for all completers. Moreover, the average 
wage of union-trained participants who were placed in 1979 was 70 percent 
above the average for all Job Corps-recorded placements. 37/
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Linking to the Employment and Training System
Because Job Corps is an expensive, comprehensive treatment in a 
residential setting, it is important from both a cost and effectiveness 
standpoint that enrollees really need this type of approach, will stay long 
enough to benefit, and cannot be as effectively served in alternative 
treatments. The legislation specifies that recruits must be living in an 
environment "so characterized by deprivation, a disrupted homelife, or 
other disrupting conditions as to substantially hinder prospects for 
successful participation in other programs providing needed training, 
education, or assistance." Job Corps must determine through a screening 
process that recruits "have the present capabilities and aspirations needed 
to complete and secure the full benefit of Job Corps and to be free of 
medical and behavioral problems so serious that the individual could not 
adjust to the standards of conduct, discipline, work and training which the 
Job Corps involves."
While roughly 5 percent of Job Corps enrollments nationwide are non- 
residential participants, and while some of the residential participants 
are drawn from nearby communities, most Job Corps enrol lees are some 
distance from their homes. For many, this is the first mobility oppor 
tunity and this is unquestionably a positive experience on average—as 
witnessed by the changes in behavior and attitudes and increases in 
subsequent mobility. Nevertheless, it creates a disjuncture and a re 
adjustment problem upon Job Corps termination. All participants are to 
receive placement services. Terminees must, in fact, check in with 
designated placement agencies in their home community or area of relocation 
in order to receive their readjustment allowances. But the low employment 
and earnings rates of Corpsmembers relative to controls in the first two 
post-program months document that the transition is difficult for some.
Ideally, then, Job Corps should be closely linked to local CETA 
activities. The prime sponsors presumably have a large pool of dropout 
youth from which they can choose those best served by Job Corps in light of 
knowledge about alternative treatments. Presumably also, the local 
operators would be best situated to arrange for placement and transitional 
assistance when the participants return from Job Corps. Unfortunately, 
such commonsense linkages have not been forged.
Job Corps is a nationally-operated program. Working primarily through 
the federal/state Employment Service plus nationwide groups such as Women 
in Community Service (WICs), and Joint Action for Community Service (JACs), 
Job Corps maintains a separate system for recruiting, screening and 
placement. While the Employment Service has offices everywhere in the 
nation, it is responsible for local employment and training activities in 
only a minority of areas. Moreover, Job Corps does not benefit from the 
use of existing capacity. Job Corps must pay for services at roughly $250 
per head for recruiting, screening, and subsequent placement! In 
Employment Service offices, there are separately funded personnel solely 
responsible for recruiting and placement; frequently they operate in 
relative isolation from other Employment Service activities.
Critics of Job Corps have focused on the recruiting and placement 
aspects of the program as its weak link. One charge is that many youth
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enter Job Corps who could be better served in community treatments or do 
not need Job Corps treatment, so that the money is wasted. This is 
supported by the charge that the recruiters sometimes coerce or mislead 
candidates in order to fill quotas and receive payments. 38/ There are 
several rather compelling counterarguments. First, the demographic profile 
of Job Corps recruits has changed hardly at all in the last 16 years, and 
it is self-evident that the overwhelming majority of enrollees face serious 
barriers to employment and need help. Indeed, the major change in re 
cruiting and screening procedures in the last decade has been dis 
continuance of detailed screening on the basis of criminal records because 
it is no longer possible to gather this information in many states and 
localities. These records were used to screen out those not considered 
likely candidates. Second, the evidence does not support the notion that 
there are a profusion of options. The previously cited enrollment figures 
document that training opportunities for dropout youth in local CETA pro 
grams are meager. The experiences of the control group selected to assess 
the net impacts of Job Corps in 1977 suggest what would have occurred if 
Corpsmembers had remained in their communities. On average, over the two 
years of tracking, only 3 percent of the controls at any time were enrolled 
in CETA programs and less than 4 percent were enrolled in any work or 
training program. Less than 4 percent were in vocational and technical 
school or some alternative school, while 8 percent were, on average, 
reenrolled in high school. 39/ Third, Job Corps recruits largely seek out 
this program rather than being pressured into application, i.e., they are 
self-selected not shanghied. Among 1977 recruits, 63 percent first heard 
about Job Corps from friends or relatives, 11 percent from advertisements 
or news articles, and 5 percent from schools. Only 17 percent first heard 
about the program from the Employment Service or a probation officer. Most 
then went to the Employment Service to get more information. They entered 
Job Corps primarily for job training, to get a job, or because they could 
not find work (71 percent noted these as the primary reasons), or else to 
get a GED or education (50 percent). Only 5 percent reported enrollment in 
order to stay out of trouble or because of a court decision, while 29 
percent cited reasons such as self-improvement, getting away from home, 
nothing better to do, or the attraction of the allowance. Significantly, 
nine of ten enrollees subsequently rated the characteristics of Job Corps 
training and education about the same as or above expectations; and eight 
of ten gave the same rating to recreational and social characteristics of 
the program. The only aspects where the program proved less than expected 
were the food (hardly a surprising complaint, whether among Corpsmembers or 
college students) and the allowance. 40/ The latter should not have 
occurred, since allowance policies are quite specific. Therefore, Job 
Corps prepared a simple brochure explaining all aspects of Job Corps 
including pay and allowances, rights, responsibility, and chances of 
securing training of choice. This must now be provided to every recruit, 
and presented orally to those who cannot read. The recruit must then 
indicate in writing that he or she understands all the information. Books 
are also provided to recruiters showing pictures of centers and detailing 
the training possibilities. In other words, it is unlikely that there is 
much false advertising in recruiting, if there ever was.
This does not alter the fact, however, that there are youth in the 
eligible population, and certainly many who apply to local CETA programs, 
who have more need for Job Corps treatment than some of those who enter.
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If Job Corps recruited from a unified local system, and particularly from 
prime sponsors who, rather than the Employment Service, usually allocate 
local employment and training opportunities, Job Corps opportunities might 
be distributed more equitably and efficiently. Certainly Job Corps should 
not be paying for recruiting and screening to the Employment Service when 
CETA and the Employment Service have their hands on and are not now 
adequately serving large numbers of disadvantaged youth.
The charges against Job Corps placement efforts are much more on 
target, although the object of criticism is usually the reporting system 
rather than the placement activities per se. The Job Corps system is, 
indeed, misleading (although steps have been taken to improve it). In 
fiscal 1978, for instance, there were 44,900 terminations. Placement 
status was recorded for only 32,300, of whom 2300 were ill, incarcerated, 
or females with full-time family responsibilities and therefore considered 
"not available for placement." Of the remaining 30,000, 93 percent were 
reported as "placed" including 20,500 who entered eployment, 6000 in 
education and training programs, and 1,400 who entered the armed 
forces. 41/ A Job Corps placement is, therefore, more like a positive 
termination than a placement in the CETA management information system. In 
CETA, the individuals not followed-up at termination are counted as not 
placed and as nonpositive terminations so that they reduce the positive 
termination rate, whereas in Job Corps they are subtracted from the 
denominator which increases the reported rate. Only recently have time 
limits been placed on how long after termination the labor market status 
must be reported. The placement records for fiscal 1978 would suggest a 66 
percent employment rate at the point in time the placement status was 
noted. In contrast, the follow-up data on 1977 Job Corps participants 
found that the employment rate of those not in the military averaged 41 
percent during the first year after termination. 42/
Yet the real issue is not just whether placement claims are mis 
leading, but whether placement services are offered and whether they are 
effective. In the first-year follow-up of 1977 Corpsrnembers, three of five 
reported that they had not had any placement contact with Job Corps 
personnel or any agency referred to them by Job Corps, including JACS and 
WICS or the Employment Service. Three-fourths of Corpsmembers claimed they 
could have used additional help in finding a job. Among those with a 
placement contact, only 43 percent reported a successful placement as a 
result, representing less than one in five terminees. Considering that the 
Employment Service was paid on a per capita basis for placement services 
and its contracts covered the preponderance of terminees, it is shocking 
that only one in ten Corpsmembers reported that they got a job through the 
Employment Service. 43/
Where advanced career training is provided, or where the Job Corps 
center is serving youth from nearby areas, it would be appropriate for the 
training agent or center operator to be responsible for placement. 
However, in most cases the responsibility should be with the local employ 
ment and training system from which the participant was referred or to 
which he or she is returning. Only if the system has responsibility for 
recruitment can it also be expected to have responsibility for placement. 
This will only occur if it gets credit in the CETA MIS for recruitment and 
placement, and probably only if quotas are set. Unless the prime sponsor
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understands and tracks the Job Corps treatment, it will be unable to make 
an appropriate placement. In other words, the nationally-administered Job 
Corps needs to be integrated on the recruiting and placement ends, with 
local CETA programs. Any nationally-directed training activity will have 
to pay attention to such linkages so that there are not a crazy-quilt of 
institutions competing for recruits and subsequent placements in each labor 
market.
Is Longer Training Feasible?
Job Corps has disproportionately greater impacts on long stayers and 
completers. All studies of Job Corps over the years have reached this same 
conclusion. There have been efforts, therefore, to increase the duration 
of stay. Since the Job Corps serves a volatile population which is the 
least likely to make and follow-through on long-term commitments, the 
experience in this regard has implications for local training.
It appears that the duration of stay is policy manipulable. The 
average stay has improved steadily since the early days of Job Corps—from 
a mean of 4.3 months averaged in 1966 and 1967 to 4.8 months in fiscal 
1975, and 6.0 months in fiscal 1980. The latter figure is rather re 
markable. The Job Corps was in the midst of a doubling of center capacity 
in 1980. In the past, high turnover rates had been experienced whenever 
new centers were opened. The improvement in fiscal 1980 was achieved even 
though new center enrollment represented a third of on-board strength.
There are four principal ways in which the recent and longer-term 
improvement was accomplished. First, a conscious effort was exerted to 
reduce the transhipment of youth and to keep them as close to home as 
possible. Leave poliies were also changed to permit more frequent visits. 
This probably accounted for improvements in duration of stay in the late 
1960s, although the closing of a number of centers in the early 1970s 
increased the average distance from home and, therefore, was a negative or 
certainly not positive, factor in the 1970s. The new centers established 
in 1979 and 1980 were consciously planned to achieve a better geographic 
distribution, so that this may have been a positive, albeit modest factor 
in the 1980 improvement.
Second, a performance system was implemented in 1976 to judge both 
center operators and regional Department of Labor Job Corps personnel 
according to the weekly termination, capacity utilization and completion 
rates averaged in centers (in addition to the placement rates). This 
unquestionably had an affect on the 1977-1980 improvements.
Third, Job Corps allowances are structured to reward enrollees who 
remain and perform well in the program. At the beginning of fiscal 1980 
the incentives were increased as allowances in Job Corps were doubled. 
Enrollees in centers 0-60 days are paid $40 monthly, with automatic 
increases to $60 per month for 61-180 days in center and to $80 monthly 
after 180 days. There are rules for denying the automatic increase for bad 
behavior, and there are rewards of up to an extra $20 monthly for exemplary 
performance (with restrictions on the percentage of total center enrollees 
who can be rewarded). When enrollees leave the center and return home,
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they are provided readjustment allowances of $75 for each month of par 
ticipation if they have remained less than six months, but $100 for each 
month beyond this. If they have stayed more than 271 days, they receive 
the $100 for all months of participation. 44/ There is no doubt that these 
incentives have had some effect on length of stay. This was particularly a 
factor when pay and allowances were increased in September 1979. In the 
prior year, the weekly termination rate in Job Corps averaged 3.7 percent. 
In the year after, it averaged only 3.5 percent despite predicted increases 
as a result of the opening of new centers. 45/
Fourth, the expansion of advanced career training offerings in Job 
Corps increased the length of stay both because these are open only to 
Corpsmembers who have stayed more than 90 days and performed well in the 
core center programs, and because they have a scheduled longer duration 
with clear job and earnings payoffs at the end of the line. An an example, 
in 1977 a program was introduced to place a yearly average of between 1250 
and 1500 Job Corps youth in individualized career-oriented program in 
colleges and post-secondary vocational schools where they would receive 
full Job Corps support, services and allowances. To be eligible, youth had 
to be in Job Corps for 90 days and had to have secured a GED or high school 
diploma. Three-fifths of Corpsmembers in the centers from which the 
first-year enrollees were selected indicated that they would stay longer in 
order to take advantage of the college option, and, in fact, completion 
rates in GED programs rose noticeable in these "feeder" centers. 
Corpsmembers who were selected for this program achieved the same grade and 
retention levels as other entering students in the institutions to which 
they were assigned. Over two-thirds returned the next year. Thus, the 
retention rate past the 90-day point was substantially greater for those 
ACT participants than for regular center enrollees. 46/ Because all the 
advanced programs together account for only a sixth of Job Corps en 
rollments, the extra length of stay of participants has a diluted effect on 
overall duration of stay but there is no doubt that expansion of these 
offerings has been a positive factor in the last several years. The lesson 
is that when meaningful "quantum leap" programs are provided, at least a 
minority of even the most disadvantaged youth are willing and able to 
complete long-term training when they can clearly see the benefits.
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THE END OF AN ERA
During two decades of extraordinary growth, employment and training 
activities targeted for those at the end of the labor queue enjoyed broad 
consensus and support. Prior to 1979, the upward climb in real expendi 
tures was interrupted by only three years of modest retrenchment. There 
was sporadic debate about countercyclical vs. structural goals, emphasis 
shifted between different intervention strategies and target groups, 
federal and local responsibilties were periodically realigned, but the 
underlying programmatic elements, in their design and delivery, remained 
relatively consistent.
A manpower program savant of the late 1960s returning to the delivery 
level after a decade's absence would have noticed the increased scale of 
activities, a greater diversity of delivery agents, better institutional 
relations and less friction, as well as more women and college graduates 
delivering services and making decisions. Probably the biggest shock would 
have been the legions of monitors and the mountains of paper. Yet under 
neath these trappings, the services offered would have been recognizable— 
in quite a few cases, provided by the same local delivery agents in the 
same settings and sometimes by the same people whose thinking had changed 
little over the years. Classroom training remained a short-term inter 
vention preparing for entry-level jobs, operating for the most part without 
standardized curricula, competency standards, or qualitative input re 
quirements, and providing few opportunities for the acquisition of skills 
or credentials that could be expected to improve lifetime prospects. 
Income maintenance continued as major element, attracting some to training 
who only wanted the money, fostering retention even when participants 
performed poorly. Local training was, as in the past, focused on local 
opportunities, so that the areas with disproportionate funding based on 
need were burdened by attempts to prepare participants for and to place 
them in scarce local jobs. OJT was, as always, a preferred approach most 
difficult to market other than to employers at the lowest levels in the 
primary economy, and sometimes those simply wanting cheap labor. The 
observer would not have been surprised by the "creaming" in OJT, and the 
reluctance of delivery agents to risk the precious few slots on the 
"hardest of the hard core." Neither would he have been shocked by the 
ignorance of the delivery agent about what was really occurring at OJT 
training sites. A trip to the typical Job Corps center would have evoked a 
sense of d£ja vu, particularly if the center were one of the many which had 
continued in operation since the early days. Job Corps was a good design 
from conception and it kept the faith, improving efficiency by trimming 
some excesses, weathering occasional political and publicity storms, but 
gradually gaining acceptance as one of the Great Society programs that 
worked.
Returning from the delivery level to the ivory tower, the manpower 
savant might have been overwhelmed by the volume of the literature and the 
sophistication of econometric techniques, and somewhat bemused by the 
investment of so much to learn so little new, but the findings themselves 
offered no surprises. Recent evidence has confirmed the conclusions from 
past studies that training efforts are worthwhile—increasing earnings of
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those who participate and paying off modestly as a social investment. Yet 
this payoff is achieved without dramatically improving the status of very 
many participants, without noticeably affecting the functioning of the 
economy, and despite some obvious and persistent shortcomings.
What has changed over the last two decades is the consensus that 
supported expansion and the faith that new initiatives or better management 
would necessarily improve performance. At the end of the 1970s, there was, 
for the first time, a substantial reversal of the long-term growth trend. 
While public criticism focused on employment components, doubts were raised 
about the entire system, and, indeed, the entire mission. For the first 
time, a significant body of opinion questioned whether we could live 
without such activities, rather than proposing modifications or al 
ternatives.
If our modern day Rip Van Winkle returns a decade hence, what will he 
find? Given the current mood of social welfare retrenchment, there may be 
little left to justify" a return visit. More likely, considering the 
inertia of politics and institutions, business will continue as usual, 
albeit on a reduced scale, as the employment and training system, like 
welfare, proves too beneficial to completely eliminate but too entrenched 
or costly to reform. It is also possible, and certainly to be hoped, that 
today's challenges will prove constructive rather than destructive, and 
that rational analysis and reasoned debate will lead to the emergence of a 
new system, building on the lessons of the past and its institutional 
foundations, but designed to meet some very different needs that can be an 
ticipated in the years ahead.
The decisions in the immediate future will largely determine which of 
these scenarios prevails, since the Comprehensive Employment and Training 
Act is subject to reauthorization in 1982, coincident with the reauthori 
zation of vocational education. Defenders of the present system who argue 
for finetuning, critics who seek to wipe the slate clean and leave it that 
way, as well as visionaries with commitment to building a new system, can 
all agree on the need for a careful and objective assessment of present 
performance, reexamination and resolution of underlying issues which have 
largely been unquestioned since the beginning of employment and training 
programs, as well as discussion of the long-term goals.
The reams of facts and figures synthesized in the preceding analysis 
and summarized here serve as one component of such a comprehensive review. 
The following interpretations of the evidence, discussions of the issues, 
proposals for the long-term, and recommendations for next steps are based 
on this evidence. Other interpretations, normative judgments, immediate 
policy prescriptions and future visions are possible, indeed probable, 
using the same information. Nevertheless, the facts and figures should not 
be ignored in decisionmaking. Some gainsayers claim we know too little to 
reach reasoned judgments—that there is no proof about what works and why, 
or even whether anything works. Such claims have dubious merit. Few 
social welfare activities have been scrutinized as thoroughly as employment 
and training programs, and few can provide equally compelling documentation 
of their positive impacts. The reliability of the evidence varies, but 
most findings can be confirmed from several different sources. The problem 
is not the availability, but the profusion of information, and the 
challenge is to make sense of it all.
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SECTION 2.
TRAINING AND ITS IMPACTS— 
A SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS
Recipes for the "Leftovers"
There were five and a half million individuals in the labor force 50 
weeks or more in 1980 whose employment and earnings problems were so 
serious that their wages and salaries, even when combined with earnings of 
other workers in their families, were below the poverty level. There were 
fifteen million who did not earn the equivalent of the minimum wage for the 
hours and weeks each was willing and able to work. Economic growth and 
tight labor markets have modest effects on the structural problems of these 
low earners, totally and intermittently unemployed, involuntarily part-time 
and discouraged workers. There will be, under any foreseeable economic 
scenario, millions of "leftovers" who lack education, skills, experience, 
equal opportunity, or good fortune.
There are several options for dealing with these "leftovers." They 
can be neglected, either benignly or malignantly, and left to continue 
struggling in the labor market with inadequate help from income maintenance 
programs. Alternatively, the "safety net" of transfer programs can be 
improved to reduce the hardship resulting from their employment problems. 
Financial incentives and appeals to corporate conscience may be used to 
encourage employers to reach further down the labor queue. Job placement, 
mandated job search, worker relocation, and economic development strategies 
can try to better match these workers with available employment. Sub 
sidized jobs might be created for them. Finally, training may be provided 
in order to improve their ability to compete in the labor market.
Since the Great Society, and particularly under the Carter adminis 
tration, the job creation and training options have received priority. 
Employment and training activities were the premier growth area of social 
welfare policy in the last two decades. Beginning near zero at the start 
of the 1960s, real expenditures rose to the billion dollar level in fiscal 
1965; they doubled again within the next year; redoubled by 1972; and then 
tripled between 1972 and 1978, before dropping precipitously at the close 
of the decade. The training components experienced steadier growth to $650 
million in 1968 and to $1.9 billion in 1980.
The relative prominence and mix of training activities have fluctuated 
over the years. The training share of employment and training expenditures 
was predominant until the War on Poverty; training declined to 63 percent 
of total expenditures in 1969 and to only 15 percent of expenditures in 
1978. Despite rapid growth and a two billion dollar pricetag, remedial 
efforts for the "leftovers" in the labor market represent only a small 
share of our nation's total education and training activities and reach 
only a small portion of the universe of need. Public expenditures for 
higher education and vocational education in 1980 were twenty-five times 
those targeted to persons at the end of the labor queue. In 1980, new 
participants in targeted training represented only 1 percent of the labor 
force, and the average monthly enrollment in training programs represented 
less than one-twentieth of average unemployment.
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Training Activities
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act is the legislative 
umbrella for most of the activities targeted for the "leftovers." Under a 
complex array of separate categorical authorizations, it provides funds by 
formula to states and localities for local programs they design and manage 
within the framework of federal law, regulations and oversight. CETA also 
funds national programs for special needs groups, as well as the Job Corps, 
a nationally-operated residential training program for severely dis- 
advantaged youths.
There are four categories of training provided under CETA: (1) local 
classroom training is a full-time activity, which includes both occu 
pational instruction and other training and remediation provided in an in 
stitutional setting; (2) on-the-job training is a full-time activity, where 
a participant is hired by an employer and trained primarily at the work 
site, with public funds covering the extra costs of supervision and 
training; (3) supplemental training is a part-time or short-term activity 
enhancing subsidized work experience or a limited intensity service to help 
in the transition into the labor force; and (4) Job Corps is a structured 
program of vocational instruction, basic education, work experience, 
counseling, health care, and living experiences in a residential center.
Job Corps is the most comprehensive and intensive, as well as most 
targeted of the training approaches. It serves only the most disadvantaged 
among those in need—young school dropouts from poor families. Its costs 
were over $13,000 a training year in fiscal 1980. Local classroom 
training, which is nonresidential and deals with a somewhat more employable 
group, had a cost of $8,000 per year. On-the-job training serves the most 
employable of those in need and had a cost of $6,000. Supplemental 
training for participants in subsidized public service employment (PSE) 
cost $2,700 per training year, while transition services in-school youth 
averaged $800 per service year.
Most CETA training is typically short-term, aimed to prepare the par 
ticipant for entry level occupations or to provide basic educational 
credentials or English competency. Job Corps is ambitious, with an average 
duration of stay for completers of 1.1 years. However, there is a high 
early dropout rate with 40 percent of participants leaving before 90 days 
and another 30 percent leaving before full completion, so that the average 
duration of stay is 6.0 months. Local classroom training averages 5.5 
months for completers, but because of early dropouts, the average duration 
of stay is around 5.1 months. On-the-job training averages 4.3 months.
Job Corps vocational training is concentrated in the construction 
trades, automotive and machine repair, health and food services, and 
clerical occupations. Local classroom training is predominantly in the 
clerical, craft, and service fields. Local on-the-job training is mainly 
in the clerical, operative and nonconstruction craft occupations. Most 
training assignments are sex stereotyped, with women assigned primarily to 
clerical and health services training, while males are assigned primarily 
to training in the crafts and in welding.
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All Job Corps participants receive basic education or GED preparation 
along with vocational training and a comprehensive array of manpower and 
supportive services. A fifth of local classroom trainees are exclusively 
in education activities and another fifth are in a combination of voca 
tional and educational activities. There is very little remediation 
associated with OJT, since the training mostly occurs at the worksite and 
the trainees are the least disadvantaged of CETA participants.
Because job creation has received priority over training under CETA, 
classroom training opportunities were available for less than a fifth of 
new enrol lees in local programs in fiscal 1980, or three in ten excluding 
the summer program, while OJT was available for less than one in twenty, or 
still less than one in ten excluding the summer program. Enrollments in 
Job Corps accounted for only 5 percent of youth enrollments in CETA local 
programs.
Females, Hispanics and "other" minorities, dropouts, single parents 
and CETA participants with inadequate English-speaking ability, have above 
average chances of assignment to classroom training. In marked contrast, 
on-the-job training slots are reserved for the most employable among the 
CETA participants—whites, males, graduates, and parents in two-parent 
families. Job Corps is the "program of last resort" for poor youth age 16 
to 21 who have dropped out of school (85 percent of enrol lees), been 
rejected by the military (one of every four) or had trouble with the law 
(two of every five). The dropouts who entered Job Corps in 1980 repre 
sented one-third of all dropout youth served by CETA and half again the 
total of dropout youth in local training.
Earnings Impacts
Classroom training in MDTA and other pre-CETA programs increased the 
earnings of participants between $250 and $300 in the year after termina 
tion. OJT under JOBS and MDTA increased annual earnings $400 to $900. Job 
Corps and adult basic education increased earnings, but less substantially, 
according to past studies. The recent evidence suggests impacts of the 
same order of magnitude.
CETA classroom training for 1976 entrants increased earnings $350 in 
the year after leaving, a 10 percent increment above the earnings of a 
comparison group of nonparticipants. Moreover, the gains rose to nearly 
$450 in the next year. On-the-job trainees gained $850, an 18 percent 
increase. However, the gains eroded to less than $600 the second post- 
program year. In contrast, fiscal 1976 work experience participants had 
earnings in the two post-termination years that were below those of like 
nonparticipants, although public service employment participants gained 
$250 in the first year and $350 in the second.
Job Corps increased the civilian earnings of 1977 participants by $200 
above those of the comparison group in the first post-program year and 
nearly $500 in the second year, or 8 percent and 13 percent, respectively. 
Job Corps also increased military enlistment substantially, so that the 
total earnings impacts were even greater.
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All race, sex and age groups among 1976 participants benefitted 
significantly from on-the-job training when compared to like nonpar- 
ticipants. Persons with low or no earnings before entry, particularly 
labor force reentrants and middle-aged participants, did especially well in 
classroom training. Females accounted for half of participants but 
four-fifths of the aggregated post-program gains of classroom trainees. 
The impacts increased between the first and second post-program years for 
most subgroups of trainees, but particularly for females. All groups 
gained more from OJT than work experience, and all except minority females 
gained more from classroom training than work experience. Female Job Corps 
participants gained more than males in terms of earnings, although males 
gained slightly more in terms of hours of employment. Females without 
children did better than females with children.
The public investment in training for persons of limited employability 
is profitable, as equivocally as this must be judged by benefit-cost 
analysis. Under reasonable and purposefully conservative assumptions about 
the fade-out of earnings gains measured in the two post-program years, 
about the dollar value of nonearnings impacts, and about the appropriate 
discount rate, Job Corps provides social benefits with a current value of 
$1.45 for every $1.00 invested. Utilizing the same assumptions and the 
estimated post-program earnings gains for 1976 local classroom trainees, 
CETA training returns $1.38 in benefits for every $1.00 invested. The 
estimates for OJT are less precise because of uncertainty concerning the 
real training cost incurred by employers, the productivity of trainees 
relative to regular hires, and hence, the degree of windfall in the 
employer reimbursement. But the range is from a low of $1.21 to a high of 
$8.48 in benefits for every dollar invested, with a "best" estimate of 
$2.55. Thus, on-the-job training pays off most, where Job Corps ranks 
next, and local classroom training follows closely. The benchmark 
benefit-cost assumptions probably overstate the relative payoff of OJT and 
understate the relative payoff of classroom training. Job Corps has 
noticeable earnings impacts but the "socialization" effects are equally 
significant. The reduction in crime is so substantial during participation 
and in the year after, while the costs of crime and its treatment are so 
great, that the present value of the crime cost savings is about equal to 
the present value of the earnings gains per participant from local 
classroom training. Even though the increase in post-program earnings per 
dollar of investment is greater for classroom training than for Job Corps, 
the total payoff is slightly less because there are minimal effects on 
crime and modest effects on dependency.
The public beneficiaries of training include participants as well as 
the taxpayers who support it. Social benefit-cost calculations exclude 
transfer payments from costs and count as benefits all increased earnings. 
From the taxpayer perspective, transfers are included among costs and the 
benefits are not the post-program earnings gains, but rather the taxes they 
generate as well as the resulting reductions in dependency. Taxpayer 
benefit-cost ratios are, therefore, lower than social benefit-cost ratios, 
and though the latter are a more appropriate consideration from a social 
policy perspective, the former will more likely concern the voters in a 
period when taxes are a major concern. Job Corps has the highest taxpayer 
benefit-cost ratio because the crime reductions are a savings to taxpayers; 
there is a return compared to alternative uses of the same resources of
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$.96 for every $1.00 invested according to the most reasonable, albeit 
conservative, assumptions. The intermediate estimate for OJT is a return 
between $.0 and $1.06 for every $1.00 invested. Local classroom training 
returns $.73 for every dollar. Such recondite analysis hardly figures in 
the political equation, but it certainly justifies the solid political 
support for Job Corps and the preference for more OJT in the local activity 
mix.
Benefit-cost analyses of pre-CETA institutional and on-the-job train 
ing programs generally found that benefits exceeded costs. Estimates for 
Job Corps varied considerably, with several suggesting benefits less than 
costs. Using standardized assumptions which focus only on earnings 
effects, the benefit-cost ratios calculated from recent impact estimates 
for Job Corps and CETA classroom training are in the high range relative to 
past estimates, while the ratios calculated from recent OJT impact esti 
mates are in the mid-range relative to past estimates.
The Anatomy of Impacts
Increased employment rather than increased earnings rates account for 
most (though certainly not all) of the real earnings gains achieved through 
training. For fiscal 1975 classroom trainees, over four-fifths of the 
increase in real annual earnings from the year prior to entry to the first 
year after termination resulted from a rise in the percent time employed. 
Comparing the pre-entry to the second post-termination years, increased 
employment accounted for three-fourths of the real gain. Approximately 
half of classroom trainees with employment before and after participation 
had no improvement in real hourly pay from the year before entry to the 
second post-termination year. For fiscal 1975 on-the-job trainees, 
increased employment accounted for all of the real earnings improvement in 
the first year and four-fifths of the gain between the pre-entry and second 
post-termination years. However, two-thirds of the trainees with previous 
earnings kept ahead of inflation in their hourly wages. Fiscal 1977 Job 
Corps participants earned 11 percent more than controls in the first two 
post-program years but worked 16 percent more hours; in other words, all 
their gains came from increased work time.
The employment gains, in turn, resulted from increased labor force 
participation as much as reduced unemployment. Among fiscal 1975 classroom 
trainees, the increase in the percentage of time in the labor force from 
the pre-entry to first post-program year equaled two-thirds of the increase 
in percent time employed for all trainees. Three-fifths of the net 
increase in time employed from the pre-entry to second post-program year 
for classroom trainees was accounted for by individuals who had zero 
earnings in the year before entering CETA. For OJT participants, two- 
thirds of the employment gains in the first year were also explained by 
increased participation, and zero earners before entry accounted for 45 
percent of the net increase in percent time employed from the pre-entry to 
second post-termination year. Increased labor force participation by 1977 
Job Corps participants accounted for two-thirds of their gains in em 
ployment relative to controls over the two post-program years.
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Success Ingredients
Training tends to move individuals from the secondary labor market and 
irregular jobs into low level but more regular jobs. Among 1976 classroom 
trainees with previous experience, a fifth had worked primarily as garage 
attendants, transportation operatives, laborers, farm workers or private 
household workers. Only a tenth of trainees with work after termination 
held such jobs. The share working as craftsmen and welders increased from 
11 to 17 percent, while clericals rose from 20 to 27 percent.
Among on-the-job trainees, over a third were placed in the same broad 
occupational categories in which they had previously worked, while over a 
fifth were assigned to training positions at a lower occupational level. 
Comparing the occupational distribution before and after training, the pro 
portion working as laborers, transportation operatives, garage workers, 
farm laborers and private household workers actually rose from 13 percent 
to 15 percent.
A third of Job Corps entrants have had no regular work experience and 
the remainder have largely worked in menial "youth" jobs. Job Corps 
training helps them secure entry level "adult" jobs although only one in 
seven participants ends up as a completer with training-related employment. 
Post-program employment is concentrated in manual, entry clerical and entry 
health jobs secured by the participants mainly through their own initia 
tive.
Little is known about the "best bets" for training. Most female 
classroom trainees are in clerical and service occupations (usually 
health). While 17 percent of all 1976 classroom trainees with a job before 
entry worked in female clerical occupations, 35 percent of trainees were in 
female clerical occupations and 25 percent of trainees with a job after 
training remained in these occupations. Three-fifths of participants 
trained in clerical work who subsequently got jobs ended up in training- 
related work, as did two-thirds of those trained in service jobs. The 
rates of training-related employment were much lower for trainees in other 
occupations. Nonconstruction crafts were standard training fare for males, 
but the batting average of this training was low in terms of subsequent 
training-related employment. While OJT participants were more likely to 
find employment in the occupation of assignment, those "trained" as service 
workers, laborers, garage workers, farm workers and transportation 
operatives were less likely than other on-the-job trainees to stay in the 
same occupation, probably because they were able to find something better 
on their own. Job Corps training that looks good in the short-run does not 
look as beneficial over the long-term. Based on experience of 1977 
participants, the best bets for completion, placement and higher wages were 
manual occupations—forestry, gardening, construction and industrial 
production—for males and forestry, gardening, construction and health for 
females. Over the longer run (12-18 months post-termination), however, 
persons trained in these occupations were less likely to register gains 
relative to controls than those trained in some other occupations including 
transportation and service for males and the clerical field for females.
The impact of training is determined by the duration of stay. The 
estimated annual earnings gains of 1976 classroom trainees staying one to
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20 weeks were only one-sixth those of participants staying 40 or more 
weeks. Job Corps males who stayed less than 90 days, and those who did not 
continue to completion, were earning the same as controls during the period 
12 to 18 months after termination; in contrast, those completing a 
vocational program earned $1,250 more on an annualized basis. Early female 
dropouts gained $300 on an annualized basis, partial completers $750, and 
full completers $1,500.
Placement is a second key factor. All of the post-program earnings 
gains for 1976 classroom trainees were accounted for by the group entering 
employment on terminating the program. While it is not surprising that 
those immediately employed had higher near-term earnings relative to 
controls or relative to other participants not placed, it is significant 
that the differentials remained substantial two years later.
Trainees staying longer are more likely to be placed. The more 
employable participants tend to stay longer and are more likely to 
complete. Such in-program sorting is greater in Job Corps—where only 
three of ten participants are full completers--than in local classroom 
training where three in four complete the usually shorter duration 
assignments. Yet for both Job Corps and local classroom training, the 
effects of duration of stay and placement remain significant after 
adjustment for the measurable differences between dropouts and completers. 
Moreover, the dropouts and short-stayers earn much the same as their 
controls over the long-run, so that sorting of the "winners" and "losers" 
is not an explanation of the substantial gains of those who stay. 
Completion itself appears to be a substantial factor. Those completing 
local classroom training have a high probability of being placed whatever 
their duration of stay. Those who complete Job Corps training gain 
substantially more and are more likely to be placed than participants who 
stay as long but do not complete. Corpsmembers who secure a GED earn more 
than matched individuals who do not. Finally, the effect of duration of 
stay is strong even when placement is used as an additional control 
variable in regression equations predicting earnings gains. All this 
supports the conclusion that training increases human resource endowments 
and employability, and that those trained longer are more likely to obtain 
certification which in turn improves their chances of finding employment or 
being placed upon termination, but also their chances of staying and 
progressing in the initial jobs or being able to move on to better ones.
Remedial instruction, basic life skills training and attitudinal or 
motivational improvement activities are important components of training. 
Certainly they are a major factor behind the Job Corps' success. Par 
ticipants who stay over 90 days gain significantly in maturity and social 
attitudes. Job Corps treatment reduces crime (arrest rates the first year 
out were 10.9 per hundred for 1977 participants, compared to 16.7 per 
hundred for controls), reduces childbearing and illegitimacy, increases 
mobility, and increases matriculation in college and post-second training. 
However, Job Corps achieves these changes by creating a 24-hour-a-day 
structured environment away from other influences. The supported work 
program that provided well-organized and well-run full-time employment 
opportunities for dropout youth, but did not remove them from home en 
vironments and did not include counseling, recreation, motivation, student 
government and the like, did not produce positive changes in criminal
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behavior or drug abuse, nor did it significantly increase post-program 
employment constancy.
School-based programs aiming to improve "employability skills" through 
instruction and activities designed to expose youth to work settings and 
requirements are able to change tested vocational attitudes, job knowledge, 
job holding skills, work relevant attitudes, job seeking skills, and sex 
stereotyping in career goals. However, these attitudinal and skill gains 
do not markedly alter post-program labor market success except when 
combined with substantial job development activities so that employers 
recognize that the changes have occurred, and unless the activities are 
targeted to youth who plan to immediately enter the full-time labor market 
after graduation rather than continuing their education. Moreover, 
measurable attitudinal and skill gains are not realized in summer programs 
which have about half the treatment hours, suggesting that intensity and 
continuity are necessary to affect these dimensions noticeably. On the 
other hand, short-term interventions that provide a helping hand at the 
point of job search can substantially increase the immediate chances of 
employment with little or no effect on measured employability skills or 
attitudes.
There is clear evidence that a variety of alternative methods can 
substantially improve the academic competencies of even the most education 
ally disadvantaged; indeed, learning rates can be attained which not only 
exceed the prior learning rates of such individuals, but overall school 
norms as well. Participants in Job Corps, who have a sixth grade average 
reading level at entry, gain 1.5 years in 90 hours of instruction and 2.2 
years in 150 hours. The key is a self-paced, individualized educational 
approach with the flexibility to be delivered a few hours daily in 
combination with other activities. Computers simplify delivery of these 
self-paced, individualized materials, increasing the gain rates, helping to 
standardize curricula, reducing paperwork, and facilitating delivery in a 
variety of settings.
Work as Training
Work, alone, apparently does not increase employability or employment 
chances. The post-program earnings of 1976 adult work experience par 
ticipants were no higher than those of matched nonparticipants, while 
participants in public service employment gained between $250 and $750 in 
1977. The greater PSE impact was due to more frequent transition into 
unsubsidized public sector jobs. Almost all of the increase in employment 
from pre-entry to the first year post-termination experienced by 1976 PSE 
participants reflected increased unsubsidized public sector work.
The supported work experiment carefully tested the impacts of well- 
operated work experience projects structured to provide increasing re 
sponsibility, close supervision and peer support. It found little or no 
post-program earnings effects for dropout youth, drug addicts or ex- 
offenders, but a statistically significant impact for long-term AFDC 
recipients. Increased post-program employment in the public sector was the 
primary source of the earnings gains for the welfare cohort.
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Where worksites have been used as classrooms for training in con 
struction trades, with journeymen instructors, linkages to unions, and 
structured skill progressions, the placement rates in construction, in 
unions, and in high wage jobs far exceeded those in comparable work 
projects which did not emphasize training or linkages, even though there 
were very modest differences in positive termination and employment rates. 
Where participants received work and training sequences—and only one in 
twenty CETA participants in 1976 participated in multiple activities—they 
appeared to benefit more than from work experience alone but less than from 
classroom training or OJT. One reading of the runes is that when work and 
training are combined, the post-program earnings effects will be largely 
determined by the amount of training provided unless unsubsidized public 
sector jobs are secured. For dropout youth in an experiment testing 
alternative services, training activities had more impact on post-program 
employment chances than work and training activities, which in turn had 
more impact than work alone. Summer employment for disadvantaged teenagers 
modestly increases the likelihood of returning to school and the proba 
bility of part-time employment in school. The employment effects are 
strongest among those who are least likely to secure employment in the 
absence of the program. On the other hand, there are no measurable gains 
over the summer in job knowledge, vocational attitudes, job seeking or job 
holding skills, relative to control groups. Apparently, a first work 
experience provides a "taste for earnings" or helps to overcome fears about 
work without markedly altering attitudes or employability skills.
In summary, work experience can be useful for young people in ad 
vancing workforce entry. It can be combined with training activities in a 
sequence, with benefits roughly proportional to the degree of training. A 
worksite may be structured as a training site and can yield some of the 
benefits of classroom and on-the-job training while producing useful 
output, but this model is the exception rather than the rule in local work 
experience programs. In most other circumstances, the subsidized work will 
only have post-program impacts if it serves as a tryout or on-the-job 
training mechanism for existing unsubsidized jobs in the public or non 
profit sector. This does not mean that work experience and public 
service employment are bad investments. If $1.00 in output is produced for 
every $1.00 in cost, then any post-program earnings increases or in-program 
benefits (such as reductions in crime) represent a positive return on the 
outlay. However, if the aim is to alter future employment prospects, work 
is only effective when properly targeted, designed or linked to unsub 
sidized employment.
An Interpretation of the Evidence
When all persons available and looking for work are ranked into cate 
gories based on prior experience, education, previous training and other 
measurable characteristics used by most employers in setting job require 
ments and in ranking applicants, CETA enrol lees are concentrated at the low 
end of the distribution. The same standards used to establish eligibility 
for CETA, and the same problems which lead applicants to choose this 
option, are among those used by employers to rate individuals as high 
risks. Nevertheless, there is very significant diversity in employability 
among CETA participants. At one extreme, CETA may serve a single mother
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with a college degree reentering the labor force or a machinist displaced 
from a job in a one-industry town; at the other extreme, the participant 
may be a mentally retarded young person who has never held a job, or a 
school dropout who has spent the last five years in prison. Each set of 
characteristics can be assigned "batting averages" which are statistically 
valid predictors of outcomes in most settings. The mother and the ma 
chinist are good bets for training and for subsequent placement. The 
dropout or the handicapped youth are poor bets. Yet there is also much 
unexplained variance reflecting chance but also the wide range in potential 
among individuals sharing any set of characteristics. Some dropouts may be 
both motivated and intelligent, having left school because of family 
responsibilities. Others may have dropped out because school was too slow 
and regimented, although they have now matured. Some may have very serious 
behavioral problems which are not recorded. Most failed in school because 
they simply were not as good in academic areas as those who passed. Five 
years in the future, these subgroups among the dropout population are 
likely to have quite different average success rates in the labor market. 
But it is impossible, or certainly difficult, to identify a priori the 
differences in potential which will produce these differences in outcome.
Employers must make hiring decisions based on characteristics they can 
measure and on the "batting averages" for persons with these character 
istics. Available jobs at any point can be ranked according to their 
hiring requirements, i.e., how much prior experience, education, previous 
training and other skills the employers require. The distribution on the 
supply side of the labor market ranking the available work force in terms 
of employability, is paralleled on the demand side by the distribution of 
available jobs according to the minimum employability they require in 
applicants. There are always some jobs available for even the most 
unskilled, and the most disadvantaged individual can usually get a job if 
he or she really tried, even though the meager payoff may not justify the 
effort. But usually, there are more available workers in the low em 
ployability categories than there are jobs willing to employ such workers 
and all such individuals could not find employment if they looked at the 
same time.
Among jobs with equal hiring requirements, there is wide diversity in 
career potential. Some entry jobs are dead-ends while others can be first 
steps on career ladders. For the available worker entering the hiring door 
or reading the want ads, it is in many cases impossible to distinguish 
between jobs with career potential and those which lead nowhere.
The labor market functions by iterative matching of workers and jobs. 
An individual with low potential hired into a job may soon be fired or 
quit, or will accept the most menial work as his or her lot. One with high 
potential will either retain the job and move up or will look for another 
that provides more career opportunity. Eventually, he or she will find a 
job with career potential and will advance, or will acquire a college 
credential or apprenticeship which documents to employers a set of skills 
or characteristics they desire. This individual will, then, move up the 
queue to the next level of documented employability. Whether bouncing from 
job to job or remaining in dead-end employment, the available worker with 
less potential will become identifiable as a "loser," moving down the queue 
in the eyes of employers to a lower level of documented employability.
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Classroom training targeted to individuals with limited employability 
can impact on employment chances in several distinct ways: First, the 
training can serve as an experiential sorting mechanism, not improving 
skills or credentials, but rather identifying those participants with more 
potential and motivation. Employers will want to hire them instead of 
others with the same external characteristics because they know them to be 
better risks. Second, the training activity may serve as a way of gaining 
access to jobs without necessarily improving skills or credentials. This 
may occur through the institutional leverage of the delivery agent or by 
aiding participants in job search. Third, the training may be able to sort 
both individuals and jobs, matching persons who have been identified as 
having greater potential with entry jobs identified as more promising. 
Fourth, the training may improve potential by increasing motivation, 
employability skills or academic competencies, without providing cre 
dentials that employers will accept in the labor market. Fifth, the train 
ing may provide a demonstrable skill or a certification which is accepted 
in the labor market and leads to a better paying and more stable job.
The distinction between these effects is of more than academic 
interest. For instance, the second impact process may produce measured 
gains in earnings relative to nonparticipants, but will do so largely by 
reducing the chances of the nonparticipants. The process will have no 
impact on skill shortages and the participants will benefit only to the 
extent their job search is shortened. The fourth process increases 
performance in a job once secured, but does not increase either the chances 
of employment or the quality of the first job. Only the fifth process 
meets skill needs and improves documented employability so that the 
completer will be more attractive to employers.
There is evidence that CETA local classroom training functions in all 
these ways. In general, however, the training is not of long enough 
duration to increase competencies to the point where they can be certified 
and documented. Only a small proportion of participants get a GED, 
sheepskin, or certificate indicating the completion of apprenticeship. 
There are very few occupations where skills can be taught in short order 
than can be certified or tested at the hiring door, and where a large 
number of jobs are available. Clerical training is one of these occupa 
tions, and it tends to work best where those who are trained are mature and 
have adequate academic competencies. Judging from the concentration of 
earnings gains among 30-44 year-old classroom trainees, women, and those 
previously out of the labor force--i.e., the groups most likely to be 
assigned to clerical training—there is little doubt that this occupation 
accounts for a substantial portion of the total gains from training. Basic 
skills can be taught quickly in some occupations such as welding, but 
training less frequently leads to jobs. For most occupations, long-term 
training is needed to gain useful skills or certifications that are 
recognized and demanded. Only the few classroom trainees who stay long- 
term gain these skills and certifications. Those who fall sort need the 
placement leverage of prime sponsors in order to realize gains from 
training. Likewise, less than a third of Job Corps participants graduate 
from training or get a GED certificate. Placement assistance is con 
centrated on this minority, with little help provided to noncompleters. 
The overall gains produced by the program are largely the result of im 
proved "potential" as manifested in greater stability of labor force attach-
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ment and employment. The jobs which are secured by Corpsmembers, most 
often by their own initiative, do not pay more and are not much different 
than those which could be secured without participation.
The most employable trainees are likely to stay longer and complete. 
Those who are placed among those who stay longer or complete are even more 
employable. In local classroom training sorting probably occurs more 
through the placement process than the enforcement of completion standards. 
Those placed are the "best" both because they include individuals with 
initiative to get a job and those who are helped by the delivery agent. 
The fact that the impact of placement continues over time suggests that 
those individuals who are placed at termination are indeed "better" after 
controlling for measurable differences and that jobs accessed for them are 
"better" in terms of stability and career potential. The gains registered 
by those classroom trainees who are placed despite short-duration training 
and despite the lack of certifying credentials are probably a combination 
of these two factors. The converse of this observation is that sorting 
does not occur in classroom training that will be accepted by the labor 
market in the absence of CETA leverage, i.e., the distinction between com- 
pleters and noncompleters is not very specific in local classroom training, 
and only a minority of participants even know if they complete. An 
employer is not likely to give much credit to participation alone without 
knowing the standards for completion and whether these standards were en 
forced.
Job Corps sorting is much more significant because completion stand 
ards are competency-based, the educational and vocational achievements are 
documented and the residential experience itself tends to separate the 
mature from the immature. Those employers—such as the military—who 
regularly hire from Job Corps know the difference. Some employers use the 
achievement records. But the completion standards and the competency 
measures are not recognized by most local employers unfamiliar with the 
program, so that if a youth does not get a job through the program, he or 
she is unlikely to get credit and must prove himself or herself once hired.
Sorting is much more predominant in on-the-job training. The CETA 
decisionmaker can and does screen more candidates than a typical employer 
interviewing for a job, since all CETA applicants are assessed and usually 
the most employable are assigned to OJT. Because OJT is rarely a "piggy 
back" on other treatments, the sorting must occur basically on measurable 
employability characteristics rather than potential as demonstrated during 
prior participation. Judging from the wage and occupational change 
patterns, it does not appear that there are wide gaps between experience 
and job requirements in the OJT match-ups of workers and jobs, or that 
extensive training is necessary. Nevertheless, trainees may still be less 
employable or at least more risky than the usual hires. The try-out which 
occurs for all entry hires also occurs under OJT. The training period 
offers an opportunity to determine whether the somewhat higher risk 
trainees, particularly those who have been outside the labor force and 
those who have lost their last employment and therefore may be of uncertain 
quality, will adjust to the job and respond to normal entry instruction. 
OJT, thus, provides a try-out for more stable and better paying jobs for 
those whose careers have been disrupted, as well as an opportunity for 
entrants and reentrants into the work force--albeit those with more edu-
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cation credentials--to get a chance to prove themselves. Immediate 
employment is particularly important to reentrants or entrants who are more 
likely to remain in the labor force when they get work right away. From 
this perspective, OJT is more of a screening device than a training ground. 
The roughly one of three participants who are not hired permanently are 
those who fail their try-out or find that the assignment does not meet 
their expectations. The decline in the earnings gains from the first to 
the second year after termination, in contrast to the increase for 
classroom trainees, suggests that some of the OJT participants lose their 
jobs and the "training" is not transferrable, while equally employable 
nonparticipants are eventually able to catch up somewhat.
There are several implications of these notions of sorting, certi 
fying, job access and try-out. First, they suggest why OJT is so hard to 
market to employers. Candidates are referred and the employer must choose 
among them on the basis of documented employability dimensions, but they 
are all risky to the extent that, on average, they have characteristics 
which would usually rank them below normal entry employees or their 
potential is uncertain because they do not follow the normal entry routes, 
for instance, being recommended by other employees. Because hiring is 
first and training later, the employer assumes the risk that the individual 
cannot pick up the job as easily as normal hires, and the subsidy must 
cover this risk. To the degree the job requires substantial training as 
opposed to mere orientation, the employer assumes an even greater risk. To 
overcome the employers' reservations, the delivery agent is inclined to 
screen participants as much as possible so that they meet usual employa 
bility requirements. Unless the best of the referrals is within the "risk 
range" covered by the OJT subsidy, the employer will not even participate. 
But given the difficulties of finding OJT slots and the clear evidence that 
they help participants, the delivery agent may not want to jeopardize 
future placements and may provide referrals well within the risk range- 
providing windfalls to the employer—in order to assure future cooperation 
and to get immediate results for participants.
If the public accepted the initial risk by payrolling the participant 
during a limited tryout period, the employer would have to be subsidized 
only for extra training costs rather than the hiring risk. The extra 
training costs for the individual could be better determined after the 
try-out because there could be evidence of performance of each participant 
in each assignment. It would be possible for the employer to take greater 
risks. If there were such a try-out, experiential sorting in work or 
classroom training programs could be used to identify and place in OJT the 
measurably disadvantaged who demonstrated greater potential; the delivery 
agent would not have to convince the employer that prior sorting had 
occurred, but rather could could let him see for himself.
Second, placement is a key factor in realizing the payoffs of 
training, but there are different implications in different settings. If 
classroom training does not lead to credentials or measurable skills, like 
typing speed, that can be tested by employers prior to hiring, improved 
employment chances depend on placement leverage as well as the training 
institution's reputation, which in the short-run may be affected by 
publicity and linkage efforts, but over the long-run reflects the job 
performance of trainees. If there is no sorting of completers and non-
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completers based on demonstrated acquisition of specific skills, then over 
the long run the placement leverage and reputation will erode and in 
dividual participants who perform most effectively in training will not be 
able to translate their hard work and ability into commensurately better 
jobs. Improving potential but not documented employability will help when 
and if the participant gets a job, but pays off more certainly when there 
is placement, particularly when this accesses jobs with career potential 
where the individual's abilities and newly acquired skills can be fully 
utilized. Placement is less crucial where training provides accepted 
credentials or measurable skills; however, these are likely to be dis 
counted unless the individual shares the characteristics and experiences 
usually associated with these credentials and skills, or if the trainee has 
other impediments to employment. This will be particularly true where an 
individual makes a "quantum leap." In such cases it may be necessary even 
if there has been substantial sorting, training and certification, to 
provide for a try-out or to exert a special effort to secure placement so 
that the skills and credentials are accepted at face value.
Third, the attainment of credentials requires longer training than is 
usually provided, and more sorting as well. In order to avoid hurting 
those who lack the potential for a major advance, the obvious solution is 
to use a base-level training activity to provide worthwhile aid to large 
numbers while identifying participants with the greatest potential for long 
training in a second tier of activities. For the majority not moving on to 
the second tier, placement after first tier participation would continue, 
as now, to find "better" jobs for those who are "better" but not good 
enough for advanced training, while helping the remainder to simply find 
employment more quickly. In the second tier, where the number of entrants 
and completers would be much smaller than in the first tier, substantial 
placement efforts would and could be exerted to secure employment in 
training-related jobs in order to assure that the intensive investments 
paid off.
Fourth, improved skills mean little if not recognized and utilized by 
employers. Recognition depends on identification of competencies acquired, 
documentation of the quality of the inputs which went into the preparatory 
experience, proof that standards were maintained, and recognition that the 
skills and competencies needed for specific jobs were, in fact, provided. 
If there are no graduation standards, if the certification is nothing more 
than a claim that some training occurred, if the quality of the training is 
suspect, or if the competencies taught bear little relation to what 
employers really want, the payoffs of training will be reduced, par 
ticularly over the longer-run when jobs will depend on acceptance of the 
credentials rather than the immediate leverage of the CETA hiring subsidies 
and placement efforts.
Fifth, the future implications of these interpretations are even more 
significant. The size of the available workforce at any point in time, and 
especially the numbers at the lower end of the employability distribution, 
is largely determined by the number of entrants and reentrants into the 
labor force. This number will decline dramatically relative to total 
employment as the post-war babies age into the prime working years and the 
participation rate of women levels off. The annual rate of growth of the 
civilian labor force age 20 to 24 is projected to fall from the 2.7 percent
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annual growth rate for males in the 1975-1979 period to -.1 percent 
annually between 1979 and 1985, and to then decline by 2.9 percent annually 
in the 1985 to 1990 period. For all women, the rate of increase in the 
labor force will decline from 4.1 percent to 2.9 percent and then to 1.9 
percent. Employment grew 2.7 percent annually over the second half of the 
1970s, and 2.1 percent over the entire decade. Anything close to this job 
growth would drastically exceed the 1.9 percent total labor force growth 
projected for 1979 to 1985 and the 1.3 percent rate for 1985 to 1990. \J
The impacts will be greatest at the entry level. While there may be 
large numbers of relatively well-educated prime age males and females 
competing for mid-career advancement, the pressures at the career entry 
door will be reduced, as well as the competition for menial and casual 
jobs. Illegal or legal immigrants may fill the latter need, but they are 
unlikely to be allowed full access to career entry opportunities. In 
response, many employers whose hiring policies are now structured to take 
advantage of the excess supply of entry applicants are likely to lower 
their usual entry standards, regularize the career ladders so that the 
promise of a future can be used to attract entry workers, initiate their 
own intensive preparatory programs, work more closely with public insti 
tutions, recruit from areas with excess workers, increase the pirating of 
trained employees and further protect their own workers by compensation 
provisions and advancement opportunities tying them to the firm.
Where firms increasingly provide their own training and must draw from 
a high-risk pool, they will be much more responsive to preparatory ac 
tivities by public institutions that screen and improve basic skills. More 
firms will be willing to specify their requirements and work with insti 
tutions to develop training adapted specifically to their needs. Since 
they will have to take more chances in hiring, they will be more receptive 
to a try-out approach which protects them from some of the risk. Persons 
who are trained and credentialed are more likely to find jobs at higher 
levels and have their credentials accepted even if they lack some of the 
other characteristics now expected in applicants for these better jobs. As 
more firms train, there will be an increased concern about other firms 
stealing their employees, and a desire to limit this if possible by 
expanding the supply of entry skilled workers and equalizing employer 
training costs.
The magnitude of these developments will be affected by immigration 
policies, military manpower needs, technological change, foreign competi 
tion, national and world economic conditions. There is no crystal ball 
which can accurately predict these factors. But all else being equal, the 
labor supply changes which can be projected with some certainty are 
massive. Employers will not alter their behavior overnight, and the degree 
of change will vary by industry, region and type of firm. But the market 
is enormously adaptable and the directions of change should work in favor 
of training which sorts and improves potential as well as more ambitious 
efforts to provide quantum leaps in documented skills. On the other hand, 
training that simply accesses low-level, menial jobs will be relatively 
less necessary or useful.
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SECTION 3.
MANAGEMENT, DECISIONMAKING AND DELIVERY— 
A SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS
Diversity in Local Programming
The local delivery system which accounts for nine-tenths of trainees 
and more than seven-tenths of training expenditures under CETA is charac 
terized by enormous diversity. There were 484 state and local juris 
dictions designated as "prime sponsors" for CETA in fiscal 1980, that is, 
receiving funds by allocation, planning for the use of these funds, 
contracting and managing activities, monitoring compliance, and reporting 
to the federal government. Under the "comprehensive" component of CETA 
(Title IIBC) which finances most local OJT and classroom training, prime 
sponsors have broad discretion to choose the types of participants and the 
types of services. They vary substantially in how they exercise this 
discretion—particularly in choosing between job creation and training—as 
well as in the results they achieve. In 1980, a fifth enrolled less than 
30 percent of participants in classroom training while another fifth 
enrolled over 70 percent. Over half of prime sponsors provided OJT 
opportunities for less than a tenth of participants, but one in ten prime 
sponsors provided opportunities for 30 percent or more. The cost of 
classroom training per participant averaged under $1000 in a fourth of 
prime sponsors, but over $1750 for another fourth. The placement rate upon 
termination averaged over 50 percent, and the cost per placement below 
$4000, for a fourth of primes; but the placement rate was below 30 percent 
and the cost per placement above $8000 for another fourth. Under the youth 
and structural public service employment titles of CETA, where the prime 
sponsors also had a great deal of discretion in choosing between training 
and other treatments, even greater variation occurred in the emphasis on 
training.
The varying emphasis on training was not related to the variability in 
local economic conditions nor in the participants who were served. The 
unemployment rate might be expected to affect the availability of OJT 
assignments, the opportunities which can be opened through classroom 
training, and the relative attractions of and need for job creation, while 
the youth share among participants might influence the service mix since 
youth are usually offered short-term subsidized jobs and are underrepre- 
sented in local classroom training and, even more so, in OJT. According to 
regression equations measuring the relationships between the emphasis prime 
sponsors placed on classroom training in fiscal 1980 and their unemployment 
rates and youth shares, primes with significantly above average unem 
ployment rates or significantly above average youth shares gave marginally 
lower priority to classroom training, but these two factors alone, ex 
plained little of the variability in classroom training emphases. Neither 
did they have much relationship to, nor explain much of the variability in, 
relative OJT emphases or the priorities placed on classroom training and 
on-the-job vs. work experience. To the degree a relationship existed, 
prime sponsors with higher unemployment rates tended to undertake more OJT 
and more total training (hence less work experience) than those with lower 
unemployment. By the same token, the unit costs of OJT and classroom 
training were only marginally related to unemployment rates or youth
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shares. Prime sponsors with high unemployment rates did not have to pay 
substantially more to access jobs through OJT, and the duration or in 
tensity of classroom training as reflected in the cost per participant, was 
not substantially greater in high unemployment areas nor substantially 
lower when more youth were served.
The type of governmental unit making the local decision, its size and 
regional location affected service mix and outcome patterns. Smaller prime 
sponsors with a labor force of less than 200,000 and state government 
sponsors were more likely to emphasize OJT, controlling for their differing 
unemployment rates and youth shares. Smaller primes (100,000 or less labor 
force) and the large cities (500,000 or more labor force) were more likely 
to emphasize classroom training, while states were less likely to use this 
approach. The training shares of Title IIBC expenditures were lowest for 
prime sponsors in the South and Northwest. The costs per participant in 
classroom training were highest in large cities, counties and consortia, 
reflecting cost-of-living differences probably as much as intensity 
differences. OJT costs were lowest for the smallest prime sponsors and for 
states. Prime sponsors which placed a heavy emphasis on training under 
Title IIBC also emphasized training under their structural public service 
employment and youth programs.
Differences in participant mix and in economic conditions were much 
more powerful in explaining the variability in outcomes than the vari 
ability in training emphases and costs. Differences in participant mix 
(age distribution, race, sex, and welfare recipient shares), differences in 
area conditions (unemployment rates, economic growth rates and quit rates) 
and differences in activities (on-the-job and classroom training shares, 
average lengths of stay and costs per enrol lee), explained almost two- 
fifths of the variance in fiscal 1980 placement rates of prime sponsors. 
Among these factors, the activities dimensions had the least impact. A 
larger OJT share contributed to higher placement rates but a standard 
deviation increase in the OJT share was associated with less than a fifth 
of a standard deviation increase in the placement rate. In contrast, a 
standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate was related to a 
standard deviation decrease in the placement rate. Yet the fact remains 
that the placement success of a prime sponsor was not foreordained by 
participant characteristics, economic conditions or service patterns. 
Three-fifths of the variance in placement rates was not explained even by 
the most detailed regression equations, suggesting that management of and 
priority on placement at the local level had much to do with prime 
sponsors' relative placement success.
The Worm's Eye View
From the prime sponsor's perspective, the benefits of classroom 
training vs. work experience are not as apparent as the national impact 
studies would suggest. Prime sponsors do not undertake long-term follow- 
up, nor do they attempt to secure comparison groups in order to measure net 
impacts. They focus, instead, on short-term outcomes and participant gains 
from entry to exit. Immediately at exit from CETA, the employment rates 
for 1976 work experience participants were higher than for classroom 
trainees (52 compared with 29 percent). At the three-month follow-up, the
297
differential was still in favor of work experience (52 to 46 percent). 
Even though the work experience group was more likely to be employed a 
month before entry, its gains from entry to exit were significantly greater 
than for classroom trainees, and from entry to three-month post-termination 
they were about the same. Work experience is also shorter and less costly 
per person year, so that within a given local allocation more people can be 
served by the work approach. At the same time, the local public gets back 
a useful social product and locally-financed transfer payments may be 
reduced during the period of participation, since wages offset welfare 
benefits while allowances do not. In other words, the benefit-cost 
calculus is different at the local level, and emphasis on work experience 
is understandable even if it does not maximize the net post-program 
earnings impacts from employment and training investments.
Likewise, the case for long-duration training is not as compelling 
from the local perspective. In the first quarter after termination, the 
percent of time employed for second half fiscal 1975 classroom trainees who 
stayed between half a year and a year was 46 percent, compared to 43 
percent for those staying 30 to 90 days. The differential was 57 vs. 47 
percent over the entire post termination year and 66 vs. 54 percent in the 
second post-termination year. In other words, a 90 day follow-up--the 
longest which prime sponsors usually undertake—would not show the greater 
relative gains made by the longer-term trainees. Based on prime sponsor 
placement rates for trainees of varying lengths of stay, and assuming costs 
proportional to length of stay, the cost per placement recorded by the 
prime sponsor for the one to two month training would be three-tenths that 
of training activities of over half a year's duration. It is not sur 
prising that shorter training is emphasized.
Local decisions are based, to a large extent, on management in 
formation gathered and processed according to a uniform system of 
definitions and reports required by the Department of Labor. This 
management information system has serious deficiencies. The descriptors of 
employment and training activities are too broad. The intensity and cost 
of treatments for specific participants and participant groups cannot be 
determined. Only CETA costs are tracked; offsets from income maintenance 
programs or other funding sources cannot be identified, so that the public 
expenditure for treatment may exceed the CETA expenditure. The laundry 
list of participant characteristics which are gathered, once aggregated, 
provide little sense of the employability of participants. Outcomes are 
difficult to interpret since positive termination is defined inclusively 
and placements are not considered relative to the types of training 
provided. Like all accounting systems, there are also loopholes; official 
termination may not occur for three months or more after the receipt of 
really substantive services. The information produced is not just 
inaccurate; it is misleading. Because the MIS leaves substantial latitude 
for creaming, and because service intensity is not measured, low cost, 
limited instensity services which are targeted for the most employable 
among participants and which will maximize immediate outcomes, are en 
couraged whenever budgets are tight or placement emphasized. Multi-step, 
intensive investments for persons most in need are discouraged.
Even if prime sponsors could measure net impacts and the benefits and 
costs of alternate local interventions for different participant groups,
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and even if management information accurately described and did not bias 
their actions and outcomes, rational decisionmaking at the local level 
would be almost impossible because of the instability and uncertainty in 
federal budgeting and policymaking. CETA has experienced dramatic 
fluctuations in overall funding, but these shifts have been exacerbated at 
the local level by an allocation formula which alters the relative shares 
among prime sponsors from year to year. Congress almost never appropriates 
the money on time. Every year there is a new program or new emphasis from 
the federal level. The best talent in the private sector could not plan 
and manage effectively under similar circumstances. Prime sponsors respond 
as best they can by emphasizing the simplest short-term interventions which 
can be phased up or down rapidly. Most focus on the short-run and on 
crisis management rather than long-term institution building and system 
development. Uncertainty and volatility are, without question, the primary 
causes of CETA's management and delivery problems.
The Federal Presence
The prime sponsors operate within the framework of federal regulations 
and federal oversight. The "feds" review and approve the activity plans 
prepared each year by prime sponsors, monitor performance indicators each 
quarter, and conduct a top-to-bottom review at the end of the year.
While the feds seek to achieve year-to-year improvements in placement 
rates and unit costs in negotiating plans, prime sponsors may justify 
exceptions in the plan or may seek modifications during the year. 
Apparently, there is not too much torque in this review process. The 
planned Title IIBC placement rate approved for fiscal 1980, after the 
modification process had occurred, was below the level in fiscal 1979 and 
only 1 percentage point above the level in fiscal 1978. The variances in 
planned placement rates, training shares, and projected costs were almost 
the same as the variances in the rates, shares, and costs realized in 
fiscal 1980.
The end-of-the year performance review is a ritual paper exercise with 
minimal consequences. Prime sponsors are rated as either eligible for 
immediate funding, as needing corrective actions over the next year, or as 
having serious problems that must be solved before funding. But denial of 
funds almost never occurs, since it would mean termination for active 
participants. Instead, the feds negotiate corrective actions and give 
conditional approvals, which frequently continue for year after year. Even 
if the "stick" were a meaningful threat, the quality of training is given 
minimal weight in the assessment and no prime sponsor in 1980 received a 
serious problem rating under IIBC because of deficient training. Process 
issues such as equal opportunity enforcement and monitoring procedures have 
received greater priority than measured performance. Even though outcomes 
will be increasingly stressed in future reviews, the shortcomings of the 
management information system will never permit accurate judgments about 
local performance which would justify stern penalties. To date, however, 
the annual reviews have had little or no effect on the amount of CETA local 
training or its quality.
299
The federal regulations do not preclude long-term training. The 
guidelines concerning the appropriate length of training suggest that six 
months is the minimum necessary training period for almost any occupation 
in which classroom or on-the-job training occurs under CETA, and even in 
these cases there is a presupposition of basic competencies which are 
frequently lacking among CETA participants and which would require extra 
time in addition to the vocational preparation. The two and one-half year 
limit on classroom training cannot be considered much of an impediment 
since less than one percent of fiscal 1977 classroom training entrants 
stayed in CETA for more than 450 days.
The regulations do limit on-the-job training. Quite simply, the 
payments to the employers do not compensate for the risk in hiring someone 
of less certain qualifications and the paperwork involved. While prime 
sponsors have varying success in securing employer cooperation, even the 
most successful have marketing difficulties. If GOT shares under Title 
IIBC were increased by a standard deviation, i.e., to a level now achieved 
by the best one-sixth of prime sponsors, opportunities would still be 
available for less than a fifth of participants. Experiments with varying 
subsidy levels and formats have demonstrated that employers are responsive 
to the level of reimbursement, and that the response rate escalates when 
the participant is payrolled from CETA for a try-out period rather than 
hired first by the employer. This is the only way most will give a chance 
to the more disadvantaged among CETA participants. In sites where the 
try-out approach was utilized for dropout youth and for disadvantaged 
students, OJT opportunities for even these hardest-to-employ groups 
expanded manyfold.
The federal measures which most affect the level and duration of 
classroom training are the supplemental vocational education set-aside (6 
percent of Title IIBC funds), the legislatively mandated training re 
quirement under public service employment (15 percent of Title I ID PSE 
expenditures in fiscal 1980), and special-purpose initiatives such as the 
Skills Training Improvement Program (STIP) and HIRE, which provided funds 
for classroom training and on-the-job training respectively, but only to 
those prime sponsors who could use the money and meet requirements. The 
increase in the vocational education set-aside from 5 to 6 percent in the 
1978 amendments, the phase-up of the STIP program, and the PSE training 
requirements, accounted for most of the increase in local classroom 
training activity between fiscal 1977 and fiscal 1979. The Private Sector 
Initiative Program which established local Private Industry Councils (PICs) 
and set aside funds for private-sector oriented activities also increased 
the share of funds going to training, simply because work experience was 
intended as a last resort for the funds allocated for PICs. PICs have not 
had an easier time marketing OJT than prime sponsors, and, hence, have 
turned to classroom training and transition services. The expectations 
that business participation in decisionmaking and the intermediation of a 
business-oriented local group in the delivery process would make OJT more 
attractive, placement easier and employer cooperation much more likely, 
were unquestionably exaggerated. PICs may do marginally better than prime 
sponsors, and the increment may be worth the cost, but more fundamental 
changes in policies and practices will be necessary to improve the 
effectiveness of local programs in private sector placement.
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An Alternative Approach—The Lessons from Job Corps
The Job Corps, operating under national direction and drawing par 
ticipants from all areas of the country, offers several important lessons 
for the design and management of training activities:
First, Job Corps is the only CETA activity which invests substantially 
in the "hardest of the hard-core." The demography of Job Corps par 
ticipants has changed hardly at all over the years and the legislative 
stipulation of services has thwarted the attempts by budget cutters and 
critics of intensive investments to trim the sinew and bone, rather than 
the fat, from the program. To achieve similar targeting and intensive 
investments under local pograms, it is probably necessary to specify both 
service mix and the eligibility focus in the law and regulations, and to 
shift more responsibility to the national or perhaps state level rather 
than locally, where there are so many pressures to both dilute service 
intensity or to "cream" whenever significant opportunities are provided.
Second, the residential dimension of Job Corps is a critical element. 
The program draws individuals from areas of greatest need—usually where 
institutions are overburdened or nonexistant—and provides exposure to 
alternatives and a developmental opportunity. The number of intercity 
moves for job-related reasons are more than twice as high for Job Corps 
participants as for controls in the first year and a half after termina 
tion. Job Corps is the only CETA program which is not localized. Most 
"national" programs funded under Title III of CETA provide extra service 
and delivery options which augment local activities but involve neither 
recruitment from multiple prime sponsors nor mobility of participants.
Third, the Job Corps management approach is unique. Three-fifths of 
Job Corps centers are operated on a contract basis by private corporations 
or nonprofit organizations. Competition provides options. Where a 
contractor performs poorly, another can be selected. In contrast, it is 
extremely difficult to suspend decisionmaking and management authority of a 
local government unit. It is particularly difficult to fire the local 
bureaucracies directing the programs. And where the same government units 
are responsible for both decisionmaking and management, they are likely to 
choose the approaches which are easiest or safest to manage, rather than 
what may be best for participants. Private sector management per se is not 
necessarily more effective—at least this has not been the case in Job 
Corps, where nonprofit and public managers of contract centers have done as 
well as private corporations—but the competition provided by the contract 
approach, the flexibility to hire and fire, the separation of policymaking 
and program management, have all proved beneficial. Where private or 
nonprofit contractors operate in multiple sites, there are economies of 
scale and the potential for specialization of staff and standardization of 
management approaches. The annual budgets are larger for some contractor- 
managed centers than for many prime sponsors, and the provision of 
comprehensive services for the severely disadvantaged is much more 
challenging. Contracting for the management of local programs is an option 
which should certainly be considered where local public sector management 
has proved deficient.
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Fourth, Job Corps offers a complete spectrum of opportunities ranging 
from special aid to the learning disabled all the way to college options 
for Corpsmembers who advance rapidly, from vocational training in jani 
torial work for persons unable to perform any other jobs to multi-year 
training as computer customer engineers. If individuals cannot be served 
appropriately at one center, they can be moved to a component at another. 
Instruction is individualized and self-paced. Achievements are recorded 
and rewarded. The standardized educational programs are based around a 
diagnostic, prescriptive and progress measurement system. Most available 
public and private sector materials have been screened and cross-referenced 
to this system, so that there are a number of options to suit the interests 
and needs of each individual. Likewise, occupational training is struc 
tured around competency-oriented skill and knowledge hierarchies for each 
vocation, with recording of progress for each trainee. In all Job Corps 
offerings, then, enrollees are placed according to ability or interest, can 
advance as rapidly as possible, can be rewarded for measured accomplish 
ments and can compete for advanced opportunities available within the 
system based on performance within the system. This approach is in marked 
contrast to local CETA programs which offer "one-shot" treatment in most 
cases, with few incentives for performance, no uniform records of achieve 
ment, and limited opportunities for "quantum leaps."
Fifth, all activities in Job Corps operate under detailed national 
standards dictating minimum qualitative and quantitative inputs. On-site 
reviews can, therefore, assure that input standards are met. The use of a 
standardized competency assessment and progress systems for the vocational 
and educational components allows comparison across centers. With the same 
essential mix of services from center to center, enrol lee surveys can be 
and are used to identify potential problems in components. Most criti 
cally, with costs negotiated and itemized by detailed component, and with 
components relatively standardized, outcomes relative to national norms can 
be used to assess performance. The poor performing center operators have 
few excuses, and hence low performers are subject to greater pressures and 
are likely to improve over time. Because the service mix and intensity of 
local CETA operations is so variable and because there are no qualitative 
standards, it is difficult to get the same torque on prime sponsors with 
the CETA performance measurement system.
Sixth, recruitment and placement are the weak links of nationally- 
directed programs such as Job Corps, and they require more attention. Job 
Corps recruits through its own system of contractors, primarily the state 
Employment Services. Few prime sponsors use Job Corps as a treatment 
alternative on a regular basis. Some enrollees could be better served in 
local programs, while many participants in local CETA activities should be 
in Job Corps. Job Corps also has its own largely separate placement system 
that works in getting completers into jobs, but does not help dropouts and 
partial completers for the most part, in contrast to local classroom 
training where placement is more often provided to participants whatever 
their duration of stay. As a result, many Corpsmembers have depressed 
earnings during the first month or so after termination even though they 
eventually break even or surpass like nonparticipants. This transition 
could be eased if local prime sponsors had the responsibility of placing 
individuals sent off to Job Corps for training and subsequently returning 
to the locality without a job, and if they were notified immediately or
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even before scheduled exit. In other words, local activities must be 
better linked with nationally-operated programs. They must begin to 
operate in tandem rather than in isolation.
An Assessment of Operational Experience
All the facts and figures on training and its impacts reduced to some 
rather simple conclusions: CETA (or its successor) should put more 
emphasis on training, the duration of classroom training should be longer, 
and on-the-job training opportunities should be expanded. Placement 
efforts should go hand-in-hand with training, with an emphasis on securing 
training-related jobs. Competency attainment should be stressed and 
performance standards maintained for participants. Career-oriented 
opportunities should be available for those who prove themselves in the 
system.
The CETA system is not now designed nor managed to achieve these ends. 
This is a statement of fact, not a critique. CETA's mission over the last 
decade has been, first and foremost, to create jobs, which was probably 
appropriate as the economy strained to absorb the ever-increasing numbers 
of youth and female labor force participants. Evidence in support of new 
missions and approaches has not been available until recently. The decline 
in labor force entrants which will provide the imperative for change is 
only beginning to occur. Yet if past patterns are justified, they also 
offer clues concerning the changes in policy and practice most likely to 
move the system along the paths which are, in light of new evidence and 
emerging labor market trends, now more appropriate.
Decentralization and decategorization were initiated under CETA in the 
belief that decisions about services, delivery agents and participants 
could best be made at the local level in response to local conditions. 
Diversity was both expected and desired. A planning system and procedural 
rules were formalized to assure a fair and reasoned set of decisions, 
placing primary reliance on an analysis of labor market conditions as a 
guide to local decisions. It would be expected, then, that areas with 
similar economic conditions or similar target groups would tend to adopt 
similar choices among intervention alternatives. Recognizing the crudeness 
of area data as well as participant, service mix and outcome measures, it 
is surprising that the service patterns, which vary so markedly among prime 
sponsors, bear little relation to either area unemployment rates—the 
primary consideration in planning and allocation—or to the proportion of 
youth served—the participant mix factor expected to have the largest 
impact on the choice of local service strategies. The findings discount 
the most common excuses of prime sponsors, i.e., that training does not 
occur because the "feds" force too many youth to be served, that below 
average OJT enrollments are necessitated by high unemployment, or that 
placement rates cannot be improved because of the participant mix or area 
conditions. Decisions are more determined by the structure of the 
decisionmaking unit, its size, and the historical approaches prevailing in 
different regions.
Because of the difficulty in pinning down activities, services, or 
outcomes, much less their interrelationships, performance monitoring has
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been basically a ritual exercise. Where the diversity is so great because 
of local flexibility and the lack of federal standards, it is difficult to 
second-guess any local decision or to judge local outcomes. Unlike Job 
Corps, where one center is very much like another, and the activities are 
defined by a set of detailed requirements for each element, the descriptors 
for local activities which are used in the federally-mandated management 
information system are not very specific and the content standards for 
activities are almost nonexistent. "Classroom training," even with a 
single prime sponsor, may range from a few hours of motivational and 
character development activities to full-time occupational training for 
over a year. Within even the broad descriptor categories, there is no 
identification of the types of participants or the outcomes. The outcome 
measures are also so vague that they tell very little about performance; it 
is doubtful whether a "positive termination" really means anything and 
impossible to tell whether a "placement" is training related. Without the 
ability to measure what activities are occuring, without standards about 
what should, as a minimum, go into each of these activities, and without 
outcome measures available by characteristic of participants and services 
received, it is impossible to make judgments about whether the activities 
are adequate or the outcomes appropriate. Hence, the federal oversight 
system focuses neither on inputs and their quality, nor on outputs and 
their meaningfulness, but rather on processes. Acceptable processes do not 
guarantee (and in fact may not even promote) wise decisions or positive 
results. For instance, the summer programs operated by prime sponsors were 
accepted until the last few years as long as plans were filed and the 
participants and expenditures counted. Yet inadequate worksite activities, 
poor supervision, and slack worksite standards were found in recurring 
assessments by the General Accounting Office. Beginning in 1978 the 
Department of Labor began to specify standards about what was required in 
worksites, provided models, demanded specification of activities in 
worksite agreements, but more critically, used these standards and 
agreements as the basis for massively expanded on-site monitoring. There 
were substantial improvements in the quality of worksite activities as a 
result. The improvements were documented by further site visits by the GAO 
and the Department of Labor's Inspector General, but were no more visible 
in the management information collected by the Department of Labor than 
were the earlier shortcomings. In fact, unit costs rose noticeably as a 
result of increased management and monitoring efforts and the enrichment of 
worksite activities. 2J
In a system which focuses on aggregates, and emphasizes quantity over 
quality, there is little incentive for the prime sponsor to develop high 
quality, intensive components. Since such components would serve only a 
small proportion of participants, their effectiveness would be completely 
hidden in a mass of numbers under the current management information 
system. Despite the cumbersome paperwork requirements on local systems, 
the management information system does not collect and report the right 
information needed to support local or federal management, or to promote 
either long-term training or the progression of individuals in an orderly 
way through local systems.
The boogeyman of the heavy-handed federal government squelching local 
creativity and dictating decisions turns out to be a pussycat. There is no 
evidence that the federal regulations or the federal oversight restrict the
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amount or duration of classroom training undertaken by prime sponsors. The 
law clearly allows for long training courses and urges targeting to those 
most in need in the eligible population. It is primarily local pressures, 
habit and administrative expediency which result in the broadest dis 
tribution of limited resources. Everyone wants more OJT, and federal 
oversight is certainly not the reason many prime sponsors do so little. It 
is simply too difficult to market to employers.
Yet if the federal presence is largely neutral concerning the exercise 
of local discretion over activity mix, intensity and targeting, the 
oversight is not benign. It focuses attention on ritual processes while 
providing no direction as to what is important. If the feds cannot or do 
not say what works or what the standards should be, nor do they review 
quality, neither can the local decisionmakers when dealing with politically 
connected local delivery agents. Why create new training institutions or 
approaches when existing deliverers are clamoring for support and there are 
no incentives and few performance or impact standards for justifying 
alternatives? Why concentrate resources when low costs and services for 
more participants are favored by both local politicians and accepted by 
federal monitors as an indication of efficiency. It takes all the 
ingenuity and resources available to the prime sponsor to avoid the process 
pitfalls that will be scrutinized in federal review, and to generate the 
plans and modifications required by the feds even though they have little 
to do with operational realities.
The basic issue, however, is whether decisionmaking should be 
localized. A rational local decisionmaker conscientiously assessing 
placement rates, costs and three month follow-up results might rationally 
decide to emphasize work experience, or to put ten participants through 
4-week training rather than offer one participant 40 weeks of training. 
From the local viewpoint, the effectiveness differentials do not square 
with those estimated by the "ivory tower" national impact studies. Since 
the most rational decision from a local perspective is also the most 
expedient, all the better! If residents must be placed only in local jobs, 
and if these are scarce, the training options or payoffs may be limited so 
that job creation and short training for menial positions are the best al 
ternatives. It is not a condemnation of the quality of local decision- 
makers to suggest that they may not know best in their limited context, and 
that it may not be best to limit the decisionmaking context to the local 
area.
More classroom training can be accomplished by expanding the state 
set-aside for vocational education, categorizing resources for training as 
in PSIP, requiring training under work experience as in PSE, or overlaying 
a competitively-funded program such as STIP. Longer training can be 
accomplished by duration specifications for these earmarked and extra 
dollars, by emphasis from the federal level, and by the use of management 
information system descriptors that identify costs for specific types and 
intensities of services so that false economies are not achieved by 
shifting to less intensive activities within broad service categories. 
Marginally more OJT can be accomplished by guidelines, set-asides or 
competitive funding to areas able to move OJT dollars, but the real answer 
is to change the formula to provide for a "try-out" period before a hiring 
decision or training contract is signed with the employer.
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These actions would focus federal policy, but would not represent a 
reduction in local control, since there are already copious set-asides, 
categorical titles, minimum spending requirements and the like. The key is 
to align these requirements so that they achieve a coherent policy and 
provide clear guidance.
The real issue, then, is whether a consistent national policy can be 
developed and sustained. Currently the local CETA system tries to respond 
to ever-changing priorities, and make the most rational decisions based on 
the evidence at hand, but the directions are not clear and the locus of 
decisionmaking inappropriate. The answer is not a new program model, or 
more vigorous performance monitoring, or redistribution of decisionmaking 
authority, although all these steps may be required. The key is, instead, 
to determine at the national level what we are trying to achieve with 
employment and training efforts, to set long-range goals, and to choose the 





The most basic issues underlying employment and training policies are 
rarely broached, and some basic tenets have been accepted without question 
since the emergence of manpower programs on a major scale in the mid-1960s. 
Because of cumulative changes, substantially different prospects for the 
future, and the current retrenchment and uncertainty, it is critical that 
these issues and postulates be reexamned.
At the inception of manpower programs, our nation's income maintenance 
system left much to be desired. Although many persons in need may still 
fall through the "safety nets," there has been dramatic improvement in the 
scale and scope of cash and in-kind aid. Where major gaps existed in the 
past, particularly in aiding the working poor, these have been partially 
bridged by food stamps, earned income tax credits, increased work in 
centives under welfare, expanded coverage and benefit levels under un 
employment insurance as well as boosts in the minimum wage. For instance, 
among the 5.5 million full-year labor force participants in 1980 whose 
earnings, combined with those of other family workers, were below the 
poverty level, 2.5 million were lifted out of poverty by receipt of 
transfers and other income, and the average poverty deficit was reduced by 
an eighth for those remaining below poverty. 3/ Wage and allowance 
policies under employment and training programs need to be reassessed in 
light of these changes.
There has been a significant reduction since the 1960s in labor market 
discrimination, making it possible for minorities with skills and cre 
dentials to compete on much more even terms than in the past. There is 
also less discrimination in mainstream institutions such as colleges, 
post-secondary schools and the apprenticeship system. To the degree 
minorities can reach these entry doors with the required abilities and cre 
dentials, they have much more equal access. Since action has now become 
less affirmative, deficits in preparation due to limited prior oppor 
tunities must be ovecome if further progress is to be achieved. Tra 
ditionally, employment and training programs have served as battering rams, 
or else have offered separate training in separate institutions. More 
emphasis may be needed on providing substantive skills and credentials so 
that the less employable can take advantage of increased mainstream 
opportunities.
When manpower programs emerged, the institutional infrastructure was 
quite limited. There were few community- and neighborhood-based organi 
zations representing those in need. Primary emphasis was placed on 
building institutional capacity and diversity. Likewise, to the extent 
mainstream institutions had previously ignored the disadvantaged and their 
special needs, the programs had institutional change missions. Practicing 
what was preached, primary emphasis was placed on equal opportunity 
employment of women and minorities in the mangement and delivery jobs in 
the manpower growth industry. Now, with a wealth of community institutions 
established, much institutional change achieved, and employment and 
training programs a declining industry, it is neither appropriate nor 
possible to give these goals the same priority as in the past, although
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they should certainly not be abandoned. Likewise, when resources were 
plentiful, a "live-and-let-live" attitude prevailed among different 
institutions. Reductions in funding will necessarily increase friction as 
each interest seeks to protect its own rice bowl. Unless there is a clear 
sense of goals and objectives, institutional leverage and political power, 
rather than the needs of those being served, will dictate the relative 
burdens of retrenchment.
Though retrenchment exacerbates tensions and debate, it occurred 
because the consensus in support of employment and training policy had 
already ruptured. By the close of the 1970s, the notion of an active 
manpower policy—with countercyclical job creation efforts built on a 
stable base of structural employment and training activities—was 
undermined by the evidence of serious operational difficulties but even 
greater political liabilities related to large-scale job creation. 
Continually changed policy thrusts and overreactions to each perceived 
problem had produced a complex system, difficult to understand and almost 
impossible to administer because of the intricate procedures implemented to 
achieve contradictory objectives. The panaceas had all been tried with 
little effect. For instance, CETA was initiated as a block grant approach, 
promising that decentralization and decategorization would improve the 
quality of services. Yet most of the flaws of CETA which were highlighted 
in the late 1970s were problems of misuse of local control made possible by 
the lack of effective federal oversight, not the problems of too much 
central control. It is ironic that the strongest advocates of a block 
grant approach are also the most vociferous critics of CETA's failings at 
the local level. A variety of mechanisms have been tried in an attempt to 
increase private sector involvement, from the efforts of the National 
Alliance of Business under the JOBS program to the creation of local 
Private Industry Councils. NAB worked for a while in the tight labor 
markets of the 1960s but its leverage soon dissipated. Some PICs have 
worked, most have not, but they certainly have not proved a savior of CETA. 
Federally-directed efforts have been good in some cases and bad in others. 
Some states have effectively utilized Governors' grants to link and improve 
local activities; most have not. Metropolitan-wide activities have been 
encouraged with modest incentives for consortia, but performance has been 
disappointing to those who favor planning and delivery on a labor market 
basis. In other words, there are few untried ideas and hence little faith 
that organizational changes alone will make a major difference.
Turning to the future, two major developments are likely to sub 
stantially alter the setting of employment and training activities. The 
labor markets of the next two decades will differ sharply from the 
preceding two. The leveling off in female labor force participation and 
the aging of the post-war babies into their prime working years will reduce 
the surfeit of menial workers while increasing competition for mid-career 
jobs. Labor market changes should improve the potential effectiveness of 
training for persons of limited employability, but they will require 
changes in approach. The diversified post-secondary education and training 
system that was developed in response to the post-war baby boom will face 
severely declining enrollments as this demographic cohort ages. While the 
mainstream system focused primarily on advantaged groups in the past, 
justifying the creation of a separate track for the disadvantaged, the 
system will no longer have the luxury of such creaming. There are, then,
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physical and human resources available that can be tapped to upgrade the 
quality of training and to increase the training options for those at the 
end of the labor queue.
These past, present and future developments necessitate a recon 
sideration of some fundamental issues and assumptions—however painful this 
process may be. First and foremost, it is necessary to decide on the basic 
missions of employment and training programs. Second, it must be de 
termined whether or to what extent to maintain a separate remedial system 
varying in approach and assumptions from mainstream institutions. Third, 
the income maintenance policies must be reexamined and perhaps reconsti 
tuted to reflect changes which have occurred. Fourth, a determination must 
be made whether to continue spreading resources broadly among clients or to 
try to concentrate on fewer individuals in order to prepare them to compete 
more equally for available employment and higher education opportunities. 
Finally, there must be a recognition of the limits as well as potentials 
for improvement in employment and training efforts.
Rethinking the Missions
Clear definition of purpose is the foundation of effective social 
policy. A vast array of missions have been assigned to employment and 
training activities. In some cases, these missions have been contra 
dictory. In the absence of priorities, they have always competed for 
scarce dollars and attention. In simplest terms, it is unresolved whether 
manpower programs are addressing a cyclical rather than structural problem, 
whether they are targeted for people or for places, and whether their aim 
is to provide palliatives rather than cures. According to the legislative 
statement of purpose, CETA is intended "to provide job training and 
employment opportunities for economically disadvantaged, unemployed or 
underemployed persons which will result in an increase in their earned 
income, and to assure that training and other services lead to maximum 
employment opportunities and enhance self-sufficiency." These are fine 
words, but too vague for federal or local policy formulation. The un 
employed, underemployed, or disadvantaged may be suffering from either 
short-term or long-term problems; and different sections of the law define 
eligibility in different ways to differentiate between the structurally 
unemployed and the cyclically unemployed. Increases in earned income can 
be achieved through temporary subsidized jobs, placement and job access 
strategies, remedial band-aids, or significant enhancement in individual 
skills and abilities. The gains may reflect increased labor force par 
ticipation, stabler employment, better pay, occupational mobility, or a 
combination of all of these. The gains may be temporary, durable or even 
cumulative.
The relative emphasis on structural and countercyclical goals has 
changed from year to year, reflected in the violent fluctuations in funding 
levels for different activities. Between fiscal 1975 and 1976, the 
increase in job creation expenditures (measured in constant dollars) 
equalled 90 percent of the cumulative increase since the begining of the 
War on Poverty. Between 1977 and 1978, the increase in a single year was 
again equal to 90 percent of the cumulative increase in all preceding 
years. The constant dollar declines in the next two years erased three-
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fourths of this growth even though the aggregate level of unemployment 
hardly improved. At present, there is a general consensus that counter 
cyclical job creation is wasteful, but public opinion changes rapidly, and 
if there were a sudden increase in the unemployment rate, there would be a 
temptation to reinstitute job creation alternatives.
Such staggering fluctuations in funding and activity mix have ruptured 
the delivery system. Any private sector business doubling in size every 
four years would have growth pains, but if the product mix were substan 
tially altered each time without warning, while the organizational struc 
ture and accounting procedures were constantly changing, there is no way it 
could perform effectively. This is what has been asked of the employment 
and training delivery system.
However, growth and change are not the only problems. There are parts 
of the system that are designed and operated as if addressing short-term 
problems, although structural problems are supposed to be their objective. 
Resources are allocated according to relative unemployment rates and, as a 
result, there are dramatic year-to-year fluctuations in local activities 
even when the aggregate funding levels do not change, and even though 
structural problems do not fluctuate significantly over the short-run in 
either absolute or relative terms. Local prime sponsors are required to 
plan, contract, and deliver services on a year-to-year basis. Unspent 
resources at the end of the year are subject to reallocation.
This scenario affects all aspects of operations. It leads to programs 
of the lowest common denominator—those with the least complexity that are 
extensions of existing efforts and which can be expanded or reduced with 
little problem. The interventions selected are short-term so that they can 
be surged and can have an immediate impact. Such projects rarely consider 
multi-year or longer-term sequences for individual participants. Sequences 
could only be arranged by the prime sponsor by linking together separate 
activities, but each of these has very uneven enrollment patterns dictated 
by annual funding schedules. The staffing patterns are also affected. 
Only certain types of persons are willing to live with the uncertainty or 
can be found on a moment's notice. Usually, they are uncredentialed, ready 
to leave for other jobs, undermining stability of program delivery. 
Finally, the stop and go pattern, and the annual division of spoils among 
competing claimants, almost foreordains the use of existing community 
resources rather than the development over time of improved training 
programs, since their continuity cannot be guaranteed.
This approach to local CETA programs is in marked contrast to that for 
Job Corps. Each center is considered a federal investment with planned 
capital improvements over a multi-year period. Corpsmembers constantly 
upgrade the centers through work activities which teach vocational skills. 
Job Corps operational contracts are for two years with the possibility of 
extension for another year if performance is adequate. In the expansion of 
Job Corps in 1977-1980, careful attention was given to balancing the 
geographic distribution of centers, building up capacity for serving 
special needs populations, and diversifying training by the establishment 
of a range of advanced career training offerings. This was only possible 
because of the long-term focus and stable direction of the program. The 
best and most stable prime sponsors also have such a long-range institution
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building focus, but this is despite rather than because of the design of 
the planning and funding system for local programs.
Perhaps even more basic is the fact that funds are distributed to 
areas according to need. Jurisdictions with the fewest jobs and with the 
largest shares of their populations in need get disproportionate funding. 
These areas, faced with massive job deficits, are least able to invest in 
the long-term because of the immediacy of problems and the burdens of 
managing massive job creation activities; their developmental institutions 
are usually overburdened and the payoff of training is most questionable 
because there are few jobs for those trained. In some cases, such prime 
sponsors have been unable to spend their resources, in which case the 
dollars are reallocated to the better spenders, usually those whose 
problems are less severe, or those whose activities are even less ambi 
tious, and therefore easier to mount. Resources allocated to states have 
generally been redistributed to subareas based on need. Suburban and urban 
areas are offered mild encouragement to form consortia which will encompass 
whole labor markets, but they are then permitted to design activities which 
merely composite separate programs for separate residents rather than 
providing training and jobs where the opportunities are greatest (usually 
the suburban areas) for residents of the less affluent areas within the 
labor markets (usually the core cities). Finally, national programs other 
than Job Corps have generally been used to support community-based groups 
and unions in the delivery of localized services, diversifying offerings or 
increasing equity, but rarely aiding in mobility or providing anything 
which could not be developed locally. In other words, allocation to places 
has taken precedence over the most effective services to people. National 
programs, consortia, state activities and reallocated funds should all be 
used to encourage training and employment in areas where the opportunities 
are greatest for residents from areas where the opportunities are most 
limited. Instead of leaning against the wind, CETA has accepted, perhaps 
exacerbated, the status quo by its strictly localized focus.
CETA or its successor should be addressed exclusively to structural 
problems. It should be targeted to people not just places. It should aim 
to provide long-term cures rather than short-term palliatives. Thus, the 
legislative purpose of CETA or its successor should be reformulated (1) to 
provide employment and employability development activities for youth which 
will assure an equal opportunity to gain the basic competencies required in 
the competitive labor market; and (2) to provide adults suffering from 
persisting labor market-related hardship the training and other remedial 
services of adequate intensity, quality and duration to assure, as a 
minimum, the capacity for self-support, and to offer, as far as possible, 
opportunities for substantial career advancement commensurate with in 
dividual ability and commitment.
To achieve this purpose, several fundamental changes would be re 
quired. It is not enough to merely abandon the job creation titles of CETA 
and to continue with all the other requirements. Achievement of the 
structural mission requires realignment of the entire system including 
planning, management information, regulations, allocation formulae, 
eligibility rules, and most critically, funding stability. Uniform eli 
gibility and allocation formulae are needed which focus on economic hard 
ship—the longer-term problems of individuals rather than just their cur-
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rent status, and the structural problems of areas, not just their transient 
unemployment difficulties. Employability plans for individuals would 
emphasize long-term as well as short-term aims, i.e., indicating the 
advanced opportunities for which they might compete and the performance 
standards in the immediate offerings which would serve as the basis for 
this competition. The sequencing of program components, based on per 
formance at each step, would be encouraged. "Opportunity tracks" of 
advanced training and career access opportunities would be developed over 
time and maintained with links to the current short-term activities. All 
resources not allocated to, or not spent by, local areas would be used to 
provide opportunities for training and employment wherever these could most 
effectively be provided but reserved for persons from areas where the 
structural problems are most severe. Aggregate funding targets would be 
established for the long-term, with two-year advanced funding facilitating 
a two-year planning and contracting cycle.
Mainstreaming
Most of our nation's formal training is provided in post-secondary 
schools and colleges. Public expenditures for secondary, vocational and 
higher education were on the order of twenty times greater than the best 
guess of private sector expenditures for formal training in 1980, and over 
seventy times greater than CETA training outlays for the disadvantaged.
The mainstream system of preparation for work has several predominant 
features. First, it is a system which maintains standards at each level 
for the quantity and diversity as well as the quality of inputs. Second, 
it also maintains standards for individual progression through the system, 
with minimum requirements for graduation from any level, and more refined 
measures of performance that can be used in assessing qualifications for 
movement to the next level. Third, the system is self-contained, with 
built-in ladders and pathways so that performance at one level determines 
the probability and direction of transition to the next. The payoffs for 
completing any given level and the promise of the opportunities at the next 
provide motivation for individual performance. Fourth, the system sorts 
individuals so that, on average, those who advance are better able to meet 
the requirements of the next level than those who do not. Fifth, there are 
a number of second chance options such as alternative schools, less 
demanding colleges or two-year institutions, in order to allow for the fact 
that the sorting does not work perfectly. Finally, the system provides 
credentials which are recognized in the labor market, and these credentials 
are supplemented by more detailed information about the institutions or the 
individual's performance in them which provides a further basis for 
assessing ability.
Most of the problems in this mainstream system are related to devia 
tions from these principles—deficiently trained teachers, grade inflation 
and automatic promotion, unequal chances of advancement for persons of like 
ability, sorting on the basis of factors unrelated to performance, the lack 
of adequate second chance options, and the resulting debasement of the 
diploma as a credential for judging past and potential performance.
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The local training and remediation system for those failing in or 
failed by these mainstream institutions operates by a completely different 
set of principles. There are no system-wide specifications of course 
content or personnel qualifications. Expectations and measures of par 
ticipant performance are minimal, and, strict completion standards are the 
exception rather than the rule. For most participants, the primary 
activity is prescribed at entrance and is a single experience followed by 
termination. Because there are no higher level opportunities within CETA 
allocated on the basis of performance within the system, and because 
allowances often equal or exceed the starting salaries in potential jobs, 
there is little incentive for the more able to work harder and accelerate 
learning. Sorting is discouraged. Although early leavers tend to be the 
less employable among trainees, the allowance system encourages par 
ticipants to remain in training even when they are not performing, and the 
management information system penalizes projects with high termination. 
Consequently, completion of a CETA training program does not mean much to 
employers unless the training is secured from a mainstream institution with 
its own reputation and standards, or achievements of participants are 
referenced to some outside credential standard such as the GED.
There are several reasons why principles and practices of the remedial 
system are so divergent from those of mainstream institutions. One is 
ideology—the belief that individuals who have failed in or been failed by 
the schools and the labor market need success not reinforcement of previous 
failure. Sorting is resisted on the grounds that identification of 
"winners" also requires identification of "losers." Manpower programs 
emerged in the 1960s as a "piece of the action" for institutions and 
individuals left out of the mainstream, so that different principles were 
adopted as a rationale for a separate system. Remedial training activities 
on a major scale are only two decades old, and delivery personnel have not 
yet been professionalized and standards for local activities have not been 
developed, as they were, over time, in the more stable and mature voca 
tional education system. The uncertain financial support provided for 
remedial training, and the emphasis on day-to-day operations and "body 
counts," has discouraged the development of an institutional infra 
structure. Short-duration, "one-shot" courses are dictated by the 
planning, contracting and funding cycles. Local systems could not mature 
because of the frequent changes in policy, fluctuations in resources and 
the harried pace of growth.
With its principles so at variance with those of mainstream insti 
tutions, the local training and remediation system has difficulty in 
establishing linkages. Only a portion of its participants can meet entry 
standards without remediation, but CETA's focus has traditionally been just 
this first remedial step. Courses may be purchased from local insti 
tutions, but these often amount to a special class for CETA enrollees, 
frequently of shorter duration and with lower standards.
Job Corps is the exception. It was designed to parallel and link with 
mainstream institutions. It has competency-based vocational and educa 
tional programs that document individual achievement, with standards for 
progress and completion. Job Corps "sorts" in that less than one of three 
entrants meets completion standards. Advanced career training components 
provide multiple options all the way up to enrollment in two-year and
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four-year colleges, but only to Corpsmembers who prove themselves in the 
system. Thus, when linkages with mainstream institutions are achieved, 
success in Job Corps can be, and has been, rewarded. For instance, unions 
have agreed to apply apprenticeship standards in many of the Job Corps 
training courses which lead to qualification for skilled craft jobs and ac 
ceptance by employers. Similarly, vocational schools, colleges and junior 
colleges involved in advanced training have awarded credit for Job Corps 
education and training. The problem is not one of design but of recog 
nition. The Job Corps is relatively small and its centers are isolated, so 
that employers and institutions may not be familiar with the Job Corps 
approach.
There is no conclusive evidence but no real doubt that participants in 
remedial programs are more likely to succeed in the labor market if they 
can be trained in mainstream institutions and participate according to 
mainstream principles. Almost any employer will credit completion of a 
year's training at a local community college or a recognized proprietary 
training institution higher than a year's training in a program established 
by CETA. The CETA reference alone may have negative connotations, and a 
participant supported by CETA to go to a local mainstream training insti 
tution might do better by disguising this sponsorship.
Some doubt that CETA eligibles can effectively navigate in the main 
stream, but the evidence suggests that they can, with a little help. In 
May 1981, 1,800 of the 42,000 Job Corpsmembers were enrolled in post- 
secondary institutions. Over two-thirds of those who had been enrolled the 
previous year returned—a rate equalling that of regular students in the 
institutions. These youth would not have been in college without this 
assistance. Less than half a percent of a comparison group for 1977 Job 
Corps participants were in college in 1979. In a structured experiment to 
test a GI-Bill voucher approach as an alternate treatment strategy for 
CETA-eligible youth, only half of the control group attended college the 
next year, compared to nine-tenths of those provided tuition and expenses, 
as well as counseling and other assistance. Among the experimentals, 
four-fifths of those who attended college were still enrolled through three 
semesters compared with only half of the controls who originally matric 
ulated. Those participants who were in the cohorts receiving educational 
and personal counseling had better retention than those simply provided 
financial support. 4/
Some argue that mainstream institutions will not serve the disad- 
vantaged, but there is no question that opportunities will be increasing. 
Unlike the 1970s when enrollment in two-year post-secondary institutions 
almost doubled from 2.2 to 4.2 million while enrollment in four-year 
institutions rose from 6.4 to 7.2 million, the enrollment in two-year 
institutions will decline to 3.8 million by 1988 unless there are changes 
in attendance patterns, while enrollments in four-year colleges will 
decline to 5.7 million. 5/ Excess capacity will generate increased 
interest from mainstream institutions. It is important to take advantage 
of these resources.
Congress has encouraged the use of these institutions through an 
emphasis in the law on cooperation and linkage. However, the real obstacle 
is not the relational process, but the fundamental mismatch between the
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principles of the mainstream and remedial systems. In order to fully and 
effectively utilize mainstream institutions, CETA will have to bring 
individuals up to normal entry standards, which, in turn, will require a 
two-tier approach, providing advanced offerings but only to those who 
demonstrate the motivation and ability in the first tier and come up to 
standards. The system now focuses primarily on preparation for and place 
ment in low level jobs without providing the more substantial opportunities 
which are possible and needed. The remedial system will be more acceptable 
to the private sector, and the credentials it provides will yield more 
payoff, if it operates like mainstream institutions.
Deemphasizing Income Maintenance
Employment and training programs began their rapid expansion as part 
of the War on Poverty, and income maintenance has always been one of their 
primary objectives, even though the rhetoric has emphasized future earnings 
improvements. For classroom training, the transfers are clearly identi 
fiable. Allowances represent over two-fifths of the cost of local train 
ing, with trainees receiving the minimum wage for hours of participation 
plus reimbursement for extra costs of participation. Unemployment in 
surance recipients have their weekly benefit subtracted from this al 
lowance. Welfare recipients receive $30 above their weekly welfare benefit 
plus expenses, rather than an hourly allowance. The transfer is not so 
identifiable but still substantial in other activities. For on-the-job 
training, participants are usually paid the going wage for the entry job to 
which they are assigned even though their productivity may be below 
average. It is difficult to estimate the gap between the productivity and 
learning rates of CETA trainees and other entry employees, although the 
assumption, stated in regulations, is that the OJT payment, usually half of 
the wage, covers this differential. In subsidized work programs, the dif 
ference between the usual minimum wage paid and the productivity of 
enrol lees represents income maintenance. For instance, for a variety of 
youth programs it is estimated that the work activities return between $.30 
and $.70 worth of value added for each dollar paid. 6/ The income transfer 
is, thus, between 30 and 70 percent of the wage bill. In some programs 
such as public service employment, where skilled but unemployed workers are 
hired, the value added may actually be higher than the wage paid. On 
average, though, when work experience is provided to persons of limited 
employability, there is an element of transfer.
There are several justifications for these income maintenance 
elements. Training and work are constructive activities, returning future 
benefits in the first case and immediate benefits in the latter. From a 
social perspective, income transfers through training and work are more 
fruitful, less expensive, and therefore more politically acceptable, than 
subsidization of idleness. Many trainees could not afford to participate 
or would not be interested unless their income needs were met. For
classroom training, the use of the minimum wage as an hourly allowance 
makes training as attractive as work (or even more attractive since al 
lowances are not taxed). Also, minimum allowances and earning floors 
protect against erosion of competitive wage levels.
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There are also several arguments against income maintenance, at least 
as structured under current law and practice. More persons could receive 
work or training if the income maintenance elements were reduced. The 
allowances or wages are inherently inequitable, since opportunities are 
available for a small minority of the poor who are then usually lifted far 
above the poverty threshold by participation. Where the cash benefits of 
training or work are more attractive than the options in the labor market, 
participation may be encouraged even though training is not desired or the 
experience is not needed. Likewise, the differential may produce an 
incentive to remain in a program rather than to transition quickly into the 
labor market. When a minority of trainees participate only to get the 
income transfers, it can detract from the quality of the training for 
others. Work experience requiring less than "a day's work for a day's pay" 
may create unrealistic expectations and complicate adjustment to the 
competitive labor market. Finally, a high allowance floor limits the 
resources and range for incentive mechanisms.
The evidence provides some perspectives on these issues. Individuals 
lacking the resources for minimal subsistence would surely find successful 
participation difficult, and this absolute level of need is probably best 
defined by the poverty standard. As a result of eligibility requirements, 
almost all participants in classroom training have an annualized income 
over the last six months which is below the poverty threshold or 70 percent 
of the BLS lower living standard, or else they receive welfare. Their 
average annual poverty deficit--i.e., the amount needed to bring their 
income up to the poverty threshold (based on income recorded on CETA intake 
records, estimates of welfare benefits which are not counted in determining 
eligibility, family size at entry and the poverty levels associated with 
these size categories) was between $2000 and $2500 in fiscal 1979. It 
would be even less if account were taken of the food stamps received by a 
fourth of participants (in fiscal 1979). ]_/ A minimum wage allowance in 
1979 for 35 hours weekly of classroom training equalled an annualized $5300 
in untaxed income, with up to another $1000 available for dependents. In 
other words, the allowance would be between two-fifths and half as large if 
the aim were merely to assure all participants a subsistence (poverty) 
standard of living during participation.
Granted that no one gets rich by enrolling in a training course, the 
issue remains whether the scarce resources have been husbanded sufficiently 
or divided equitably. Some people have been denied training because their 
income was barely above the poverty level; others a few dollars below the 
threshold enrolled and received allowances which moved them substantially 
above the poverty level. In the case of welfare recipients, however, it is 
assumed that the public assistance benefits meet needs, even though these 
benefits are substantially below poverty levels in most states. Recipients 
are provided $30 per week in addition to their normal benefit as an 
incentive to participate. Thus, a person from a family with exactly the 
same income from sources other than public welfare would receive an 
allowance three or four times as large as the stipend to recipients.
Does lesser income preclude the successful participation of welfare 
recipients? Single parents who apply to CETA are more likely than others 
to be assigned to classroom training (38 percent versus 30 percent in 
1980), AFDC recipients stay longer in training (33 percent of 1977 class-
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room trainees who were recipients stayed 180 days or more compared to 31 
percent of all participants), and have a dropout rate only slightly above 
average (27 percent versus 24 percent for 1977 enrolles) despite the longer 
duration of their scheduled training. jB/ In other words, it does not 
appear that the lack of the full hourly allowance is an impediment to 
participation, even for the group which has the greatest family responsi 
bilities.
Job Corps takes another approach. Its total transfers were estimated 
at approximately $3000 per Corpsmember year in fiscal 1977, but the monthly 
allowance and readjustment benefit accounted for less than a third of this 
total. The current allowance on entry is $40 per month, but this rises to 
as high as $100 per month depending on length of stay, as does the re 
adjustment allowance which is available upon termination. Job Corps has 
been able to fill its centers, even though it provides less cash in the 
pocket, because it offers a meaningful option to what is available locally. 
The incentives are unquestionably one of the factors contributing to longer 
stay.
If the allowance in local classroom training were reduced by half, it 
would mean roughly a one-fifth reduction in per participant costs. 
Training programs might also economize by registering participants for the 
welfare benefits to which they are entitled. One-sixth of classroom 
training entrants in fiscal 1980 were eligible but not receiving public 
assistance at application, and many more were eligible for but not 
receiving food stamps. 9/ The preferred payment might be through an al 
lowance, but the source of the funding might better be the income main 
tenance programs if the aim were to maximize the amount of training with 
the scarce resources targeted for this purpose. Rational local decision- 
makers would prefer to avoid registration since they share in local welfare 
costs while the allowances are totally funded by the federal government. 
Likewise, they would prefer to place recipients in work experience, since 
the wages offset welfare payments while the allowances do not.
The level of allowances obviously affects the payoff of training from 
a taxpayer's perspective. Under the most reasonable assumptions, the 
taxpayer benefit-cost ratio for classroom training was estimated to be .73 
for 1976 participants. If allowances were reduced by half, the ratio would 
rise to .91. Under more liberal assumptions about the continuance of 
post-program gains, the higher estimate of the taxpayer benefit-cost ratio 
were near the breakeven point under the current allowance approach, but 
would rise substantially above it if allowances were paid up to the poverty 
level rather than on an hourly basis. Allowances are not counted as costs 
in social benefit-cost calculations, since they are a transfer from 
nonparticipants to participants, but the same public expenditure would 
produce more social benefits if there were no allowance payment and more 
individuals could be served.
The evidence that allowances attract and hold participants who have 
little desire for training is circumstantial. There have been no careful 
tests of alternative formulations, and the few unstipended activities have 
usually been short-term and in competition with stipended approaches. 10/ 
However, the circumstantial evidence is compelling. Among fiscal 1976 
classroom training entrants, only 37 percent were employed 12 months prior
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to entry and 20 percent one month before entry. With the allowance pro 
viding a minimum wage income or an incentive supplement to welfare pay 
ments, it is clear that at least four-fifths and probably more received a 
higher income in-program than one month prior to entry, and at least 
three-fifths received more than they had before any temporary problems were 
encountered. Likewise, the post-program employment rates were 42 percent 
one month after termination rising to 54 percent one year later, i.e., 
nearly three-fifths received more income during participation than they 
could and would immediately afterward, while nearly half received more than 
they would one year later, ll/ It would certainly be understandable if 
persons lingered in training and if delivery agents were reluctant to 
terminate participants with inadequate performance.
The effectiveness of allowances structured as incentives has not been 
tested, but certainly the logic is compelling. If each trainee in fiscal 
1976 were provided a $100 bonus for finding immediate employment in a 
training related job, there would have been a "windfall" for the 42 percent 
securing employment without the bonus, but the $4200 for every 100 par 
ticipants would have been more than offset if just one more of the 
remaining 58 per hundred got and kept a job for one year at the average 
immediate post-program earnings of $6700. The economics are even greater 
if self-placement can substitute for institutional placement. For in 
stance, Employment Service costs per placement averaged $160 in fiscal 
1980. The evidence of the success of low-cost job search assistance 
suggests that this activity coupled with placement bonuses for classroom 
trainees could probably make a substantial difference in placement rates 
and placement costs. On the other hand, incentives for staying only make 
sense if there are completion standards and the bonus is based on com 
petency attainment, not just staying. All incentives need not be 
financial. If career training opportunities were allocated based on 
performance in short, basic-level training activities, a lower incentive 
bonus might be used because the opportunity itself could provide moti 
vation.
The savings to be realized by paying lower wages to participants in 
work experience and OJT are potentially substantial, but there are several 
issues which must be addressed. If work experience were targeted to those 
with no recent employment and with extremely limited skills, the principle 
of a learner's differential—which is already contained in the Fair Labor 
Standards Act—would certainly make sense. If the work experience were 
structured as training, then part of the payment (up to the level of output 
of the participant) might be charged to wages and the remainder to 
allowances structured as incentives for performance and self-placement 
rather than paid for hours of participation. The mechanism for lower wages 
in OJT would be a "try-out" period in which the individual would be 
stipended by CETA as a training participant, receiving allowances rather 
than wages. The individual would not be an employee of the company and 
would not undercut wages. A reduction in wages for subsidized work which 
offers no training or employs those who could do the same work without 
training is certainly not reasonable. A requirement for remediation as 
part of all work experience, the use of work experience to identify 
training candidates, and a time limit on the allowance element in work 
experience would help to protect against abuse. On-the-job training at 
lower wages is inequitable if, as is usually the case now, the individuals
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placed are very closely matched in experience to the requirements of their 
jobs. But the try-out approach should permit the assignment of more 
disadvantaged participants since the uncertainty and risk are reduced for 
the employer. These safety features must be implemented as part of any 
changes in income maintenance approaches. Moreover, any reduction in 
allowances or wages will reduce the benefits to participants, and even if 
reductions are warranted from the taxpayer's perspective, they are only 
justified from a social welfare perspective if the savings are used to 
serve more individuals, to provide incentives for performance or to assure 
expanded training opportunities.
Penny Wise, Pound Foolish
A major policy issue is whether to invest intensively in a few in 
dividuals or less intensively in larger number. Because of scarce re 
sources, this rationing decision is unavoidable. The national impact data 
suggest that there are very substantial payoffs to longer term classroom 
training. The income gains relative to controls for 1976 participants were 
nearly four times as great for those staying 21-40 weeks as they were for 
those staying 11-20 weeks, and more than six times as great for those 
staying over 40 weeks. The evidence suggests that participants who are 
less employable and, in particular, black males, gain more from OJT than 
from any other intervention, so that this approach may make the most sense 
for persons most likely to be excluded from primary labor market jobs. 
Even with OJT subsidies, however, it will be difficult to market such 
individuals to employers unless their employability is first enhanced. Is 
longer-term classroom training, then, the answer? Can OJT be arranged so 
that less employable or higher risk persons can be placed after remedia 
tion? There are several factual and normative issues that must be 
addressed before reaching judgments on these questions.
While the comparison of average individual gains of long stayers 
versus short stayers strongly argues in favor of long-duration classroom 
training, a more appropriate perspective may be the total gains of trainees 
from different duration-of-stay combinations. Several persons can be 
trained short-term for every one trained long-term, and while the in 
dividual gains may be less for the short-timers, their combined gains might 
be greater. If it is assumed that the cost of training is directly pro 
portional to the weeks of training, then for every 100 persons receiving 
over 40 weeks of training (with an assumed average of 50 weeks), 167 could 
be served in the 21-40 week category (with an average of 30 weeks) and 333 
in the 11-20 week range (with an average of 15 weeks). Based on the gain 
estimates for fiscal 1976 classroom training enrol lees (leaving by the end 
of calendar 1976), the differential in total gains is less than the 
differential in average gains. Significantly, however, the payoff of 
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To the extent longer training pays off, it is important to determine 
whether participants will stay long enough to complete. The evidence 
suggests that the limited duration of CETA classroom training has not 
resulted primarily from high dropout rates. Among fiscal 1977 classroom 
trainees, just a fourth of those who reported on completion status con 
sidered themselves to have been dropouts. A third of these self-described 
completers participated for more than six months and 15 percent for over 9 
months, which was little different from the 27 percent and 13 percent 
respectively among all participants. Conversely, 34 percent of self- 
reported completers stayed less than 90 days, only slightly below the 38 
percent of all trainees. In other words, the distribution of actual 
training duration was not markedly different from the distribution of 
planned training duration. Significantly, most dropping out occurred 
early. Forty percent of self-described dropouts left the program within 
two months; past that point the dropout rate was relatively constant. Put 
another way, if a participant stayed more than two months the chances of 
completing were four in five. 13/ This suggests the possibility of 
two-stage training, where the initial two or three months are used to 
identify those seeking and likely to succeed in longer-duration training.
Length of stay
0-60 days 
More than 60 
More than 90 
More than 120 
More than 180 
More than 270
Dropouts as share of classroom 
trainees reporting on completion 








Factoring these dropout patterns into the simple model would increase 
the relative benefits of longer training. Each time an 11-20 week slot is 
refilled, the high probability of early leaving is faced again. The 
extension of the 11-20 week slot to a 40 week slot will mean fewer new 
entrants and a lesser percentage of early leavers. If those who drop out
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from longer training, say, during the 21-40 week period of a 50 week 
training program, experience the same gains as persons scheduled for 21-40 
weeks of training, then a longer scheduled period of training would almost 
always pay off. Multiple stages of training would help to assure this 
result.
The experience in Job Corps provides confirming evidence. The chances 
of completing a vocational program are 30 percent among all entrants, but 
among those staying more than 90 days, the chances increase to 50 percent. 
For all enrollees the average duration of stay is 6.0 months. For those 
who stay more than 90 days, the average is .9 years. Where advanced pro 
grams are offered which represent significantly better opportunities, and 
where individuals compete for and must prove themselves to get into these 
components, the dropout rate is extremely low. For instance, in the Job 
Corps advanced career training for computer customer engineers and 
operators—an eighteen month combination of work and training with guar 
anteed high salary jobs for completers--nearly nine of ten finished the 
training. In the advanced program in junior and community colleges, the 
length of stay of enrol lees was substantially longer than that of other Job 
Corps enrol lees staying more than 90 days while the retention rate in 
college equalled that for students in the schools in which they were 
enrolled. 14/ These advanced components required at least 90 days par 
ticipation in Job Corps, so that the early leavers were screened out. It 
appears, then, that the two stage approach does work.
Even if the extra immediate post-program earnings for short-term 
trainees cumulated to those of the long-term trainees, there are several 
reasons why the "quantum leaps" for fewer individuals might be preferred. 
For instance, 167 persons might be trained for an average of 15 weeks with 
two-thirds of those completing training and gaining $100 each in earnings. 
On the other hand, 50 persons might be trained for an average of 100 weeks, 
of whom only a third would complete but with gains of $770 each. Nomi 
nally, the benefits and costs would be the same. But society would have 83 
more welders and entry clerical workers in the first case while the second 
case would mean that it had 17 machinists or executive secretaries. The 
economy would probably be better off in the latter case if this meant 
filling skill shortages and helping to ease bottlenecks. Put another way, 
there is a fair chance that the short-term trainee is displacing a like 
person who would otherwise be getting the entry job, while there is less 
chance that the longer-term trainee would be displacing anyone, much less a 
peer, from a more skilled opportunity. In theory, it is also more likely 
that the longer training, if it provides a credential or a chance to enter 
and compete equally in a career track, would have greater continuity of 
benefits. The preliminary evidence offers only partial confirmation. 
Benefits increase between the first and second post-program years for 21-40 
week participants in contrast to those with shorter training, but they fade 
out somewhat for persons with 40 weeks or more of training. For women, 
however, the gain from longer training apparently increases over the 
post-program period. 15/
Another reason for longer training aimed to produce substantial career 
advancement is that it can be used as an incentive for performance in 
shorter training, just as the chance to get into a prestigious college is 
an incentive to maintain grades in high school. There is no reason to
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believe that the disadvantaged will respond to opportunities any 
differently, and the limited evidence supports this view. In Job Corps, 
for instance, the attendance and completion in on-center GED programs 
increased when the advanced program in colleges and junior colleges was 
introduced with the requirement of a diploma or GED before entry. 
Likewise, enrollees in Job Corps centers with more input into the college 
program indicated that they planned to stay longer in order to get into the 
advanced program. 16/ This incentive effect will only occur if there are 
enough advanced options, if they are attractive, if assignments into them 
are hinged on performance, and if the options and performance requirements 
are made known to enrol lees. If more advantaged participants are simply 
assigned at entry to the advanced courses, there is no incentive effect. 
Thus, it is necessary to integrate second tier with first tier oppor 
tunities if there is to be a synergy.
For OJT, the duration of stay is not the issue, but rather the 
differential between the experience and credentials of the participant and 
the minimal requirements of the job to which he or she is referred. The 
best approach would appear to be a combination of work experience and OJT, 
or classroom training and OJT, i.e., where the performance in a primary 
component would be used to identify potential as well as to improve skills 
up to the level required for entry and success in the on-the-job training. 
Unfortunately, this coupling of activities is rarely used. Only 2 percent 
of 1976 participants were enrolled in a combination of classroom training 
or work experience and OJT. 17/ Another approach would be to let the 
employer try out the participant before making the hiring decision. In 
either case, it would then be possible to increase the differential between 
measurable characteristics of the participant and the normal entry re 
quirements of the job without increasing the risks for the employer.
A Focus on Competencies
Competency-based approaches for education, vocational education, and 
employability development, seek to identify knowledge or skill "building 
blocks" and to arrange them hierarchically according to importance, 
difficulty, and pedagogical sequence. Learning and experiential activities 
are organized into units paralleling these competency clusters and 
hierarchies. Measurement information systems are formalized to assess 
skill or knowledge attainment and to track mastery of the building blocks. 
Step-off levels are identified where meaningful certification can be 
provided for mastery of the subsumed competencies for those not advancing 
further.
Most remedial and special education curricula are competency-based. 
In mathematics, they usually begin with addition and subtraction of whole 
numbers, multiplication, then division, fractions, decimals, and so forth. 
Addition is necessary before multiplication is possible, and multiplication 
is necessary before long division can be accomplished. To teach addition, 
as well as each of the subsequent competencies, there are tutorial 
materials, as well as sets of drill and practice exercises. Mastery of 
addition is tested by the ability to correctly answer a variety of 
problems, and progress to subtraction does not occur until addition skills 
are mastered. Likewise, remedial reading and language arts systems usually
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define clusters of skills or "strands" such as vocabulary, antonyms and 
synonyms, word usage, interpretation, and the like. Each strand has its 
own building blocks of lessons and tests. The building blocks in each 
strand are scheduled so that advancement along each strand provides the 
competencies needed to master competencies at the same levels in other 
strands. The levels can be set so as to parallel grade-level norms in the 
schools. GED instruction is based on a clustering of high school com 
petencies into five functional areas. A uniform national test, with five 
subparts, is used to measure initial skills in each category and lessons 
are structured to overcome test-measured deficiencies in any of these 
areas. There are a set of practive tests which can then be used to assess 
progress with the lessons, and when they are passed, the full GED test may 
be taken. Each state will grant a diploma to nongraduates who achieve 
adequate scores on each of the subtests, and an average for the total 
tests, as determined by varying state standards.
Competency-based vocational training curricula have been developed in 
almost every occupation. As an example, competency-based courses in 
carpentry usually begin with lessons concerning safety, terminology, tool 
usage and care, and the understanding of sketches. The next cluster may 
include laying-out and grading foundations, and might then advance to 
clusters of lessons concerning framing, roofing, exterior work, interior 
finishing, and finally remodeling. There may be several building blocks in 
each of these clusters. An entry carpenter might need basic knowledge in 
each of these clusters. An advanced carpenter might need a higher level of 
skills in each cluster. Skills are usually assessed by knowledge tests, 
but also by the successful completion of designated tasks.
There are also some competency-based approaches for basic life skills 
training and employability development. For instance, some curricula 
subdivide basic life skills into areas such as consumer skills, citizen's 
rights, job application and job search techniques, career knowledge, and 
the like, with lessons designed to achieve each of these clusters of skills 
and with written tests to measure skill or knowledge mastery.
The various alternative competency-based education, vocational 
training and employabilty skills systems differ in the specificity and 
clustering of their building blocks, the design of the knowledge/skills 
hierarchies, the segment of the hierarchy to which they are directed, as 
well as the number and types of tests or tasks to demonstrate competency 
attainment. They also differ in the lessons and activities which are 
developed to provide each identified competency.
The setting in which they are applied also varies. At the extreme is 
the Job Corps education approach. All Corpsmembers operate within a 
uniform system, all materials in Job Corps are referenced to the same 
standards, all individual options within Job Corps depend on progress 
within this system, and individual teachers and centers can be judged 
relative to their ability to move students forward in this system. In most 
other settings, the competency-based approach is less comprehensive. One 
in five high schools in the nation requires seniors to pass an individual 
competency test. Some states and some local school systems have adopted 
competency systems for the kindergarten through 12th grade levels which 
dictate the skills required to move from each grade to the next and they
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have restructured curricula to focus specifically on these competencies. 
Most employ a single competency test which seniors must pass to graduate. 
Two of three schools with competency tests for graduation have at least 
some special remedial courses developed to overcome specific deficiencies 
as measured by these tests. In many other cases where there are no 
competency standards overall, a competency-based system may operate 
alongside regular classroom instruction. For instance, students may spend 
some of their day in self-paced computer-assisted instruction systems based 
on competency hierarchies, but participate the rest of the day in a regular 
classroom where progress is graded relative to class norms. For vocational 
training, there are a few occupations such as radiology or nursing where 
licensure requirements serve as the reference points for the competency 
standards. Apprenticeship involves the specification of the skills which 
must be mastered and provides the framework for competency-based in 
struction in apprenticeable occupations. The apprenticeship standards and 
training requirements for each occupation vary from state to state, but the 
systems for any given occupation have a great deal of similarity. In most 
applications, however, competency-based vocational training systems are 
restricted to a single delivery institution or set of institutions. Some 
public and many private for-profit institutions structure their training to 
"meet the needs of industry," i.e., they determine their competency 
hierarchies and the step-off levels in conjunction with representatives of 
the private sector. However, such efforts are usually ad hoc.
Competency-based systems have several inherent advantages: First, 
they usually involve individualized, self-paced learning. This has 
pedagogical as well as operational attractions. Individualized systems 
make sense for those who can progress faster or cannot progress as fast as 
norms. Where individualized systems are in place, it is not necessary to 
segregate the slow or fast learners in special classes in order to meet 
their needs. Many students learn more easily when lessons are organized in 
"bite-sized" chunks which provide positive reinforcement each time one is 
mastered. Some individuals can do better when compared with their own 
abilities rather than classroom norms which compound their inadequacies. 
Such systems help to identify when skills are not mastered so that remedial 
attention can be concentrated when and where it is most needed. In a 
regular classroom a student may sit quietly for a semester and never learn 
anything without this being noted; a unit approach provides continuing 
indication of effort and accomplishment.
Second, in any system which serves those who have severe income and 
earnings problems in need of immediate attention, participation cannot be 
scheduled on a semester basis. Instruction needs to be open-entry and 
exit. Participants will vary widely in capacity, so that any remedial 
system of instruction must allow entry at the level of ability. Remedial 
treatments are voluntary rather than legally enforced like school 
attendance, and the disadvantaged may have many problems that interrupt 
their courses mid-stream. A competency-based system is ideal since they 
can return later without repeating all previously learned segments.
Third, the formalization of a single hierarchy of competencies 
requires consensus on learning processes and on the skills that are needed 
for certain tasks or outcomes. This consensus can help to provide 
legitimacy to the education and training which is provided. There is,
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then, some assurance that the individuals who are credentialed or have 
completed will know certain information and be able to perform certain 
skills, and that the skills and knowledge are appropriate.
Fourth, where a hierarchical system of building blocks has been 
established, it is possible to cross-reference materials to the level, 
strand, or unit to which they are directed, and then to assess their 
relative effectiveness in helping individuals to master each competency. 
For instance, in Job Corps where there is one uniform system of strands, 
levels, and units structuring education efforts, almost all available 
commercial and publicly-developed materials have been screened for 
applicability and cross-referenced to this grid. Available for each center 
and instructor are a range of pre-screened written materials from different 
publishers, Job Corps-developed lessons, as well as computer-assisted drill 
and practice and tutorial lessons. The teacher may choose from these 
options or may develop his or her own. Gradually, experience has been 
gained about how well each of these different materials works. This 
information has been used to add to and subtract from the options system- 
wide, and to communicate insights between teachers and across centers. If 
each center had its own hierarchy of competencies and competency tests, 
each would have had to screen and cross-reference materials, and there 
would be limited transferability of the lessons because the systems would 
be so different. A standardized reference system is particularly important 
given the rapid expansion of computer-assisted instruction lessons. In a 
prime sponsor with numerous delivery agents offering remedial education, it 
would be impossible to utilize a minicomputer and terminal system unless 
the reference framework were standardized.
Fifth, the use of a single competency-based system permits better 
performance assessment and evaluation. Where there is a uniform framework, 
the entry competencies are known for all individuals, i.e., they are 
measured against the same standards so that differences in the individuals 
served by different agents can be more exactly determined in making com 
parisons. The gains resulting from participation can also be assessed by 
the same standards, and then weighted in light of the time and cost to 
achieve these gains. The subdivision into building blocks permits a more 
refined estimate of impacts than when the only success measure is com 
pletion of a benchmark such as a GED--i.e., a ruler which measures in 
inches will give a better indication of height and its consequences than 
one which measures only yards, particularly when many of the distances 
covered are less than a yard.
Standardized and refined measures of in-program changes are par 
ticularly important where there are differing service mixes and approaches 
that produce the outcomes. Marginal increases in educational competencies 
bear only a modest relationship to immediate employment chances, so that 
assessing the success of an education component by the placement rate of 
participants is not very exact. Different agents may be responsible for 
placement and education. If the former is effective, the latter might 
appear effective whatever the quality of its instruction and vice versa. 
Where an agent handles both remedial education and placement, the per 
formance in either component may obscure the performance in the other.
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Sixth, the use of a standardized, competency-based framework can 
simplify the teaching task, permitting teachers to concentrate on meeting 
rather than diagnosing specific needs, and more on utilizing rather than 
selecting or developing lessons. This is particularly important where the 
vocational instruction or education is delivered by staffs which are not 
well-trained to make such decisions. School and vocational education 
systems try to assure quality by dictating the necessary preparation of 
teachers and specifying at least the core materials which will be used. 
CETA at the local level usually contracts with a multitude of delivery 
agents, which vary in standards for teachers and materials.
There are several possible drawbacks to competency-based approaches:
First, any system of building blocks and skills hierarchies may not be 
optimal for all purposes and all persons. As noted, there are several 
different remedial competency-based systems, each with its own hierarchy, 
learning strands, and levels. Presumably it could be determined which of 
these works more effectively, on average, from a pedagogical and opera 
tional viewpoint, but none will be optimal in all circumstances. For 
instance, a competency might not be equally important in different 
settings. Auto mechanics training in the Southwest would have to give more 
priority to air conditioner maintenance than a course taught in the 
Northeast. The educational steps by which most remedial students learn 
best might not be appropriate for those with learning disabilities. The 
basic issue is whether the exceptions are rare enough or the basic frame 
works flexible enough to allow for specialized subsystems to be cross- 
referenced or additional measures and treatments added.
Second, any competency-based system requires tests or demonstrations 
of ability through task performance. There are problems in the accuracy 
and application of any tests. These are reduced where the tests and the 
curricula are closely interconnected as in competency-based systems where 
each unit contains its own test, the accomplishment of a set of units is 
documented by questions drawn from all of these separate tests, so that 
trainees become accustomed to test-taking. Yet where curricula provides 
learning which is not closely related to what is tested, the benefits may 
not be measured, so that over time emphasis will be placed on approaches 
focusing narrowly on the tested competencies. Mastery of some competencies 
cannot be tested but must be demonstrated, which introduces a judgemental 
element even when there is very clear specification of the tasks and 
performance standards. If delivery agents are judged by the accomplish 
ments of students, they are likely to generously interpret any standards 
and an outside checking system may be needed to assure accurate assess 
ments.
Third, competency-based systems usually increase paperwork. Each unit 
or building block ends in a series of tests or skill demonstrations which 
must be graded by students or teachers. Level tests must be applied after 
completion of a set of building blocks. There needs to be a tracking of 
individual progress through the system. In contrast, there may be only 
four or five tests a semester that must be graded and recorded in a regular 
classroom. The real problem comes when competency-based systems supplement 
traditional approaches, so that the tracking needed for the individualized 
system is in addition to, rather than an integral part of, the regular
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grading and assessment system. The benefits of the competency-based 
approach increase when it is used consistently, i.e., the curricula is 
adapted to this framework, and students, teachers, and delivery agents are 
judged according to performance within this framework. In Job Corps, there 
is this consistency. In many other systems, however, there are dis- 
junctures. Individualized education plans (lEPs) are required for special 
populations in the schools, and usually these include competency-based 
prescriptions. But special education classes most often supplement regular 
activities, so that students are graded by what they do in regular 
classrooms, while the individualized approach is a separate, overlaid 
system. The plans, formats and methods of tracking progress towards 
achievement of IEP goals are rarely standardized even within school 
districts so that instructors are not judged according to the relative 
progress of their students in relation to these plans. Thousands of filing 
cabinets are full of lEPs (and CETA employability plans) which have little 
relationship to treatments and for which there is no tracking of outcomes 
relative to plans or of the steps which led to these outcomes.
Fourth, competency-based systems can be a challenge to traditional 
approaches and personnel. Much of the training received by teachers and 
vocational instructors—learning to prepare lesson plans, to survey and 
select materials, to make meaningful presentations to classes, and to 
diagnose individual problems—is of reduced importance in individualized, 
competency-based systems. Teachers used to exerting control over students 
through class norms and peer pressures may be uneasy in educational 
settings where students can progress at their own rate and are judged 
relative to objective standards. The same teachers may not be prepared for 
nor inclined towards the individual interaction which is a part of com 
petency-based instruction. It is easier to use student aides and para- 
professionals in a competency-based system, and this may threaten the 
professionalism of teachers as well as their job security. Finally, the 
tracking of students' performance by a uniform and objective system 
facilitates better comparisons of the effectiveness of teachers. No one 
likes to be under the gun constantly to produce results.
Turf issues are unavoidable where uniform standards and approaches are 
involved. Everyone may agree with the concept of the individualized 
competency-based approach, yet some believe that each school district or 
prime sponsor should establish the framework, others believe that standard- 
setting should occur at the state level, while there are advocates for the 
creation of uniform national standards. The issue of debate is whether 
differences in students or teachers between areas and states require 
different systems, and whether these differences must be determined 
locally; but to a large extent, the core question is simply who gets to 
call the shots.
With the exception of Job Corps, employment and training policy has 
not addressed content issues such as appropriate standards for delivery 
staffs and services, the types of materials which are utilized, the 
competencies which are attained, or the frameworks by which education, 
training, and employability development are structured and tracked. Each 
prime sponsor is left on their own, with no stipulations in the regulations 
nor in the federal plan and performance review process, and with almost no 
technical assistance. Few prime sponsors have specialists in training,
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education, or basic life skills training, even though these are the major 
human resource development components of CETA-funded local activities. As 
a result, few set standards or try to track participants relative to these 
standards. They usually contract with whatever institutions exist locally 
and accept their standards, if any. It is impossible in such cases to 
compare the effectiveness of like training activities within a prime 
sponsor area, much less across prime sponsor areas, except by the post- 
program results. Yet these are poor indicators of the quality of training 
since they are dependent on the type of clients served (whose skills at 
entry are not measured), as well as placement and job access effectiveness 
(which may vary widely). Each delivery agent must screen all available 
materials and choose a curriculum, which is a hit-or-miss process when 
staff has not been trained to make such decisions. Many develop their own 
lessons, hierarchies and skills building blocks without any test of whether 
these are better or worse than ones already existing. Job developers and 
placement personnel then try to market products which vary widely in 
quality. Employers cannot know what tasks CETA trainees can perform or 
what knowledge they have attained.
The picture is the same for CETA-funded remedial education offerings. 
If a community-based work program for dropouts wants to add an educational 
or employability skills component, the delivery agent must screen all 
available materials. It will have to set up a system for assessing 
progress in these materials and establish standards of completion. If the 
delivery agent were instead provided the Job Corps system or another one 
like it, it would simply have to test the students to determine their 
beginning level and try-out the various lessons that have already been 
pre-screened for each level. Technical assistance materials would already 
be available on how to use these materials. The uniform competency testing 
framework in Job Corps is already cross-referenced to SAT, CAT, GED tests, 
and grade level norms, so that the deliverer would not have to validate 
separately the quality of its educational activities.
CETA employability skills training, which is usually focused on youth, 
includes a potpourri of activities. No one knows what an individual has 
accomplished or learned, and hence the "graduate" is little better off in 
competing for jobs than the nongraduate. Each pre-employment activity uses 
its own system of assessing employability skills, so the assessment must be 
repeated each time the individual participates in another activity.
These shortcomings could be overcome by the adoption of standardized 
systems for measuring, tracking, and certifying competencies and for 
structuring CETA education, vocational training and employability skills 
development activities. For each major occupation of training, the 
Department of Labor, in conjunction with apprenticeship and vocational 
education experts, could screen the various competency-based systems and 
agree on a competency hierarchy spanning from the entry level to the most 
advanced training level. These would be much like, but improvements on, 
the Training Achievement Records used in Job Corps. Short tests and 
required skills demonstrations would be specified. The vast array of 
existing competency-based curricula in CETA, Job Corps, and vocational 
education which aim at different levels in this hierarchy and seek to move 
trainees different distances could, then, be screened for adequacy and 
cross-referenced so that anyone developing a training program at any level
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would be provided the best of the available options. An entering par 
ticipant in CETA would be given a standardized test of vocational aptitudes 
and abilities (and the score would be recorded on the MIS intake form). He 
or she would be assigned a training cluster and would enter at a level 
based upon already acquired skills and competencies which would be noted as 
the beginning point on the training record. Training would be offered to 
provide each of the competencies in the hierarchy, whether through one of 
the nationally-identified curricula options or a locally-developed one. 
Presumably, the locally-developed curricula could be divided into modules 
to parallel the hierarchy, but an alternative would simply be to apply the 
knowledge tests and performance demonstrations to document achievements in 
a standardized way, however these were taught. Other skills and spe 
cialities could be documented to supplement the training record if the 
delivery agent were providing more than the minimum training. Thus, all 
trainees in carpentry in various courses in a prime sponsorship or in the 
nation could be pegged according to where trainees started and how far they 
advanced. As part of the monitoring process, the prime sponsor could spot 
check whether trainees could indeed perform as indicated by the training 
record, thus assuring that competency standards were maintained. Each 
prime sponsor or perhaps each state, in conjunction with employers, could 
determine the levels or step-off points which would be certified. Some 
might choose to put greater emphasis on a particular competency by adding 
more detailed standards to supplement the national framework. The national 
system would presumably be consistent with the usual apprenticeship and 
licensing requirements, so that at the state level, it could be determined 
which of the skills and activities had to be acquired to achieve an 
apprenticeable level, and any additional requirements that would have to be 
added to meet special state expectations.
In basic reading, mathematics and language arts, up through the GED 
level, a uniform competency framework would be much like, but an improve 
ment upon, the Job Corps educational system. Each participant in CETA 
would be given a short, standardized reading and mathematics test at entry. 
The scores would be part of the record, along with other demographic 
information, since educational competence is a major determinant of 
employability. Participants in need of remediation would then be placed 
within an educational component at the level of demonstrated ability, and 
their advancement though standardized competency levels would be tracked. 
The end point would be noted on the management information system as an 
outcome. Experts could (as they have done to date for Job Corps) screen 
and cross-reference the vast array of available competency-based commercial 
and public curricula (including CAI lessons), providing options for each of 
the standardized building blocks (and, perhaps, purchasing in large 
quantities certain of the best materials which could be provided as a core 
program if prime sponsors chose to utilize it). In such a system, each 
state would determine the step-off points, just as they do now on the GEO 
test by setting the average and individual score requirements for the five 
GED subtests. In fact, the GED categories, practice tests, and related 
instructional materials would be integrated as the cap in the national 
system, since they have already been adopted by all states and are used in 
Job Corps. But it might also be possible to identify a "basic skills" 
step-off point lower than the high school diploma level which would 
recognize acqusition of some of the basic academic abilities expected by 
employers even for entry jobs. This makes sense since many of the dropouts
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who participate in CETA cannot be brought up to the GED level, but can at 
least master these elementary skills.
A competency-based employability skills framework would define and 
cluster the knowledge and skills needed to enter the world-of-work. One of 
these clusters could be the "basic skills" certification just mentioned. 
Others might include consumer skills, citizen's rights and responsi 
bilities, job search skills, and occupational decisions. Acquisition of 
competencies in each of these areas might be tested but would also 
necessarily include the successful completion of certain tasks such as 
opening a bank account and applying for a certain number of jobs. There 
has been some progress in specifying pre-employment skills and skills tests 
under the Consolidated Youth Employment Program which adopted a competency- 
based approach, and a comprehensive system has been developed for Job 
Corps. 18/ The vast array of materials which have been developed in recent 
years would be screened and cross-referenced, with perhaps a core package 
provided to prime sponsors. There would be a standardized fonn for 
tracking individual participants, and documenting mastery of each 
knowledge/skill cluster. Again, the management information system would 
count the number of participants achieving these basic competencies.
In the CETA context, the "pros" of such competency-based approaches 
would outweigh the "cons" for several reasons:
First, since CETA is 100 percent federally financed, it would be much 
easier and more justified to establish a uniform framework than would be 
possible for education or vocational education, where there is a long 
history of local control and most of the funding comes from state and local 
sources. CETA deals mostly with the individuals who have left or are 
excluded from these basic education and vocational systems. The dis- 
advantaged are more likely to have interrupted participation, the inter 
ventions are usually short-term, and it makes sense in these contexts (as 
it does in the case of the GED) to have a single measurement and tracking 
framework so that progress can be cumulated over several periods of par 
ticipation.
Within CETA, the roles of the various players would not be markedly 
altered. State and local governments would still have the authority to 
choose clients, to adapt to local conditions, and to choose curricula. 
Paralleling the GED approach, states could still establish their own 
requirements along a standardized competency hierarchy. Likewise, prime 
sponsors could choose, in conjunction with employers, the levels of 
vocational skills needed for sets of jobs, or could determine each em 
ployer's needs separately. The prime sponsor would still be free to choose 
the level of entering participants (consistent with CETA eligibility) and 
how far to try to move them. Curricula could be chosen from among the 
screened alternatives, or the prime sponsor might use other curricula but 
with tracking of progress according to the standardized competency 
hierarchy. Extra requirements could, of course, be added to this hier 
archy.
Second, because CETA participants are outside the mainstream systems, 
the standards imposed would not challenge these other systems, on the 
contrary, the development and adoption of competency frameworks might
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provide a basis for the integration of CETA activities with vocational 
education, apprenticeship, military training and education. Vocational 
education has been moving rapidly towards a competency-based approach, and 
there is a possibility of legislative consolidation of federally-supported 
post-secondary vocational education and CETA training. Certainly an 
important step in this direction would be to adopt common nomenclature so 
that there would be transferability between curricula, records and creden 
tials in the two systems. Likewise, apprenticeship, itself, is a com 
petency-based system specifying the skills and knowledge needed in par 
ticular jobs and the ways in which these can be obtained. Standards differ 
from state to state but usually cover the same building blocks. The 
frameworks evolved under CETA could be made as consistent as possible with 
those core state systems. In each state, the CETA framework could be 
referenced relative to the apprenticeship requirements (or the requirements 
could be altered to match the CETA framework) so that training could build 
towards certified career tracks. Much work has been done to identify the 
transferability of military training, i.e., to determine the competencies 
provided which could be applied to civilian occupations. The adoption of 
standardized skills/ knowledge hierarchies for each occupation would 
provide a reference framework. In addition, CETA training might be used as 
preparation for military careers and credited upon enlistment rather than 
repeated afterwards. The linkage with education systems is already 
achieved to some extent through the GED system, but standardization of CETA 
approaches below this level would enable states to specify and credential a 
basic skills level lower than high school equivalency.
Third, it is likely that CETA will increasingly emphasize human 
resource development, including mandatory combinations of training with 
work. It is critical to be able to track the effectiveness of each of the 
components in the service mix, and also to be able to mount quality 
educational offerings which supplement other activities. Since CETA 
participants are disadvantaged and frequently minority group members who 
may suffer from discrimination, it is all the more important to document 
the competencies they attain and to do so by an objective system which is 
recognized in the labor market and by all delivery institutions.
The competency-based approach will help to assure the quality of the 
CETA materials and instruction without requiring the credential!ing of 
staff at the delivery level. The pre-screening of materials by experts and 
the use of an individualized self-paced system reduce the need for staff 
who are highly trained in lesson planning, materials selection, and 
education or training philosophy. It permits greater use of individuals 
who are good at working with participants needing personal attention and 
understanding. Because materials and offerings are so diverse in the CETA 
system, and there is no common reference system, it is now almost impos 
sible to offer technical assistance on the substantive education and 
training offerings. A common reference system will facilitate technical 
assistance.
Fourth, the imposition of such a system would not add significantly 
paperwork requirements since CETA already must prepare individual 
ployability plans for each participant which include assessments, servi 
plans and goals. Prime sponsors are charged with linking each traini 







GED attainment are already kept so that there is some tracking of in 
dividuals relative to this goal. Much of the CETA-funded human resource 
development activity at the local level is, by necessity, competency-based 
and open-entry and exit, thus requiring recordkeeping at the delivery site 
to track individual progress. A uniform framework would permit full 
utilization of computer-managed instruction capabilities >as well as 
computerization of many recordkeeping tasks. It is only when the frame 
works are the same and nomenclature is standardized that economies of scale 
can be achieved through computerization. The introduction of such al 
ternative systems where tests are taken and scored on terminals, where 
assignments are made by the terminals based on progress in lessons, where 
computer-assisted lessons are shared on a wide scale, will dramatically 
reduce paperwork. The technical feasibility of such systems has already 
been demonstrated.
Fifth, the competency-based approach would provide the basis for 
measuring the effectiveness of CETA components. All entrants in local 
prime sponsor activities and from one prime sponsor to another would be 
assessed using standardized educational, vocational, and employability 
skills tests; this information would add significantly to the determination 
and comparison of employability. Where a remedial component is combined 
with another activity such as work experience, it will be possible to 
directly measure whether the remediation is effective rather than trying to 
infer from post-program outcomes which reflect the impact of the total 
treatment. The need for improved performance assessment and management 
leads in the same direction as the arguments for standardized competency- 
based frameworks.
Finally, these standardized competency-based approaches could be 
implemented incrementally without rupture to the current CETA system. The 
competency-based education approach of Job Corps has been well tested with 
a disadvantaged population and could be adopted as an option for all prime 
sponsors, supplemented by a requirement that all participants be tested at 
entry and exit using Job Corps reading and mathematics tests, and that 
their scores plus hours of treatment in educational components be recorded 
in the CETA management information system, as they are in the Job Corps 
MIS. A competency-based employability skills program is desperately needed 
because of the diversity, disorganization, and uncertain quality of pre- 
employment activities under youth programs. A standardized curricula might 
be provided as an option, but the standards for "basic employability 
skills" for each individual might be incorporated as an outcome measure on 
the MIS. The occupational competency hierarchies could be developed and 
implemented for one occupation at a time in a coordinated effort with the 
apprenticeship and vocational education systems. Uork is already underway 
to develop such competency frameworks in several occupational areas, 
borrowing from the extensive developments in the vocational education 
community.
Without question, there will be problems in implementing such frame 
works and in forcing change in the traditional ways of doing business under 
CETA. There will be justifiable complaints where the systems do not make 
sense in local contexts, and these cases are sure to be exaggerated by 
individuals and institutions adversely affected by the changes. Yet if 
CETA is to increase its emphasis on human resource development, if it is to
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realize the potentials of computerization for management, technical 
assistance and instruction, if the quality of substantive offerings is to 
be improved, if performance is to be measured and if the activities and 
participants are to be better marketed to the private sector, employment 
and training policy must begin to address these controversial issues and 
move towards the standardization of competency assessment and tracking 
systems and instructional frameworks. Because CETA is a federal system, 
because its clients need individualized, self-paced assistance offered in a 
variety of settings, and because they critically need documentation of 
their competencies so they can compete more successfully in the labor 
market, it is crucial that CETA take the lead in developing and imple 
menting competency-based systems.
Realistic Expectations
One of the most difficult issues of social policy is to agree what 
constitutes success or failure of social interventions, to set realistic 
expectations, and to then judge performance by these standards. Employment 
and training programs have suffered in the past from overselling and then 
failure to measure up to inflated expectations. For instance, President 
Johnson claimed, in signing the Economic Opportunity Act, that each $1,000 
invested in Job Corps would return $40,000 over a lifetime. From a social 
benefit-cost perspective, the Job Corps investment is profitable, but the 
"profit" is closer to $.40 rather than $40 on each dollar invested. The 
present value of the earnings gains alone do not even amortize the 
investment. If it were not for the program's substantial impacts on crime, 
it might not be considered profitable. Moreover, the taxpayers' benefits 
do not exceed costs under most assumptions. There is no doubt that the Job 
Corps provides a unique opportunity which results in substantial gains for 
those who complete. But participation does not assure self-sufficiency. 
Even though the proportion of 1977 participants who were taxpayers in the 
next two years was a fourth above the proportion among like nonpartici- 
pants, and even though the proportion who were welfare recipients declined 
by half, a fourth of Corpsmembers were still outside the labor force two 
years after termination and the average annualized earnings of those 
employed was just $8,000, or only slightly above the poverty level for a 
family of four or the earnings from full-time work at the minimum wage. 19/
For local classroom training, the earnings gains pay back the social 
costs, yet self-sufficiency is not the result for very many participants. 
Two years after termination, less than three of ten second-half 1975 
trainees had annual earnings of over $6,000--or roughly the 1977 poverty 
level of a nonfarm family of four—and two-fifths of these were persons who 
had earnings above $4,000 in the year before entry. A fifth of trainees 
had no earnings two years later. Although on-the-job training produces 
more substantial earnings gains, it does not assure self-sufficiency 
either. Two-fifths of second-half 1975 trainees had earnings below $6,000 
in the second post-termination year, and a tenth had earnings below $1,000. 
Over half of those with earnings above the $6,000 threshold were substan 
tial earners (above $4,000) in the year before entry. 20/
Are these reasonable batting averages? The answer depends on the 
perspective. For instance, the recent estimates of the rate of return on
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investments in college education range from 8 to 16 percent, while the rate 
of return for two-year technical degrees is between 8 and 15 percent. The 
rate of return has declined over the last decade although the amount of 
deterioration is subject to debate. For white males, four years of college 
is associated with between one-third and two-fifths higher earnings than 
for high school graduates, and one to three years of college is associated 
with between 5 and 10 percent higher earnings. For black males, the 
returns to four years of college are almost double those for whites, when 
they are compared to other blacks. 21/ The total cost of college in fiscal 
1980 was $5,000 per student per year. Estimating foregone earnings at the 
minimum wage level of $6000 annually, the cost of four years of college 
would thus be $44,000. Next to these figures, the gains from five months 
of OJT or classroom training or six months in Job Corps--18 percent, 10 
percent and 8 percent, respectively, do not appear inconsequential. 
Likewise, the estimated social rates of return—45 percent for Job Corps, a 
minimum of 38 percent for classroom training, and a higher, though 
uncertain, rate for OJT--are more than reasonable. Alternatively, the 350 
hours of remediation averaged in classroom training might be compared with 
the 15,000 hours averaged in the primary and secondary education system. 
Should the expected benefits be proportional? The dropout rate in Job 
Corps is high--perhaps excessive to some—but the one-third completion rate 
does not look so bad when compared to the less than 50 percent completion 
rate of two-year colleges. 22/
The schools and the labor market are not perfect sorting mechanisms, 
but they do, on average, separate the "winners" from the "losers." 
Failures and deficits may cumulate over time so that even though a person 
has innate potential, there can be enormous impediments to its realization. 
Thus, a low batting average is inherent in any program which seeks to 
substantially alter the skills and behavior of individuals who are identi 
fied on the basis of prior failures or employment handicaps. The more 
ambitious a program, the smaller the proportion who can complete it, all 
else being equal.
The chances of translating increased skills and credentials into 
increased earnings are also constrained. Within the CETA population, many 
Job Corps or classroom training completers achieve skills equal to those of 
more advantaged individuals, but few enjoy the same earnings. The CETA 
trainee and the post-secondary vocational school trainee may type at the 
same speed, perhaps even read with the same ability, but if one is a 
welfare mother and the other independent of childcare responsibilities, 
employment is less likely to be interrupted and jobs easier to find for the 
latter. Furthermore, employers are unlikely to give full credit to CETA 
training. The private sector sees the system as one which screens in the 
least employable, does not sort out the poor performers, and provides only 
modest duration of training. If adequate numbers of entry workers can be 
found through contacts with trusted employees or other reliable mechanisms 
which reduce the risks, why should employers draw from CETA for anything 
but menial jobs? The employer has to be convinced that the training is 
real and that the trainees can perform; otherwise the employer will respond 
only if bribed or coerced.
In light of these realities, the expectations concerning the payoffs 
which will result from improvements in the system must be tempered. For
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instance, if the proportion of local classroom trainees staying over 40 
weeks were doubled from the 7 percent level in fiscal 1976, with propor 
tionate reductions in each of the shorter-stay categories, and if these 
longer trainees benefited as much as those in 1976, the average impact of 
classroom training would be increased by only a sixth. Moreover, the cost 
per participant would rise by an eighth. Similarly, if enrollments in 
advanced career training in Job Corps were expanded so that one-third of 
the completers achieved post-program earnings gains double the average for 
completers, this would increase the average gain for all Corpsmembers 
(based on the 12-18 month post-termination estimates) by two-fifths, or 
from 13 to 17 percent of control earnings. But the number who could be 
served would be reduced by a fifth if each of the advanced trainees 
remained an extra year. Total earnings gains from the same Job Corps ex 
penditures, then, would rise by a tenth and the social benefit-cost ratio a 
little over a twentieth.
These crude simulations merely suggest that longer training means 
fewer will be served, and that the larger earnings gains of the few who 
benefit more must be averaged over all other participants. If the proposed 
changes occurred, they would not dramatically alter the overall performance 
of the training system, although they would increase the rate of return on 
the public and taxpayer's investment.
The degree of possible reorientation is also constrained by the 
proportion of the CETA population that can benefit from advanced training, 
as well as by the number of advanced opportunities that can be secured. 
Less than a fourth of Job Corps participants, for instance, enters with or 
secures a diploma or a GED. If half of these participated in college or 
post-secondary programs, they would still represent only a third of 
completers or an eighth of total participants. In local programs, which 
serve a more varied and less disadvantaged population, a larger proportion 
could benefit from "quantum leap" approaches. The constraint is really the 
ability to organize such offerings and to link them to jobs. Training and 
job links may be very difficult in depressed areas where the disadvantaged 
are concentrated. Mobility arrangements to secure training and jobs 
elsewhere are not going to be of interest to most participants. Even in 
Job Corps, where participants have demonstrated their willingness to leave 
home at least temporarily, the increased moves across cities (excluding Job 
Corps relocation) are only 20 for every 100 participants in the first 18 
months after termination. 23/ Moreover, there are serious problems in 
mounting relocation efforts because of the political sensitivity of the 
issue. A reasonable goal might be to serve between a tenth and a fifth of 
all participants in CETA in mobility-oriented programs, which might be 
expected to achieve an increase in suburban and intrastate mobility of a 
few per hundred total trainees, and even less interstate mobility. However 
beneficial at the margin, and however correct in the direction of emphasis, 
this will have modest impacts on aggregate measured benefits even if the 
mobile individuals gain significantly.
None of these changes will be achieved rapidly. The benefits of 
advanced training options, for example, rest on the premise that indi 
viduals will be sorted and developed in a first tier of activities and then 
a select few will move to the second tier. Simply creaming at intake and 
selecting the best individuals, or openly recruiting more able individuals
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for these opportunities, will result in more modest net benefits. The 
advanced training options will take time to establish, but it will be even 
longer before the feeder system is linked to these opportunities, and 
participants move through both the first and second tiers. Even if the 
earnings improvements of second tier participants were quite substantial, 
it would be some years before the gains noticeably increased the payoff of 
all CETA training. Likewise, realignment of the employment and training 
system consistent with mainstream principles is a lengthy institutional 
change process. The development and utilization of competency assessment 
systems, input requirements, standardized curricula and graduation 
standards takes time, and it will be even longer before the labor market's 
perceptions of the system's effectiveness are altered and potential clients 
are convinced that, in fact, real opportunities are being offered so that 
they can get more from CETA than a weekly check.
Because massive impacts cannot be expected and any impacts will take 
time does not argue against the directions of change, or their substantial 
payoff at the margin. Since the current training activities are working, 
since the changes involve a steady realignment rather than a revolution in 
these procedures, and since the new system would be in place by the 
late-1980s when the labor market effects of demographic changes will be 
most strongly felt, there is nothing to be lost by carefully building a 
second tier of advanced training activities, providing opportunities to 
successful participants in the first tier, and gradually changing the 
thought processes and operational procedures in the system that already 
exists. Without expecting major or immediate improvements in overall per 





Since the first employment and training programs were implemented at 
the beginning of the 1960s, there has been a continuing quest for a 
"national manpower policy" and a "national manpower system." The "holy 
grail" was a comprehensive and coordinated set of programs addressing both 
structural and transitional labor market problems. The structural measures 
would include basically preventative activities—youth jobs and pre- 
employment services that would compensate for opportunity deficits of 
minority and poor youth; programs that were basically corrective—including 
intensive remedial assistance such as Job Corps, classroom and on-the-job 
training, and comprehensive services for poverty areas; plus those that 
were basically ameliorative—job creation for older workers and for welfare 
recipients plus sheltered work for the handicapped. The measures addressed 
to transitional problems would include countercyclical job creation to 
absorb a significant share of the unemployed, pfus adjustment assistance to 
aid the victims of mass layoffs, foreign competition ancl other dis 
locations. Ideally, these elements of the manpower system would be co 
ordinated with other governmental decisions and actions under a national 
manpower policy. By linking with affirmative action efforts, the placement 
performance of the training programs could be improved, while the availa 
bility of hiring and training subsidies would provide a "carrot" to go 
along with the affirmative action "stick." Training activities were 
initiated as a means to provide the skilled manpower to attract firms to 
depressed areas; conceptually if not operationally, they remained closely 
interrelated with economic development activities. Employment and training 
programs were intended as a mechansim to help public assistance recipients 
achieve self-sufficiency, or at least to provide useful output to offset 
the costs of income maintenance. Manpower policies were to be coordinated 
with military and immigration policies to balance supply and demand in the 
labor market.
The quest carried us far. Youth development activities increased 
dramatically in the mid 1960s and in the late 1970s. Training efforts rose 
through most of the two decades. Structural and countercyclical employment 
measures expanded exponentially as part of the Carter administration's 
economic stimulus package. Countercyclical job creation was established in 
principle when the trigger formula was added to CETA in 1976, authorizing 
funds adequate to create jobs for one-fifth of the excess unemployed above 
4 percent. The Humphrey-Hawkins legislation provided a framework, pledging 
the nation to combatting both structural and cyclical problems. There were 
steps to link economic development activities initiated under the stimulus 
package with expanding employment and training programs. Welfare reform 
proposals and demonstrations were mounted, with the goal of transforming 
countercyclical PSE jobs into opportunities for welfare recipients as 
unemployment eased. A large-scale, experimental program was implemented, 
guaranteeing part-time school-year and full-time summer jobs to al 1 poor 
16- to 19- year-olds remaining in or returning to school. Expansion and 
reorientation of youth programs was proposed and almost passed into law in 
1980, with the aim of creating a stable and comprehensive employability
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development system. Tentative linkages were established between CETA and 
the military to train for military entry and to utilize domestic military 
facilities. The certification procedures of Trade Adjustment Assistance 
were liberalized in the late 1970s, and adjustment programs were extended 
to the lumber and airline industries, where conservation measures and 
deregulation, respectively, caused dislocations. A "positive adjustment 
assistance" demonstration was announced in the waning days of the Carter 
administration in order to increase retraining and relocation under Trade 
Adjustment Assistance.
Thus, the nation came very close to establishing a manpower system and 
policy consistent with the ideals which had existed since the genesis of 
employment and training programs. Yet, even as the policy measures were 
being adopted and programs implemented, the consensus and resources began 
to erode. Before the Reagan administration entered office with its pledge 
to cut back the role of government, the Carter administration and Congress 
had already reduced countercyclical public service employment, making a 
sham of the trigger formula and burying any hopes of translating the 
Humphrey-Hawkins full-employment bill into a meaningful commitment. The 
favorable results of the youth Entitlement program were ignored, and the 
brakes were applied to welfare reform. The Reagan administration quickly 
finished the work, eliminating all public service employment, drastically 
retrenching youth programs, wielding the meat-axe on trade adjustment 
assistance, and proposing workfare rather than guaranteed jobs and training 
as the direction for welfare reform. The underlying issue in the public 
debate shifted from how quickly the nation could afford to implement the 
remaining elements of a "national manpower policy" and a "national manpower 
system," to whether we should even continue federally-funded employment and 
training activities.
There are reasons for this dramatic reversal which had nothing to do 
with the wisdom of the policies or programs. Employment and training 
activities were one of the few controllable elements in the federal budget, 
and hence, easiest to cut. Countercyclical programs were reasonably pop 
ular while people were being hired, but there were few political benefits 
once the opportunities were filled. The Congress which voted on appro 
priations never received political credit, since the hiring decisions were 
made locally, but always received the heat when local excesses were 
discovered. Trade Adjustment Assistance was a promise made to buy off 
opposition to tariff reductions; once these reductions had been imple 
mented, the promise could be reneged. The structural portions of CETA were 
concentrated in poverty areas, and increasingly targeted on the poor, and 
the delivery system was isolated from the mainstream institutions, so that 
the programs had limited constituencies. The conscience of the majority 
was eased by the claim that a booming economy would result from reduced 
government expenditures, soon creating jobs for those otherwise served in 
public programs.
While these reasons largely explain the drastic retrenchment, the 
shortcomings of employment and training policies and programs were also a 
factor. To put it bluntly, the preventative elements did not have 
demonstrable preventative impacts; many of the corrective measures were 
diluted until they provided only short-term help; the countercyclical 
components did fairly well in hiring during the build-up but poorly in
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transitioning and phase-down; adjustment assistance did more to compensate 
for the pain associated with change than to facilitate adjustment. 
Basically, all these measures became ameliorative in emphasis. This is not 
to say that they had no impacts on transition, adjustment, preparation, 
prevention, and career advancement, but they usually reduced to the lowest 
denominator so that their long-term effects were subverted to maximize im 
mediate, ameliorative impacts.
The basic lesson is that it is difficult to mix missions. When there 
are dual roles, those which are most immediate and easiest to achieve will 
overwhelm the others. Alleviation of symptoms is simpler than the achieve 
ment of cures.
This is not to argue that symptoms should or can be ignored. Our 
economy does not generate enough jobs for those at the end of the labor 
queue. The shortfalls are severely felt by the young, minorities and 
residents of poverty areas. It is a judgment whether job creation is 
preferrable to income maintenance or to doing nothing. It is a fact, 
however, that job creation efforts in the 1970s would have performed better 
if not so rapidly expanded, and could have been designed and improved to 
increase their transitional, preventative and preparatory impacts. But job 
creation is basically an ameliorative approach. If problems are to be 
cured rather than simply mitigated, it is necessary to pay much more 
conscious attention to, and place more priority on, human resource develop 
ment. The drastic retrenchment of job creation at this juncture makes this 
shift in priorities a fait accompli. Most likely, job programs which are 
now being retrenched will return to favor at some point. Yet if this 
occurs, it does not mean that comprehensive manpower policies and systems 
which combine job creation and human resource development missions are 
appropriate. Training, education and career access activites for those at 
the end of the labor queue have a different "gestalt" from job programs, 
and though the measures should be closely integrated, they need separate 
policies and approaches. Thus, an "active manpower policy"--the holy grail 
of the last two decades for advocates of employment and training programs- 
must be redefined. There needs to be a new vision of what can be or should 
be achieved in the future through human resource development, whatever 
occurs on the job creation front.
While there are shortcomings in the design and implementation of our 
human resource development efforts for persons of limited employability, 
the setting in which they must operate is much to blame. The flaws in CETA 
training that receive attention, and the improvements that can be made by 
their correction, are minor in terms of the "big picture," even though the 
larger and more critical dimensions are rarely examined and certainly not 
blamed for the problems they cause: First, the distribution of public 
resources violates principles of horizontal and vertical equity. Through 
the secondary education level, the distribution is reasonably equitable. 
There has been some progress in equalizing expenditures among the school 
districts of rich and poor, minority and nonminority. Remedial activities 
and those focused on special needs populations expanded rapidly (at least 
until recently), helping to equalize opportunity. The major problem comes 
when young people leave the secondary level. Higher education predomi 
nantly serves persons of high socioeconomic status, and public expenditures 
for human resource development beyond the secondary level are concentrated
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on higher education. The distribution of enrollees in two-year insti 
tutions and post-secondary vocational institutions is more balanced than in 
four year institutions, but the disadvantaged and less academically able 
are underrepresented throughout. Public support for remedial training 
efforts are meager in comparison, whether measured in aggregate dollars, 
the proportion of those in need who are helped, or the intensity of 
investment in any participant.
Human resource development efforts—both the mainstream components and 
those targeted to the "leftovers"--must operate in a void, preparing 
individuals for the labor market without specification of work require 
ments, without established bridges into jobs, and without the involvement 
or interest of the employer community. There are exceptions for pro 
fessional occupations, such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers and 
nurses, where job requirements are developed and maintained by the pro 
fessional community or through licensure, but at the middle and lower 
levels of the occupational structure, the requirements for jobs are rarely 
specified. Employers have no incentive to work with the preparatory in 
stitutions and/or to formalize entry routes unless they face shortages of 
particular types of workers, but this usually occurs only at the upper ends 
of the skill distribution. For most jobs, employers prefer to be left 
alone with their own methods of recruiting and standards of selection. As 
a result, training and education must be general rather than customized to 
prepare individuals to meet specific requirements. Many who could be 
trained to or already can meet the true requirements of a job are not 
hired.
Because limited resources are devoted to remediation or ernployability 
development for those who do not make it into higher education, these 
dollars are targeted on persons by the only quantifiable and readily 
available proxie of need—family income—and then spread as broadly as 
possible among those who are eligible. This encourages the development of 
a separate delivery system for the poor, one which has short-term objec 
tives, and one which is isolated from the labor market and mainstream 
institutions because it recruits high risk individuals and does not do 
enough to substantially change or sort them. Within this separate system, 
the major emphasis is on "dividing the pie," frequently creating separate 
programs and institutions for each need group and each dimension of 
employment problems. Even though the problems and groups overlap, it is 
difficult to link the separate programs and institutions. There is no real 
reason, for instance, other than institutional history and vested interest, 
why the Employment Service and CETA should not be consolidated, or that the 
WIN program for welfare recipients should be operated separately, or even 
that post-secondary vocational training and CETA should not be under the 
same decisionmaking framework even if operated by separate professional 
systems.
Some very basic changes would be required to achieve greater equity in 
public human resource development investments, to increase their payoff by 
altering some of the grqundrules in the labor market, and to improve their 
efficiency by eliminating institutional and vested interest barriers 
between related efforts. These changes must be fundamental goals of any 
human resource development policy. While there are a variety of ways to 
realize these aims and almost infinite possibilities for a human resource
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development system, the following approaches are certainly among the 
options which deserve consideration:
Preparing for Employment
The cornerstone of any human resource development policy is a primary 
and secondary education system that, indeed, educates. While much at 
tention has been devoted to the failures of education reflected in 
declining reading and mathematics skills of students on standardized tests, 
the reasons are relatively simple and the prospects for improvement not all 
that gloomy. The crush of rapidly expanding enrollments, the breakdown of 
standards for teachers and students, the proliferation of missions assigned 
to the schools, and the lack of adequate alternative settings for youth not 
performing well in regular classrooms, have been the major causes of 
current problems. Enrollments are already declining, and there are more 
teachers to choose from; the use of competency standards for students and 
teachers are receiving increased emphasis; school systems are generally 
returning back to the basics as resources become less plentiful; al 
ternative schools operated within regular school systems or by community- 
based organizations have expanded in recent years. These trends should be 
accelerated so that achievement of basic competencies would be the primary 
mission and focus of schools. Materials and teaching methods could and 
should reflect the real world of work through career education concepts. 
In recognition of the increasing propensity to combine part-time work and 
education, there could be flexibility in the sequencing and scheduling of 
school, including options such as shorter days, a quarter system, or more 
entry and exit possibilities. Nevertheless, the "three Rs" would be 
stressed during school hours so that it is assured that students who 
advance and graduate have achieved the requisite competencies.
The development of "employability skills" and the provision of first 
work experiences where there are no other alternatives, would be the 
responsibility of a federally-supported, community-based system working 
with and within the schools. This system, which would utilize as delivery 
agents neighborhood based organizations, business groups, nonprofit 
intermediaries, unions, vocational education agencies, the federal/state 
Employment Service, and the schools themselves to provide career 
counseling, occupational information, job search assistance, and placement 
help to those who wanted and needed such aid. Transition services would be 
guaranteed to all young people, and the progress of each youth in achieving 
basic employability skills and experiences would then be tracked. Sub 
sidized jobs and other developmental activities such as remedial education 
and Job Corps entry training, would be targeted to young people with more 
severe needs. First employment opportunities could be guaranteed to 
persons from low-income families or those with severe employment handicaps 
unable to find unsubsidized employment, but these jobs would be predicated 
on school attendance and performance, and would be at least as demanding 
as, and no more renumerative than, jobs in the private sector, so that 
there would be incentives for transition. There would also be limitations 
on the total hours of subsidized work. The aim would be to assure that 
every youth wanting to work would have some job experience before leaving 
school, along with the necessary career information, counseling and in 
struction to enter the adult labor market.
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Career Investments
All persons permanently leaving the universal secondary education 
system and the universal employability development system, whether grad 
uating successfully or dropping out before attaining academic competencies 
and employability skills, would be served by a career development (and 
redevelopment) system. Each citizen would have a "career investment 
account" which would provide support, as under the old GI Bill, for in 
tensive remediation, career training or post-secondary education. Each 
individual would receive an endowment, perhaps the equivalent of the 
average tuition, room and board cost for two years of college. This endow 
ment could be used to polish up the basics at the point of career entry, 
for movement into a second career, or for retraining and relocation in the 
case of dislocation. The endowment might be increased to reward military 
service or volunteer work in VISTA, Peace Corps or a National Youth Service 
program. It might also be increased for individuals adversely affected by 
government decisions, such as tariff reductions and subsequently increasing 
foreign trade.
The "endowment" could be used for higher education, post-secondary 
vocational training in public institutions, training in certified private 
sector institutions, or participation in public programs designed spe 
cifically for the hard-to-employ. It could also be used to finance 
mobility for career improvement. The "endowment" would be used on a 
voucher basis. Each institution would charge the "full freight," would 
maintain its entry and input standards, and the individual could, then, 
choose among the various options. The voucher would not always involve 
cash payments from the career investment account. For instance, tax 
credits for college could simply be noted in the account. For guaranteed 
loans the charge might be based on the default rate and administrative 
costs or the subsidy costs for below-rnarket interest rates.
The single account approach would, thus, subsume a variety of separate 
aid programs including college tax credits, Basic Equal Opportunity Grants, 
much of the aid to post-secondary vocational education, readjustment 
benefits, remedial training activites, and perhaps Gl-bill benefits (if 
there is a return to the old Gl-bill approach for veterans). The net cost 
of such a system for society is not the sum of the endowments which are 
used, but rather the increased career training and education which would 
occur for those who want to but are not now able to acquire training. The 
account would equitably redistribute public expenditures among individuals 
of different income levels. Some now receiving more than a fair share of 
public funds would be capped at the endowment level. Any public aid beyond 
the endowment period would be conditioned on later service contributions 
such as doctors serving in the military or the Public Health Service, or 
would be loans repayable at market rates, perhaps through the tax struc 
ture. Rich and poor would, then, receive equal support from the same 
system. Career training and preparation would be provided not on the basis 
of a need determination, but as a right. The disadvantaged could use their 
endowment in the same way and in the same institutions as the nondisad- 
vantaged, if they could qualify, or else could use them to secure remedial 
assistance.
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The career development system would serve a brokering function. Its 
purposes would include outreaching to assure that those with special 
problems utilized their endowments, helping individuals to make the right 
career investment choices, monitoring to protect against misuse of 
vouchers, providing mechanisms to facilitate mobility, certifying the 
quality of education and training institutions, and developing institutions 
to fill local needs where voids exist (although these would have to become 
self-supporting through the vouchers of participants). This brokering 
system would be forged by the realignment of currently separate but very 
much related activities—the federal/state Employment Service, CETA, WIN, 
veterans retraining services, post-secondary vocational education, vo 
cational rehabilitation, and the apprenticeship system. All the separate 
delivery systems already have pyramidal decisionmaking structures, but the 
decisionmaking levels and authorities vary widely so that coordination is 
difficult. The systems would not necessarily be merged, but the decision 
points and responsibilities would be made parallel. Federal funds for each 
purpose, subject to whatever strings are attached, would be channeled to 
states and then to area "Career Investment Brokering Agencies" (CIBAs) 
which would have allocation, planning and oversight responsibilities within 
each separate category, subject to state and federal review. The CIBAs 
would be the same for all these activities. The CIBAs might be juris 
dictions of a minimum size, consortia of jurisdictions, or substate 
districts. The minimum unit would probably have to be larger than the 
existing cutoff for prime sponsors, since increasing administrative burdens 
and declining funding levels have made this system uneconomical as well as 
difficult to manage.
The realignment, alone, would solve some problems, but of more im 
portance, it would facilitate other needed changes. There could be a 
single advisory council for career development and redevelopment activi 
ties, perhaps with subcommittees for each specific focus area. Reporting 
nomenclature, funding schedules and decisionmaking procedures could be 
gradually standardized. The basic benefits for career investments would 
all be noted in the same account system so that it would be possible to 
keep track of the expenditures from different sources for each individual.
The lines of responsibility—which have become blurred in practice 
under most federal grants in aid--could be clarified so that the federal 
government would monitor the states and the states would monitor the local 
agencies, and they, in turn, would have responsibility for monitoring any 
subgrantees. Nationally-run programs would consist only of those involving 
multi-state target populations, necessarily involving mobility and resi 
dential support. Likewise, state managed programs would be those drawing 
from several CIBAs, rather than simply augmenting local activities.
The ultimate aim of these realignments is a one-stop, comprehensive, 
full-services approach for all career investment activities. Any in 
dividual needing help in preparing for career entry or reentry could turn 
to a one-stop agency that would have access to all available institutions 
and services. They would be provided by right as long as the individual 
had a balance in his or her account. The full-services at the one-stop 
center would include brokering of opportunities available outside the area 
but allocated to its residents, both those developed by states and those 
developed by national funding to promote interstate mobility. The military
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would be another option, and the one-stop agent could help the individual 
to make his or her choice in light of a full range of options by providing 
independent counsel and ombudsmanship relative to the military career.
Incentives for the Private Sector
This universal career investment approach would help to make human 
resource development efforts more equitable. The use of voucher and 
one-stop treatment approaches would help to integrate efforts for the dis- 
advantaged and mainstream human resource development activities. Yet 
ultimately, these measures would still be limited without steps to in 
fluence the demand side of the equation--i.e., the labor market setting in 
which this system and its participants must function. Traditionally, 
emphasis has been restricted to the supply side. With the exception of 
limited affirmative action efforts and tax credits for hiring the dis- 
advantaged and welfare recipients, labor market processes and their results 
have been accepted as a given, with public policy seeking to adapt in 
dividuals and treatment strategies to these realities.
Competitive markets are best left alone unless there is a compelling 
reason for intervention. One such reason is when the costs and benefits to 
decisionmaking units in a market do not reflect the costs and benefits to 
society. This is clearly the case in private sector decisions about 
training investments. As long as the education system turns out an excess 
supply of highly (perhaps overly) educated workers and the public picks up 
the tab, firms will take advantage of this system and avoid their own 
training. If each firm had to pay for the education of each college 
graduate it hired, they would certainly cut back on the number of graduates 
hired as well as the course requirements and costs. Likewise, investments 
in worker training by individual firms may not be profitable because, with 
our highly mobile workforce, the benefits may be captured by another 
employer willing to pay a few dollars more to the employee. One way to 
overcome these disincentives is an employer tax covering some of the costs 
of preparatory activities now provided as "free goods," combined with an 
offset where firms provide their own training or worker educational bene 
fits. A "career investment tax" on the wage bill could be used to cover at 
least part of the cost of career investment endowments. Employers with 
their own training programs, or participating in cooperation with public 
programs, could receive credit against the tax. Associations could pool 
resources and establish training programs. Employers who did not train 
would simply have to pay the tax. Penalties might also be invoked for 
relocating firms not offering retraining and relocation benefits or ad 
vanced warning to their previous employees; the individual accounts of 
affected workers would then be credited so that they would have the means 
for retraining and relocation. A training tax could be incorporated into 
and managed by the Social Security system. In other words, employers and 
employees would pay for some of the costs of career preparation and re 
training in addition to unemployment, disability, illness and retirement.
The apprenticeship approach might be fostered by granting a lower 
career investment tax rate or "experience rating" to firms willing to 
register positions with a federal/state apprenticeship system. Partici 
pating employers would articulate the competencies required for the jobs as
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well as the training needed to achieve these competencies, would set the 
standards and monitor the training for registered jobs, and would then 
recognize the credential for completers of approved programs. The stand 
ards would be utilized in training activities financed through the career 
investment system. Trainees would, then, be provided skills specifically 
required by employers rather than receiving extraneous training. The 
requirements would be known by trainees and training institutions, so the 
performance of both could be monitored. Most importantly, the certifica 
tion of completion would be recognized in the labor market.
Ideals and Realities
In a period when budgets are being slashed for all social programs and 
when taxes, particularly added payroll taxes, are anathema, it may appear 
naive to even hint at the possibility of a comprehensive employability 
development system, an individual entitlement to human resource invest 
ments, a training tax on employers or an expanded apprenticeship system. 
Yet there are several reasons to believe that these notions are not as 
unlikely as they may appear today. Moreover, as long as these options are 
not totally implausible, and as long as they provide the appropriate 
guidance for incremental policy decisions, it is not necessary to believe 
that they are probable long-term developments.
A comprehensive employability development system is realizable. 
Schools have never devoted substantial resources to counseling, guidance, 
or placement, and are now retrenching in this area, so that they would 
welcome outside support. More and more, these activities have become the 
domain of CETA-funded efforts. The Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot 
Projects experiment has proved that part-time school-year and full-time 
summer jobs could be guaranteed to all low income youth in school or 
returning to school with a pricetag of less than $2 billion if the minimum 
wage were paid for all hours of participation. 24/ If the wages were lower 
and the total hours of participation were restricted to assure only first 
employment experiences, it would be possible to reach a broader group of 
youth, probably including most of those with below average family incomes. 
Transition services could be implemented at a relatively low cost. A 
developmental system which could reach into the schools and serve all 
youth, utilizing an individualized competency assessment and achievement 
measurement system, has already been tested in a variety of settings under 
the Consolidated Youth Employment Program demonstration. In other words, a 
comprehensive youth developmental system is completely feasible, its 
elements well-tested and its pricetag not overwhelming if viewed as a goal 
for a decade in the future when there will be fewer youths.
The concept of separate universal systems for education and employa 
bility development, with schools concentrating on academic basics and 
community-based and employer-linked local agencies concentrating on 
employability skills, is certainly acceptable as an ideal. The two-year 
review of youth employment problems by the Vice President's Task Force on 
Youth Employment under the Carter administration, which included an ex 
haustive effort to assess all empirical evidence but also to give fair 
hearing to all perspectives and interests, reached the conclusion this was 
the direction to move. The proposed Youth Act of 1980 which embodied this
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approach enjoyed bipartisan support although it was not enacted. 25/ The 
Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects component of YEDPA, which tested 
performance-conditioned job guarantees for poor students, emerged from the 
Republican side of the aisle. Budget stringencies may have postponed the 
implementation of these approaches and the realization of a comprehensive 
employability development system, but there was broad consensus about the 
directions of change even if resources were considered inadequate at the 
beginning of the 1980s to move forward.
By the same token the entitlement to a minimum level of career 
training and assistance does not necessarily mean a massive expansion of 
governmental activity. To a large extent, the investment account would be 
another way of paying for or simply keeping track of activities that occur 
already through tax credits, subsidies to colleges, Basic Equal Opportunity 
Grants and manpower programs. Not all of those who are eligible to receive 
benefits will utilize them. By the time such a system is implemented, the 
labor market at the entry level should be tighter, so that fewer would 
choose a training alternative because of the dearth of work options. If 
the long-term increase in the portion of the population enrolled in post- 
secondary activities continues, a larger share will already be partici 
pating when the endowment is implemented so there will be less incremental 
expansion. The endowment can be financed because the declining numbers of 
career entrants should substantially offset the incremental proportion 
provided education and training under this approach. Thus, the total 
enrollments and expenditures for career training and education may not be 
substantially larger as a percent of the work force or national income than 
they are today.
Entitlement or endowment notions are hardly foreign. Each citizen has 
an endowment for a primary and secondary education (and, in fact, is not 
even free to choose whether to use it). Since longer education and 
training are necessary to function in an increasingly complex society, it 
would make sense to extend this approach to the post-secondary level, as 
some states have essentially done with subsidized higher education. The 
voucher and individual account approaches are certainly plausible. The GI 
Bill—one of the most popular human resource investment programs in our 
nation's history--has tracked a fairly large portion of the adult popu 
lation under its entitlement system. Currently, service agencies collect 
and retain detailed case files on individuals. For instance, CETA is 
required to track services received over a five year period even if 
individuals move from one jurisdiction to another. Social Security and 
military registration are a fact of life, and sooner or later it is likely 
that more foolproof citizenship and work certificates will be established. 
An individual account, as opposed to numerous overlapping record systems, 
would be no more of an infringement than social security retirement benefit 
records, and equal protections could be built into the system.
The voucher and account notions force recognition that choice should 
be maximized for all individuals. Institutional and vested interests are 
intertwined with those of participants and, all too frequently, those being 
served become captives of delivery institutions. A crucial question is 
whether the individual, if provided the same resources and information 
about the options, would make the same choices, and, in particular, whether 
the disadvantaged would continue to use separate institutions or whether
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they would choose to enter the mainstream. The voucher approach forces the 
question, and could be a useful supplement to, if not substitute for, the 
service system which now exists for the poor.
Whether a human resource investment system is accepted, realignment of 
separate programs and approaches makes sense. Attempts to force cooper 
ation between CETA, the Employment Service, WIN and vocational education 
through overlapping councils, reviews, sign-offs and set-asides have gone 
about as far as they can where the decisionmaking structures are so much 
out of alignment, and plans are evolved separately on the basis of distinct 
thought patterns and nomenclatures. The ideals of comprehensive and co 
ordinated administration, common terminology and one-stop, full services, 
are important if they restrain fissiparous tendencies of separate programs 
and provide direction and discipline for incremental movement towards their 
integration. Likewise, the notion that federal, state, and local responsi 
bilities should be reconstituted so that states provide options that 
localities cannot, while the federal government provides opportunities for 
residents of all states, can help to cut through the current confusion of 
roles and responsibilities. Instead of providing options for mobility, 
training and jobs which are not available locally, both the states and the 
"feds" fund local activities in addition to but rarely coordinated with 
those developed by local decisionmakers. Local decisionmakers are con 
strained to planning for local labor markets and in light of available 
local institutions. The dollars are channeled where the opportunities are 
least. While Job Corps is a notable exception, providing for mobility and 
for intensive training not offered locally, it is not integrated with the 
local systems so that the youths who most need this type of assistance are 
not always the ones who enroll. These problems need to be addressed 
whether the career investment account approach is adopted.
The realignment of all the currently separate human resource invest 
ment programs into a uniform and comprehensive system will be a nightmarish 
process. Yet the Reagan administration is clearly in favor of the con 
solidation of like programs and the provision of increased authorities to 
states. There is likely to be some action on this front even if the career 
endowment and employer tax notions are not accepted. The reauthorization 
of vocational education and CETA at the same time, and the continuing 
discussion of Employment Service reform, and the diminutive size of WIN, 
offer immediate possibilities for such realignments. The restoration of GI 
Bill benefits is under discussion and this might be easily integrated into 
a comprehensive system. Finally, the trade adjustment problem will not 
disappear because budget cutters have decided that benefits are no longer 
owed to those affected by past policies. New trade issues will arise, 
workers will again have to be "bought off," and the proposed account 
system, coupled with extended unemployment insurance during the training or 
relocation period, would be an expedient approach.
The one-stop, full-services approach is hardly a new concept. It 
occurs today under vocational rehabilitation. The vocational rehabili 
tation specialist is the broker for medical and training services which may 
be arranged or purchased from an account for each individual. The 
Veterans' Administration also provides help in some cases on a "full- 
services" basis, particularly for disabled veterans; it arranges for the 
various types of assistance for which the veteran is eligible by right.
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Some state and local prime sponsors have made progress in integrating 
services under CETA, the federal/state Employment Service and vocational 
rehabilitation. Given encouragement, this trend could easily accelerate.
Finally, the now "radical" notions of a career investment tax and a 
substantially-expanded and legislatively-supported apprenticeship system 
are not unforeseeable. The employer tax assumes that the economy will need 
trained entry-level workers, both because of the reduced supply of entrants 
and the increased skill requirements. If labor market conditons force 
employers to do training anyway, and if those who invest find their workers 
pirated away by other firms, they would have nothing to lose and something 
to gain from such a tax. The tax need not and will not cover the full 
costs of the career investments, because there are broader societal 
benefits. Moreover, the scheme might be introduced as payroll taxes are 
eased through general revenue tax financing of the redistributive aspects 
of Social Security, or as unemployment declines so that unemployment 
insurance taxes fall. To soften the blow, state unemployment insurance 
debts to the federal trust fund might be forgiven, thus substituting 
training taxes for the increases in unemployment insurance taxes needed to 
pay back advances to states from the federal government. This is not to 
argue that it will ever be easy to sell new taxes and a new approach, and 
certainly not to suggest that it will be costless. The basic purpose of 
the career investment account is to assure increased training investments 
for persons who would otherwise be excluded. These extra resources could 
be provided exclusively from general revenues. The reason to favor payroll 
tax support for some of the costs is to provide incentives for the private 
sector to do more training itself and to get more involved with public 
efforts.
The idea of an expanded apprenticeship system, where employers 
articulate job requirements and the training needed to meet these require 
ments, thereby formalizing career entry ladders, has been much more widely 
accepted in other industrialized nations, particularly when they faced a 
shortage of entry workers as our nation will in the coming years. Our 
nation's apprenticeship system, with under 300,000 registered apprentices, 
covers a far smaller portion of total employment and far fewer occupations 
than the systems in most of the European nations. There are now no 
financial incentives for cooperation by employers. It is not unlikely, 
therefore, that the emerging shortage of entry workers, combined with 
financial incentives, will increase employer interest in the apprenticeship 
approach.
Debate over a career investment tax and a national apprenticeship 
system might be helpful as a way to demonstrate that supply side efforts, 
no matter how well designed, are limited unless the demand side is also 
leveraged. Training programs which concentrate on those who are least 
employable will not succeed in more than marginal reordering of positions 
at the end of the labor queue unless the unsubsidized sector—private, 
public and nonprofit—feels that it is in its best interest to train to 
meet needs rather than to hire already qualified or overly qualified 
workers, and unless employers consider it in their best interests to work 
with public institutions. The private sector must now be approached with 
subsidy bribes and appeals to corporate conscience in an effort to convince 
them that the workers provided through the employment and training system
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are as good as others even though they have "high risk" characteristics and 
would normally be shunned. All too often, employers turn away from these 
appeals by disparaging the training or the red tape that goes with the 
bribes, simply because they do not believe they have a risk-taking or 
training mission, and no need to accept one when there are plenty of 
low-risk applicants available. The threat of a tax might, in itself, 
generate more active efforts by the employer community. This was the case 
in Germany when a training tax was legislated but never implemented because 
employers voluntarily increased their involvement in the apprenticeship 
system. At the very least, public debate and private sector opposition 
would reveal the dearth of formal training in the private sector and would 
dispel the claim that vaguely defined "private sector alternatives" can 
replace public programs. If nothing else, it would force greater recogni 
tion of the fact that the disadvantaged, and the institutions that serve 




The appropriate short-term goals are much more straightforward and far 
less controversial. The weight of evidence documents the need for sig 
nificant reorientations of our nation's manpower programs and policies for 
persons of limited employability. Training deserves more emphasis, and 
subsidized jobs should be combined with and lead into remediation, serving 
as a mechanisn to identify those with potential for longer-term training. 
On-the-job training rules need to be changed to make the approach more 
marketable but also to facilitate OJT participation by the more disad- 
vantaged. The duration of training should be increased through the 
addition of a second tier of long-term training activities which provide 
the opportunities for "quantum leaps" in employment status. These second 
tier activities must be integrated with shorter-duration, first-tier work 
and training efforts which are now the primary focus of CEfA. Performance 
in these base level activities should be used to determine potential for 
advanced training so that the advanced opportunities encourage better 
performance. Placement must be emphasized, with greater concern for the 
career potential and training-relatedness of the jobs, particularly where 
more intensive investments are made in participants. Mechanisms must be 
developed to facilitate the movement of individuals from geographic areas 
of severe need to areas where employment and training opportunities are 
more promising. Finally, the training system must be stabilized, with 
increased focus on qualitative, rather than quantitative, dimensions, and 
with greater use of competency-based education, vocational training and 
employability skills development.
Such reorientations, while achievable with only modest legislative and 
administrative changes, would have far-reaching implications. They would 
make the employment and training system for the disadvantaged more like the 
mainstream preparatory institutions, with increased emphasis on individual 
performance standards and more sorting of the "winners" from the "losers." 
Income maintenance objectives would be downplayed, and incentives initiated 
to reward participant performance. More intensive assistance would mean 
that fewer individuals could be served. Priority would have to shift from 
the ameliorative, job creation oriented approach of current programs to a 
stable and continuing focus on structural problems. The issues raised by 
these changes cannot be resolved by facts and figures alone, but rest on 
normative and political judgments. Resolution will require continuing 
discussion. Yet the available evidence suggests the importance of main 
stream precepts, the problems of current income maintenance approaches; and 
the payoffs of greater resource concentration.
While decisions on next steps should certainly consider long-term 
goals, no consensus exists today, and, indeed, the public discussion has 
hardly begun. The only agreement seems to be on what not to do. The long 
standing ideal of a national manpower policy which would include both 
structural and countercyclical components has been undermined by the 
evidence of severe operational and political problems in rapid job 
creation, and, even more tellingly, by the evidence that job creation and 
meaningful training rarely go hand-in-hand. But a new consensus has not 
yet emerged, and options such as a comprehensive employability development
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system to assure basic skills for entrants into the adult work force, a 
Gl-bill voucher approach to assure equitable and effective career in 
vestments, a dramatic expansion of the apprenticeship system in order to 
better identify the competencies and training necessary for career entry, 
and tax incentives for the private sector to invest in training, have, to 
date, received little attention or analysis. Whether one agrees with the 
political feasibility of these notions or in the desirability of such 
comprehensive reform in human resource development approaches, however, 
these long-term proposals are reasonable navigational aids for next steps, 
suggesting the need to more equally distribute public human resource 
investments, to focus them more towards the end of the labor queue where 
the payoff will increase in the next two decades, to move from a separate 
needs-based delivery system to one integrated into the mainstream, to 
improve the career entry process so that there is less waste and greater 
equity, and to foster the involvement of the private sector.
The best means to achieve these ends are debatable. Judgments must be 
based on what we know from abstract analysis of impact patterns, benefit- 
cost computations and labor market theories, as well as from nuts and bolts 
assessments of decisionrnaking and delivery patterns. The following recom 
mendations, while necessarily judgmental, are strongly supported by both 
the theoretical and applied analyses. These steps would achieve the 
desired improvements in the current system, without major discontinuities 
or drastically expanded resource requirements, by modifying the service 
components, utilizing self-enforcing mechanisms and incentives to improve 
performance, expanding second-tier, longer-duration training activities 
locally, and gradually implementing an array of state and career training 
activities providing mobility options.
An Emphasis on Training
Training should be a mandated element of work experience activities. 
The 1978 requirement for training under Title IID public service employment 
was straightforward and resulted in increased use of PSE as a training 
vehicle. The regulations for work experience, career employment experience 
under youth programs and summer youth employment activities call for 
enrichment of work with education, training and transition services, but 
they do not set any targets. Whether structural PSE is restored, its 
set-aside approach for training should be adopted, and the training 
activities under work programs should be tracked in the management 
information system, as is now done in the case of PSE training. Hours of 
unstipended paper and pencil as well as computer-assisted instruction might 
be made a standard part of the workweek for in-school, summer, out-of- 
school youth and adult work experience programs. Another approach is to 
structure work projects as training. One tested model is the Ventures in 
Community Improvement program, which mounted large-scale, carefully 
organized restoration projects utilizing union supervisors, linkages to 
apprenticeship, measurements of competency acquisition, graduated work 
tasks, and performance requirements for participants so that work and 
training were synonymous. Similar work projects might be structured to 
provide training in other occupations.
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On-the-job training regulations should be modified to provide for a 
"try-out" employment approach. Currently, an employer under OJT must hire 
an individual without being able to discern whether the person can be 
trained to meet requirements. In other words, the subsidy must cover the 
training costs and lower productivity, but also the hiring risks. As a 
result, employers are reluctant to participate in OJT unless provided 
workers with previous experience in the same fields or those who are good 
bets. An alternative would be to allow a three-month or six-month "try- 
out" period, during which the CETA prime sponsor would pay allowances to 
the trainee placed in the private sector. At the end of this "try-out," 
the employer would make a hiring decision. Based on the participant's 
remaining deficits at the end of the try-out, an "OJT-extended" contract 
could be negotiated to cover any further training. Alternatively, the 
employer might be eligible for the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit at this point 
(assuming it remains in effect), after certification that such an incentive 
would be warranted. This try-out approach would be attractive to employers 
because they could size up the participant before a permanent hiring 
decision. But it would also allow the prime sponsor to better judge the 
ability of the individual to perform the specific job and to determine 
training needs. Individuals participating in the "try-out" phase could be 
offered remedial services and assistance. It would be possible to take 
somewhat greater risks, i.e., matching more disadvantaged individuals with 
any given job. Few really disadvantaged would be productive during a short 
training period, so that there would not be a windfall to employers.
OJT is allowable but rarely used in the public and nonprofit sectors 
because of the availability of PSE and work experience subsidies covering 
the full costs of hiring. Given the evidence that PSE or work experience 
increase post-program earnings primarily when they function as try-out 
mechanisms in the public sector, it would be useful to formalize this 
dimension, permitting try-out employment for unsubsidized jobs in the 
public and nonprofit sectors under the same rules as in the private sector. 
If a tax credit were provided for subsequent training to the private sector 
employer, a similar payment might be made to the nonprofit or public agency 
to encourage permanent hiring, or else an extended OJT contract could be 
negotiated. As in the private sector, this would permit employers with 
"real" jobs to take a risk on individuals more disadvantaged than those 
usually hired. This approach could also be usefully linked to counter 
cyclical revenue sharing rather than mounting a separate CETA job creation 
effort when stimulus is next needed.
Adding Second-Tier Opportunities
New classifications for local training activities should be es 
tablished in the federal regulations and the management information system 
so that long-duration training can be identified, properly budgeted, and 
emphasized. It is necessary to clearly define and accurately measure an 
activity before it can be encouraged, and there is no recording of length 
of training in local programs. A quite simple approach is to divide what 
is now labeled as "classroom training" into more refined categories. 
"Career Training" would be primarily occupational in focus, with a planned 
duration of at least 1000 hours. "Career Preparation" would be primarily 
educational in focus, and also planned to last over 1000 hours. "Entry
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Training" would be primarily occupational, and "Basic Skills" primarily 
educational, with both planned to last less than 1000 hours. Expenditure, 
outcome, and participant data would all be divided according to these cate 
gories. Likewise, plans and goals would be identified separately for these 
activities.
Minimum requirements could, then, be established for local Career 
Training, Career Preparation, and On-the-Job (Try-out and Extended) 
Training. In the review and approval process for local plans, there might 
be targets for these activities developed either by regression analysis of 
prime sponsor data in order to allow for participant mix and local economic 
variation or by averaging the level for all prime sponsors and using this 
as a guideline. Another approach would be to legislate a set-aside out of 
the funds provided by formula so that this proportion could only be used 
for these longer career training interventions. If the set-aside were not 
spent locally, the resources would be part of the reallocations used for 
state-level programs or nationally-directed Career Training and Career 
Preparation activities.
State supplemental vocational education set-asides should be reserved 
for Career Training and Preparation activities, i.e., long-term training 
and remediation expected to significantly and permanently improve em- 
pi oyability. Prime sponsors would compete for these state funds to provide 
training to local residents, perhaps matching from their formula allo 
cations. The state could establish its own programs to serve residents of 
balance-of-state areas and of local jurisdictions unable to mount ac 
ceptable programs, or else it would buy slots from the prime sponsors with 
exemplary programs and arrange for the mobility and residential support. 
The result would be an in-state program, very much like STIP, but with 
mobility features. The projects would be funded on a two-year cycle. Such 
activities would have first priority in any reallocation of resources 
provided by formula to prime sponsors within the state.
Advanced Career Training programs in Job Corps should be expanded and 
diversified. For each general occupational area of training in Job Corps, 
there should be at least one advanced training component which would draw 
from centers throughout the nation those trainees who wanted to continue 
their career preparation and had demonstrated the capacity and maturity. 
These advanced courses would focus on expanding career areas in each 
occupation. The Job Corps post-secondary and college program should also 
be continued, and its opportunities more equitably distributed rather than 
drawing disproportionately from a few centers. A reasonable target would 
be to expand advanced training options to one-third of slots in Job Corps 
which, because of their much longer duration of stay, would serve about 
one-fifth of participants.
Corporate Career training programs of up to two years duration would 
be implemented under national direction to provide intensive, fully- 
subsidized, classroom instruction and internships in programs operated or 
directed by corporations and employer associations guaranteeing unsub- 
sidized employment in jobs with career potential for all those completing 
the training. The participants would be carefully screened from local CETA 
programs to identify those who could make it with assistance but who would 
have little chance without it. The opportunities would be restricted to
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persons from disadvantaged backgrounds (not just those eligible in the six 
months before application) who had proved themselves in education and 
training activities. The occupations of training would have a minimum 
annual starting salary of half the mean earnings of year-round, full-time 
male workers (the equivalent of roughly $10,000 in 1980). The jobs would 
have to have documented career progressions beyond the entry level. The 
institutional training would be in established corporate or association 
facilities, or in programs established jointly with public institutions. 
The internships would be provided by the sponsoring corporation or 
association members, and would be carefully integrated with the classroom 
instruction.
It is recognized that only a limited number of large corporations or 
associations have established training centers or would be willing to 
create such centers, and not all of these would be willing to guarantee 
career entry jobs for disadvantaged participants even if they could assure 
the quality of training and even if the costs would be fully covered. The 
programs would have to be developed on a case-by-case basis with the aim of 
building up gradually to and then maintaining a permanent capacity. The 
goal would be to provide, on a continuing basis, roughly 10,000 career 
entry opportunities annually.
Forging the Elements Into a System
Work experience is, according to present regulations, restricted to 
persons with no previous experience, those reentering the labor force or 
those in special need of a supportive work environment. A periodic review 
of status is required in order to encourage the transfer of participants 
into other activities or private sector employment as rapidly as possible. 
This does not usually occur. Average stay in work experience was slightly 
longer in 1980 than in 1976. 26/ The sequencing of activities, i.e., work 
followed by OJT or classroom training, is all too infrequent. The most 
straightforward approach would be to limit the work experience for any 
individual to 500 hours, or roughly three months of full-time employment, 
two years of summer employment, or one year of summer and part-time school 
year employment. Job search assistance would be required for all par 
ticipants at the end of this period. Successful completers of work 
experience who had participated effectively in job search assistance, but 
were unable to find unsubsidized employment, would be given priority in 
local training activities.
Income maintenance and wage policies should be designed to encourage 
entry into unsubsidized employment and successful performance in employment 
and training activities. Particularly in the summer youth employment 
program, compensation should be reduced. The aim should be to serve those 
young people who have no other options and to provide them a first ex 
perience so that they can find unsubsidized jobs. There is no doubt that 
the program now serves a disadvantaged group, but it probably draws from 
the front of the queue among those eligible and does not encourage tran 
sition because the minimum wage is higher than what most could earn in the 
private sector (three-fifths of 14- and 15-year-olds who worked in the 
private sector earned less than the minimum wage in 1979, while partici 
pants this age—representing 45 percent of summer enrollments--were all
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paid the minimum wage). 27'/ It is no wonder that teenagers are anxious to 
come back one summer after another. Perhaps the easiest approach, as 
suggested previously, is to require summer enrol lees to spend a day a week 
or the equivalent in mandatory but unstipended instruction, and the re 
mainder of time in minimum wage work. Incentive payments might be used for 
those achieving milestones in the instructional program. This would avoid 
confrontation over the subminimum wage issue by providing the minimum 
during work hours but a lower hourly reimbursement for the full period of 
participation. This same approach could be used for in-school work ex 
perience.
The allowance under local training programs should be reconstituted 
into three components providing for maintenance, participation expenses, 
and performance incentives. The maintenance allowances would cover the 
poverty deficits, i.e., the differences between family income (including 
the cash value of food stamps) and the higher of the poverty level or 70 
percent of the lower living standard, not to exceed the hours of partici 
pation multiplied by the minimum wage. Participation expenses would be 
determined on an individual basis to reimburse demonstrable expenses. 
Performance incentives would be designed locally and might reward length of 
stay, completion, and self-placement. These incentives would be limited to 
one-fourth the hours of participation times the minimum wage. A best guess 
is that the substitution of this allowance approach for current policies 
would reduce the average costs of local classroom training by 10 to 15 
percent.
OJT opportunities should be targeted primarily for successful par 
ticipants in other components. First priority in assignment should be 
given to successful completers of local Career Training and Career 
Preparation to assure a payoff from this large investment. The assignments 
should be commensurate with the vocational skills which have been learned 
and the competencies which have been attained. Second priority in assign 
ment would be given to successful participants in shorter-term training, 
work experience, and other local activities.
Prime sponsors should be utilized as recruiting, referral, and place 
ment agents for Job Corps. Each could be provided a quota of Job Corps 
opportunities and could receive credit for referral into Job Corps, but 
would also have the responsibility for placing residents upon their return. 
Job Corps would have an advance warning system to notify prime sponsors 
instantaneously in the case of early termination and prior to planned 
graduation for completers. In case of relocation to another area, place 
ment would be the responsibility of the recipient prime sponsor, with 
reimbursement by Job Corps, unless Job Corps contracted with a union or 
other placement agent. Job Corps would, thus, be integrated with the 
comprehensive local systems even though managed at the federal level.
Advanced Career Training (ACT) in Job Corps, Corporate Career and 
state-directed Career Training and Preparation programs must also be 
integrated with first-tier activities. Each entrant into Job Corps is now 
provided a catalogue of centers which includes a description of the entry 
training available at each. When a full portfolio of ACT offerings are 
developed, these should also be presented in a catalogue specifying the 
entry requirements and probabilities for each offering and detailing the
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expected performance in and outcomes from training. Presentation of these 
options should be a required element of entry orientation and of counseling 
upon completion of basic reading and mathematics or entry vocational 
training in local programs.
Each prime sponsor should be provided an allocation of opportunities 
for state-directed advanced training programs and nationally-funded 
Corporate Career slots. In each case, the entry and training requirements 
would be specified in detail. The prime sponsors would, then, identify 
local participants willing and able to leave to complete advanced training. 
This catalogue approach and allocation of slots according to need would 
assure all individuals an equal chance at "quantum leap" opportunities.
With the shrinking size of CETA, it makes sense to consolidate local 
programs. The preferred approach is a bifurcated system with a set of 
youth developmental activities preparing young people up to the point of 
readiness for career training or entry, and an adult system which provides 
the career training and career entry activities. This was the approach 
recommended in the proposed Youth Act of 1980 and it makes a good deal of 
sense. For most youth, teen problems do not presage permanent diffi 
culties. Teenagers gradually increase work activities, gaining the 
experience and competencies for career entry, so that unemployment rates 
fall rapidly by their early 20s. However, the teen problems would be 
reduced, and the career chances improved, if transitional assistance were 
available to better guide the process. The disadvantaged and minorities do 
not have the same opportunities and their progress towards career entry 
lags. They need first work experiences, a helping hand along the way, and 
exposure to career options—in other words, short-term assistance sequenced 
over these difficult years—if they are to enter the career job market 
without handicaps. Intensive remediation or training in a single episode 
is not appropriate until the youth has some maturity, commitment, and sense 
of direction. Thus, the proposals for the Youth Act included a detailed 
system for benchmarking competency development and maturation, and for 
arranging a sequence of short-duration services over the teen years as 
determined by individual needs and patterns of development. This youth 
system would use experiences in summer and in-school work programs, among 
other things, to make a determination of the readiness for career entry and 
career training. The youth developmental system would, thus, serve as a 
feeder into the adult, career-oriented system.
Limited services such as job search assistance, testing and guidance, 
basic life skills training, and remedial education should be used to 
identify those in need of more help, rather than operating in many cases as 
separate treatments. These services, if unstipended, all have low costs 
and might be expanded even with current budget stringencies. Inexpensive 
minicomputer terminal networks or microcomputers can be used to deliver 
short-duration assessment, world-of-work instruction, occupational 
information and remedial education to anyone who needs such services. The 
networks and terminals are a way to link with all delivery agencies, 
particularly the schools. Job search assistance, in-school employability 
services delivered by specially-created nonprofit intermediaries, and 
pre-employment services for out-of-school youth and adults, have proved 
effective in diverting individuals from the use of intensive training that 
is not needed or for which they are not ready. Significantly expanded and
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formalized transition services should be offered without eligibility 
requirements other than the need for and interest in help, and should 
identify those who need more assistance so that they can be channeled into 
first-tier activities in either the youth or adult systems.
Increasing Placement Results
A crucial element of the "try-out" OJT approach would be a "rule- 
of-two"--n_o position could be refilled more than twice without a permanent 
hire. This would encourage placement and would be a self-enforcing 
mechanism. If individuals were assigned to menial jobs lacking oppor 
tunity, they would be likely to terminate without placement and the 
positions could not, then, be refilled. There would be iteration towards a 
portfolio of try-out assignments attractive to participants. On the other 
hand, the employers could not "try out" endless numbers of participants 
simply to secure subsidized employees. Such a protective mechanism is 
particularly important if the try-out approach is used in the public and 
nonprofit sectors, where work experience slots have often been used over 
and over without a transition into permanent employment.
To further encourage placement, employers making a permanent hire 
would be eligible for extended OJT negotiated at the end of the try-out 
period based on an assessment of the individual's performance and remaining 
deficits. It would also be useful to continue a variation of the Targeted 
Jobs Tax Credit, but this should be restricted to employers hiring com- 
pleters of Career Training, Career Preparation, Job Corps or Try-Out OJT, 
and should be based on a determination by the prime sponsor that the 
employer is taking an extra risk or will incur extra training costs in 
hiring the participant.
Under the second-tier efforts—Corporate Career, Career Training and 
Career Preparation activities, and Job Corps Advanced Career Training- 
there would be self-enforcing mechanisms to assure training-related place 
ments for all completers. The Corporate Career program would involve a 
guarantee from the sponsoring corporations or employer associations that 
everyone successfully finishing the fully subsidized period of classroom 
training and internship would be provided a training-related job by the 
corporation or association at a guaranteed minimum salary level. For state 
and local Career Training and Preparation, there would be a requirement for 
the placement of three of four completers in jobs utilizing the acquired 
skills or competencies before a new contract or new class could be 
initiated. This requirement, combined with the priority under try-out OJT 
given to completers of such long-term training and preparation, would 
encourage placement efforts prior to the completion of training. In Job 
Corps, the operators of Advanced Career Training would be responsible for 
placement activities. The placement of three in four completers in 
training-related jobs would also be required. The tax credit and try-out 
OJT approaches would be authorized also for these completers.
To assure placement from first-tier activities, the performance system 
would emphasize unsubsidized placement above all other goals. Placements, 
thus, need to be recorded by activity, with further designation as to 
whether they are training- or work experience-related. The local allo-
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cation formula might be modified to provide 10 percent added funds to prime 
sponsors exceeding their expected (based on regression analysis) placement 
rate. Lowest performers would be precluded from competing for state Career 
Training and Career Preparation grants (although residents would still be 
served in programs operated by the state or in other jurisdictions funded 
by the states, as well as in national advanced training programs).
For school-age teenagers, placement is not usually an appropriate 
outcome. If youth who are not yet ready for the full-time labor market are 
included in the data system, they will obscure the placement results and 
reduce the possible leverage of performance monitoring efforts and in 
centives. Alternatively, pressure for placement might result in fewer 
teenagers being served. The bifurcation of local delivery systems into a 
youth developmental system and an adult career entry and training system 
would solve this problem. The "sticks and carrots" for placement would 
primarily be applied to the career system, whereas the youth activities 
would emphasize the development over time of the basic competencies needed 
before entry into the full-time labor market. If the bifurcated approach 
is not adopted, youth for whom placement is not an expected or desired 
outcome should be designated in a special category so that they are not 
included in the calculation of the placement rate.
Job search assistance should be an exit service in all components. 
The evidence indicates that the employment rates of both youth and adults 
can be increased by job-finding help. A strong argument can also be made 
for bonus payments to participants who secure their own jobs and stay in 
them for some period, say three months. The incentive component of the 
reconstituted allowance formula could be used to provide such bonuses.
Mobility Options
The Career Training and Career Preparation activities funded with 
state vocational education resources would provide for mobility. The 
grants would be competitively distributed, but the opportunities for 
participation would be allocated according to need. Thus, prime sponsors 
without local Career Training and Preparation activities, as well as the 
balance-of-state areas, would be allocated a number of slots in the 
state-operated programs or in the state-funded activities of other prime 
sponsors. The advanced programs would include funds for mobility and 
residential support. The first priority for formula allocated resources 
not spent by prime sponsors within a given state would be the expansion of 
advanced opportunities so that individuals from these underspending areas 
could be provided Career Training and Preparation elsewhere. Since these 
advanced components would serve only a minority of all participants, and 
since most jurisdictions would be able to mount at least some local ac 
tivities, the mobility arrangements would be required for only a small 
portion of total participants in the training system and should be 
feasible.
For the nationally-directed Corporate Career program, Job Corps might 
serve as the administrative mechanism, since its authorization provides the 
needed flexibility, mobility, and national focus. The age limitation would 
have to be waived for older participants, although the most appropriate
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target group may well be young adults. The training activities themselves 
would be managed with minimum red-tape by each participating corporation or 
association. A private sector Job Corps contractor(s) could serve as the 
intermediary management agent for the program, i.e., working to identify 
and screen local candidates for the opportunities, registering and keeping 
track of them during participation, and arranging for mobility and 
residential support. The contractor might also have responsibility for 
identifying and developing Corporate Career opportunities. Thus, the 
private sector would be dealing with a compatible intermediary rather than 
a government bureaucracy.
The retrenchment of Trade Adjustment Assistance activities makes it 
even more critical that relocation and retraining be integrated into 
regular CETA activities. Yet a stable, structurally-oriented, localized 
system cannot deal well with mass layoffs, particularly when there is no 
advanced warning. Retraining and relocation, which are probably the best 
options for those who do not have a good chance of recall, are rarely 
utilized because local training facilities are focused on local jobs, there 
is limited knowledge of opportunities available elsewhere, and no help in 
arranging for mobility. Therefore, a national intermediary or several 
intermediaries should be supported under the direction of the Department of 
Labor to provide assistance to workers, firms and communities where mass 
layoffs occur. The intermediary would, as early as possible after the 
announcement of the layoff and upon the request of the local prime sponsor, 
provide on-site employability and skills transferability assessments for 
the laid-off workers. It would have pre-packaged job search assistance 
materials as well as providing funds to initiate training. A full-time 
unit of the intermediary would conduct job development in areas and in 
dustries where transferability would be feasible, thus establishing a 
relocation job bank. Based on individual assessments of workers, the unit 
would make travel and job interview arrangements, would pre-screen for the 
employer and would seek to move groups of employees and their families if 
possible. If training were needed, this could be financed in the original 
community or in the relocation destination. Prime sponsors in the source 
and recipient areas would register the trainees, with reimbursement from 
national discretionary funds or reallocated funds. Alternatively, the 
resources currently authorized for Title 11C upgrading and retaining, which 
have not been utilized by most prime sponsors, could be reserved for such 
purposes rather than allocated by formula, so that resources could be 
provided instantaneously where needed most.
There are several organizational alternatives for intermediaries. 
Existing groups might be utilized, such as the Manpower Demonstration 
Research Corporation or Public/Private Ventures which operated supported 
work and VICI respectively. National community-based organizations could 
coordinate such efforts through their local chapters. Private for-profits 
could serve this function as they do under Job Corps management contracts.
Quality and Stability
These next steps constitute yet another restructuring of employment 
and training activities. If they are to be achieved without rupturing the 
current system—which is providing training that on average is effective,
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and in some cases is exemplary--there is a need to lighten the adminis 
trative burdens and to remove many of the extraneous requirements. With 
the use of self-enforcing mechanisms such as the rule-of-two under try-out 
OJT, the 500-hour limitation for work experience, the three-in-four 
placement requirement for long-term training approaches, priority for 
training completers in try-out OJT, and set-asides for the advanced 
components with automatic allocation to state and national mobility 
programs in the case of underspending locally, there is less need for 
detailed plans and process-oriented regulations. "Occam's Razor" should be 
used to eliminate the ever increasing complexities of the legislation and 
regulations. Perhaps a good place to start is in the planning requirements 
for CETA, given the evidence that there is very little relationship between 
types of participants, area conditions, treatment strategies or outcomes 
despite the mandated planning process. Quarterly reporting and review by 
the federal government is not necessary and should be ended, substituting 
an end-of-the-year report that includes monthly enrollment, spending and 
outcomes by major category of activity. Another useful change would be to 
provide two year funding for CETA. At the very least, changes are needed 
in administrative rules regarding real location so that two-year contracting 
can be undertaken for Career Training and Career Preparation activities. 
The allocation formula should be based on hardship factors rather than 
unemployment, and the allocation share might be revised every two years 
rather than annually.
The Department of Labor should adopt and require uniform, multi-level 
competency standards for the major areas of academic, basic life skills, 
and occupational training. After review of the best curricula and 
materials, it should select those most appropriate for CETA client groups, 
reference them to the competency standards, and provide them to local de 
livery agents upon request. For instance, the Job Corps reading and 
mathematics diagnostic and achievement measurement systems might be stand 
ardized for all CETA reading and mathematics programs, and all the 
materials which have been referenced to these systems could be catalogued, 
purchased in quantity to save costs, and provided to prime sponsors to be 
used by their subagents. Likewise, for each occupational area, there would 
be a ladder of skills and knowledge. The achievement of each step could be 
tested or judged by successful performance of specific tasks. The 
competency ladder would be established in consultation with employers and 
unions and in cooperation with the Bureau of Adult and Occupational 
Education in the Department of Education and the Bureau of Apprenticeship 
and Training in the Department of Labor. Once established, all available 
curricula from private sources as well as those developed with public 
support could be screened, and referenced to each of the competency di 
mensions and levels. Those in the public domain could be provided for 
local use, and the best of the private materials could be recommended and 
purchased in quantity to be supplied on request. State and local prime 
sponsors could, and would be encouraged to, develop their own curricula for 
education, vocational training and basic life skills instruction, but would 
have to reference them to the standardized diagnostic and achievement 
measurement systems, and would provide them to the Department of Labor so 
that they could be shared with other prime sponsors. States and localities 
would establish completion standards for specific components and per 
formance levels required for advanced opportunities; these standards would 
be referenced to the standardized diagnostic and achievement measurement
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systems, just as states now set varying requirements for the GED by 
reference to nationally-standardized competency tests. Thus, local 
decisionmakers would have flexibility to choose among a comprehensive array 
of materials, to set standards for each component at any level along the 
skills measurement hierarchies, and to develop their own materials. Yet 
they would have the advantage of less expensive acquisition, savings in 
materials and screening costs, and greater transferability of model 
curricula.
An institutional performance review and improvement plan should occur 
every two years (just as colleges are reviewed for accreditation on a 
regular basis). This top-to-bottom on-site assessment approach, combined 
with an analysis of performance data, is used in Job Corps. Each center 
also has formal improvement plans for the use of federal capital funds, 
curriculum changes, and Corpsmember projects. The approach would simply be 
extended to prime sponsors (and to the Corporate Career projects). Federal 
teams or contractors could conduct assessments of each discrete activity 
locally. They would identify where minimum standards were not met and 
improvements could be made. Developmental plans prepared by each locality 
would outline the steps to improve local training capacities. The time 
saved by federal personnel in reviewing current quantitatively-oriented 
plans, quarterly reports and grant modifications would be used in the field 
to review local institutions. Local institutional assessments might also 
be conducted by citizen's review teams,of employers, educators, vocational 
educators and community representatives.
The propitious coincidence of the reauthorization of vocational 
education and CETA might be used to realign the decisionmaking structures 
from the state level down, particularly if federal contributions to 
secondary vocational eduation are reduced, leaving primary emphasis on the 
post-secondary level. The states could be given the authority to designate 
area "Career Investment Broken'ng Agencies" or CIBAs subject to federal 
guidelines, with the proviso that jurisdictions of more than 200,000 
population would automatically qualify. These CIBAs would have planning 
and decisionmaking authority for both federal vocational education and CETA 
funds, subject, of course, to state and federal policies. Interagency 
committees might be mandated at the federal and state levels to standardize 
the management information and follow-up requirements for vocational 
education and CETA, as well as to develop the standards for competency 
assessment and curricula. If this step were taken, the federal/state 
Employment Service and the WIN program should be consolidated into this 
structure.
These legislative and administative actions, by themselves, will not 
produce instant or dramatic improvements in employment and training ac 
tivities. In fact, it is of utmost importance that they be implemented in 
a measured fashion. As the Job Corps experience demonstrated so vividly in 
the 1960s, intensive and complex training programs cannot be established 
overnight. Even more critically, it will take time and a constant effort 
to alter behavior and thought processes in the CETA system so that it is 
reoriented to accept some unfamiliar concepts such as sorting, long-term 
treatment, and a focus on careers rather than just jobs. A substantial 
output of long-term trainees would not be expected until the last half of 
the decade even if rapid implementation followed a 1982 reauthorization.
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Yet this is also when we can expect both improved economic conditions and 
declining numbers of labor force entrants. What is needed is to set the 
course properly and to proceed without the constant policy changes which 
have characterized employment and training efforts of the last two decades.
The sagging productivity of the 1970s, and the decline of our economic 
growth relative to other developed nations, taught us the dangers of 
short-term perspectives, inadequate and erratic investment in capital and 
equipment, and wasteful use of scarce natural resources. The lessons are 
equally applicable to human resources. The future of the economy and the 
social fabric depends in great measure on our willingness to initiate, and 
to follow-through with consistency, policies which will develop the skills 
of those who have traditionally been discarded and ignored, but who will be 
needed more in the next decade.
At least on this one issue, the prescriptions to achieve equity and 
efficiency are coincident. Those who preach the supply-side Gospel, as 
well as those concerned with mitigating the inequalities which have proved 
resistant to short-duration interventions, should be able to find common 
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